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
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THE

DIVINE LEGATION

OF

MOSES

DEMONSTRATED.

IN NINE BOOKS.

The FIFTH EDITION, Corrected and Enlarged.

BY

WILLIAM, Warburton Lord Biſhop of GLOUCESTER.

ΑΠΟΚΑΛΥΨΟΝ ΤΟΥΣ ΟΦΘΑΛΜΟΥΣ ΜΟΥ
ΚΑΙ
ΚΑΤΑΝΟΗΣΩ ΤΑ ΘΑΥΜΑΣΙΑ ΕΚ ΤΟΥ ΝΟΜΟΥ ΣΟΥ.
PSAL.

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TO

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE

PHILIP,

EARL of HARDWICKE,

LORD HIGH CHANCELLOR

OF

GREAT BRITAIN.

MY LORD,

YOUR Lordſhip having ſo far approved of the good intentions of my endeavours for above twenty years

 paſt,

paſt, in the cauſe of RELIGION, as to confer upon me a diſtinguiſhing mark of your favour, I am proud to lay hold of the firſt public opportunity which I have had, of deſiring leave to make my moſt grateful acknowledgments.

I take the liberty to inſcribe to your Lordſhip a new Edition of a Work tending to ſhew and illuſtrate, by a new Argument, the *Divine Legation of Moſes*; which in our own, as well as former times, the moſt celebrated Champions of Infidelity have cunningly, for their own purpoſes, laboured with all their might, to overthrow.

If I have ſucceeded, or as far as I have ſucceeded, or may hereafter ſucceed, in the further proſecution of this attempt, I ſhall ſtrengthen one foundation of Chriſtianity.

As an Author, I am not ſollicitous for the reputation of any literary performance.

formance. A work given to the World, every reader has a right to cenſure. If it has merit, it will go down to poſterity: If it has none, the ſooner it dies and is forgot the better.

But I am extremely anxious that no good man ſhould miſtake the view with which I write; and therefore cannot help feeling, perhaps too ſenſibly, when it is miſrepreſented.

So far as any cenſure can ſhew that my poor labours are not calculated to promote *Letters* or *Learning*, to advance *Truth*, or, above all, to ſerve the Cauſe of *Religion*, which I profeſs as a Chriſtian and a Member of the Church of *England*, I own, I have miſſed my end; and will be the firſt to join with the cenſure which condemns them.

In the mean time, the firſt Book of this Work, ſuch as it is, is here humbly commended to your Lordſhip's protection.

tection. For to whom does it ſo properly belong to patronize an Argument ſhewing the UTILITY of Religion to Society, as to that great Magiſtrate, Legiſlator, and Stateſman, who is beſt able to recommend and apply the Subject, by his being convinced of the TRUTH of Religion; and by his giving the moſt exemplary proof of his belief, in a ſteddy regard to it's dictates in his life and actions.

It is this which makes me preſume on your Lordſhip's protection, not any thing extraordinary in the Work itſelf. It is enough for your Lordſhip to find in thoſe you favour a real zeal for the intereſts of Virtue and Religion. The effectual ſervice of thoſe intereſts depends on ſo many accidents, reſpecting both the ability of the Writer and the diſpoſition of the Reader, that your Lordſhip's humanity and candour, inlarged, and not (as it often happens) dimi-

diminiſhed, by your great knowledge of Mankind, will always diſpoſe You to eſtimate merit by a better rule than the Succeſs.

I am,

MY LORD,

With the utmoſt Gratitude,

Your Lordſhip's moſt obliged,

and devoted Servant,

London, Nov. 5, 1754.

W. WARBURTON.

TO THE FREE-THINKERS.

GENTLEMEN,

AS the following diſcourſe was written for your uſe, you have the beſt right to this addreſs. I could never approve the cuſtom of dedicating books to men, whoſe profeſſions made them ſtrangers to the ſubject. A diſcourſe on the Ten Predicaments, to a leader of armies, or a ſyſtem of caſuiſtry to a miniſter of ſtate, always appeared to me a high abſurdity.

Another advantage I have in this addreſs, is that I ſhall not lie under any temptations of flattery; which, at this time of day, when every topic of adulation has been exhauſted, will be of equal eaſe and advantage to us both.

Not but I muſt own you have been managed, even by ſome of our Order, with very ſingular complaiſance. Whether it was that they affected the fame of moderation, or had a higher ambition for the honour of your good word, I know not; but I, who neither love your cauſe, nor fear the abilities that ſupport

it, while I preſerve for your perſons that juſtice and charity which my profeſſion teaches to be due to all, can never be brought to think otherwiſe of your character, than as the deſpiſers of the Maſter whom I ſerve, and as the implacable enemies of that Order, to which I have the honour to belong And as ſuch, I ſhould be tempted to glory in your cenſures; but would certainly refuſe your commendations.

Indeed, were it my deſign, in the manner of modern dedicators, to look out for powerful protectors, I do not know where I could ſooner find them, than amongſt the gentlemen of your denomination: for nothing, I believe, ſtrikes the ſerious obſerver with more ſurprize, in this age of novelties, than that ſtrange propenſity to infidelity, ſo viſible in men of almoſt every condition; amongſt whom the advocates of Deiſm are received with all the applauſes due to the inventors of the arts of life, or the deliverers of oppreſſed and injured nations. The *glorious liberty of the Goſpel* is forgotten amidſt our clamours againſt church-tyranny; and we ſlight the fruits of the reſtored *Tree of Knowledge*, for the ſake of gathering a few barren leaves of Free-thinking, miſgrafted on the old prolific ſtock of Deiſm.

But

But let me not be miſunderſtood; here are no inſinuations intended againſt Liberty: for, ſurely, whatever be the cauſe of this epidemic folly, it would be unjuſt to aſcribe it to the freedom of the Preſs, which wiſe men have ever held one of the moſt precious branches of national Liberty. What, though it midwifes, as it were, theſe brain-ſick births; yet, at the ſame time that it facilitates the delivery, it lends a forming hand to the miſhapen iſſue: for, as in natural bodies, become diſtorted by ſuffering in the conception, or by too ſtrait impriſonment in the womb, a free unreſtrained expoſition of the parts may, in time, reduce them nearer to their natural rectitude; ſo crude and rickety notions, enfeebled by reſtraint, when permitted to be drawn out and examined, may, by the reform of their obliquities, and the correction of their virulency, at length acquire health and proportion.

Nor leſs friendly is this liberty to the generous advocate of religion: for how could ſuch a one, when in earneſt convinced by the evidence of his cauſe, deſire an adverſary whom the laws had before diſarmed; or value a victory, where the Magiſtrate muſt triumph with him? Even I, the meaneſt in this controverſy, ſhould have been aſhamed of projecting the defence of the great jewiſh Lawgiver,

did not I know that the ſame liberty of thinking was impartially indulged to all. And if my diſſenting in the courſe of this defence, from ſome received opinions need an apology, I deſire it may be thought, that I ventured into this tract the leſs unwillingly, to ſhew, by my not intrenching in authorized ſpeculations, that I put myſelf upon the ſame footing with you, and would claim no privilege that was not in common.

This liberty then may you long poſſeſs; may you know how to uſe; may you gratefully acknowledge! I ſay this, becauſe one cannot, without indignation, obſerve, that amidſt the full poſſeſſion of it, you ſtill continue, with the meaneſt affectation, to fill your prefaces with repeated clamours againſt the difficulties and diſcouragements attending the exerciſe of Free-thinking: and, in a peculiar ſtrain of modeſty and reaſoning, employ this very liberty to perſuade the world you ſtill want it. In extolling liberty, we can join with you; in the vanity of pretending to have contributed moſt to its eſtabliſhment, we can bear with you; but in the low cunning of pretending ſtill to groan under the want of it, we can neither join nor bear with you. There was indeed a time, and that within our own memories, when ſuch complaints were

ſeaſonable

ſeaſonable and even uſeful; but, happy for you, Gentlemen, you have out-lived it: all the reſt is merely ſir Martin [a]; it is continuing to fumble on the lute, though the muſic has been long over. For it is not a thing to be diſguiſed, that what we hear from you, on this head, is but an aukward, though envenomed imitation of an original work of one, whoever he was, who appears to have been amongſt the greateſt, and moſt ſucceſsful of your adverſaries. It was publiſhed at an important juncture, under the title of *The difficulties and diſcouragements which attend the ſtudy of the Scripture*. But with all the merit of this beautiful ſatire, it has been its fortune not only to be abuſed by your bad imitations, but to be cenſured by thoſe in whoſe cauſe it was compoſed; I mean the friends of religion and liberty. An author of note thus expreſſes himſelf: [b] "Nor was this the worſt: "men were not only diſcouraged from ſtudy- "ing and revering the Scriptures by—but alſo "by being told that this ſtudy was difficult, "fruitleſs, and dangerous; and a public, an "elaborate, an earneſt diſſuaſive from this "ſtudy, for the very reaſons now mentioned, "enforced by two well known examples,

[a] In a comedy of *Dryden's*.

[b] *Revelation examined with candour*, in the preface.

land believed from a perſon of great eminence in the church, hath already paſſed often enough through the preſs, to reach the hands of all the clergymen in Great-Britain and Ireland: God in his great mercy forgive the author*." Seriouſly it is a ſad caſe! that one well-meaning man ſhould ſo widely miſtake the end and deſign of another, as not to ſee by the turn and caſt of the *Difficulties and diſcouragements*, that it is a thorough irony, addreſſed to ſome hot bigots then in power, to ſhew them what diſmal effects that inquiſitional ſpirit, with which they were poſſeſſed, would have on literature in general, at a time when public liberty looked with a very ſickly face! Not, I ſay, to ſee this, but to believe, on the contrary, that it was really intended as *a public, an elaborate, an earneſt diſſuaſive from the ſtudy of the Scriptures!* But I have ſo charitable an opinion of the great author, for a great author without doubt he was, as to believe that had he foreſeen that the liberty, which animates this fine turned piece of raillery, would have given ſcandal to any good man, he would, for the conſolation of ſuch have made any reaſonable abatement in the vigour of his wit and argument.

* The author was the excellent Dr. *Hare*, late Biſhop of *Chicheſter*.

But you, Gentlemen, have a different quarrel with him: you pretend he hath ſince written on the other ſide the queſtion. Now though the word of his accuſers is not apt to go very far with me, yet, I muſt own, I could be eaſily enough brought to believe, that an author of ſuch talents of literature, love of truth, and of his country, as this appears to have been, would as freely expoſe the extreme of folly at one end, as at the other; without regarding what party he oppoſed or favoured by it. And it is well known, that, at the time this is pretended to have been done, another intereſt being become uppermoſt, ſtrange principles of licence, which tended to ſubvert all order, and deſtroy the very eſſence of a Church, ran now in the popular ſtream. What then ſhould hinder a writer, who was of no party but that of truth, to oppoſe this extravagance, as he had done its oppoſite? And if he pleaſed neither bigot nor libertine by his uniformity of conduct, it was for his honour.

How public a bleſſing is ſuch a virtue! which, unawed by that *fatal enemy of ſenſe*, as the poet calls it, the *danger of offending*, dares equally oppoſe itſelf to the different follies of Party in extremes.

But to return to our ſubject: The poor thread-bare cant of *want of liberty*, I ſhould

hope then you would be, at length, perſuaded to lay aſide; but that I know ſuch cant is amongſt your arts of controverſy; and that ſomething is to be allowed to a weak cauſe, and to a reputation that requires managing. We know what to underſtand by it, when after a ſucceſsleſs inſult on religion, the reader is intreated to believe that you have a ſtrong reſerve; but till the door of liberty be ſet a little wider, you have not room to diſplay it.

Thus, at the very entrance of your works you teach us what we are to expect. But I muſt beg your patience, now I am got thus far, to lay before you your principal abuſes of that liberty indulged to you for better purpoſes; or, to give them the ſofteſt name I can, in an addreſs of this nature, your ARTS OF CONTROVERSY.

By this I ſhall at once practiſe the charity I profeſs, and juſtify the opinion I have paſſed upon you.

Your writers, I ſpeak it, Gentlemen, to your honour, offer your conſiderations to the world, either under the character of petitioners for oppreſſed and injured truth; or of teachers to ignorant and erring men. Theſe ſure are characters that, if any, require ſeriouſneſs and gravity to ſupport them. But ſo great ſtrangers are we to decorum, on our entry on the ſtage of life,

life, that, for the moſt part, like Bays's actor in the Rehearſal, who was at a loſs to know whether he was to be ſerious or merry, melancholy or in love, we run giddily on, in a mixt and jumbled character; but have moſt an end, a ſtrong inclination to make a farce of it, and mingle buffoonry with the moſt ſerious ſcenes. Hence, even in religious controverſy, while the great cauſe of eternal happineſs is trying; and men and angels, as it were, attending the iſſue of the conflict, we can find room for a merry ſtory; and receive the advocate of infidelity with much welcome [d], if he comes with but a diſpoſition to make us laugh: though he brings the tidings of *death*, and ſcatters round him the poiſon of our *hopes*, yet, like the dying aſſaſſin [e], we can laugh along with the mob, though our own deſpair and agonies conclude the entertainment.

This quality making a writer ſo well received, yours have been tempted to diſpenſe with the ſolemnity of their character; as

[d] Hence Anthony Urceus, ſurnamed Codrus, as vain and impious as any Free-thinker alive, being aſked the reaſon (as we are told by Blanchini, the writer of his life) why he mixed ſo much buffoonry in his works, replied, "That "nature had formed mankind in ſuch a manner, as to be "moſt taken with buffoons and ſtory-tellers."

[e] Balthazar Gerard, who murthered the Prince of Orange. See his ſtory.

thinking

thinking it of much importance to get the laugh on their ſide. Hence RIDICULE is become their favourite figure of ſpeech; and they have compoſed ſad treatiſes to juſtify its uſe, and very merry ones to evince its utility. But to be fair with you, it muſt be owned, that this ſtrange diſpoſition towards unſeaſonable mirth, drives all parties upon being witty where they can, as being conſcious of its powerful operation in controverſy: RIDICULE having, from the hands of a ſkilful diſputant, the ſame effect in barbarous minds, with the new invented darts of Marius *, which, though ſo weak as to break in the throw, and pierce no farther than the ſurface, yet ſticking there, they more intangle and incommode the combatant, than thoſe arms, which fly ſtronger, and ſtrike deeper. However, an abuſe it is, and one of the moſt pernicious too, of the liberty of the Preſs. For what greater affront to the ſeverity of reaſon, the ſublimity of truth, and the ſanctity of religion, than to ſubject them to the impure touch of every empty ſcurrilous Buffoon? the politeneſs of Athens, which you pretend ſo much to admire, ſhould be here a leſſon to you; which committed all queſtions of this nature, when they were to be examined, to their graveſt and ſevereſt

* See Plut. *Vit. Mar.*

court,

court, the Areopagus: whoſe judges would not ſuffer the advocates for either party to apply to the paſſions, ſo much as by the common rules of the chaſteſt rhetoric [f]. But a prepoſterous love of mirth hath turned you all into Wits, quite down from the ſanguine writer of *The independent whig*, to the atrabilaire blaſphemer of the miracles [g]. Though it would be but charity to tell you a plain truth, which Cicero told your *illuſtrious predeceſſors* long ago, when infected with the ſame diſtemper: "Ita "ſalem iſtum, quo caret VESTRA NATIO in "irridendis nobis, nolitote conſumere. Et "mehercule, ſi me audiatis, ne experiamini "quidem: non decet; NON DATUM EST; "non poteſtis." However, if you will needs be witty, take once more your example from the fine author of *The Difficulties and diſcouragements*, and learn from him the difference between Attic irony and elegance of wit, and your intemperate ſcurrility and illiberal banter.

What a noiſe, you will ſay, for a little harmleſs mirth. Ah, Gentlemen! if that were all, you had my leave to laugh on: I would ſay with the old comic,

Utinam male qui mihi volunt, ſic rideant.

[f] Exemplo legis Atticæ, Martiique judicii cauſæ Patronis denuntiat Præco neque principia dicere, neque miſerationem commovere. *Apul.*

[g] Woolſton.

But

But low and mean as your buffoonry is, it is yet to the level of the people; who are as little ſolicitous, as capable, of the point of argument, ſo they can but catch the point of wit. Amongſt ſuch, and to ſuch, you write; and it is inconceivable what havoc falſe wit makes in a fooliſh head: "The rabble of mankind (as "an excellent writer well obſerves) being very "apt to think, that every thing which is "laughed at, with any mixture of wit, is ridi-"culous in itſelf[h]." Few reflect on what a great wit[i] has ſo ingenuouſly owned, *That wit is generally falſe reaſoning.*

But one, in whom your party moſt glories, hath written in defence of this abuſive way of *wit and raillery*, on ſerious ſubjects. Let us hear him then[k]: "Nothing is ridiculous, "except what is deformed; nor is any thing "proof againſt raillery, except what is hand-"ſome and juſt: and therefore it is the "hardeſt thing in the world to deny fair ho-"neſty the uſe of this weapon; which can "never bear an edge againſt herſelf. One "may defy the world to turn bravery or "generoſity into ridicule: a man muſt be

[h] Mr. Addiſon's *Works*, vol. iii. p. 293. Quarto.

[i] *Mr. Wycherley to Mr. Pope, Letter* xvi.

[k] *Characteriſtics*, vol. i. *Eſſay on the freedom of wit and humour.*

"ſoundly

"ſoundly ridiculous, who, with all the wit "imaginable, would go about to ridicule "wiſdom, or laugh at honeſty or good man-"ners." Yes, ridiculous, indeed, to laugh at bravery, generoſity, wiſdom, honeſty, or good manners, as ſuch: and I hardly think, gentlemen, as licentious as ſome of you are, you will be ever brought to accept of his defiance. And why need you, when it is but ſhewing them, with overcharged and diſtorted features, to laugh at your eaſe. Call them but temerity, prodigality, gravity, ſimplicity, foppery, and as you have often experienced, the buſineſs is done, and the ridicule is compleat. And what ſecurity will the noble writer give us, that they ſhall not be ſo called? I am perſuaded, if you are never to be thought *ridiculous* till you become ſo, in the way this gentleman marks out, you may go ſafely on in the FREEDOM OF WIT AND HUMOUR, till there be never a Virtue left, to laugh out of countenance.

But he will ſay, he means ſuch clear virtue as hath no equivocal mark about her, which a prevaricator can lay hold on. Admit this: the man of wit will then try to make her ridiculous in her equipage, if he cannot make her ſo in her perſon.

However, will he ſay, it ſhews at leaſt, that nothing can be done againſt her, till ſhe be

diſguiſed. A mighty conſolation this to expiring Virtue, that ſhe cannot be deſtroyed till you have put her on a fool's coat. As if it were as hard to get that *on*, as Hercules's *off!* The compariſon holds better in the converſe, that when once *on*, it ſticks as cloſe as the envenomed one of old, and often laſts her to her funeral.

But if this noble writer means that truth cannot be obſcured, however diſguiſed; nor conſequently, be made ridiculous, however repreſented; the two celebrated examples, which follow, ſeem to ſhew he was miſtaken. Where, in the firſt, it is ſeen, that nothing was ſtronger than the ridicule, nor, at the ſame time more open and tranſparent than the diſguiſe; in the latter, nothing more clouded and obſcured than the beauty of the truth ridiculed, nor more out of ſight than the fallacy in the repreſentation. Which together, may teach us, that any kind of diſguiſe will ſerve the turn; and, that witty men will never be at a loſs for one.

Of all the virtues that were ſo much in this noble writer's heart, and in his writings, there was not one he more revered than *love of public liberty*; or which he would leſs ſuſpect ſhould become liable to the impreſſions of buffoonry. Methinks I hear him ſay,

" One

"One may defy the world to turn the love "of public liberty into ridicule: a man muſt "be ſoundly ridiculous, who, with all the wit "imaginable, would go about it."

However, once on a time, a great Wit ſet upon this taſk; he undertook to laugh at this very virtue; and that too, ſo ſucceſsfully, that he ſet the whole nation a laughing with him. What mighty engine, you will aſk, was employed, to put in motion ſo large a body, and for ſo extraordinary a cauſe? In truth, a very ſimple one: a *diſcourſe*, of which all the wit conſiſts in the title; and that too ſculking, as you will ſee, under one unlucky word. *Mrs. Bull's vindication of the indiſpenſable duty of* CUCKOLDOM, *incumbent upon wives, in caſe of the tyranny, infidelity, or inſufficiency of huſbands*[1]. Now had the merry reader been but wiſe enough to reflect, that reaſon was the teſt of ridicule, and not *ridicule the teſt of truth*, he would have ſeen to rectify the propoſition, and to ſtate it fairly thus: *The indiſpenſable duty of* DIVORCE, *etc.* And then the joke had been over, before the laugh could have begun.

And now let this noble writer tell us, as he does, that *fair honeſty can never bear an edge againſt herſelf, for that nothing is ridiculous but what is deformed*; and a great deal to

[1] *Hiſtory of John Bull*, firſt part, chap. xiii.

the

the ſame purpoſe, which his Platonic manners ſupplied.

But very often the change put upon us is not ſo eaſily diſcernible. Sulpicius tells Cicero, that returning by ſea from Aſia, and ſeeing in his courſe Ægina, Megara, the Piræus, and Corinth in ruins, he fell into this very natural, and humane reflexion: "And "ſhall we, ſhort-lived creatures as we are, "bear with impatience the death of our fel- "lows, when, in one ſingle view we behold "the carcaſes of ſo many lately flouriſhing "cities?[m]" What could be juſter or wiſer than the piety of this reflexion? And yet it could not eſcape the ridicule of a celebrated french buffoon. "If neither (ſays he[n]) the

[m] Ex Aſia rediens, cum ab Ægina Megaram verſus navigarem, cœpi regiones circumcirca proſpicere. Poſt me erat Ægina; ante Megara; dextra Piræeus; ſiniſtra Corinthus: quæ oppida quodam tempore florentiſſima fuerunt, nunc proſtrata, & diruta ante oculos jacent. Cœpi egomet mecum ſic cogitare: Hem! nos homunculi indignamur, ſi quis noſtrum interiit, aut occiſus eſt, quorum vita brevior eſſe debet, cum uno loco tot oppidum cadavera projecta jaceant? *Sulpicius M. T. Ciceroni*, lib. iv. ep. 5.

[n] *Superbes monumens de l'orgueil des humains,*
Piramides, Tombeaux, dont la vaine ſtructure
A temoigné que l'art, par l'adreſſe des mains
Et l'aſſidu travail, peut vaincre la nature!
Vieux palais ruinez, chef d'œuvres des Romains,

" Pyramids of Egypt, nor the Coloſſeum at " Rome could withſtand the injury of time; " why ſhould I think much that my black " waiſtcoat is out at elbows?" Here, indeed, the firſt thing to be obſerved is the ſuperior reſiſtance of truth.

The buffoon, before he could throw an air of ridicule on this admirable ſentiment, was forced to change the image; and in the place of Ægina, Megara, etc. to ſubſtitute the *Pyramids* and *Coloſſeum*, monuments of human pride, and folly; which, on that account, readily ſubmitted to the rude touch of buffoonery: while thoſe free cities, the nobleſt effort of human wiſdom, the nurſeries of arts and commerce, could not eaſily be ſet in a ridiculous or an idle light.

But then, how few of his readers were able to detect the change put upon them, when it is very probable the author himſelf did not ſee it?

Et les derniers efforts de leur architecture,
Colliſée, où ſouvent *ces peuples inhumains*
De s'entr'aſſaſſiner ſe donnoient tablature,
Par l'injure des ans vous eſtes abolis,
Ou du moins la plus part vous eſtes demolis:
Il n'eſt point de ciment que le temps ne diſſoude,
Si vos marbres ſi durs ont ſentis ſon pouvoir,
Dois-je trouver mauvais, qu'un meſchant pourpoint noir,
Qui m'a duré deux ans, ſoit percé par le coude?

Scarron.

who, perplexed at the obſtinate reſiſtance of *truth*, in the various arrangement of his ideas turned the edge of his raillery, before he was aware, againſt this phantaſm, and was the firſt that fell into his own deceit.

Hence may be ſeen what the noble writer ſeems to have ſpoken at random, at leaſt, not at all to the purpoſe of the queſtion he was upon, that ſuch indeed is the inflexible nature of truth, that all the wit in the world can never render it ridiculous, till it be ſo diſtorted as to look like error, or ſo diſguiſed as to appear like folly. A circumſtance which, though it greatly recommends the *majeſty of virtue*, yet, as it cannot ſecure it from inſult, doth not at all ſhew the *innocence of ridicule*; which was the point he had to prove.

But to ſee what little good is to be expected in this way of *wit and humour*, one may go further; and obſerve, that even the ridicule of *falſe* virtue, which ſurely deſerves no quarter, hath been ſometimes attended with very miſchievous effects. The Spaniards have lamented, and I believe truly, that Cervantes's juſt and inimitable ridicule of *knight-errantry* rooted up, with that folly, a great deal of their *real honour*. And it was apparent, that Butler's fine ſatire on *fanaticiſm* contributed not a little, during the licentious times of Charles II. to bring *ſober piety* into diſrepute. The reaſon is

evident: there are many lines of reſemblance between Truth and its Counterfeits: and it is the province of *wit* only to find out the *likeneſſes* in things; and not the talent of the *common admirers of it* to diſcover the *differences*.

But you will ſay, perhaps, Let Truth, when thus attacked, defend itſelf with the ſame arms: for why, as your maſter aſks, ſhould *fair honeſty be denied the uſe of this weapon?* Be it ſo: come on then, and let us impartially attend the iſſue. We have, upon record, the moſt illuſtrious example of this contention that ever was. The diſpute I mean, was between Socrates and Ariſtophanes. Here *truth* had all the advantage of place, of weapons, and of judges: Socrates employed his whole life in the cauſe of virtue: Ariſtophanes, only a few comic ſcenes againſt it. But, heavens! againſt what virtue! againſt the pureſt and brighteſt portion of it that ever enlightened the *gentile* world. The wit of the comic writer is well known: that of the philoſopher was in a ſupreme degree, juſt, delicate, and forceable; and ſo habitual, that it procured him the title of the *Attic buffoon*. The *place* was the politeſt ſtate in the politeſt time, Athens in its glory; and the *judges* the grave ſenators of Areopagus. For all this, the comic poet triumphed: and with the coarſeſt kind of buffoonry, little fitted, one would think, to take ſo polite a people, had

the art to tarniſh all this virtue; and, what was more, to make the owner reſemble his direct oppoſite, that character he was moſt unlike, that character he moſt hated, that very character he had employed all his wit to detect, lay open, and confound; in one word, the SOPHIST. The conſequences are well known.

Thus will *raillery*, in defence of vice and error, be ſtill an overmatch for that employed on the ſide of truth and virtue. Becauſe *fair honeſty* uſes, though a ſharp, yet an untainted weapon; while knavery ſtrikes with one empoiſoned, though much duller. The honeſt man employs his wit as correctly as his logic; whereas the very definition of a knave's raillery is a ſophiſm.

But, indeed, when a licentious buffoonry is once appealed to, and encouraged; its effects have no dependance on the fit choice of its object. All characters fall alike before it. In the diſſolute times of Charles II, this *weapon*, with the ſame eaſe, and indeed in the ſame hands, completed the ruin of the beſt, and, of the very worſt Miniſter of that age. The hiſtorians tell us, that Chancellor Hyde was brought into his maſter's contempt, by this court-argument. They mimicked his walk and geſture, with a fire-ſhovel and bellows, for the mace and purſe. The ſame ingenious

ſtroke

ſtroke of humour was repeated on Secretary Bennet, and, by the happy addition of his black patch, with juſt the ſame ſucceſs. Thus, it being the repreſentation, and not the object repreſented, which ſtrikes the fancy, Vice and Virtue muſt fall indifferently before it [o].

[o] The author of a late book called *Elements of Criticiſm*, ſpeaking of men's various opinions concerning the *uſe of ridicule*, proceeds againſt what is here ſaid, in the following manner—"This diſpute has produced a celebrated queſtion, *Whether Ridicule be, or be not, a teſt of Truth?* Which (ſays he) ſtated in ACCURATE TERMS, is, *Whether the* SENSE *of Ridicule be the proper teſt for diſtinguiſhing ridiculous objects from thoſe that are not ſo? To anſwer this queſtion with* PRECISION, I muſt premiſe that Ridicule is not a ſubject of reaſoning but of SENSE or TASTE." Vol. ii. p. 55. The Critic having thus changed the queſtion, which he calls *ſtating it in accurate termi*; and obſcured the anſwer, which he calls, giving it *with preciſion*, he concludes, that *Ridicule is not only the beſt, but the only, teſt of Truth.*

But what is all this to the purpoſe? Is the Dealer in Ridicule now debarred the liberty of doing what he has ſo often done, putting his object in a falſe light; and, by that means, making Truth appear like Error? As he is not, I inferred, againſt Lord Shafteſbury, *That Ridicule is not a teſt of Truth.* How does our Critic addreſs himſelf to prove the contrary? Not by ſhewing, that *ridicule* is ſuch a teſt: but that *the* TASTE *of ridicule is the teſt of what is ridiculous.* Who doubts that? It is the very thing complained of. For when our *taſte* for ridicule gives us a ſenſible pleaſure in a ridiculous repreſentation of any object, we do not ſtay to examine whether that repreſentation be a true one, but conclude it to be ſo, from the pleaſure it affords us.

I hope then, Gentlemen, you will in time be brought to own, that this method is the

His ſecond change of the queſtion is a new ſubſtitution, viz. *Whether Ridicule be a talent to be uſed or employed at all?* Of which he ſuppoſes me to hold the negative. What elſe is the meaning of theſe words? "To CONDEMN A TALENT FOR RIDICULE, becauſe it may be converted to "wrong purpoſes, is not a little ridiculous. Could one forbear to *ſmile* if A TALENT FOR REASONING WAS CONDEMNED, becauſe it alſo may be perverted?" p. 57. He has no reaſon to *ſmile* ſure, at his own miſrepreſentation. I never *condemned a talent for ridicule* becauſe it may be abuſed; nor for any other reaſon. Though others, perhaps, may be diſpoſed to *ſmile* at his abſurd inference, that we may as well *condemn a talent for reaſoning*. As if *reaſon* and *ridicule* were of equal importance for the conduct of human life.

He may then perhaps aſk, "If I do not *condemn* the *uſe* of Ridicule, on what employment I would put it, when I have excluded it from being *a teſt of truth?*" Let him not be uneaſy about that. There is no danger that the *talent for ridicule* ſhould lie idle, for want of proper buſineſs. When *reaſon*, the only *teſt of truth* I know of, has performed its office, and unmaſked *hypocriſy and formal error*, then *ridicule*, I think, may be fairly called in, to quicken the operation. Thus, when Dr. S. Clarke had, by ſuperior reaſoning, expoſed the wretched ſophiſtry which Mr. Collins had employed to prove the Soul to be only a quality of Body; Dr. Arbuthnot, who very rarely miſemployed his inimitable *talent for ridicule*, followed the blow, and gave that fooliſh and impious opinion up to the contempt and laughter it deſerved, in a chapter of the *Memoirs of Scribleruſ.* But to ſet Ridicule on work before, would be as unfair, indeed as ſcandalous, as to beſtow the language due to convicted Vice, on a character but barely ſuſpected.

moſt

moſt unfair in itſelf, and moſt pernicious in its conſequences: that its natural effect is to miſlead the judgment, and to make the heart diſſolute.

It is a ſmall matter, that the State requires of you, ſobriety, decency, and good manners, to qualify you for the noble employment of thinking freely, and at your eaſe. We have been told this, you will ſay, before: But, when it came to be explained; By, *ſober writing* was meant, writing in the *language of the Magiſtrate*. It may be ſo; but then, remember, it was not till you yourſelves had led the way to the abuſe of words; and had called calumny, plain dealing; and a ſcurril licence, urbanity. Happy for you, that you are in times when liberty is ſo well underſtood. Had you lived in the boaſted days of claſſic freedom, he amongſt you who had eſcaped beſt, had been branded with a character, the ancient Sages eſteemed moſt infamous of all, AN ENEMY TO THE RELIGION OF HIS COUNTRY. A very candid and reſpectable author ſpeaking of the ancient *reſtraints* on free-thinking, ſays, "Theſe were the maxims, "theſe the principles, which the light of nature "ſuggeſted, which reaſon dictated [p]." Nor has this fine writer any cauſe to be aſhamed of his acknowledgment; nor his adverſaries any

[p] *Letter to Dr. Waterland*, p. 52, *& ſeq.*

pretence that he muſt needs eſteem it the meaſure for the preſent times. For, as a great Ancient well obſerves, " It is one thing to ſpeak " of truth, and another to hear truth ſpeak of " herſelf[q]." It was CHRISTIAN TRUTH and CHARITY, the truth and charity you ſo much inſult, which only could take off thoſe reſtraints; and require no more of you than to be *as* FREE, *but not uſing your liberty for a cloak of maliciouſneſs*[r].

I have now done with your buffoonry; which, like chewed bullets, is againſt the law of arms; and come next to your ſcurrilities, thoſe ſtink-pots of your offenſive war.

As the CLERGY of the eſtabliſhed church have been more *particularly* watchful in what is yet the common cauſe of all, the intereſts of *Chriſtianity*, and moſt ſucceſsful in repelling the inſults of its enemies, they have fallen under the heavieſt load of your calumny and ſlander. With unparalleled licence, you have gone on, repreſenting them as debauched, avaricious, proud, vindictive, ambitious, deceitful, irreligious, and incorrigible. " An order of men profligate and abandoned to wickedneſs, inconſiſtent with the good of

[q] Ἄλλως τις περὶ ἀληθείας λέγει, ἢ ἀλήθεια ἑαυτὴν ἑρμηνεύει.

[r] 1 Pet. ii. 16.

ſociety,

ſociety, irreconcileable enemies to reaſon, and conſpirators againſt the liberty and property of mankind[*]."

To fill up your common place of ſlander, the moſt inconſiſtent qualities have been raked together to deform them: qualities that could never ſtand together but in idea; I mean, in the miſhapen ideas of a Free-thinker.

The Order is now repreſented as moſt contemptible for their politics; ever in the wrong, and under a fatality of continued blunders, attending them as a curſe: But anon, we are told of their deep-laid ſchemes of a ſeparate intereſt, ſo wiſely conducted, as to elude the policy of Courts, and baffle all the wiſdom of Legiſlatures.

Now they are a ſet of ſuperſtitious bigots, and fiery zealots, prompt to ſacrifice the rights of humanity to the intereſts of Mother-Church: but now again, they are *Tartufes without religion*; *Atheiſts and Apoſtates without faith or law.*

This moment, ſo united in one common confederacy, as to make their own Church-policy the cauſe of God: But, the next, ſo divided, that every man's hand is againſt his brother, *tearing and worrying one another*, to the

[*] *Rights of the Chriſtian Church*, and *Chriſtianity as old as the Creation*, paſſim.

great

great ſcandal of the charitable author of the *Diſcourſe of Free-thinking*.

But it is to be hoped, as the evidence is ſo ill laid together, the accuſation may be groundleſs.

But why do I talk of the Clergy, when there is not one, however otherwiſe eſteemed by, or related to you, that can eſcape your ſlander, if he happen to diſcover the leaſt inclination for that cauſe, againſt which you are ſo virulently bent? Mr. *Locke*, the honour of this age, and the inſtructor of the future, ſhews us, in the treatment he received from his FRIEND and from his PUPIL, what a believer is to expect from you. It was enough to provoke their reſentment, that he had ſhewn *the reaſonableneſs of Chriſtianity*; and had placed all his *hopes* of happineſs in *another life*.

The intimacy between him and Mr. *Collins* is well known. Mr. *Collins* ſeemed to idolize Mr. *Locke* while living; and Mr. *Locke* was *confident* Mr. *Collins* would *preſerve his memory when dead*[t]. But he chanced to be miſtaken: For no ſooner was he gone, than Mr. *Collins* publickly [u] inſults a notion of his

[t] "I know you loved me living, and will preſerve my "memory now I am dead," ſays he in his letter to be delivered to Mr. *Collins* at his death.

[u] *Anſwer to Dr.* Clarke's *third Defence of his Letter to Mr.* Dodwell, at the end.

honoured

honoured friend, concerning the *poſſibility of conceiving how matter might firſt be made and begin to be*: And goes affectedly out of the way to ſhew his good will to his memory.

The noble author of *the Characteriſtics* had received * part of his education from that great philoſopher: And it muſt be owned, that this Lord had many excellent qualities, both as a man and a writer. He was temperate, chaſte, honeſt, and a lover of his country. In his writings he hath ſhewn how largely he had imbibed the deep ſenſe, and how naturally he could copy the gracious manner of *Plato*. How far Mr. *Locke* contributed to the cultivating theſe qualities, I will not enquire: But that inveterate rancour which he indulged againſt *Chriſtianity*, it is certain, he had not from his maſter. It was Mr. *Locke*'s love of it that ſeems principally to have expoſed him to his pupil's bittereſt inſults. One of the moſt precious remains of the piety of that excellent man, are his laſt words to Mr. *Collins*: "May you live long and happy, *&c.* all the "uſe to be made of it is, *that this world is a "ſcene of vanity, that ſoon paſſes away, and af-"fords no ſolid ſatisfaction*, but the conſciouſ-"neſs of well doing, and the HOPES OF AN-

* See *Eibl, Choiſie*, tom. vi. p. 343.

"OTHER

" OTHER LIFE. This is what I can ſay by " experience, and what you will find when " you come to make up your account[y]." One would think, that if ever the parting breath of pious men, or the laſt precepts of dying philoſophers, could claim reverence of their ſurvivors, this noble monument of friendſhip, and religion, had been ſecure from outrage. Yet hear, in how unworthy, how cruel a manner, his noble diſciple apoſtrophizes him on this occaſion: " *Philoſopher!* let me hear " concerning life, what the right notion is, " and what I am to ſtand to upon occaſion; " that I may not, when life ſeems retiring, or " *has run itſelf out to the very dregs*[z], cry VA- " NITY! condemn the WORLD, and at the " ſame time complain that LIFE IS SHORT " AND PASSING. For why ſo *ſhort* indeed, " if not found *ſweet?* Why do I complain " both ways? Is *vanity*, mere vanity, a hap- " pineſs; or can miſery *paſs away* too ſoon[a]?" Here the polite author had the noble pleaſure of ridiculing the *philoſopher* and the *Pſalmiſt*[b] together. But I will leave the ſtrange reflex-

[y] Amongſt his Letters publiſhed by Deſmaizeaux.

[z] Mr. *Locke* was then in his 73d year.

[a] *Characteriſtics*, vol. i. p. 302. 3d ed.

[b] *Man is like to vanity: His days are as a ſhadow that paſſeth away.* PSAL. cxliv. 4.

ions,

ions, that naturally ariſe from hence, to the reader; who, I am ſure, will be before-hand with me in judging, that Mr. *Locke* had reaſon to *condemn a world* that caſt him upon ſuch a *friend* and *pupil*[c].

[c] The noble writer did not diſdain to take up with thoſe vulgar calumnies which Mr. *Locke* had again and again confuted. "Some even (ſays he, *Charact.* vol. i. p. 80. 3d "ed.) of our moſt admired modern philoſophers had fairly "told us, that virtue and vice had, after all, no other law "or meaſure than mere faſhion and vogue." The caſe was this: When Mr. *Locke* reaſoned againſt *innate ideas*, he brought it as one argument againſt them, that virtue and vice, in many places, were not regulated by the nature of things, which they muſt have been, were there ſuch *innate ideas*; but by mere faſhion and vogue. Is this then *fairly told* of *our admired modern philoſopher?* But it was crime enough that he laboured to overthrow *innate ideas*; things that the noble author underſtood to be the foundation of his *moral ſenſe*. (See vol. iii. p. 214.) In vain did Mr. *Locke* inceſſantly repeat, that "the divine law is the only "true touchſtone of moral rectitude." This did but increaſe his pupil's reſentment, who had all his faculties poſſeſſed with the MORAL SENSE, as "the only true touch-"ſtone of moral rectitude." But the whole Eſſay itſelf, one of the nobleſt, and moſt original books in the world, could not eſcape his ridicule: "In reality (ſays he, vol. i. "p. 299.) how ſpecious a ſtudy, how ſolemn an amuſe-"ment, is raiſed from what we call philoſophical ſpecu-"lations! The formation of ideas! their compoſitions, "compariſons, agreement, and diſagreement!—Why do "I concern myſelf in ſpeculations about my ideas? What "is it to me, for inſtance, to know what kind of idea I

But to go on, and consider the nature of this abuse of the Clergy: It is not only an affront to *Religion*, which, by your practice, you seem to regard as one of the essential branches of literary liberty; but likewise, an insult on *civil Society*. For while there is such a thing as a *Church established by law*, its Ministers must needs bear a *sacred*, that is, a *public* character, even on your own principles[d]. To abuse them, therefore, as a body, is insulting the State which protects them. It is highly injurious likewise, because a Body-politic cannot preserve the reverence necessary for the support of government, longer than its public officers, whether civil or religious, are treated with the regard due to their respective stations[e]. And here, your apology, when accused of using holy Writ irreverently, is out of doors. You pretend that the Charge is disingenuous, be-

" can form of space? Divide a solid body, *etc.*" and so he goes on in Mr. *Locke*'s own words: And lest the reader should not take the satire, a note at the bottom of the page informs us, that " these are the words of the particular au-" thor cited." But the invidious Remark on this quotation surpasses all credit. *Thus the atomist, or* EPICUREAN.

[d] " They also that have authority to teach, *etc.* are " *public ministers.*" *Leviathan*, p. 124.

[e] Ἀρχήσειν ἡ ὀφειλομένη αἰδὼς καὶ τιμὴ φυλασσομένη κόσμον πόλεως, καὶ διατηρεῖ. *Aut. Scrip. apud Stob. de rep. Serm.* 41.

cause

cauſe it takes for granted the thing in diſpute. But in the caſe before us, it is agreed, that the Miniſters of the eſtabliſhed worſhip have a *ſacred*, that is, a *public* character.

Out of your own mouths likewiſe, are you condemned. A few inſtances there are in the firſt ages of *Chriſtianity*, of ſomething reſembling this miſconduct; where the intemperance of private zeal now and then gave the affront to the national religion. But who are they that ſo ſeverely cenſure this diſorder[f]? that raiſe ſuch tragic outcries againſt the factious ſpirit of primitive *Chriſtianity*? Who, Gentlemen, but Yourſelves! The very men who, out of ſpite and wantonneſs, daily perſiſt in doing what a miſguided devotion, now and then, though rarely, betrayed a martyr to commit[g].

But would you read *Chriſtian* antiquity with equal minds, you would not want examples

[f] "The liſt of *Martyrs* conſiſted, I believe, of thoſe who "ſuffered for breaking the Peace. The *primitive clergy* "were, under pretence of Religion, a very Lawleſs "Tribe." *L. Bolingbroke*, vol. iv. p. 434.

[g] In the LX canon of the council of Eliberis, held about twenty years before the council of Nice, it is decreed that they who were ſlain by the Gentiles for breaking down their Idols, ſhould not be received by the church into the number of Martyrs, ſince neither the precepts of the Goſpel nor the practice of the Apoſtles gave any countenance to ſuch licentious behaviour.

of

of a better conduct. For in general the Apologiſts for the *Chriſtian* faith obſerved a decency and moderation, becoming the truth and importance of the cauſe they had to ſupport. We need only look into *Lactantius* for the modeſty of their conduct in this reſpect.

This eloquent Apologiſt, who wrote in an age which would have indulged greater liberties, giving in his *divine inſtitutions*, the laſt ſtroke to expiring paganiſm; where he confutes the *national Religion*, ſpares as much as poſſible the *Prieſts*; but in expoſing their *Philoſophy*, is not ſo tender of their *Sophiſts*: For theſe laſt having no public character, the State was not concerned to have them managed. Such, I ſay, was the general behaviour of the firſt *Chriſtians*.

Nor can you plead, in your excuſe, any other neceſſity, than that inſeparable from a weak cauſe, of committing this violence. The diſcovery of truth is ſo far from being advanced by it, that, on the contrary, it carries all the marks of deſign to retard the ſearch, when you ſo induſtriouſly draw off the reader's attention from the *Cauſe*, by diverting him at the expence of the *Advocate*.

It is true, that at what time the Clergy ſo far forgot the nature of their office, and of the cauſe they were appointed to defend, as to call in

in the ſecular arm to ſupport their arguments againſt wrong opinions, we ſaw, without much ſurpriſe or reſentment, You, Gentlemen, in the like deluſion, that any means were lawful in ſupport of truth, falling without ſcruple to affront the Public, (then little diſpoſed to give you an equal hearing) by the abuſe of a Body, whoſe *private* intereſts the State had indiſcreetly eſpouſed. For where was the wonder, when Government had aſſumed too much, for thoſe who were oppreſſed by it, to allow it too little? You thought this a fair return; and your candid enemies confeſſed, that ſome indulgence was to be given to the paſſions of men, raiſed and enflamed by ſo unequal a treatment. But now, that the *State* hath withdrawn its power, and confined the Adminiſtration within its proper office; and that this *learned Body* hath publicly diſclaimed its aſſiſtance; it will ſurely be expected, that You, likewiſe, ſhould return to a better mind, and forſake a practice inſolently continued, without any reaſonable pretence of freſh provocation.

Your laſt abuſe, Gentlemen, of the liberty of the preſs, is a certain diſſolute habit of mind, regardleſs both of truth and falſhood, which you betray in all your attacks on Revelation. Who that had not heard of your ſolemn profeſſions *of the love of liberty, of truth,*

of virtue, of your aim at the honour of God, and good of men, could ever believe you had any thing of this at heart, when they ſee that ſpirit of levity and diſſipation which runs through all your writings?

That you may not ſay I ſlander you, I will produce thoſe marks in your works, on which I have formed my accuſation of this illiberal temper.

1. The firſt is an unlimited buffoonry; which ſuffers no teſt or criterion to your ridicule, to ſhew us, when you are in jeſt, and when in earneſt.

2. An induſtrious affectation in keeping your true character out of ſight; and in conſtantly aſſuming ſome new and fictitious perſonage.

3. To ſupport your chicane, an unnatural mixture of the Sceptic and Dogmatiſt.

And here, Gentlemen, in illuſtrating theſe three circumſtances of your guilt, one might detect all your *arts of controverſy*, and eaſily reveal the whole myſtery of modern *Free-thinking*. But the limits of this addreſs will only permit me in few words to deſcribe the general nature of each; in order to ſhew, how certain an indication they are of the turn of mind of which, I accuſe you.

1. The illimited, UNDISTINGUISHABLE IRONY, which affords no inſight into the author's

thor's meaning, or ſo much room as to gueſs what he would be at, is our firſt note. This, which is your favourite figure of ſpeech, your noble Apologiſt owns to be "a dull ſort of wit "which amuſes all alike[h]." Nay, he even ventures to pronounce it "a groſs, immoral, "and illiberal way of abuſe, foreign to the "character of a good writer, a gentleman, or "man of worth[i]." What pity, if he ſhould chance to fall under his own cenſure! Yet this is certain, he hath ſo managed his *good humour*, that his admirers may always find a handle either to charge us with credulity, or want of charity, determine as we will of his *true* and *real* ſentiments. However, the noble writer hath not aggravated this folly, in the character he hath given of it: For, here forgetful of your own precepts, (your common-place topic againſt public inſtructors) while you preſcribe ridicule to be ſo managed, *as to ſhew it tends to a ſerious iſſue*; you practiſe it ſo indiſcriminately, as to make one believe you were all the time in jeſt. While you direct it *to unmaſk formal hypocriſy*, you ſuffer it to put ſober truth out of countenance; and while you claim its aid, *to find out what is to be laughed at in every thing*, you employ it to bring in every thing to be laughed at.

[h] *Charact.* vol. i. tract. ii. pt. i. § 2.
[i] Vol. iii. miſcel. iv. c. 2.

That a RESTRAINT on free inquiry, will force writers into this vicious manner, we readily allow. Under theſe circumſtances, ſuch a key to ridicule as juſt writing demands being unſafe; and the only way men have to eſcape perſecution being to cover and intrench themſelves in obſcurity; it is no wonder that *ridicule* ſhould degenerate into the *buffoonry which amuſes all alike:* As in *Italy*, which gave birth to this degenerate ſpecies of writing, it is the only way, in which the *poor crampt thinking wretches can diſcharge a free thought.* But in *Great Britain*, happily for Truth, and You, PHILOSOPHY is at her eaſe; and you may lead her ſafely back to Paganiſm, through all the ancient modes of doubting, objecting, and refuting.

It is difficult, therefore, to aſſign any other likely cauſe of this extravagance, than that vicious levity of ſpirit I have charged upon you. For as Man is formed by nature with an incredible appetite for Truth; ſo his ſtrongeſt pleaſure, in the enjoyment, ariſes from the actual communication of it to others. Without this, it would be a cold purchaſe, would abſtract, ideal, ſolitary Truth; and poorly repay the labour and fatigue of the purſuit. Amongſt the Ancients, who, you will allow, had high notions of this SOCIAL SENSE, it

was

was a ſaying recorded by *Cicero* with approbation, " that even heaven would be no hap-
" pineſs, to him who had not ſome compa-
" nion or *ſocial Spirit* to ſhare with him in
" the pleaſure of contemplating the great
" truths of nature there revealed unto him."
" Si quis in cœlum aſcendiſſet, naturamque
" mundi, et pulchritudinem ſiderum perſpex-
" iſſet, inſuavem illam admirationem ei fore;
" quæ jucundiſſima fuiſſet, ſi aliquem, cui
" narraret, habuiſſet[k]." *Seneca* goes yet further: " Nec me ulla res delectabit, licet ex-
" imia ſit et ſalutaris, quam mihi uni ſciturus
" ſim. Si cum hac exceptione detur ſapien-
" tia, ut illam incluſam teneam, nec enun-
" ciem, rejiciam: nullius boni, ſine socio,
" jucunda poſſeſſio eſt[l]." It was this paſſion which gave birth to writing, and brought literary compoſition to an art; whereby the Public was made a ſharer in thoſe important truths, which particulars had with ſo much toil excogitated for its uſe and entertainment. The principal object therefore of an author, while his paſſions are in their right ſtate, muſt needs be to deliver his ſentiments and opinions with all poſſible clearneſs; ſo that no particular caſt of compoſition, or turn of expreſſion, which he held conducive to the embelliſh-

[k] *De Amicitia.* [l] Ep. vi.

ment of his work, be ſuffered to throw an ambiguity on his propoſitions, which might miſlead the reader in judging of his real ſentiments. To ſuch a one, nothing can be a greater mortification than to find that this his principal purpoſe was defeated.

But when, on the contrary, we ſee a writer, ſo far from diſcovering any thing of this care, that an air of negligence appears in every thing he delivers; a viſible contempt of his reader's ſatisfaction; to which he prefers a dull malicious pleaſure of miſguiding him in the obſcurity of an illimited ridicule; we cannot poſſibly avoid concluding that ſuch a one is far gone in this wretched depravity of heart.

2. Another mark, is Your perpetually aſſuming ſome PERSONATED CHARACTER, as the exigence of chicane requires. For the diſpute is to be kept on foot; and therefore, when in danger of coming to an iſſue, a new perſonage is to be aſſumed, that the trial of ſkill may be fought over again with different weapons. So that the modern Free-thinker, is a perfect *Proteus*. He is now a Diſſenter, or a Papiſt; now again a Jew, or a Mahometan; and, when cloſely preſſed and hunted through all the ſhapes, he at length ſtarts up in his genuine form, an INFIDEL confeſſed [m].

[m] Mr. Collins.

Indeed

Indeed where the Magiſtrate hath confined the liberty of free debate, to one or two Profeſſions of belief, There an unlicenced writer hath no way of publiſhing his ſpeculations, but under the cover of one of theſe authorized Sects. But to affect this practice when the neceſſity is over, is licentious and immoral. For the perſonated character, only arguing *ad hominem*, embroils, rather than directs us, in the ſearch of truth; has a natural tendency to promote ſcepticiſm; and if not this, yet it keeps the diſpute from ever coming to an iſſue; which is attended with great public inconveniencies. For though the diſcovery of ſpeculative truth be of much importance to the perfection of man's nature, yet the ſtudious lengthening out literary debates is pernicious to Society, as Societies are generally formed. Therefore, though the good of mankind would ſet an honeſt man upon publiſhing what he ſuppoſes to be diſcoveries in truth; yet the ſame motive would oblige him to take the fairſt, and moſt direct road to their reception.

But I would not have it thought, by this, that I condemn the aſſuming a *perſonated character* on all occaſions whatſoever. There are ſeaſons when it is fair and expedient. When the diſpute is about the PRACTICAL application of ſome truth to the good of a particular ſociety;

ciety; there it is prudent to take up a ſuitable character, and to argue *ad hominem*. For there, the end is a benefit to be gained for that ſociety; and it is not of ſo great moment on what principles the majority is prevailed upon to make the ſociety happy, as it is, that it ſhould ſpeedily become ſo. But in the diſcovery of ABSTRACT SPECULATIVE truth, the affair goes quite otherwiſe. The buſineſs here is *demonſtration*, not *perſuaſion*. And it is of the eſſence of truth, to be made appear and ſhine out only by its own luſtre.

A familiar example will ſupport this obſervation. Our great *Britiſh* philoſopher, writing for *religious liberty*, combats his *intolerant* adverſary, all the way, with his own Principles; well knowing that, in ſuch a time of prejudices, arguments built on received opinions, would have greateſt weight, and make quickeſt impreſſion on the body of the People, whom it was his buſineſs to gain. But the method he employed in defending mere ſpeculative truth was very different. A Prelate of great name, was pleaſed to attack his *Eſſay concerning human underſtanding*; who, though conſummate in the learning of the Schools, yet happened at that time to apply his principles ſo very aukwardly, as gave our Philoſopher the moſt inviting opportunity of turning them againſt him. An advantage moſt to the taſte of him who

contends

contends only for victory: but he contended for truth; and was too wiſe to think of eſtabliſhing it on falſhood; and too honeſt to affect triumphing over Error by any thing but by its Oppoſite.

You ſee then, Gentlemen, you are not likely to eſcape by this diſtinction: the diſpute with you is about *ſpeculative truth*: Yourſelves take care to give the world repeated information of it, as often as you think fit to feign an apprehenſion of the Magiſtrate's reſentment.

But of as little uſe as this method, of the *perſonated character*, is, in itſelf, to the juſt end of controverſy, you generally add a double ſhare of diſingenuity in conducting it. Common ſenſe, as well as Common honeſty, requires, that he who aſſumes a *perſonated character*, ſhould fairly ſtick to it, for that turn, at leaſt. But we ſhall be greatly deceived, if we preſume on ſo much condeſcenſion: the late famous author of *The Grounds and Reaſons of the Chriſtian Religion*, took it into his head to perſonate a *Jew*, in the interpretation of ſome propheſies which he would perſuade us are not applicable to *Jeſus*. The learned Prelate, who undertook to anſwer him, having ſhewn that thoſe propheſies had no completion under the *Jewiſh* diſpenſation, concludes very pertinently, *that if they did not belong to* Jeſus, *they*

they belong to no one. What ſays our impoſtor *Jew* to this? One would be aſtoniſhed at his reply: *Suppoſe they do not*, ſays he, *I am not anſwerable for their completion.* What! not as a *Jew?* whoſe perſon he aſſumes, and whoſe argument he borrows: which argument is not founded on this, That the characters of completion, according to the *Chriſtian* ſcheme, do not coincide and quadrate; to which, indeed, the above anſwer would be pertinent; but on this, that there are complete characters of the completion of the propheſies, under the *Jewiſh* œconomy; and therefore, ſays the *Jew*, you are not to look for thoſe marks under the *Chriſtian.* The only reaſonable way then of replying to this argument, is to deny, that there are ſuch marks under the *Jewiſh* œconomy; which if the *Jew* cannot prove, his objection, founded on a *prior completion*, is intirely overthrown. Inſtead of this, we are put off with the cold buffoonry of, *I am not obliged to find a meaning for your propheſies.*

3. The third mark of this abandoned ſpirit, is that unnatural MIXTURE OF THE SCEPTIC AND DOGMATIST, which ſo monſtrouſly variegates your miſhapen works. I do not mean by it, that unreaſonable temper of mind, which diſtinguiſhes the whole claſs of Free-thinkers; and ſuffers you, at the ſame time that you affect

ſect much *ſcepticiſm* in rejecting Revelation, to *dogmatize* very poſitively on ſome favourite points of civil tradition. The noble author, your Apologiſt, could not forbear to ridicule his party for this foible [n]. "It muſt certainly, "ſays he, be ſomething elſe than incredulity "which faſhions the taſte and judgment of "many Gentlemen, whom we hear cenſured "as Atheiſts.—Who, if they want a true "*Iſraelitiſh* faith, can make amends by a *Chi-*"*neſe* or *Indian* one.—Though *Chriſtian* mi-"racles may not ſo well ſatisfy them, they "dwell with the higheſt contentment on the "prodigies of *Mooriſh* and *Pagan* countries."

This is ill enough; but the perverſity, I ſpeak of, is much worſe: and that is, when the ſame writer, on different occaſions, aſſumes the *Dogmatiſt* and *Sceptic* on the ſame queſtion; and ſo abuſes both Characters, in all the perverſity of ſelf-contradiction.

For inſtance, how common is it for one of Your writers, when he brings *Pagan* antiquity to contradict and diſcredit the *Jewiſh*, to cry up a Greek hiſtorian as an evidence, to which nothing can be objected? An imperfect hint from *Herodotus*, or *Diodorus*, though one lived a thouſand, and the other fifteen hundred years after the caſe in queſtion, picked up from any

[n] *Characteriſtics*, vol. i. p. 345. edit. 3.

lying

lying traveller the one met with in his rambles, or the other found in his collections, ſhall now outweigh the circumſtantial Hiſtory of *Moſes*, who wrote of his own People, and lived in the times he wrote of. But now turn the tables, and apply the teſtimony of theſe Writers, and of others of the beſt credit of the ſame nation, to the confirmation of the *Jewiſh hiſtory*, and then nothing is more uncertain and fallacious than claſſical Antiquity. All is darkneſs and confuſion: then we are ſure to hear of,

——Quicquid Græcia mendax
Audet in hiſtoria.——

Then *Herodotus* is a lying traveller, and *Diodorus Siculus* a taſteleſs collector.

Again, when the choice and ſeparation of the *Iſraelites* for God's peculiar People, is to be brought in queſtion, and made ridiculous; they are repreſented as the vileſt, the moſt profligate, and perverſe race of men: then every indiſcreet paſſage of a *declamatory Divine* is raked up with care to make them odious; and even the hard fate of the great hiſtorian *Joſephus* pitied, that he had "no better a ſub-"ject than ſuch an illiterate, barbarous, and "ridiculous people [o]." But when the Scripture-account of the treatment, which the Holy *Jeſus* met with from them, is thought fit to

[o] *Diſcourſe of Free-thinking*, p. 157.

be

be diſputed; theſe *Jews* are become an humane and wiſe Nation; which never interfered with the teachings of ſects, or the propagation of opinions, but where the public ſafety was thought to be in danger by ſeditious doctrines.

But ſo it is, even with the BIBLE itſelf, and its beſt interpreter, HUMAN REASON. It is generally allowed that the Author of *the Diſcourſe of Free-thinking*, and of *the Grounds and Reaſons of the* Chriſtian *Religion*, was one and the ſame perſon. Now it being to this man's purpoſe in the firſt pamphlet, to blaſt the credit of the book in general, as a *rule of faith*, the Bible is repreſented as a moſt obſcure, dark, incomprehenſible collection of multifarious tracts. But in his diſcourſe of *The Grounds*, etc. where [p] he is to obviate the reaſon of the difficulty in explaining ancient Propheſies, drawn from the genius of the Eaſtern ſtyle, ſentiment, and manners; this very book is, on a ſudden, become ſo eaſy, plain, and intelligible, that no one can poſſibly miſtake its meaning.

Again, the ſame Writer, where, in his *Eſſay concerning the Uſe of Reaſon*, he thinks fit to diſcredit the doctrine of the ever bleſſed Trinity, and other myſteries of the *Chriſtian faith*, repreſents human reaſon as omniſcient,

[p] *Diſcourſe of Free-thinking*, p. 68. and *of the Grounds and Reaſons of the Chriſtian Religion*, p. 81—2.

and

and the full meaſure of all things: but when the proof of the *immateriality of the ſoul*, from the qualities of MATTER and SPIRIT, is to be obſtinately oppoſed, the ſcene is ſhifted, and we are preſented with a new face of things: then Reaſon becomes weak, ſtaggering, and impotent: then we know not but one quality may be another quality; one mode, another mode; Motion may be conſciouſneſs; and Matter ſentient [q].

Theſe, Gentlemen, are the ſeveral ways in which you have abuſed the LIBERTY OF THE PRESS. One might defy you, with all your good will or invention, to contrive a new one, or to go further in the old: You have done your worſt. It is time to think of growing better. This is the only inference I would draw from your bad conduct. For I am not one of thoſe who ſay you ſhould be disfranchiſed of the Rights you have ſo wantonly and wickedly abuſed. *Natural* rights were leſs precariouſly beſtowed: the *Civil*, indeed, are frequently given on the condition of the Receiver's good behaviour. And this difference, in the ſecurity of the poſſeſſion, is founded in the plaineſt reaſon. *Natural* rights are ſo neceſſary to our Being, that, without them, Life becomes miſerable; but the *Civil* only contributing to our

[q] See his Anſwers to Dr. *Clarke*.

eaſier

eaſier accommodation, in ſome circumſtances of it, may be forfeited without injury to our common Nature.

In a word then, all that we deſire is your amendment; without any ſiniſter aim of calling upon the Magiſtrate to quicken your pace. So I leave you, as I dare ſay will *He*, to yourſelves. Nor let any good man be above meaſure ſcandalized at your faults; or more impatient for your reformation, than mere charity demands. I do not know what panic the preſent growth of Infidelity may have thrown ſome of us into: I, for my part, confide ſo much in the goodneſs of our Cauſe, that I too could be tempted to *laugh* in my turn, while I think of an old ſtory told us by *Herodotus*[r], of your favourite EGYPTIANS; of whom you are like

[r] Lib. ii. c. 14. vid. Plutarch. *Symp.* l. iv. Prob. 5. The learned Gale cannot be reconciled to this kind of huſbandry. He is therefore for having the word Τς, uſed by *Herodotus*, not to ſignify *ſwine*, but *cows* or *heifers*. His authority for this uſe of the word is *Heſychius*. But *Plutarch* is a much better for the other ſignification, who in his *Symp.* quoted above, ſpeaking to the queſtion Πότερον οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι σεβόμενοι τὴν ὗν, *etc.* mentions this very circumſtance of tillage from *Herodotus*, and underſtands by ὗς *ſwine*. The truth of the matter ſeems to be this, *Heſychius* found that ὗς, in ſome obſcure province or other, meant a *Heifer*, as κάπρος amongſt the *Tyrrhenians*, we are told, meant a *goat*, and ſo put it down to inrich his dictionary with an unuſual ſignification.

to

to hear a great deal in the following work. With this tale I ſhall beg leave to conclude my long addreſs unto you.

He tells us then, that at what time their Deity, the NILE, returns into his ancient channel; and the huſbandman hath committed the *good ſeed* to the opening glebe, it was their cuſtom to turn in whole droves of SWINE, to range, to trample, root up, and deſtroy at pleaſure. And now nothing appeared but deſolation, while the ravages of the obſcene herd had killed every chearful hope of future plenty. When on the iſſue, it was ſeen, that all their perverſity and dirty taſte had effected, was only this; that the SEED took better root, incorporated more kindly with the ſoil, and at length ſhot up in a more luxuriant and abundant harveſt.

I am,

GENTLEMEN, *etc.*

PRE-

POSTSCRIPT.

A POET and a Critic*, of equal eminence, have concurred, tho' they did not ſtart together, to cenſure what was occaſionally ſaid in this *Dedication* (as if it had been addreſſed to them) *of the uſe and abuſe of Ridicule.* The Poet was a follower of Lord Shaftſbury's fancies; the Critic a follower of his own. Both Men of TASTE, and equally anxious for the well doing of RIDICULE. I have given ſome account of the latter in a note of the *Dedication*[a]. The other was too full of the ſubject and of himſelf to be diſpatched with ſo little Ceremony: He muſt therefore undergo an examination apart.

Since it is (ſays he) *beyond all contradiction evident, that we have a* natural ſenſe or feeling *of the ridiculous, and ſince ſo good a Reaſon may be aſſigned to juſtify the ſupreme Being for beſtowing it*; ONE CANNOT WITHOUT ASTONISHMENT *reflect on the conduct of thoſe Men who imagine it for the ſervice of true Religion to vilify and blacken it* WITHOUT DISTINCTION, *and endeavour to perſuade us that it*

* See *Pleaſures of Imag.* and *Elements of Criticiſm.*

[a] Page xxi.

is never applied but in a bad cauſe[b]. The Reaſons here given, to ſhew, that *Ridicule* and *Buffoonery* may be properly employed on ſerious and even ſacred ſubjects, is admirable: it is becauſe we have a *natural ſenſe or feeling of the ridiculous*; and becauſe *no ſenſation was given us in vain*; which would ſerve juſt as well to excuſe *Adultery* or *Inceſt*. For have we not as *natural a ſenſe or feeling* of the *voluptuous*? Yes, he will ſay, but this *ſenſe* has its proper object, *virtuous love*, not *adulterous* or *inceſtuous*: And does he think, I will not ſay the ſame of his *ſenſe of the ridiculous*? Its proper objects are, not weighty and Sacred matters, but the civil cuſtoms and common occurrences of life. For he ſtretched a point when he told the Reader, I *vilified and blacken'd it without diſtinction*. The thing I there oppos'd, was *the abuſive way of art and raillery on religious Subjects*. With as little regard to Truth did he ſay, that *I endeavoured to perſuade the Public that it is never applied but in a bad Cauſe*: For, in that very place, I apologized for an eminent Writer who had applied it in a *good* one.

Ridicule (ſays he) *is not* [i. e. ought not to be] *concerned with mere ſpeculative Truth and Falſhood*. Certainly. And, for that very reaſon I would exclude it from thoſe Subjects.

[b] *Phæn. of Imag.* p. 105-6.

What

What need? he will ſay, For when was it ſo employed? When, does he aſk? —— When his Maſter ridiculed the *Subject* of Mr. Locke's ESSAY OF HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, in the manner there mentioned. When the ſame noble Perſon ridiculed REVELATION, in the merry Story of the travelling Gentlemen, who put *a wrong bias on their Reaſon* in order to believe right [c].——

He goes on, *It is not in abſtract Propoſitions on Theorems, but in Actions and Paſſions, Good and Evil, Beauty and Deformity, that we find Materials for it; and all theſe Terms are relative, implying Approbation or Blame.* The reaſon here given, why, not *abſtract Propoſitions*, &c. but *Actions and Paſſions*, &c. are the ſubject of *ridicule* is, becauſe theſe latter are *relative Terms implying Approbation and Blame.* But are not the former as much *relative Terms, implying Aſſent and Denial?* And does not an abſurd Propoſition as frequently afford materials for Ridicule as an abſurd action? Let the Reader determine by what he finds before him. — *To aſk then,* (ſays he) *whether Ridicule be a Teſt of truth, is, in other words, to aſk whether that which is ridiculous can be morally true; can be juſt and becom-*

[c] *Charact.* Vol. III. *Miſc.* 2. c. 3. p. 99.

ing: or whether that which is juſt and becoming can be ridiculous. A queſtion that does not deſerve a ſerious anſwer. However, in civility to his Maſter, or rather indeed to his Maſter's Maſters, the ancient *Sophiſts*, who we are told [d] in the *Characteriſtics*, ſaid ſomething very like it, I ſhall give it a *ſerious anſwer*. For how, I pray, comes it to paſs, that to aſk *whether ridicule be a teſt of truth, is the ſame thing as to aſk whether that which is ridiculous can be morally true?* As if, whatever thing the *teſt of Ridicule* was applied to, muſt needs be *ridiculous*. Might not one aſk *Whether the Copel* [e] *be a teſt of gold*, without incurring any abſurdity in queſtioning, Whether the matter to which the Copel is applied be ſtandard gold. But he takes a *teſt of truth* and a *detection of error* to be one and the ſame thing; and that nothing is brought to *this teſt* but what was known beforehand, whether it was *true* or *falſe*. His Maſter ſeems much better verſed in the uſe of things. [f] *Now, what rule or meaſure* (ſays he) *is there in the world, except in conſidering the real temper of things, to find which are truly ſerious, and which ridiculous? And how can this be done, unleſs by applying the ridicule* TO SEE WHETHER IT WILL BEAR?

[d] *'Twas a ſaying of an ancient Sage, that humour was the only Teſt of Ridicule.* Vol. I. p. 74.

[e] *Coppella*, It. in Engliſh, a *teſt*. [f] *Charact.* Vol. I. p. 12.

But

But if the Reader be curious to ſee to the bottom of this affair, he muſt go a little deeper. Lord Shaftſbury, we find, was willing to know, as every honeſt Man would, Whether thoſe things, which had the appearance of ſeriouſneſs and ſanctity, were indeed what they appeared. The way of coming to this knowledge had been hitherto by the *teſt of reaſon*. But this was too dull and tedious a road for this lively Genius. He would go a ſhorter and a pleaſanter way to work, and do the buſineſs by *ridicule*; given us, as his Diſciple tells us, *to aid the tardy ſteps of Reaſon*. This the noble Author would needs *apply*, to ſee *whether the appearances would bear the Touch*. Now it was this ingenious expedient, to which I thought I had cauſe to object. For when he had applied this *Touch*, and that that, to which it was applied, was found to endure it, what reparation could he make to Truth, for thus placing her in a ridiculous and idle light, in order only, as he pretended, to judge rightly of her? Oh, for that, ſaid his Lordſhip, ſhe has the amends in her own hands: Let her railley again; *for why ſhould fair Honeſty be denied the uſe of his Weapon*[t]? To this ſo wanton a liberty with ſacred Truth, I thought I had many good reaſons to oppoſe; and ſo, it ſeems, thought our Poet likewiſe: Or why did

[t] Charact. Vol. I. p. 128.

he endeavour to excuſe his Maſter, by putting another ſenſe on *the application of ridicule as a Teſt*, which implies that the Truth or Falſhood of the thing tried, is *already known*. But the ſhift is unlucky; for while it covers his Maſter, it expoſes himſelf. For now it may be aſked, what need of ridicule at all, after the Truth is *known*; ſince the ſole uſe of a *teſt*, according to his Maſter, conſiſts in enabling us to *diſcover* the true ſtate of things?

But now he comes to the *Philoſophy* of his Criticiſm on my abſurdity. For *it is moſt evident* (ſays he) *that as in a metaphyſical Propoſition offered to the Underſtanding for its aſſent, the faculty of Reaſon examines the terms of the Propoſition; and finding one Idea, which was ſuppoſed equal to another, to be in fact unequal, of conſequence rejects the Propoſition as a falſhood: So in Objects offered to the Mind for its eſteem or applauſe, the faculty of ridicule feeling an incongruity in the claim, urges the Mind to reject it with laughter and contempt.* And now, how does this ſublime account, of Reaſon and Ridicule, prove the foregoing Propoſition to be abſurd? Juſt as much, I ſuppoſe, as the height of St. Paul's proves GRANTHAM Steeple to ſtand awry.

However, if it cannot *prove* what preceeds, he will try to make it *infer* what follows: *When*

THERE-

THEREFORE (ſays he) *we obſerve ſuch a claim obtruded upon Mankind, and the inconſiſtent circumſtances carefully concealed from the eye of the Public, it is our buſineſs, if the matter be of importance to Society, to drag out thoſe latent circumſtances, and, by ſetting them full in view, convince the World how ridiculous the Claim is; and thus a double advantage is gained; for we both detect the moral Falſhood ſooner than in the way of ſpeculative enquiry, and impreſs the minds of Men with a ſtronger ſenſe of the vanity and error of its Authors. And this, and no more, is meant by the application of Ridicule.* A little *more*, if we may believe his Maſter: who ſays, it is not only to *detect Error*, but to *try Truth*, that is, in his own expreſſion, to ſee *whether it will bear.* But why all this a-do; for now, we ſee, no body miſtook what was *meant by the application of Ridicule*, but himſelf.—As to what he ſaid before, that when *Objects are offered to the Mind for its eſteem and applauſe, the faculty of Ridicule, feeling an incongruity in the Claim, urges the Mind to reject it with laughter and contempt*; it is ſo expreſſed, as if he intended it not for the deſcription of the *Uſe*, but the *eſſence of Ridicule.* But the dealers in this Traſh frequently *urge the Mind to reject* many things with *laughter and contempt*, without *feeling* any other *incongruity*, than in their own pretentions to Truth and Honeſty. And this, our Poet ſeems to be no ſtranger to.

For now he comes to the point.—*But it will ſaid the practice is dangerous, and may be inconſiſtent with the regard we owe to Objects of real dignity and excellence. I anſwer, the practice,* FAIRLY MANAGED, *can never be dangerous.* Who, ever thought any thing, FAIRLY MANAGED to be dangerous? The danger is in the *abuſe* or *unfair management.* The uſe of Stilleto's and Poiſons, FAIRLY MANAGED, can never be dangerous. And yet this has not hindered all wiſe States, whenever they have found a violent propenſity to the handling of theſe things, to forbid their promiſcuous uſe, under the ſevereſt penalties, to prevent abuſe and *unfair management*.

However, he allows at length, that *Men may be diſhoneſt in obtruding circumſtances foreign to the Object; and we may be inadvertent in allowing thoſe circumſtances to impoſe upon us; but*——but what? Why *the* SENSE OF RIDICULE ALWAYS JUDGES RIGHT. And, he had told us before, that this is a *natural ſenſe, and beſtowed upon us by the ſupreme Being, to aid our tardy ſteps in purſuit of Reaſon.* Why, as he ſays, who can withſtand this? Nothing can be clearer! Writers may be diſhoneſt; Readers may be miſled; and, the Public judge wrong. But what then, the *ſenſe of Ridicule always judges right.* And while

we

we can ſupport our *Platonic republic* of *Ideas*, it ſignifies little what becomes of the People, the *Fæces Romuli*. And ſo again it is in the uſe of Poiſons: *Men may be diſhoneſt in obtruding them; and we inadvertent enough* to be *impoſed upon*. But what then? The Virtue of Poiſon always does its kind. *It is a natural power, and beſtowed upon it by the ſupreme Being, to aid our tardy ſteps in purſuit of Vermin.*—In truth, one would imagine, by this extraordinary argument, that the queſtion was not *of the injury to Society* by the abuſe of Ridicule, but *of the injury to Ridicule itſelf*.

But let us hear him out: *The* Socrates *of* Ariſtophanes *is* (it will be ſaid) *as truly a ridiculous character as ever was drawn. True; but it is not the character of* Socrates, *the divine Moraliſt, and Father of ancient Wiſdom*. Indeed!—But then, if, like the true *Soſia*, in the other Comedy, *he* muſt bear the blows of his fictitious Brother, what reparation is there to injured Virtue, to tell us, that he did not deſerve them?

Again,—*What then? Did the ridicule of the Poet hinder the Philoſopher from detecting and diſclaiming thoſe foreign circumſtances which he had falſely introduced into his character, and thus rendering the Satiriſt doubly ridiculous in his turn.* See here again!

again! all his concern, we find, is, leſt good Raillery ſhould be beat at its own weapons. No, indeed, I cannot ſee how it could poſſibly *hinder the Philoſopher from detecting and diſclaiming*. But *this* it did, which ſurely deſerves a little conſideration, it hindered the *People* from *ſeeing* what he had *detected and diſclaimed* —— A mighty conſolation, truly, to the illuſtrious Sufferer that he *diſclaimed* the Fool's Coat they had put upon him!

But what is the Sacrifice of a SOCRATES now and then, to ſecure to us the *free* uſe of that inеſtimable bleſſing, BUFFOONRY? So thinks our Poet; when all the Anſwer he gives to ſo natural, ſo compaſſionate an objection as this,—*it nevertheleſs had an ill influence on the minds of the People*,—is telling us a ſtory of the Atheiſt Spinoza; while the godlike Socrates is left deſerted, in the hands of his Judges; whither RIDICULE, this noble guide of Truth, had ſafely brought him.

But let us hear the concluding anſwer which the *reſpectable* Spinoza is employed to illuſtrate. ——*And ſo* (ſays he) *has the reaſoning of* Spinoza *made many Atheiſts; he has founded it indeed on Suppoſitions utterly falſe; but allow him theſe, and his Concluſions are unavoidably true. And if we muſt reject the uſe of* Ridicule *becauſe, by the impoſition*

of falſe circumſtances, things may be made to ſeem ridiculous, which are not ſo in themſelves, Why we ought not in the ſame manner to reject the uſe of Reaſon, *becauſe, by proceeding on falſe Principles, concluſions will appear true which are impoſſible in Nature, let the* vehement and obſtinate Declaimers *againſt Ridicule determine.*

Nay, we dare truſt it with any one; whoſe common ſenſe is not all run to *Taſte.* What! becauſe REASON, the guide of Life, the ſupport of Religion, the inveſtigator of Truth, muſt be ſtill uſed tho' it be continually ſubject to abuſe; therefore RIDICULE, the paultry buffoon Mimic of REASON, muſt have the ſame indulgence! Becauſe a KING muſt be intruſted with Government, tho' he may miſuſe his power; therefore the King's FOOL ſhall be ſuffered to play the Madman! But upon what footing ſtandeth this extraordinary Claim? Why, we have a *natural ſenſe of the Ridiculous*; and the *Ridiculous has a natural feeling of the Incongruous*; and then —— who can forbear LAUGHING? If to this, you add *Taſte, Beauty, Deformity, Moral-ſenſe, Moral-rectitude, Moral-falſhood,* you have then, I think, the whole Theory of the RIDICULOUS. But who would have imagined, that while he was defending Ridicule from the charge of ABUSE, he ſhould be adding freſh exceptions to his own Plea?

Plea? Not indeed, that the comment diſgrac'd the Text; or that there was much *Incongruity* in pleading for a fault he was juſt then committing. But ſo it is, that, where he is poetically marſhalling the follies of human Life, he places the whole *body of the Chriſtian Clergy* in the foremoſt rank. Amongſt ſuch, who, he tells us, *aſſume ſome deſirable quality or poſſeſſion which evidently does not belong to them* [h],

"Others, of graver Mien, behold; adorn'd
"With holy Enſigns, how *ſublime* they move,
"And, bending oft their *ſanctimonious* Eyes,
"Take homage of the *Simple-minded Throng*,
"AMBASSADORS OF HEAV'N [i].

——But let it go for what it is; A poor joke of his Maſter's [k], and ſpoil'd too in the telling. The *dulneſs* of the *Ridicule* will ſufficiently attone for the *abuſe* of it.

[h] Page 49. [i] Page 96. [k] Charac. Vol. III. p. 336.

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PRE-

PREFACE

TO THE

FIRST EDITION

In MDCCXXXVIII.

THE following ſheets make the *firſt volume* of a work, deſigned to prove the DIVINE ORIGIN OF THE JEWISH RELIGION. As the author was neither indebted, nor engaged to the Public, he hath done his Readers no injury in not giving them more; and had they not had *this*, neither he nor they, perhaps, had eſteemed themſelves loſers. For writing for no Party, it is likely he will pleaſe none; and begging no Protection, it is more likely he will find none: and he muſt have more of the confidence of a modern Writer than falls to his ſhare, to think of making much way with the feeble effort of his own reaſon.

Writers, indeed, have been oft betrayed into ſtrange abſurd concluſions, from I can't tell what obſolete claim, which LETTERS have to the patronage of the GREAT: a relation, if indeed there ever were any, long ſince worn out and forgotten; the *Great* now ſeeming reaſonably well convinced, that it had never any better foundation than the rhetorical importunity of Beggars.

But however this claim of Patronage may be underſtood, there is another of a more important nature; which is the Patronage of RELIGION. The Author begs leave to aſſure Thoſe who have no time to ſpare from their attention on the Public, that the Protection of Religion is indiſpenſably neceſſary to all Governments; and for his warrant he offers them the following volume; which endeavours to ſhew the neceſſity of RELIGION in general, and of the doctrine of a FUTURE STATE in particular, to civil Society, from the nature of things and the univerſal conſent of Mankind. The proving this, I make no queſtion, many Politicians will eſteem ſufficient: But thoſe who are ſolicitous to have Religion TRUE as well as USEFUL, the author will endeavour to ſatisfy in the following volumes.

THE

THE DIVINE LEGATION OF *MOSES* DEMONSTRATED.

BOOK I.

SECT. I.

THE Writers, in defence of revealed Religion, diſtinguiſh their arguments into two ſorts: the one they call the INTERNAL, and the other the EXTERNAL Evidence. Of theſe, the firſt is, in its nature, more ſimple and perfect; and even capable of demonſtration: while the other, made up of very diſſimilar materials, and borrowing aid from without, muſt needs have ſome parts of unequal ſtrength with the reſt; and, conſequently, lie open to the attacks of a willing adverſary. Beſides, the *internal* evidence is, by its nature, perpetuated; and ſo fitted for all ages and occaſions: while the *external*, by length of time, weakens and decays. For the nature and genius of the religion defended afford-

ing the proofs of the firſt kind, theſe materials of defence are inſeparable from its exiſtence; and ſo throughout all ages the ſame. But Time may, and doth efface memorials independent of that exiſtence; out of which the *external* evidence is compoſed: which evidence muſt therefore become more and more imperfect, without being affected by that whimſical and partial calculation, to which a certain *Scotchman*[a] would ſubject it[b]. Nay, of ſuch uſe is the *internal* evidence, that, even the very beſt of the *external* cannot ſupport itſelf without it: for when (for inſtance) the ſupernatural facts done by the founders of our holy faith, are unqueſtionably verified by human teſtimony, the evidence of their divinity will not follow till the nature of that doctrine be examined, for whoſe eſtabliſhment they were performed. Indeed, in the inſtance here given, they muſt be inforced in conjunction before any concluſion can be drawn for the truth of the Revelation in queſtion. But were there no other benefit ariſing from the cultivation of the *internal* evidence than the gaining, by it, a more perfect

[a] Craig. *Theologiæ Chriſt. Principia Mathematica*, *London*, 1699, 4to.

[b] This gradual weakening of the *external evidence* hath in fact actually happened; and was occaſioned by the loſs of ſeveral ancient teſtimonies, both Pagan and Chriſtian, for the truth of Revelation; which learned men, on ſeveral occaſions, have frequently lamented. This is the only way, I ſuppoſe, the *external evidence* can weaken.—As it is of the nature of *true Religion* to ſuffer by time, ſo it is of the nature of the *falſe* to gain by it. "L'Antiquité convient à la Religion (ſays the learned *Préſident de Montſquieu*) parce que ſouvent nous croyons plus les choſes à meſure qu'elles ſont plus reculées; car nous n'avons pas dans la tête des idées acceſſoires tirées de ces temps-là, qui puiſſent les contradire." *L'Eſprit des Loix*, lib. xxvi. c. 2. For whatever Religion, thus circumſtanced, the Writer had then in his thoughts, he muſt needs ſuppoſe it to be a falſe one; it being nonſenſe to ſuppoſe the true ſhould ever be attended with any *external evidence* which argued it of falſehood.

knowledge

knowledge of God's word; this, ſure, would be enough to engage us in a vigorous proſecution of it. That this is one of its fruits I need not tell ſuch as are acquainted with its nature. And it is not without occaſion I take notice of this advantage: for who, in this long controverſy between us and the Deiſts, hath not applied to certain advocates of Revelation, what was formerly ſaid of *Arnobius* and *Lactantius*, *that they undertook the defence of Chriſtianity before they underſtood it?* A misfortune which probably, the more careful ſtudy of the *internal* evidence would have prevented; becauſe no one, well verſed in *that*, could have continued ignorant of ſo important a principle, as that THE DOCTRINE OF REDEMPTION IS OF THE VERY ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY. Notwithſtanding theſe ſuperior advantages, it hath ſo happened, that the *internal* evidence hath been hitherto uſed as an introduction only to the *external:* and while by the *latter*, men have proved our Religion actually divine, they have gone no further with the *former*, than to ſhew it worthy indeed of ſuch original.

What may have occaſioned this neglect, is not ſo eaſy to ſay. Perhaps it was becauſe Writers have, in general, imagined that the difficulties of proſecuting the *internal* method to effect, are not ſo eaſily ſurmounted as thoſe which attend the other; as ſuppoſing that the Writer on the *external* evidence hath only need of the uſual proviſion of church-hiſtory, common diligence, and judgment, to become maſter of his ſubject; while the reaſoner on the *internal* proof, muſt, beſides theſe, have a thorough knowledge of human Nature, civil Policy, the univerſal hiſtory of Mankind, an exact idea of the *Moſaic* and *Chriſtian* Diſpenſations cleared from the froth and grounds of ſchool-ſubtilties, and church-ſyſtems; and, above all, ſhould be bleſſed with a certain ſagacity, to inveſtigate the relations

of human actions, through all the combinations of natural, civil, and moral complexities. What may ſuggeſt this concluſion is, their reflecting, that, in the *external* evidence, each circumſtance, that makes for the truth of revealed Religion, is ſeen to do ſo, as ſoon as known: ſo that the chief labour, here, is to ſearch and pick out ſuch, and to place them in their proper light and ſituation; but that, in proſecuting the *internal* evidence, the caſe is widely different: a circumſtance in the frame and compoſition of this Religion, which perhaps, ſome time or other, may be diſcovered to be a Demonſtration of its divinity, ſhall be ſo far from being generally thought aſſiſtant in its proof, that it ſhall be eſteemed, by moſt, a prejudice againſt it: of which, I ſuppoſe, the ſubject of the following diſcourſe will afford a remarkable Example. And no wonder, that a Religion of divine original, conſtituted to ſerve many admirable ends of Providence, ſhould be full of ſuch complicated myſteries, as filled the learned Apoſtle with aſtoniſhment. On the other hand, this Religion being for the uſe of man, we need not deſpair, when we have attained a proper knowledge of man's nature, and the dependencies thereon, of making ſtill growing diſcoveries, on the *internal* evidence, of the divinity of its original.

Now, though all this may be true; and that, conſequently, it would appear a childiſh arrogance in an ordinary writer, after having ſeen the difficulties attending this method, to hope to overcome them, by the qualities here ſaid to be required; yet no modeſt ſearcher after truth need be diſcouraged. For there are, in revealed Religion, beſides thoſe interior marks of truth, above deſcribed, which require the delicate operation of a great Genius and Maſter-workman to bring out and poliſh, others alſo, no leſs illuſtrious, but more univocal

univocal marks of truth, which God hath been pleaſed to impreſs upon his Diſpenſations; which require no great qualities, but humility, and love of truth, in him, who would from thence attempt *to vindicate the ways of God to man.*

The Subject of this Diſcourſe is one of thoſe illuſtrious marks; from which, the diſcoverer claims no merit from any long, learned, or laborious ſearch. It is honour enough for him that he is the firſt who brings it out to obſervation; if he be indeed the firſt. For the demonſtration is ſo ſtrong and beautiful, and, at the ſame time, appears to be ſo eaſy and ſimple, that one cannot tell whether the pleaſure of the diſcovery, or the wonder that it is now to make, be the greater.

The Medium, I employ, is the Omiſſion of the doctrine of a future ſtate of rewards and puniſhments, in the laws and religion *Moſes* delivered to the *jewiſh* people. By this, I pretend to carry the *internal* evidence much further than uſual; even to the height of which it is capable, moral demonſtration.

Why I chuſe to begin with the defence of *Moſes*, is from obſerving a notion to have ſpread very much of late, even amongſt many who would be thought *Chriſtians*, that the truth of Chriſtianity is independent of the *jewiſh* Diſpenſation: a notion, which was, 'till now, peculiar to the *Socinians*; who go ſo far as to maintain [c], *that the knowledge of the Old Teſtament is not abſolutely neceſſary for Chriſtians:* and, thoſe who profeſs to think more ſoberly, are generally gone into an opinion that the truth of the *jewiſh* Religion is impoſſible to be proved but upon the truth of the *Chriſtian.* As to the firſt ſort of people, if they really imagine Chriſtianity hath no dependence on Judaiſm, they deſerve our compaſſion,

[c] Cuper, adverſ. Tract. Theol. Polit. lib. i.

as being plainly ignorant of the very elements of the Religion they profeſs; however ſuitable the opinion may be to a modern faſhionable notion, not borrowed from, but the ſame with, the *Socinian*, that *Chriſtianity is only the republication of the religion of Nature*. As for the more ſober, it is reaſonable to think, that they fell into the miſtake from a view of difficulties, in the *jewiſh* Diſpenſation, which they judged too ſtubborn to be removed. I may pretend then to their thanks, if I ſucceed, by coming ſo ſeaſonably to their relief; and freeing their reaſonings from a vicious circle, which would firſt prove the *chriſtian* by the *jewiſh*; and then the *jewiſh*, by the *chriſtian* Religion.

Why I chuſe this medium, namely, *the omiſſion of a future ſtate in the jewiſh Diſpenſation*, to prove its divine original, is, *Firſt*, for the ſake of the DEISTS: being enabled hereby to ſhew them, 1. That this very circumſtance of *Omiſſion*, which they pretend to be ſuch an imperfection, as makes the Diſpenſation unworthy the Author to whom we aſcribe it, is, in truth, a Demonſtration that God only could give it. 2. That thoſe ſeveral important paſſages of Scripture, which they charge with obſcurity, injuſtice, and contradiction, are, indeed, full of light, equity, and concord. 3. That their high notions of the antiquity of the Religion and Learning of the *Ægyptians*, which they inceſſantly produce, as *their palmary argument*, to confront and overturn the hiſtory of *Moſes*, do, in an invincible manner, confirm and ſupport it.

Secondly, For the ſake of the JEWS; who will, at the ſame time, be ſhewn, that the nature of the THEOCRACY here delivered, and the OMISSION of the doctrine of a future ſtate in that Diſpenſation, evidently obliges them to look for a more perfect revelation of God's Will.

Third'y,

Thirdly, For the ſake of the SOCINIANS; who will find, that *Chriſtianity* agrees neither with itſelf, nor with *Judaiſm*; neither with the Diſpenſations of God, nor the declared purpoſe of his Son's Miſſion, on their principle, of it's being only a *republication of the religion of Nature.*

In this Demonſtration, therefore, which we ſuppoſe very little ſhort of mathematical certainty, and to which nothing but a mere phyſical poſſibility of the contrary, can be oppoſed, we demand only this ſingle *Poſtulatum*, that hath all the clearneſs of ſelf-evidence; namely,

"That a ſkilful Lawgiver, eſtabliſhing a Religion, "and civil Policy, acts with certain views, and "for certain ends; and not capriciouſly, or with-"out purpoſe or deſign."

This being granted, we erect our Demonſtration on theſe three very clear and ſimple propoſitions:

1. "THAT TO INCULCATE THE DOCTRINE OF "A FUTURE STATE OF REWARDS AND PUNISH-"MENTS, IS NECESSARY TO THE WELL BEING "OF CIVIL SOCIETY.
2. "THAT ALL MANKIND, ESPECIALLY THE "MOST WISE AND LEARNED NATIONS OF AN-"TIQUITY, HAVE CONCURRED IN BELIEVING "AND TEACHING, THAT THIS DOCTRINE WAS "OF SUCH USE TO CIVIL SOCIETY.
3. "THAT THE DOCTRINE OF A FUTURE STATE "OF REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS IS NOT TO "BE FOUND IN, NOR DID MAKE PART OF, "THE MOSAIC DISPENSATION.

Propoſitions ſo clear and evident, that one would think, we might directly proceed to our Concluſion,

THAT

That therefore the law of Moses is of divine original. Which, one or both of the two following syllogisms will evince.

I. Whatſoever Religion and Society have no future ſtate for their ſupport, muſt be ſupported by an extraordinary Providence:
The *Jewiſh* Religion and Society had no future ſtate for their ſupport:
Therefore, the *Jewiſh* Religion and Society were ſupported by an extraordinary Providence.

And again, II. The ancient Lawgivers univerſally believed that ſuch a Religion could be ſupported only by an extraordinary Providence.
Moses, an ancient Lawgiver, verſed in all the wiſdom of *Egypt*, purpoſely inſtituted ſuch a Religion.
Therefore, *Moſes* believed his Religion was ſupported by an extraordinary Providence.

But ſo capricious are men's paſſions, now for paradox, and now for system, that theſe, with all their evidence, have need of a very particular defence; Libertines and Unbelievers denying the major propoſitions of both theſe *Syllogiſms*; and many Bigots amongſt Believers, the minor of the firſt. Theſe paſſions, however different with regard to the objects that excite them, and to the ſubjects in which they are found, have this in common, that they never riſe but on the ruins of Reaſon. The buſineſs of the Religioniſt being to eſtabliſh, if his Underſtanding be too much narrowed, he contracts himſelf into *Syſtem*: and that of the Infidel, to overturn; if his Will be depraved, he, as naturally, runs out into *Paradoxa*. Slavish, or licentious thinking, the two extremes of free enquiry, ſhuts them up from all inſtructive views, or makes them fly out beyond

beyond all reaſonable limits. And as extremes fall eaſily into one another, we ſometimes ſee the oppoſite writers change hands: the Infidel, to ſhew ſomething like coherence in his *paradoxes*, repreſents them as the ſeveral parts of a *ſyſtem*; and the Religioniſt, to give a reliſh to his *ſyſtem*, powders it with *paradoxes:* in which arts, two late *Hibernians*[d], the heroes of their ſeveral parties, were very notably practiſed and diſtinguiſhed.

It was not long then before I found, that the diſcovery of this important truth would ingage me in a full dilucidation of the *Premiſes* of the two *Syllogiſms:* the *Major* of both requiring a ſevere ſearch into the civil Policy, Religion, and Philoſophy of ancient times; and the *Minor*, a detailed account of the nature and genius of the *jewiſh* Diſpenſation. The preſent volume is deſtined to the firſt part of this labour; and the following, to the ſecond. Where, in removing the objections which lie in our way, on both ſides, we ſhall be obliged to ſtretch the inquiry high and wide. But this, always, with an eye to the direction of our great maſter of reaſon[e], *to endeavour, throughout the body of this diſcourſe, that every former part may give ſtrength unto all that follow, and every latter bring ſome light unto all before.*

SECT. II.

THE firſt propoſition, THAT TO INCULCATE THE DOCTRINE OF A FUTURE STATE OF REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS IS NECESSARY TO THE WELL BEING OF CIVIL SOCIETY, I ſhall endeavour to prove, from the nature of man, and the genius of civil ſociety.

[d] See the diſcourſe called *Nazarenus — An Epiſtolary Diſcourſe concerning the Immortality of the Soul. —— Diſſertationes Cypricæ, &c.* [e] Hooker.

The general appetite of ſelf-preſervation being moſt indiſpenſable to every animal, nature hath made it the ſtrongeſt of all. And though, in the rational, this faculty alone might be ſuppoſed ſufficient to anſwer the end, for which that appetite is beſtowed on the others, yet, the better to ſecure that end, nature hath given man, likewiſe, a very conſiderable ſhare of the ſame inſtinct, with which ſhe hath endowed brutes ſo admirably to provide for their preſervation. Now whether it was ſome *plaſtic Nature* that was here in fault, which *Bacon* ſays, *knows not how to keep a mean*[f], or, that it was all owing to the perverſe uſe of human liberty, certain it is, that, borne away with the luſt of gratifying this appetite, man, in a ſtate of nature, ſoon ran into very violent exceſſes; and never thought he had ſufficiently provided for his own being, till he had deprived his fellows of the free enjoyment of theirs. Hence, all thoſe evils of mutual violence, rapine, and ſlaughter, which, in a ſtate of nature, where all are equal, muſt needs be abundant. Becauſe, tho' man, in this ſtate, was not without a law, which exacted puniſhment on evil doers, yet, the adminiſtration of that law not being in common hands, but either in the perſon offended, who being a party would be apt to inforce the puniſhment to exceſs; or elſe in the hands of every one, as the offence was againſt all, and affected the good of each not immediately or directly, would be executed remiſly. And very often, where both theſe executors of the law of nature were diſpoſed, the one to be impartial, and the other not remiſs in the adminiſtration of juſtice, they would yet want ſufficient power to enforce it. Which together, would ſo much inflame the evils above mentioned, that they would ſoon become as general, and as intolerable, as the *Hobbeiſt* repre-

[f] Modum tenere neſcia eſt. *Augm. Scien.*

ſents

ſents them in that ſtate to be, were it not for the reſtraining principle of RELIGION, which kept men from running into the confuſion neceſſarily conſequent on the principle of inordinate ſelf-love. But yet Religion could not operate with ſufficient efficacy, for want, as we obſerved before, of a common Arbiter, who had impartiality fairly to apply the rule of right, and power to enforce its operations. So that theſe two PRINCIPLES were in endleſs jar; in which, Juſtice generally came by the worſt. It was therefore found neceſſary to call in the CIVIL MAGISTRATE as the Ally of *Religion*, to turn the balance.

Jura inventa metu injuſti, fateare neceſſe eſt,
Tempora ſi faſtoſque velis evolvere mundi.

Thus was *Society* invented for a remedy againſt injuſtice; and a *Magiſtrate*, by mutual conſent, appointed, to give a ſanction "to that common meaſure, to which, reaſon teaches us, that creatures "of the ſame rank and ſpecies, promiſcuouſly born "to the ſame advantages of nature and to the uſe "of the ſame faculties, have all an equal right[g]." Where it is to be obſerved, that though ſociety provides for all thoſe conveniences and accommodations of a more elegant life, which man muſt have been content to have lived without, in a ſtate of nature; yet it is more than probable that theſe were never thought of when Society was firſt eſtabliſhed[h]; but that they were the mutual violences and injuſtices,

[g] Locke.

[h] Though the judicious *Hooker* thinks thoſe advantages were principally intended, when man firſt entered into ſociety: *this was the cauſe*, ſays he, *of mens uniting themſelves at firſt into politique ſocieties. Eccl. Pol.* l. i. § 10. His maſter *Ariſtotle*, though extremely conciſe, ſeems to hint, that this was but the ſecondary end of civil ſociety, and that That was the firſt, which we make to be ſo. His words are: γινομένη μὲν οὖν τοῦ ζῆν ἕνεκεν, οὖσα δὲ τοῦ εὖ ζῆν. *Pol.* lib. i. cap. 2.

at length become intolerable, which ſet men upon contriving this generous remedy: Becauſe Evil felt hath a much ſtronger influence on the mind than Good imagined; and the means of removing the one is much eaſier diſcovered, than the way to procure the other. And this, by the wiſe diſpoſition of the Creator; the avoiding pain being neceſſary to our nature; not ſo, the procuring pleaſure. Beſides, the idea of thoſe unexperienced conveniencies would be, at beſt, very obſcure: and how unable men would be, before trial, to judge that Society would beſtow them, we may gueſs by obſerving, how little, even now, the generality of men, who enjoy theſe bleſſings, know or reflect that they are owing to ſociety, or how it procures them; becauſe it doth it neither immediately nor directly. But they would have a very lively ſenſe of evils felt; and could ſee that Society was the remedy, becauſe the very definition of the word would teach them how it becomes ſo. Yet becauſe *civil Society* ſo greatly improves human life, this improvement may be called, and not unaptly, the *ſecondary end* of that Convention. Thus, as *Ariſtotle* accurately obſerves in the words below, that which was at firſt conſtituted for the ſake of *living*, is carried on for the ſake of *happy living*.

This is further ſeen from fact. For we find thoſe ſavage nations[1], which happen to live peaceably out of ſociety, have never once entertained a thought of coming into it, though they perceive all the advantages of that improved condition, in their civilized neighbours, round about them.

Civil Society thus eſtabliſhed, from this time, as the poet ſings,

[1] See § V. iv. 2. where it is ſhewn, how it might happen that men, in a ſtate of nature, might live together in peace; though we have there given the reaſons why they very rarely do.

abſiſtere

abſtinere bello,
Oppida cœperunt munire, & ponere leges,
Ne quis fur eſſet, neu latro, neu quis adulter.

But as before bare RELIGION was no preſervative againſt moral diſorders; ſo now, SOCIETY alone, would be equally unable to prevent them.

1. 1. For *firſt*, its laws can have no further efficacy than to reſtrain men from open tranſgreſſion; while what is done amiſs in private, though equally tending to the public hurt, eſcapes their animadverſion; and man, ſince his entering into Society, would have greatly improved his practice in this ſecret way of miſchief. For now an effectual ſecurity being provided againſt *open violence*, and the inordinate principle of ſelf-love being ſtill the ſame, *ſecret craft* was the art to be improved; and the guards of Society inviting men to a careleſs ſecurity, what advantages this would afford to thoſe hidden miſchiefs which civil laws could not cenſure, is eaſy to conceive.

2. But, *ſecondly*, the influence of civil Laws cannot, in all caſes, be extended even thus far, namely, to reſtrain *open* tranſgreſſion. It cannot *then*, when the ſevere prohibition of one irregularity threatens the bringing on a greater: and this will always be the caſe when the irregularity is owing to the violence of the ſenſual appetites. Hence it hath come to paſs, that no great and opulent Community could ever puniſh *fornication*, in ſuch a ſort as its ill influence on Society was confeſſed to deſerve: becauſe it was always found, that a ſevere reſtraint of this, opened the way to more flagitious luſts.

3. The very attention of civil Laws to their principal object occaſions a further inefficacy in their operations. To underſtand this we muſt conſider, that the care of the State is for the WHOLE, under which *individuals* are conſidered but in the ſecond place, as acceſſaries

acceſſaries only to that *whole*; the conſequence of which is, that, for the ſake of the Aggregate, individuals are ſometimes left neglected; which happens when *general*, rather than *particular* views ingroſs the public attention. Now the care of *Religion* is for PARTICULARS; and a *Whole* has but the ſecond place in its concern. But this is only touched upon to ſhew, in paſſing, the natural remedy for the defects here explained.

4. But this was not all, there was a further inefficacy in human Laws: the Legiſlature, in enquiring into the mutual duties of Citizens, ariſing from their equality of condition, found thoſe duties to be of two kinds: the firſt, they intituled the duties of PERFECT OBLIGATION; becauſe civil Laws could readily, and commodiouſly, and were, of neceſſity, required to enforce their obſervance. The other they called the duties of IMPERFECT OBLIGATION; not, that morality does not as ſtrongly exact them, but becauſe, civil Laws could not conveniently take notice of them; and, that they were ſuppoſed not ſo immediately and vitally to affect the being of Society. Of this latter kind are *gratitude*, *hoſpitality*, *charity*, &c. concerning ſuch, civil Laws, for theſe reaſons, are generally ſilent. And yet, tho' it may be true, that theſe duties, which human Laws thus overlook, may not ſo directly affect Society, it is very certain, that their violation brings on as fatal, though not ſo ſwift deſtruction, as that of the duties of *perfect obligation*. A very competent judge, and who alſo ſpeaks the ſentiment of Antiquity in this matter, hath not ſcrupled to ſay: "Ut ſcias per ſe expetendam eſſe *grati animi adfec-*
"*tionem*, per ſe fugienda res eſt *ingratum* eſſe:
"quoniam nihil æque concordiam humani generis
"diſſociat ac diſtrahit quam hoc vitium [k]."

[k] Seneca *de Benef.* lib. iv. cap. 18.

5. But

5. But ſtill further, beſides theſe duties both of *perfect* and *imperfect* obligation, for the encouraging and enforcing of which, civil Society was invented; Society itſelf begot and produced *a new ſet of duties*, which are, to ſpeak in the mode of the Legiſlature, of *imperfect obligation:* the firſt and principal of which is that antiquated forgotten virtue called the LOVE OF OUR COUNTRY.

6. But *laſtly*, Society not only introduced a new ſet of duties, but likewiſe increaſed and inflamed, to an infinite degree, thoſe inordinate appetites, for whoſe correction it was invented and introduced: like ſome kind of powerful medicines, which, at the very time they are working a cure, heighten the malignity of the diſeaſe. For our wants increaſe, in proportion as the arts of life advance. But in proportion to our wants, ſo is our uneaſineſs;—to our uneaſineſs, ſo our endeavours to remove it—to our endeavours, ſo the weakneſs of *human reſtraint*. Hence it is evident, that in a STATE OF NATURE, where little is conſulted but the ſupport of our being, our wants muſt be few, and our appetites, in proportion, weak; and that in CIVIL SOCIETY, where the arts of life are cultivated, our wants muſt be many, and our appetites, in proportion, ſtrong.

II. Thus far concerning the imperfection of civil Society, with regard to the adminiſtration of that power which it hath, namely of *puniſhing* Tranſgreſſors. We ſhall next conſider its much greater imperfection with regard to that power which it wanteth; namely of *rewarding* the Obedient.

The two great ſanctions of all Law and Command are REWARD and PUNISHMENT. Theſe are generally called the two hinges, on which all kinds of Government turn. And ſo far is certain, and apparent to the common ſenſe of mankind, that whatever laws are not enforced by both theſe ſanctions, will never be obſerved in any degree ſufficient to carry on the ends of civil Society.

Yet, I ſhall now ſhew, from the original conſtitution and nature of this Society, that, it neither had, nor could enforce, the SANCTION OF REWARD.

But, to avoid miſtakes, I deſire it may be obſerved, that by *reward*, muſt needs here be meant, *ſuch as is conferred on every one for obeying the laws of his country*; not ſuch as is beſtowed on particulars, for any eminent ſervice: as by *puniſhment* we underſtand *that which is inflicted on every one for tranſgreſſing the laws*; not *that* which is impoſed on particulars, for neglecting to do all the ſervice in their power.

I make no doubt but this will be called a paradox; nothing being more common in the mouths of politicians[1], than *that the ſanctions of reward and puniſhment are the two pillars of civil government*; and all the modern *Utopias* and ancient ſyſtems of ſpeculative politics derive the whole vigour of their laws from theſe two ſources. In ſupport then of my aſſertion, permit me to inforce the two following propoſitions:

I. That, by the *original conſtitution* of civil Government, the ſanction of rewards *was not* eſtabliſhed by it.

II. That by the very *nature* of civil Government they *could not* be eſtabliſhed.

I. The truth of the firſt propoſition appears from hence. On entering into Society, it was ſtipulated, between the Magiſtrate and People, that *protection* and *obedience* ſhould be the reciprocal conditions of each other. When, therefore, a citizen obeys the laws, that debt on Society is diſcharged by the protection it affordeth him. But, in reſpect to diſobedience, the proceeding is not analogous; (though

[1] Neque ſolum ut Solonis dictum uſurpem, qui & ſapientiſſimus fuit ex ſeptem, & legum ſcriptor ſolus ex ſeptem. Is *rempubli-cam duabus rebus contineri dixit, præmio & pœnâ.* Cic. ad Brutum, Ep. 15.

protection,

protection, as the condition of obedience, implies the withdrawing of it, for diſobedience;) and for theſe reaſons: The effect of withdrawing protection muſt be either expulſion from the Society, or the expoſing the offender to all kind of licence, from others, in it. Society could not practiſe the firſt, without bringing the body politic into a conſumption; nor the latter without throwing it into convulſions. Beſides, the firſt is no puniſhment at all, but by accident; it being only the leaving one Society to enter into another: and the ſecond is a very inadequate puniſhment; for though all obedience be the ſame, and ſo, *uniform protection* a proper return for it; yet diſobedience being of various kinds and degrees, the withdrawing protection, in this latter ſenſe, would be too great a puniſhment for ſome crimes, and too ſmall for others.

This being the caſe, it was ſtipulated that the tranſgreſſor ſhould be ſubject to pecuniary mulcts, corporal infliction, mutilation of members, and capital ſeverities. Hence aroſe the Sanction, and the *only ſanction* of civil Laws: for, that protection is no reward, in the ſenſe which theſe are puniſhments, is plain from hence, that the one is of the eſſence of Society itſelf; the other an occaſional adjunct. But this will further appear by conſidering the oppoſite to protection, which is *expulſion*, or baniſhment; for this is the *natural* conſequence of withdrawing protection. Now this, as we ſaid, is no puniſhment but by accident: and ſo the State underſtood it; as we may collect, even from their manner of employing it *as a puniſhment* on offenders: for baniſhment is of univerſal uſe, with other puniſhments, in all ſocieties. Now where withdrawing protection is inflicted as a puniſhment, the practice of all States hath been to retain their right to obedience from the baniſhed member; though, according to the nature of the thing, conſidered alone, that right be really

diſcharged; obedience and protection, as we obſerved, being reciprocal. But it was neceſſary all ſtates ſhould act in this manner when they inflicted exile as a puniſhment; it being no puniſhment but by accident, when the claim to ſubjection was remitted with it. They had a *right* to act thus; becauſe it was inflicted on an *offender*; who by his very offence had forfeited all claim of advantage from that *reciprocal condition*.

II. The ſecond propoſition is, that by the nature of civil government, *the ſanction of rewards could not be enforced by it*: My reaſon is, becauſe Society could neither diſtinguiſh the objects of its favour; nor reward them, though they were diſtinguiſhed.

I. Firſt, *Society could not diſtinguiſh the objects of its favour*. To inflict puniſhment, there is no need of knowing the *motives* of the offender; but judicially to confer reward on the obedient, there is.

All that civil judicatures do in puniſhing is to find whether the act was *wilfully* committed. They enquire not into the intention or motives any further, or otherwiſe than as they are the marks of *a voluntary act*: and having found it ſo, they concern themſelves no more with the man's motives or principles of acting; but puniſh, without ſcruple, in confidence of the offender's demerit. And this with very good reaſon; becauſe no one of a ſound mind, can be ignorant of the principal offences againſt right, or of the malignity of thoſe offences, but by ſome ſottiſh negligence which hath hindered his information; or ſome brutal paſſion which hath prejudiced his judgment; both which are highly faulty, and deſerve civil puniſhment.

It is otherwiſe in rewarding abſtinence from tranſgreſſion. Here the motive muſt be conſidered: becauſe as *merely doing ill*, i. e. without any *particular* bad motive, deſerves puniſhment, a crime in the caſe of wrong judgment being ever neceſſarily inferred;

ferred; ſo *merely abſtaining from ill*, i. e. without any *particular* good motive, cannot, for that very reaſon, have any merit.

In *judicially rewarding*, therefore, the *motives* muſt be known; but human judicatures cannot know them but by accident: it is only that tribunal, which ſearches the heart, that can penetrate thus far. We conclude, therefore, *that reward cannot, properly, be the ſanction of human laws.*

If it ſhould be ſaid, that though rewards cannot be equitably adminiſtred, as puniſhments may, yet, nothing hinders but that, for the good of Society, all who obſerve the laws ſhould be rewarded, as all who tranſgreſs the laws are puniſhed? The anſwer will lead us to the proof of the ſecond part of this propoſition.

2. That *Society could not* reward, *though it ſhould* diſcover *the objects of its favour*; the reaſon is, becauſe no Society can ever find a fund ſufficient for that purpoſe, without raiſing it on the people as a tax, to pay it back to them as a reward.

But the univerſal practice of Society confirms this reaſoning, and is explained by it; the ſanction of *puniſhments* only having, in all ages and places, been employed to ſecure the obſervance of civil laws. This was ſo remarkable a fact, that it could not eſcape the notice of a certain admirable Wit and ſtudious obſerver of men and manners; who ſpeaks of it as an univerſal defect: *Although we uſually* (ſays he) *call reward and puniſhment the two hinges, upon which all government turns, yet I could never obſerve this maxim to be put in practice by any nation except that of* Lilliput[m]. Thus he introduceth an account of the laws and cuſtoms of an *Utopian* Conſtitution of his own framing; and, for that matter, as good, perhaps, as any of the reſt: and, had he in-

[m] *Gulliver's Travels*, vol. i. p. 97.

tended it as a ſatire againſt ſuch chimerical Commonwealths, nothing could have been more juſt. For all theſe political romancers, from *Plato* to this Author, make civil rewards and puniſhments *the two binges of government.*

I have often wondered what it was, that could lead them from fact, and univerſal practice, in ſo fundamental a point. But without doubt it was this, The deſign of ſuch ſort of writings is to give a perfect pattern of civil Government; and to ſupply the fancied defects in real Societies. The end of government coming firſt under conſideration; and the general practice of Society ſeeming to declare this end to be only, what in truth it is, *ſecurity to our temporal liberty and property*; the ſimplicity of it diſpleaſed, and the plan appeared defective. They imagined, that, by enlarging the bottom, they ſhould ennoble the ſtructure; and, therefore, formed a romantic project of making civil Society ſerve for all the good purpoſes it was even accidentally capable of producing. And thus, inſtead of giving us a true picture of civil Government, they jumbled together all ſorts of Societies into one; and confounded the *religious*, the *literary*, the *mercantile*, the *convivial*, with the CIVIL. Whoever reads them carefully, if indeed they be worth reading carefully, will find that the errors they abound in are all of this nature; and that they ariſe from the loſing, or never having had, a true idea of the ſimple plan of civil Government: a circumſtance which, as we have ſhewn elſewhere[a], hath occaſioned many wrong judgments concerning it. No wonder, then, that this miſtake concerning the *end* of civil Society, drew after it others, concerning the *means*; and this, amongſt the reſt, that *reward was one of the ſanctions of human laws.*

[a] See *The Alliance between Church and State.*

On the whole then, it appears, that civil Society hath not, in itſelf, the *Sanction of rewards*, to ſecure the obſervance of its laws. So true, in this ſenſe likewiſe, is the obſervation of St. *Paul*, that THE LAW WAS NOT MADE FOR THE RIGHTEOUS, BUT FOR THE UNRULY AND DISOBEDIENT.

But it being evident, that the joint ſanctions of rewards and puniſhments are but juſt ſufficient to ſecure the tolerable obſervance of Right (the miſtaken opinion, that theſe are the two hinges of government, ariſing from that evidence) it follows, that, AS RELIGION ONLY CAN SUPPLY THE SANCTION OF REWARDS, WHICH SOCIETY NEEDS, AND HATH NOT; RELIGION IS ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY TO CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

Thus, on the whole we ſee, I. That Society, by its own proper power, cannot provide for the obſervance of above one third part of moral duties; and of that third, but imperfectly. We ſee likewiſe, how, by the peculiar influence of its nature, it enlarges the duty of the Citizen, at the ſame time that it leſſens his natural ability to perform it.

II. We ſee, which is a thing of far greater conſequence, that Society totally wants one of thoſe two ſanctions which are owned by all to be the neceſſary hinges on which government turns, and without which it cannot be ſupported.

To ſupply theſe wants and imperfections, ſome other coactive power muſt be added, (which hath its influence on the mind of man) to keep ſociety from running back into confuſion. But there is no other than the power of RELIGION; which, teaching an over-ruling Providence, the Rewarder of good men, and the Puniſher of ill, can oblige to the duties of *imperfect obligation*, which human laws overlook: and teaching alſo, that this Providence is omniſcient, that it ſees the moſt ſecret actions and intentions of men, and hath given laws for the perfecting their

nature, will oblige to thoſe duties of *perfect obligation*, which human laws cannot reach, or ſufficiently enforce.

Thus have we explained in general, the mutual aid, *religion* and *civil policy* lend to one another: not unlike that which two Allies, in the ſame quarrel, may reciprocally receive againſt a common enemy: While one party is cloſely preſſed, the other comes up to its relief; diſengages the firſt; gives it time to rally, and repair its force: By this time the aſſiſting party is puſhed in its turn, and needs the aid of that which it relieved; which is now at hand to repay the obligation. From henceforth the two parties act in conjunction; and, by that means, keep the common enemy at a ſtand.

Having thus proved the ſervice of Religion in general, to Society; and ſhewn after what manner it is performed, we are enabled to proceed to the proof of the propoſition in queſtion: For by what hath been ſaid, it appears that Religion doth this ſervice ſolely, *as it teacheth a Providence, the rewarder of good men, and the puniſher of evil:* ſo that although it were poſſible, as I think it is not[a], that there could be ſuch a thing as a Religion not founded on the doctrine of a Providence; yet, it is evident, ſuch a Religion would be of no manner of uſe to Society. Whatſoever therefore is neceſſary for the ſupport of this doctrine is mediately neceſſary for the well-being of Society. Now the doctrine of A FUTURE STATE of rewards and puniſhments is abſolutely and indiſpenſably neceſſary for the ſupport of the general doctrine of providence, under its preſent diſpenſations in this life; as we ſhall now ſhew.

[a] St. *Paul* ſuppoſes there can no more be a Religion without a Providence, than without a God: *He that cometh to God, muſt believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder of them that diligently ſeek him.*

Religion

Religion eſtabliſhing a Providence, the rewarder of virtue, and the puniſher of vice, men naturally expect to find the conſtant and univocal marks of ſuch an adminiſtration. But the hiſtory of mankind, nay even of every one's own neighbourhood, would ſoon inform the moſt indiligent obſerver, that the affairs of men wear a face of great irregularity: the ſcene, that ever and anon preſents itſelf, being of diſtreſſed virtue, and proſperous wickedneſs; which unavoidably brings the embarraſſed Religioniſt to the neceſſity of giving up his belief, or finding out the ſolution of theſe untoward appearances. His firſt reflexion might perhaps be with the poet [P]:

omnia rebar
Conſilio firmata Dei; qui lege moveri
Sidera, qui fruges diverſo tempore naſci,——
Sed cum res hominum tanta caligine volvi
Adſpicerem, lætoſque diu florere nocentes,
Vexarique pios, rurſus LABEFACTA CADEBAT
RELIGIO.

But, on ſecond thoughts, Reaſon, that, from the admirable frame and harmony of the material univerſe, taught him that there muſt needs be a ſuperintending Providence, to influence that order which all its parts preſerve, for the ſake of the Whole, in their continued revolutions, would ſoon inſtruct him in the abſurdity of ſuppoſing, that the ſame care did not extend to Man, a creature of a far nobler nature than the moſt conſiderable of inanimate beings. And therefore human affairs not being diſpenſed, at preſent, agreeably to that ſuperintendence, he muſt conclude, that Man ſhall exiſt after death, and be brought to a future reckoning in another life, where all accounts will be ſet even, and all the preſent obſcurities and perplexities in the ways

[P] *Claud.*

of Providence unfolded and explained. From hence Religion acquires reſiſtleſs force and ſplendor; and riſes on a ſolid and unſhaken baſis[9].

Now this doctrine of a FUTURE STATE being the only ſupport of Religion under the preſent and ordinary diſpenſations of providence, we conclude (which was what we had to prove) that the *inculcating this* doctrine *is* NECESSARY *to the well-being of Society.*

That it was the general ſentiment of mankind, we ſhall ſee hereafter; where it will be ſhewn, that there never was, in any time or place, a civilized People (the *Jewiſh* only excepted) who did not found their Religion on this doctrine, as being conſcious it could not be ſuſtained without it. And as for the neceſſity of Religion itſelf to Society, the very enemies of all Religion are the loudeſt to confeſs it. For, from this apparent truth, the Atheiſt of old formed his famous argument againſt the divine origin of Religion; which makes ſo great a figure in the common ſyſtems of infidelity. Here then, even on our adverſary's confeſſion, we might reſt our cauſe; but that we find (ſo inconſtant and perverſe is irreligion) ſome modern Apologiſts for Atheiſm have abandoned the ſyſtem of their predeceſſors, and choſen rather to give up an

[9] Hear an unexceptionable evidence to this whole matter: Et quidem (ſays the free-thinking Lord *Herbert*) præmium bonis, & ſupplicium malis, vel hac in vita, vel poſt hanc vitam dari, ſtatuebant Gentiles. —Nihil mage congruum naturæ divinæ eſſe docuerant, tum philoſophorum tum theologorum Gentilium præcipuorum ſcholæ, quam ut bona bonis, mala malis remetiretur Deus. Cæterum quum id quoque cernerent, quemadmodum viri boni calamitatibus miſeriiſque oppreſſi heic jacerent; mali improbique e contra lautitiis omnibus affluerent; certiſſimis ex juſtitia bonitateque divina argumentis deductis, bonis poſt hanc vitam præmium condignum, malis pœnam dari credebant: SECUS ENIM SI ESSET, NULLAM NEQUE JUSTITIÆ NEQUE BONITATIS DIVINÆ RATIONEM CONSTARE POSSE. *De religione Gentilium*, cap. *Præmium vel pœna.*

argument

argument againſt the divine original of religion, than acknowledge the civil uſe of it: which with much frankneſs and confidence they have adventured to deny.

Theſe therefore having endeavoured to cut away the very ground we ſtand upon, in proof of our propoſition, it will be proper to examine their pretenſions.

SECT. III.

THE three great Advocates for this paradox are commonly reckoned POMPONATIUS, CARDAN, and BAYLE; who are put together, without diſtinction: whereas nothing is more certain than that, although *Cardan* and *Bayle* indeed defended it, *Pomponatius* was of a very different opinion: but *Bayle* had entered him into this ſervice; and ſo great is *Bayle*'s authority, that nobody perceived the deluſion. It will be but juſtice then to give *Pomponatius* a fair hearing, and let him ſpeak for himſelf.

This learned *Italian*, a famous Peripatetic of the fifteenth century, wrote a treatiſe [r] to prove that, on the principles of *Ariſtotle*, it could not be proved that the ſoul was immortal: But the doctrine of the mortality of the ſoul being generally thought to have very pernicious conſequences, he conceived it lay upon him to ſay ſomething to that objection. In his xiii^th^ chapter, therefore,

[r] *De Immortalitate Animæ*, printed in 12mo *An.* 1534. It is of him chiefly that the celebrated *Melchior Canus* ſeems to ſpeak, in the following words: "Audivimus Italos quoſdam, qui ſuis "& *Ariſtoteli* & Averroi tantum temporis dant, quantum ſacris "literis ii, qui maximè ſacrâ doctrina delectantur; tantum vero "fidei, quantum Apoſtolis & Evangeliſtis ii qui maximè ſunt in "Chriſti doctrinam religioſi. Ex quo nata ſunt in Italia peſti"fera illa dogmata *de mortalitate animi*, & divina circa res hu"manas *improvidentia*, ſi verum eſt quod dicitur." *De Ariſt. diſput.* l. x. *De locis*, c. 5.

he

he enumerates thoſe conſequences; and in the xiv^th^, gives diſtinct anſwers to each of them. That which ſuppoſeth his doctrine to affect ſociety, is expreſſed in theſe words: "*Obj.* 2. In the ſecond "place, a man perſuaded of the mortality of the "ſoul ought in no caſe, even in the moſt urgent, "to prefer death to life: And ſo, fortitude, which "teaches us to deſpiſe death, and, when our "country, or the public good requires, even "to chuſe it, would be no more. Nor on ſuch "principles ſhould we hazard life for a friend: on "the contrary, we ſhould commit any wicked-"neſs rather than undergo the loſs of it: which is "contrary to what *Ariſtotle* teacheth in his Ethics[s]." His reply to this, in the following chapter, is, that *virtue requires we ſhould die for our country or our friends; and that virtue is never ſo perfect as when it brings no dower with it:* But then he ſubjoins, "Philoſophers, and the learned, only know "what pleaſures the practice of virtue can pro-"cure; and what miſery attends ignorance and "vice:—but men not underſtanding the excel-"lence of virtue, and deformity of vice, would "commit any wickedneſs rather than ſubmit to "death: To bridle therefore their unruly appe-"tites, they were taught to be influenced by hope of "reward, and fear of puniſhment[t]."—This is

[s] Secundò, quia ſtante animi humani mortalitate, homo in nullo caſu, quantumcunque urgentiſſimo, deberet eligere mortem: & ſic removeretur fortitudo, quæ præcipit contemnere mortem, & quod pro patria & bono publico debemus mortem eligere: neque pro amico deberemus exponere animam noſtram; imo quodcunque ſcelus & nefas perpetrare magis quam mortem ſubire: quod eſt contra Ariſt. 3 Ethic. & 9 ejuſdem. P. 99.

[t] Soli enim philoſophi & ſtudioſi, ut dicit Ariſt. 6 Ethic. ſciunt quantam delectationem generent virtutes, & quantam miſeriam ignorantia & vitia.—Sed quod homines non cognoſcentes excellentiam virtutis & fœditatem vitii, omne ſcelus perpetrarent, priuſquam mori: quare ad refrænandum diras hominum cupiditates, data eſt ſpes præmii & timor punitionis. P. 119.

enough

enough to ſhew what *Pomponatius* thought of the neceſſity of Religion to the State. He gives up ſo much of the objection as urges the ill conſequence of the doctrine of the mortality to mankind in general; but in ſo doing hath not betrayed the cauſe he undertook: which was to prove that the belief of the mortality of the ſoul would have no ill influence on the practice of a learned Peripatetic: he pretends not that it would have no evil influence on the groſs body of mankind to the prejudice of Society. This appears from the nature and deſign of the treatiſe; written entirely on peripatetic principles, to explain a point in that philoſophy: by the force of which explanation, whoever was perſuaded of the mortality of the ſoul, muſt give his aſſent on thoſe principles; principles only fitted to influence learned men. It was his buſineſs therefore to examine, what effects this belief would have on ſuch, and on ſuch only. And this, it muſt be owned, he hath done with dexterity enough. But that this belief would be moſt pernicious to the body of mankind in general, he confeſſes with all ingenuity. And as his own words are the fulleſt proof that he thought with the reſt of the world, concerning the influence of Religion, and particularly of the doctrine of a future ſtate of rewards and puniſhments, on Society, I ſhall beg leave to tranſcribe them at large. "There "are ſome men of ſo ingenuous and well framed a "nature, that they are brought to the practice of "virtue from the ſole conſideration of its dignity; "and are kept from vice on the bare proſpect of its "baſeneſs: but ſuch excellent perſons are very rare. "Others there are of a ſomewhat leſs heroic turn of "mind; and theſe, beſides the dignity of virtue, "and the baſeneſs of vice, are worked upon by "fame and honours, by infamy and diſgrace, to

"ſhun

" ſhun evil and perſevere in good: Theſe are of the
" ſecond claſs of men. Others again are kept in
" order by the hope of ſome real benefit, or the
" dread of corporal puniſhment; wherefore that
" ſuch may follow virtue, the Politician hath con-
" trived to allure them by dignities, poſſeſſions, and
" things of the like nature; inflicting mulcts, de-
" gradations, mutilations, and capital puniſhments,
" to deter them from wickedneſs. There are yet
" others of ſo intractable and perverſe a ſpirit, that
" nothing even of this can move them, as daily
" experience ſhews; for theſe, therefore, it was,
" that the Politician invented *the doctrine of a future*
" *ſtate*; where eternal rewards are reſerved for the
" virtuous, and eternal puniſhments, which have
" the more powerful influence of the two, for the
" wicked. For the greater part of thoſe who live
" well, do ſo, rather for fear of the puniſhment,
" than out of appetite to the reward: for miſery is
" better known to man, than that immeaſurable
" good which Religion promiſeth: And therefore
" as this laſt contrivance may be directed to promote
" the welfare of men of all conditions and degrees,
" the Legiſlator, intent on public good, and ſeeing
" a general propenſity to evil, eſtabliſhed the do-
" ctrine of the IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL.
" Little ſolicitous for *truth*, in all this, but intent
" only on *utility*, that he might draw mankind to
" virtue. Nor is he to be blamed: for as the phy-
" ſician deceives his patient in order to reſtore his
" health, ſo the lawgiver invents apologues to form
" the manners of his people. Indeed were all of
" that noble turn of mind with thoſe enumerated
" under the firſt claſs, then would they all, even on
" the ſuppoſition of the ſoul's mortality, exactly
" perform their mutual duties to one another. *But*
" *as there are, upon the matter, none of this diſpoſi-*
" *tion,*

" *tion*, he muſt, of neceſſity, have recourſe to arts [u], " more fitted to the general diſpoſition."

After all this, it is ſurprizing that Mr. *Bayle* ſhould ſo far miſtake this book, as to imagine the author argues in it *againſt the uſefulneſs of religion to ſociety:* eſpecially, when we conſider that Mr. *Bayle* appears to have examined the book ſo nearly as to be able to confute a common error concerning it, namely, *that it was wrote to prove the mortality of the ſoul:* Whereas he ſhews, that it was wrote only to prove, that, on the principles of *Ariſtotle*, neither that, nor the contrary, could be demonſtrated. But let us hear him: " That which *Pomponatius*

[u] Aliqui ſunt homines ingenui, & bene inſtitutæ naturæ, adeo quod ad virtutem inducuntur ex ſola virtutis nobilitate, & a vitio retrahuntur ex ſola ejus fœditate: & hi optimè diſpoſiti ſunt, licet perpauci ſunt. Aliqui vero ſunt minus bene diſpoſiti; & hi præter nobilitatem virtutis, & fœditatem vitii, ex præmiis, laudibus, & honoribus; ex pœnis, vituperiis, & infamia, ſtudioſa operantur, & vitia fugiunt; & hi in ſecundo gradu ſunt. Aliqui vero propter ſpem alicujus boni, & timore pœnæ corporalis ſtudioſi efficiuntur: quare, ut tales virtutem conſequantur, ſtatuunt politici vel aurum, vel dignitatem, vel aliquid tale; ut vitia vero fugiant, ſtatuunt vel in pecunia, vel in honore, vel in corpore, ſeu mutilando membrum, ſeu occidendo puniri. Quidam vero ex ferocitate & perverſitate naturæ, nullo horum moventur, ut quotidiana docet experientia; ideo poſuerunt virtuoſis in alia vita præmia æterna, vitioſis vero æterna damna, quæ maxime terrerent: majorque pars hominum, ſi bonum operatur, magis ex metu æterni damni quam ſpe æterni boni operatur bonum, cum damna ſunt magis nobis cognita quam illa bona æterna: & quoniam hoc ultimum ingenium omnibus hominibus poteſt prodeſſe, cujuſcunque gradus ſint, reſpiciens legiſlator pronitatem viarum ad malum, intendens communi bono, ſanxit animam eſſe immortalem, non curans de veritate, ſed tantum de probitate, ut inducat homines ad virtutem. Neque accuſandus eſt politicus: ſicut namque medicus multa fingit, ut ægro ſanitatem reſtituat; ſic politicus apologos format, ut cives rectificet.—Si omnes homines eſſent in illo primo gradu enumerato, ſtante etiam animorum mortalitate, ſtudioſi fierent; ſed quaſi nulli ſunt illius diſpoſitionis; quare aliis ingeniis incedere neceſſe fuit.—Pag. 123, 124, 125.

" hath

"hath replied to the reaſoning borrowed from "hence, that the doctrine of the mortality of the "ſoul would invite men to all ſort of crimes, de- "ſerves to be conſidered[x]." And then he produces thoſe arguments of *Pomponatius*, which we have given above, *of the natural excellence of virtue, and deformity of vice; that happineſs conſiſts in the practice of the one, and miſery in that of the other, &c.* Theſe he calls *poor ſolutions:* Indeed *poor* enough, had it been, as Mr. *Bayle* ſuppoſes, *Pomponatius*'s deſign to prove that the doctrine of the *mortality* of the ſoul did not invite the generality of men to wickedneſs: for the account given by *Pomponatius* himſelf of the origin of the contrary doctrine, ſhews, that, but for this, they would have run headlong into vice. But ſuppoſing the Peripatetic's deſign to be, as indeed it was, to prove that the doctrine of the *mortality* would have no ill influence on the learned followers of *Ariſtotle*, then theſe arguments, which Mr. *Bayle* calls *poor ones*, will be found to have their weight. But he goes on, and tells us, *that* Pomponatius *brings a better argument from fact, where he takes notice of ſeveral, who denied the immortality of the ſoul, and yet lived as well as their believing neighbours.* This is indeed a good argument to the purpoſe, for which it is employed by *Pomponatius*; but whether it be ſo to that, for which, Mr. *Bayle* imagined, he employed it, ſhall be conſidered hereafter, when we come to meet with it again in this later writer's apology for atheiſm. But Mr. *Bayle* was ſo full of his own *favourite queſtion*, that he did not give due attention to *Pomponatius*'s; and having, as I obſerved above, refuted a vulgar error with regard to this famous tract, and imagining that

[x] Ce que Pomponace a repondu à la raiſon empruntée de ce que le dogme de la mortalité de l'ame porteroit les hommes à toutes ſortes de crimes, eſt digne de conſideration. *Dict. Hiſt. & Crit.* Art. (Pomponace) Rem. (H.)

the

the impiety, ſo generally charged on it, was ſolely founded in that error, he goes on inſulting the enemies of *Pomponatius* in this manner: "If the charge "of impiety, of which *Pomponatius* hath been ac- "cuſed, was only founded on his book *of the im-* "*mortality of the ſoul*, we muſt needs ſay there was "never any accuſation more impertinent or a ſtrong- "er inſtance of the iniquitous perverſity of the per- "ſecutors of the philoſophers[w]." But *Pomponatius* will not be ſo eaſily ſet clear: For let him think as he would concerning the ſoul, yet the account he gives of the origin of Religion, as the contrivance of ſtateſmen, here produced, from this very tract *De immortalitate animæ*, is ſo highly impious, that his enemies will be hardly perſuaded to give it a ſofter name than downright atheiſm. Nor is it impiety in general, of which, we endeavour to acquit him, but only that ſpecies of it, which teaches *that Religion is uſeleſs to Society.* And this we think we have done; although it be by ſhewing him to have run into the oppoſite extreme, which would inſinuate that it was *the creature of politicks.*

Cardan comes next to be conſidered: and him no body hath injured. He, too, is under *Bayle*'s deluſion, concerning *Pomponatius*: For, writing on the ſame ſubject[x], he borrows the Peripatetic's arguments to prove that *Religion was even pernicious to Society.* This was ſo bold a ſtroke, that Mr. *Bayle*, who generally follows him pretty cloſely, drops him here: Nor do I know that he ever had a ſecond, except it was the unhappy philoſopher of *Malmſbury*; who ſcorning to argue upon the matter, imperiouſly pronounced, that he who preſumed to propagate Reli-

[w] Si l'on n'a fondé les impietez, dont on l'accuſe, que ſur ſon livre *de l'immortalité de l'ame*, il n'y eut jamais d'accuſation plus impertinente, que celle-la, ni qui ſoit une marque plus expreſſe de l'entetement inique des perſecuteurs des philoſophes.

[x] *De immortalitate animorum liber*, Lugd. ap. Gryph. 1545.

gion in a Society, without leave of the Magiſtrate, was guilty of the crime of *Leſe Majeſty*, as introducing a power ſuperior to the *Leviathan*'s. But it would be unpardonable to keep the reader much longer on this poor lunatic *Italian, in whom*, as Mr. *Bayle* pleaſantly obſerves, *ſenſe was, at beſt, but an appendix to his folly*[y]. Beſides, there is little in that tract, but what he ſtole from *Pomponatius*; the ſtrength of which, to ſupport *Cardan*'s paradox, hath been conſidered already; or what Mr. *Bayle* hath borrowed from him; the force of which ſhall be conſidered hereafter: But that little is ſo peculiarly his own, that as no other can claim the property, ſo no one hath hitherto uſurped the uſe. Which yet, however, is remarkable: for there is no traſh ſo worthleſs, but what ſome time or other finds a place in a Free-thinker's ſyſtem. We will not deſpair then but that this paltry rubbiſh may one day or other have an honourable ſtation in ſome of theſe faſhionable fabricks. And, not to hinder its ſpeedy preferment, I ſhall here give it the reader in its full force, without anſwer or reply. He brings the following argument to prove that the doctrine of the *immortality* of the ſoul is even deſtructive to ſociety:—

[y] The charming picture he draws of himſelf, and which he excuſes no otherwiſe than by laying the fault on his STARS, will hardly prejudice any one in favour of his opinions. How far it reſembles any other of the brotherhood, they beſt know, who have examined the genius of modern infidelity. However thus he ſpeaks of his own amiable turn of Mind: "In diem "viventem, nugacem, religionis contemptorem, injuriæ illatæ "memorem, invidum, triſtem, inſidiatorem, proditorem, ma- "gum, incantatorem, ſuorum oſorem, turpi libidini deditum, "ſolitarium, inamœnum, auſterum; ſponte etiam divinantem, "zelotypum, obſcœnum, laſcivum, maledicum, varium, anci- "pitem, impurum, calumniatorem, &c." We have had many *Free-thinkers*, but few ſuch *Free-ſpeakers*. But though theſe ſort of writers are not uſed to give us ſo *direct* a picture of themſelves, yet it hath been obſerved, that they have unawares copied from their own tempers, in the ungracious drawings they have made of HUMAN NATURE and RELIGION.

" From this flattering notion of a FUTURE STATE, " ill men get opportunity to compaſs their wicked " deſigns: and, on the ſame account, good men ſuf- " fer themſelves to be injuriouſly treated. Civil " Laws, relying on this fanciful aſſiſtance, relax their " neceſſary ſeverity; and *thus* is the opinion produc- " tive of much miſchief to mankind [z]." And then, by another argument as good, he ſhews the benefits accruing to the ſtate from the belief of the ſoul's *mortality*: " Thoſe who maintain that the ſoul dies " with the body, muſt needs be, by their principles, " honeſter men than others, becauſe they have a pe- " culiar intereſt in preſerving their reputation; this " being the only future property they pretend to: " And the Profeſſion of the Soul's mortality being " generally eſteemed as ſcandalous as that of uſury, " ſuch men will be moſt exact and ſcrupulous in " point of honour, as your uſurer, to keep up the " credit of his calling, is of all men the moſt reli- " gious obſerver of his word [a]."

SECT. IV.

MR. BAYLE, the laſt ſupporter of this paradox, is of a very different character from theſe *Italian* Sophiſts: A writer, who, to the utmoſt ſtrength and clearneſs of reaſoning, hath added all the livelineſs, and delicacy of wit: who pervading human nature at his eaſe, ſtruck into the province of PARADOX, as an exerciſe for the unwearied vigour of his mind: who, with a ſoul ſuperior to the ſharpeſt attacks of fortune, and a heart practiſed to the beſt philoſophy, had not yet enough of real greatneſs, to overcome that laſt foible of ſuperior minds, the temptation of honour, which the ACA-

[z] *De immortalitate animorum*, cap. ii. [a] Cap. xxxiii. ejuſd. tract.

DEMIC EXERCISE OF WIT is conceived to bring to its profeſſors.

A writer of this character will deſerve a particular regard: For *paradoxes*, which in the hands of a *Toland* or a *Tindal* end in rank offenſive impiety, will, under the management of a BAYLE, always afford ſomething for uſe or curioſity: Thus, in the very work we are about to examine[b], the many admirable obſervations on the nature and genius of polytheiſm, happen to be a full anſwer to all which the Author of *Chriſtianity as old as the creation* hath advanced againſt the uſe of revelation. For a ſkilful chemiſt, though diſappointed in his *grand magiſterium*, yet often diſcovers, by the way, ſome uſeful and noble medicament; while the ignorant pretender to the art, not only loſes his labour, but fills all about him with the poiſonous ſteams of *ſublimate*.

The *profeſſed* deſign of Mr. *Bayle*'s work is to enquire, *which is leaſt hurtful to mankind, ancient idolatry, or modern atheiſm:* And had he confined himſelf to that ſubject, we had had no concern with him, but ſhould have left him in the hands of Meſſ. *Jacquelot* and *Bernard*. I freely own they are both ſtark naught: All the difference is, that Atheiſm directly excludes and deſtroys the *true* ſenſe of moral right and wrong; and Polytheiſm ſets up a *falſe* ſpecies of it.

But the more particular, though leſs avowed, purpoſe of this elaborate treatiſe is to prove, that *Atheiſm is not deſtructive of Society*; and here he falls under our notice; no diſtinct anſwer, that I know of, having been yet attempted to this part of his performance.

[b] Penſées diverſes, ecrites à un docteur de Sorbonne à l'occaſion de la comete qui parût au Mois de Decembre, 1680. &— Continuation des Penſées diverſes, &c. ou Reponſe à pluſieurs difficultez, &c.

His

His arguments in ſupport of this Paradox, are occaſionally, and ſo without any method, interſperſed throughout that large work: But, to give them all the advantage they are capable of, I have here collected and diſpoſed them in ſuch order, that they mutually ſupport, and come in to the aid of one another.

It had been generally eſteemed a proof of the deſtructive nature of Atheiſm to Society, that *this principle excludes the knowledge of moral good and evil*; ſuch knowledge being, as will be ſeen, poſterior to the knowledge of a God. His firſt argument therefore for the *innocence of atheiſm* is,

I. "That an Atheiſt may have an idea of the "moral difference between good and evil, becauſe "Atheiſts, as well as Theiſts, may comprehend the "firſt principles of morals and metaphyſics, from "which this difference may be deduced. And in "fact (he ſays) both the *Epicurean* atheiſt, who de-"nied the providence of God, and the *Stratonic* "atheiſt, who denied his Being, had this idea[c]."

This often repeated argument is ſo looſely expreſſed, that it is capable of many meanings; in ſome of which the aſſertion is true, but not to the purpoſe; in others to the purpoſe, but not true. Therefore before any preciſe anſwer can be given to it, it will be neceſſary to trace up moral duty to its firſt principles. And though an enquiry of this ſort ſhould not prove the moſt amuſing either to myſelf or my reader, it may be found however to deſerve our pains. For a ſpirit of diſpute and refinement hath ſo entangled and confounded all our concluſions on a ſubject, in itſelf, very clear and intel-

[c] Voiez les Penſées diverſes, cap. clxxxiii. & ſuiv. & l'addition à ces Penſées, cap. iv. Reponſe à la 10. & à la 13. objections, & la Continuation des Penſ. div. cap. cxliii.

ligible, that I am perſuaded, were MORALITY herſelf, of which the *ancients* made a Goddeſs, to appear in perſon amongſt men, and be queſtioned concerning her birth, ſhe would be tempted to anſwer as *Homer* does in *Lucian*, that her commentators had ſo learnedly embarraſſed the diſpute, that ſhe was now as much at a loſs as They to account for her original.

To proceed therefore with all poſſible brevity: Each animal hath its *inſtinct* implanted by nature to direct it to its greateſt good. Amongſt theſe, man hath his; to which modern philoſophers have given the name of

1. The MORAL SENSE: whereby we conceive and feel a pleaſure in right, and a diſtaſte and averſion to wrong, prior to all reflexion on their natures, or their conſequences. This is the firſt inlet to the *adequate idea of morality*; and, plainly, the moſt extenſive of all; the Atheiſt as well as Theiſt having it. When inſtinct had gone thus far,

2. The *reaſoning faculty* improved upon its dictates: For, men led by reflexion to examine the foundation of this *moral ſenſe*, ſoon diſcovered that there were real eſſential differences in the qualities of human actions, eſtabliſhed by nature; and, conſequently, that the love and hatred excited by the *moral ſenſe* were not capricious in their operations; for, that in the eſſential properties of their objects there was a SPECIFIC DIFFERENCE. Reaſon having gone thus far, (and thus far too it might conduct the *Stratonic* atheiſt) it ſtopped; and ſaw that ſomething was ſtill wanting whereon to eſtabliſh the MORALITY, properly ſo called, OF ACTIONS, that is, an OBLIGATION on men to perform ſome, and to avoid others; and that, to find this ſomething, there was need of calling in other principles to its aſſiſtance: Becauſe nothing can thus *oblige* but

3. A *ſuperior* WILL: And ſuch a *will* could not be found till the being and attributes of God were eſtabliſhed; but was diſcovered with them.

Hence aroſe, and only from hence, a MORAL DIFFERENCE. From this time human actions became the ſubject of *obligation*, and not till now: For though INSTINCT felt a difference in actions; and REASON diſcovered that this difference was founded in the nature of things; yet it was WILL only which could make a compliance with that difference a DUTY.

On theſe three Principles therefore, namely *the moral ſenſe*, *the eſſential difference in human actions*, and the *will of God*, is built the whole edifice of *practical morality:* Each of which hath its diſtinct motive to enforce it; Compliance with *the moral ſenſe* exciting a pleaſurable ſenſation; compliance with the *eſſential differences of things* promoting the order and harmony of the univerſe; and compliance with the *will of God* obtaining an abundant reward.

This, when attentively conſidered, can never fail of affecting us with the moſt lively ſenſe of God's goodneſs to Mankind, who, graciouſly reſpecting the imbecillity of Man's *nature*, the ſlowneſs of his *reaſon*, and the violence of his *paſſions*, hath been pleaſed to afford three different excitements to the practice of Virtue; that men of all ranks, conſtitutions, and educations, might find their account in one or other of them; ſomething that would hit their *palate*, ſatisfy their *reaſon*, or ſubdue their *will*. The firſt principle, which is the *moral ſenſe*, would ſtrongly operate on thoſe, who, by the exact temperature and balance of the paſſions, were diſengaged enough to feel the delicacy of it's charms; and have an elegance of mind to reſpect the nobleneſs of its dictates. The ſecond, which is the *eſſential difference*, will have its weight with the Speculative,

lative, the abſtract and profound reaſoners, and on all thoſe who excel in the knowledge of human nature. And the third, which reſolves itſelf into the *will of God*, and takes in all the conſequences of obedience and diſobedience, is principally adapted to the great body of Mankind.

It may perhaps be objected, to what is here delivered, *that the true principle of morality ſhould have the worthieſt motive to enforce it: Whereas the Will of God is enforced by the view of rewards and puniſhments; on which motive, virtue hath the ſmalleſt merit.* This character of the true principle of morality is perfectly right; and agrees, we ſay, with the principle which we make to be the true: For the legitimate motive to virtue, on that principle, is *compliance with the Will of God*; a compliance which hath the higheſt degree of merit. But this not being found of ſufficient power to take in the Generality, the conſequences of compliance or non-compliance to this Will, as far as relates to rewards and puniſhments, were firſt drawn out to the people's view. In which they were dealt with as the teachers of mathematics treat their pupils; when, to engage them in a ſublime demonſtration, they explain to them the uſe and fertility of the theorem.

To theſe great purpoſes ſerve the THREE PRINCIPLES, while in conjunction: But now, as in the *civil* world and the affairs of men, our pleaſure, in contemplating the wiſdom and goodneſs of Providence, is often diſturbed and checked by the view of ſome human perverſity or folly which runs acroſs that Diſpenſation; ſo it is here, in the *intellectual*. This admirable proviſion for the ſupport of virtue hath been, in great meaſure, defeated by its pretended Advocates; who, in their eternal ſquabbles about the true foundation of morality, and the obligation to its practice, have ſacrilegiouſly untwiſted this THREEFOLD CORD; and each running away with

with the part he eſteemed the ſtrongeſt, hath affixed that to the throne of God, as the golden chain that is to unite and draw all unto it.

This man propoſes to illuſtrate the doctrine of the MORAL SENSE; and then the morality of actions is founded only in that *ſenſe:* with him, metaphyſics and logic, by which the *eſſential difference*, in human actions, is demonſtrated, are nothing but *words, notions, viſions; the empty regions and ſhadows of philoſophy.* The profeſſors of them are *moon-blind wits*; and *Locke* himſelf is treated as a ſchoolman [d]. To talk of reward and puniſhment, conſequent on the *will of a ſuperior*, is to make the practice of virtue mercenary and ſervile; from which, pure human nature is the moſt abhorrent.

Another undertakes to demonſtrate THE ESSENTIAL DIFFERENCES OF THINGS, and their natural fitneſs and unfitneſs to certain ends; and then *morality*, is ſolely founded on thoſe differences; and God and his Will have nothing to do in the matter. Then the Will of God cannot make any thing morally good and evil, juſt and unjuſt; nor conſequently be the cauſe of any obligation on moral Agents: becauſe the eſſences and natures of things, which conſtitute actions good and evil, are independent on that Will; which is forced to ſubmit to their relations like weak Man's. And therefore, if there were no natural juſtice, that is, if the rational and intellectual nature were, of itſelf, undetermined and unobliged to any thing, and ſo deſtitute of *morality* properly ſo called, it were not poſſible that any thing ſhould be made morally good or evil, obligatory or unlawful, or that any moral obligation ſhould be begotten by any Will or poſitive command whatſoever.—And then our knowledge of moral good and evil is ſolely acquired by abſtract reaſoning: And to talk of its coming any other way

[d] *Characteriſtics*, paſſim.

into

into the mind, is weak and ſuperſtitious, as making God act unneceſſarily and ſuperfluouſly.

A third, who propoſes to place *morality* on *the will of a ſuperior*, which is its true bottom, acts yet on the ſame exterminating model. He takes the other two Principles to be merely viſionary: The *moral ſenſe* is nothing but the impreſſion of education; the *love of the ſpecies* romantic; and invented by crafty knaves, to dupe the young, the vain, and the ambitious. Nature, he ſaith, hath confined us to the narrow ſphere of *ſelf-love*; and our moſt pompous pretences of pure diſintereſtedneſs, but the more artful diſguiſe of that very paſſion. He not only denies all *moral difference* in actions, antecedent to the Will of God, which (as we ſhall ſhew anon) he might well do; but likewiſe, all *ſpecific difference*: will not ſo much as allow it to be a RULE to direct us to the performance of God's will; for that the *notions* of fit and unfit proceed not from that *difference*, but from the arbitrary impoſitions of *Will* only; that God is the free cauſe of Truths as well as Beings; and then, conſequently, if he ſo wills, two and two would not make four. At length his ſyſtem ſhrinks into a vile and abject ſelfiſhneſs; and, as he degrades and contracts his nature, he ſlips, before he is aware, quite beſides his foundation, which he profeſſes to be the *Will of God*.

Thus have men, borne away by a fondneſs to their own idle ſyſtems, preſumptuouſly broken in upon that TRIPLE BARRIER [e], with which God has

[e] St. Paul might have taught them better; who collecting together and enforcing all the motives for the PRACTICE OF VIRTUE, expreſſeth himſelf in this manner. "*Finally, brethren, whatſoever things are* true, *whatſoever things are* honeſt, *whatſoever things are* juſt"—Το λοιπὸν, ἀδελφοὶ, ὅσα ἐστὶν ΑΛΗΘΗ, ὅσα ΣΕΜΝΑ, ὅσα ΔΙΚΑΙΑ—αληθῆ evidently relating to the *eſſential difference of things*; σεμνὰ (implying ſomething of worth, ſplendour, dignity) to the *moral ſenſe* which men have of this differ-

been

been graciouſly pleaſed to cover and ſecure Virtue; and given advantage to the cavils of Libertines and Infidels; who on each of theſe three Principles, thus advanced on the ruins of the other two, have reciprocally forged a ſcheme of Religion independent on Morality [f]; and a ſcheme of Morality independent on Religion [g]; who, how different ſoever their employments may appear, are indeed but twiſting the ſame rope at different ends: the plain deſign of both being to overthrow RELIGION. But as the Moraliſt's is the more plauſible ſcheme, it is now become moſt in faſhion: So that of late years a deluge of moral ſyſtems hath overflowed the learned world, in which either the *moral ſenſe*, or the *eſſential difference*, rides alone triumphant; which like the chorus of clouds in *Ariſtophanes*, the Αἶναι Νεφέλαι, the ETERNAL RELATIONS, are introduced into the ſcene, with a gaudy outſide, to ſupplant *Jupiter*, and to teach the arts of fraud and *ſophiſtry*; but in a little time betray themſelves to be empty, obſcure, noiſy, impious Nothings.

In a word, with regard to the ſeveral ſorts of *Separatiſts*, thoſe, I mean, who are indeed friends

ence; and δίκαια, *juſt*, is relative to *Will* or Law. The Apoſtle proceeds—"*whatſoever things are* pure, *whatſoever things are* "lovely, *whatſoever things are of* good report"—ὅσα ἁγνὰ, ὅσα προσφιλῆ, ὅσα εὔφημα. In theſe three latter characters marking the nature of the three preceding: ἁγνὰ *pure* referring to *abſtract truth*; προσφιλῆ *lovely*, amiable, to *innate or inſtinctive honeſty*; and εὔφημα *of good report*, reputable, to the obſervation of *Will* or Law. He concludes, "*If there be any* virtue, *and* "*if there be any* praiſe, *think of theſe things*." εἴ τις ἀρετὴ, καὶ εἴ τις ἔπαινος, ταῦτα λογίζεσθε. That is, If the moral ſenſe and the eſſential difference of things can make the practice of morality, a *virtue*; or obedience to a *ſuperior Will*, matter of *praiſe*, *think of theſe things*.

[f] See *the Fable of the Bees*, and confer the *enquiry into the original of Moral virtue*, and the *ſearch into the nature of ſociety*, with the body of the book.

[g] See the fourth Treatiſe of the *Characteriſtics*, intituled, *An Enquiry concerning Virtue and Merit*.

to

to Religion, and who deteſt the Infidel's abuſe of their principles, I would recommend to their interpretation the following oracle of an ancient ſage. ΟΥ ΓΑΡ ΕΣΤΙΝ ΕΥΡΕΙΝ ΤΗΣ ΔΙΚΑΙΟΣΥΝΗΣ ΑΛΛΗΝ ΑΡΧΗΝ ΟΥΔΕ ΑΛΛΗΝ ΓΕΝΕΣΙΝ, Η ΤΗΝ ΕΚ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΟΣ ΚΑΙ ΤΗΣ ΚΟΙΝΗΣ ΦΥΣΕΩΣ.

This noble truth, *that the only true foundation and original of morality is the Will of God interpreted by the moral ſenſe and eſſential difference of things*, was a *random* thought of *Chryſippus* the *Stoic*. I give it this term, 1. Becauſe the ancient philoſophy teaches nothing certain concerning the true ground of moral obligation. 2. Becauſe *Plutarch*'s quoting it amongſt *the repugnances of the Stoics*, ſhews it to be inconſiſtent with their other doctrine. And indeed, the following the ancient philoſophers too ſervilely, hath occaſioned the errors of modern moraliſts, in unnaturally ſeparating the three principles of practical morality, *Plato* being the patron of the *moral ſenſe*; *Ariſtotle* of the *eſſential differences*; and *Zeno of abitrary will*.

And now, to come more directly to our Adverſary's argument: We ſay then,

1. That the Atheiſt can never come to the knowledge of the MORALITY of actions properly ſo called.
2. That though he be capable of being affected with the *moral ſenſe*, and may arrive to the knowledge of the real *eſſential differences* in the qualities of human actions; yet this *ſenſe* and theſe *differences* make nothing for the purpoſe of M. *Bayle*'s argument: becauſe theſe, even in conjunction, are totally inſufficient to influence ſociety in the practice of virtue: which influence is the thing in queſtion.

Both theſe concluſions, I preſume, have been clearly proved from what hath been ſaid above, of *the origin of Society*; and, juſt before, of *the foun-*

dation

dation of moral virtue: But that nothing may be wanting to the argument, I ſhall crave leave to examine the matter with a little more exactneſs.

1. And firſt, *that an Atheiſt, as ſuch, can never arrive to the knowledge of the morality of actions properly ſo called*, ſhall be further made good againſt the reaſoning which Mr. *Bayle* brings to prove, *that the Morality of human actions may be demonſtrated on the principles of a* Stratonicean, or atheiſtic Fataliſt; whom he perſonates in this manner: "The [h] beauty, ſymmetry, regularity, and order, ſeen in the "univerſe, are the effects of a blind unintelligent "Nature; and though this Nature, in her workmanſhip, hath copied after no ideas, ſhe hath nevertheleſs produced an infinite number of ſpecies, "with each its diſtinct eſſential attribute. It is not "in conſequence of our opinion, that fire and water "differ in ſpecies, and that there is a like difference "between love and hatred, affirmation and negation; "Their ſpecific difference is founded in the nature of "the things themſelves. But how do we know this? "Is it not by comparing the eſſential properties of "one of theſe beings with the eſſential properties of "another of them? But we know, by the ſame "way, that there is a ſpecific difference between "truth and falſhood, between good faith and perfidiouſneſs, between gratitude and ingratitude, "*&c.* We may then be aſſured, that vice and "virtue differ ſpecifically by their nature, independent of our opinion." This, Mr. *Bayle* calls their being *naturally* ſeparated from each other: And thus much we allow. He goes on: "Let [i] "us ſee now by what ways *Stratonic* atheiſts may

[h] La beauté, la ſymétrie, la regularité, l'ordre que l'on voit dans l'univers, ſont l'ouvrage d'une nature qui n'a point de connoiſſance, & qu'encore. *&c. Contin. des penſes diverſes*, c. cli.

[i] Voions comment ils pouvoient ſavoir qu'elles etoient outre cela ſeparées moralement. Ils attribuoient, *&c. Idem ibid.*

"come

"come to the knowledge of vice and virtue's being "*morally* as well as *naturally* ſeparated. They aſ- "cribe to the ſame neceſſity of nature the eſtabliſh- "ment of thoſe relations which we find to be be- "tween things, and the eſtabliſhment of thoſe rules "by which we diſtinguiſh thoſe relations. There "are rules of reaſoning independent of the will of "man: It is not becauſe men have been pleaſed to "fix the rules of ſyllogiſm, that therefore thoſe "rules are juſt and true: they are ſo in themſelves, "and all the endeavours of the wit of man againſt "their eſſence and their attributes would be vain "and ridiculous." This likewiſe we grant him. He proceeds: "If then there are certain and im- "mutable rules for the operation of the underſtand- "ing, there are alſo ſuch for the determinations of "the will." But this we deny. He would prove it thus: "The [k] rules of theſe determinations are "not altogether arbitrary; ſome of them proceed "from the neceſſity of nature; and theſe impoſe an "indiſpenſable obligation. The moſt general of "theſe rules is this, *that man ought to will what is* "*moſt conformable to right reaſon:* For there is no "truth more evident than this, that it is fit a rea- "ſonable creature ſhould conform to right reaſon, "and unfit that ſuch a creature ſhould recede from "it." This is his argument. To which I reply, that, from thence, no *moral difference* can ariſe. He contends that *things are both naturally and morally ſeparable.* He ſpeaks of theſe ideas as very differ- ent (as indeed they are) and proves the truth of them by different arguments. *The natural eſſential difference of things* then, if we mean any thing by the terms, hath this apparent property; that it creates a *fitneſs* in the agent to act agreeably thereto:

[k] Les regles de ces actes—là ne ſont pas toutes arbitraires: il y en a qui emanent, &c. *Idem ibid.*

As

As the *moral difference* of things creates, beſides this *fitneſs*, an *obligation* likewiſe: When therefore there is an *obligation* in the agent, there is a *moral difference* in the things, and ſo on the contrary, for they are inſeparable. If then we ſhew, that right reaſon alone cannot properly *oblige*, it will follow that the knowledge of what is agreeable to right reaſon doth not induce a *moral difference*: Or that a Stratonicean is not under any *obligation* to act agreeably to right reaſon; which is the thing Mr. *Bayle* contends for.

1. Obligation, neceſſarily implies an Obliger: The Obliger muſt be different from, and not one and the ſame with the obliged: To make a man at once the Obliger and obliged, is the ſame thing as to make him treat or enter into compact with himſelf, which is the higheſt of abſurdities. For it is an unqueſtioned rule in law and reaſon, that whoever acquires a right to any thing from the obligation of another towards him, may relinquiſh that right. If therefore the Obliger and obliged be one and the ſame perſon, in that caſe all obligation muſt be void of courſe; or rather no obligation would have commenced. Yet the *Stratonic* atheiſt is guilty of this abſurdity, when *he* talks of actions being *moral* or *obligatory*. For what *Being* can be found whereon to place this obligation? Will he ſay *right reaſon?* But that is the very abſurdity we complain of; becauſe *reaſon* is only an attribute of the perſon obliged, his aſſiſtant to judge of his obligations, if he hath any from another Being: To make *this* then the Obliger, is to make a man oblige himſelf. If he ſay, he means by *reaſon* not every man's particular reaſon, but *reaſon in general*; I reply, that *this* reaſon is a mere abſtract notion, which hath no real ſubſiſtence: and how that which hath no real ſubſiſtence ſhould *oblige*, is ſtill more difficult to apprehend.

2. But

2. But farther, *moral obligation*, that is, the obligation of a free agent, implies a *Law*, which enjoins and forbids; but a *Law* is the impoſition of an intelligent ſuperior, who hath power to exact conformity thereunto. But blind unintelligent Nature is no lawgiver, nor can what proceeds neceſſarily from thence come under the notion of a Law: We ſay indeed, in common ſpeech, the *law of neceſſity*, and *the law of reaſon and nature*; but theſe are merely popular expreſſions: By the firſt, we mean only to inſinuate, that *neceſſity* hath, as it were, one property of a *law*, namely that of *forcing*; and by the ſecond, we mean the rule which the ſupreme Lawgiver hath laid down for the judging of his Will. And while this light and direction of *reaſon* or *nature* is conſidered as a rule only, given by the *God of nature*, the term may be allowed: Thoſe who ſo conſidered the term were the firſt who ſo uſed it. After-writers retained the name; but, by a ſtrange abſurdity, ſeparated the *Law-giver* from his *Law*; on a fancy of its being of virtue to *oblige* by its own intrinſic excellence, or by the good of which it is productive. But how any thing except a Law, in the proper philoſophic ſenſe, can oblige a dependent reaſonable Being endued with will, is utterly inconceivable. The fundamental error in Mr. *Bayle*'s argument ſeems to be this: He ſaw the eſſential difference of things: he found theſe differences the adequate object of the *underſtanding*; and ſo too haſtily concluded them to be the adequate object of the *will* likewiſe. In this he was miſtaken, they are indeed the adequate object of the underſtanding; becauſe the *underſtanding* is paſſive in its perceptions, and therefore under the ſole direction of theſe neceſſary differences. But the *will* is not paſſive in its determinations: for inſtance, that three are leſs than five, the underſtanding is neceſſitated to judge, but the will is not neceſſitated to chuſe five

five before three: Therefore the eſſential differences of things are not the adequate object of the *will*, the Law of a Superior muſt be taken in to conſtitute *obligation* in choice, or *morality* in actions.

Hobbes ſeems to have penetrated farther into this matter, than the *Stratonicean* of Mr. *Bayle*; he appeared to have been ſenſible that *morality* implied *obligation*, and obligation a *law*, and a law a *Lawgiver*: Therefore, having (as they ſay) expelled the Legiſlator of the univerſe, that morality of actions might have ſome foundation, he thought fit to underprop it with his earthly God, the *Leviathan*; and to make him the creator and ſupporter of *moral right* and *wrong*.

But a favourer of Mr. *Bayle*'s paradox may perhaps object, that as he was allowed a *fitneſs*, and *unfitneſs* in actions, diſcoverable by the eſſential difference of things; and as this fitneſs and unfitneſs implies benefit and damage to the actor, and others; it being in fact ſeen, that the practice of virtue promotes the happineſs of the Individual, or at leaſt of the Species, and that vice obſtructs it; it may be ſaid, that this will be ſufficient to make *morality*, or *obligation*, in the *Stratonic* ſyſtem; if not in the ſtrict ſenſe of the word, yet as to the nature of the thing. To this I reply, that in that Syſtem, whatever advanced human happineſs, would be only a natural good; and virtue as merely ſuch, as food and covering: and, that which retarded it, a natural evil, whether it was vice, peſtilence, or unkindly ſeaſons. *Natural*, I ſay, in contradiſtinction to *moral*, or ſuch a good as any one would be *obliged* to ſeek or promote. For 'till it be made appear that Man hath received his being from the *will* of another; and ſo depending on that other, is accountable to him for it; he can be under no *moral obligation* to prefer good to evil, or even life to death. From the *nature* of any action, MORALITY cannot

ariſe; nor from its *effects*: Not from the firſt, becauſe, being only reaſonable or unreaſonable, nothing follows but a *fitneſs* in doing one, and an *abſurdity* in doing the other: Not from the ſecond, becauſe, did the good or evil produced make the action *moral*, brutes, from whoſe actions proceed both good and evil, would have *morality*.

If it be farther urged, that the obſervance of theſe eſſential differences is promoting the perfection of a particular ſyſtem, which contributes, in its concentration, to the perfection of the univerſe; and that therefore a reaſonable creature is OBLIGED to conform thereto: I anſwer, firſt, that (on the principles before laid down) to make a reaſonable creature *obliged* in this caſe, he muſt firſt be enforced by the Whole, of which he is part. This enforcement cannot here be by intentional command, whoſe object is free agency, becauſe the *Stratonic* Whole, or univerſal Nature, is blind and unintelligible. It muſt force then by the neceſſity of its nature; and this will, indeed, make men obliged as clocks are by weights, but never as free agents are, by the command of an intelligent Superior, which only can make actions *moral*. But ſecondly, an uniform perfect Whole can never be the effect of blind fate; but is the plain image and impreſſion of one intelligent ſelf-exiſtent Mind. In a word, as it is of the nature of the *independent* firſt Cauſe of all things to be obliged only by his own *wiſdom*; ſo it ſeems to be of the nature of all *dependent* intelligent beings to be obliged only by the *will* of the firſt Cauſe.

"All things therefore (ſays the great Maſter of reaſon) do work, after a ſort, according to Law: All other things according to a LAW, whereof, ſome SUPERIOR, to whom they are ſubject, is Author; only the works and operations of God have him both for their worker, and for the Law whereby they are wrought. The Being of God is a kind

" of Law to his working; for that perfection which " God is giveth perfection to that he DOTH [1]."

Nor does this contradict what we have aſſerted, and not only aſſerted, but proved, in ſpeaking of moral obligation, *that nothing, but Will, can oblige:* Becauſe our whole reaſoning is confined to *man's obligation.* And if there be any thing certain, in the firſt principles of law or reaſon, this muſt be confeſſed to be of the number, *that a man can neither oblige himſelf, nor be obliged by names and notions*; ſo that, to create an obligation, the *Will* of ſome other being muſt be found out. A principle, which the common conceptions of man, and the univerſal practice of human life confirms. But, as in our diſcourſe of God, the weakneſs of our intellects conſtrains us to explain our conceptions of his nature by human ideas, therefore when we ſpeak of the *morality* of *his* actions, finding them to be founded in no other, or ſuperior Will, we ſay, he is *obliged only by his own wiſdom: Obligation*, when applied to God, meaning no more than *direction:* for, that an *independent* being can be ſubject to obligation in the ſenſe that a *dependent* being is ſubject, is, by the very terms, an high abſurdity. *Obligation*, therefore, when applied to man, being *one* thing; when applied to God *another*; the ſtricteſt rules of logic will allow different attributes to be predicated of each. It is confeſſed, we have a clear and adequate idea of *obligation*, as it relates to man: of *this* obligation we have affirmed ſomething plain and evident: It is likewiſe confeſſed we have a very obſcure and inadequate idea of *obligation*, as it relates to God: Of *this* obligation, too, we have affirmed ſomething, whoſe evidence muſt needs partake of the imperfection of its ſubject. Yet there have been found Objectors ſo perverſe, who

[1] *Hooker's Eccl. Pol. B.* 1. *Sect.* 2.

would not only have *clear* conceptions regulated on *obſcure*; but what is *ſimply predicated* of God, to deſtroy what hath been *proved* of man.

But to ſet this matter in a fuller light, I will juſt mention two objections *(not peculiar* to the *Stratoniceans)* againſt morality's being founded in will.

Obj. 1. It is ſaid, "That, as every creature "neceſſarily purſues happineſs, it is *that* which "obliges to moral obſervance, and not the Will of "God: becauſe it is to procure happineſs that we "obey command, and do every other act: and be-"cauſe, if that Will commanded us to do what "would make us unhappy, we ſhould be forced to "diſobey it." To this I anſwer, that when it is ſaid *morality is founded on Will*, it is not meant that every Will obliges, but that nothing but Will can oblige. It is plain the Will of an inferior or equal cannot be meant by it: It is not ſimply Will then, but Will ſo and ſo circumſtanced: And why it is not as much Will which obliges, when it is the *Will of a ſuperior ſeeking our good*, as the *Will of a ſuperior ſimply*, I am yet to learn. To ſay then that happineſs and not Will makes the obligation, ſeems like ſaying, that when in mechanics a weight is raiſed by an engine, the *wheels* and *pullies* are not the cauſe, but that univerſal affection of matter called *attraction*. *Obj.* 2. If it be ſtill urged, "that *one* can no more be called "the obliger than the *other*; becauſe though happineſs could not oblige without Will, on the "other hand, Will could not oblige without happineſs;" I reply, this is a miſtake. Will could not indeed oblige to unhappineſs; but it would oblige to what ſhould produce neither one nor the other, though all conſiderations of the conſequence of obeying or diſobeying were away.

Obj. 3. It is ſaid, "That if, according to the "modern notions of philoſophy, the will of God "be

"be determined by the eternal relations of things, "they are properly thoſe relations (as Dr. *Clarke* "would have it) which oblige, and not the will of "God. For if A impel B; and B, C, and C, "D; it is A and not C that properly impels D." But here I ſuſpect the objection confounds *natural cauſe and effect* with *moral agent and patient*; which are two diſtinct things, as appears, as on many other accounts, ſo from their effects; the one implying *natural neceſſity*, the other, only *moral fitneſs*. Thus, in the caſe before us, the eternal relations are, if you will, the *natural cauſe*, but the will of God is the *moral agency*: And our queſtion is, not *of natural neceſſity* that reſults from the former, but, of *moral fitneſs* that reſults from the latter. Thus that which is not properly the natural cauſe of my acting, is the moral cauſe of it. And ſo on the contrary.

On the whole, then, it appears, that *Will*, and *Will only*, can conſtitute *obligation*; and, conſequently, make actions *moral*, *i. e.* ſuch as deſerve *reward* and *puniſhment*. Yet when men reflect on the affections of their own minds, and find *there* a *ſenſe* of *right* and *wrong* ſo ſtrongly impreſſed as to be attended with a *conſciouſneſs* that the one deſerves *reward* and the other *puniſhment*, even tho' there were no God; this ſo perplexes matters, as to diſpoſe them, in oppoſition to all thoſe plain *deductions*, to place morality in the *eſſential difference* of things. But would they conſider that *that very ſenſation*, which ſo much miſleads us in judging of the true foundation of morality, is the plaineſt indication of WILL, which, for the better ſupport of virtue [m], ſo framed and conſtituted the human

[m] We have explained above the admirable diſpoſition of things, by the God of nature, for the ſupport of virtue. And it was from this view that an able writer, who is for moderating in the diſpute about *moral obligation*, calls the *eſſential difference of*

mind; a conſtitution utterly inconceivable on the ſuppoſition of *no God*; would they, I ſay, but conſider this, the difficulty would intirely vaniſh.

But ſo it hath happened, this evident truth, that *morality is founded in will*, hath been long controverted even among *Theiſts*. What hath perplexed their diſputes is, that the contenders for this truth have generally thought themſelves obliged to deny the *natural eſſential differences* of things, antecedent to a Law; ſuppoſing, that the *morality* of actions would follow the conceſſion. But this is a miſtake, which the rightly diſtinguiſhing between things *naturally* and *morally* ſeparable, (as explained above) will rectify. That the diſtinction hath not been made or obſerved, is owing to the unheeded *appetite* and *averſion* of the *moral ſenſe*: And their adverſaries being in the ſame deluſion, that the *one* inferred the *other*, never gave themſelves any farther trouble, but when they had clearly demonſtrated the *natural eſſential difference*, delivered *that* as a proof of the *moral difference*, though they be, in reality, two diſtinct things, and independent of each other. More

things, diſcoverable by reaſon, the *internal obligation*, and the *will of God*, the *external*. J'entends (dit il) par *obligation interne* celle qui eſt uniquement produite par notre propre raiſon, conſidereé comme la regle primitive de notre conduite, et en conſequence de ce qu'une action a, en elle-meme, de bon ou de mauvais. Pour l'*obligation externe* ce ſera celle qui vient de la volonté de quelque être, dont on ſe reconnoit dependant, et qui commande ou defend certaines choſes, ſous la menace de quelque peine. *Burlamaqui, Principes du droit naturel*, p. 76.

If he had called the firſt, *the improper obligation*, and the other the *proper*, his terms had been a great deal more exact. For it being of the eſſence of the relative term, *obligation*, to have an outward reſpect, or external relation, *internal obligation* muſt be a very *figurative*, that is to ſay, a very abſurd expreſſion, when applied to man. Perhaps, indeed, that ruling Nature which draws all MACHINES, whether *brutal* or *rational* (if there be any of the latter kind) to purſue *happineſs*, may, in a *philoſophic* ſenſe, be called the *internal obligation*; but, ſurely, when applied to *man*, ſuppoſed a free-agent, the terms are mere jargon.

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than one of our ableſt writers have not eſcaped this deluſion. Dr. S. Clarke going on the Principle, that Obligation was founded in the nature of things, to ſupport it, was perpetually forced to confound *moral* and *natural* fitneſſes with one another; which makes him, contrary to his character, very inaccurate and confuſed[n]: And Mr. Wolaſton[o], diſſatisfied with all the principles, from which the preceding writers of his party had deduced the morality of actions, when he had demonſtrated, with greater clearneſs than any before him, *the natural eſſential difference of things*, unluckily miſtook it for the *moral difference*; and thence made *the formal ratio of moral good and evil, to conſiſt in a conformity of mens actions to the truth of the caſe, or otherwiſe.* For it is a principle with him, that things may be denied or affirmed to be what they are, by *deeds* as well as *words.* But had both parties been pleaſed to conſider *this natural eſſential difference of things*, as, what it muſt be confeſſed by both to be, THE DIRECTION WHICH GOD HATH GIVEN HIS CREATURES TO BRING THEM TO THE KNOWLEDGE OF HIS WILL; AND THE RULE OF THAT WILL, the diſpute had been at an end: and they had employed *this difference*, not as the atheiſt does, for the *foundation* of morality; but, as all true theiſts ſhould do, for the *medium* to bring us to that only ſound foundation, the *will* and command of God. Thoſe who imagine, as the author of *the principles of natural law* ſeems to do, that this is only a diſpute about words[p], are much deceived. The man who regards

[n] *Evid. of natural and revealed Religion.* 6th Ed. p. 5—27.

[o] *The Religion of Nature delineated.*

[p] Je conclus—que les differences qui ſe trouvent entre les principaux ſyſtemes ſur la nature & l'origine de l'obligation, ne ſont pas auſſi grandes qu'elles le paroiſſent d'abord. Si l'on examine de pres ces ſentimens, l'on verra que ces differentes idees, reduites à leur juſte valeur, loin de ſe trouver en oppoſition, peuvent ſe rapprocher—*Burlamaqui*, p. 75—6.

the eſſential difference of things as a command or a Law properly ſo called, hath a very different idea of it, from him who regards it only as a Rule or a Law improperly ſo called. And the reaſon is plain, becauſe theſe relative terms have an eſſential difference; a *Rule*, referring ſingly to thoſe directed by it; but a *Law* has a double reference; to thoſe governed by it, and to the Lawgiver who gave it. He therefore who regards it as a *Rule*, ſtops ſhort, and reſts obligation there, where no obligation can abide: But he who regards it as a *Law* properly ſo called, (for thoſe who conſider it as a *mere rule* give it the name of *law*, becauſe they make *obligation* to ariſe from it) reſts obligation in a Lawgiver, and purſues it to its true ſource, the throne of God. The diſpute, therefore, is not about *words*, but *things:* Or if we will needs have it to be about words, it is of the *proper* and *improper* uſe of them, which intimately concerns *things*; indeed TRUTH itſelf and COMMON SENSE. We ſay a *ſound is ſweet*, or a *colour hot*; and as no body is miſled by theſe expreſſions, we hold it fooliſh to diveſt them of their figure, and formally to contend that (ſtrictly and philoſophically ſpeaking) inconſiſtent properties are aſcribed to them. But ſhould it once be aſſumed that a *ſound* may be the ſubject of *taſte* and a *colour* the ſubject of *touch*, it would be time, I ſuppoſe, to rectify an abſurdity which tends to confound all our *ideas of ſenſation:* Juſt ſo it is, in the expreſſions of *truth* or *happineſs*, OBLIGING: While theſe were conſidered as the *rule* or *reward* of actions, given and impoſed by a Maſter on his ſervants, by a Creator on his creature, the figure was neither forced nor inelegant; and did not deſerve to be quarrelled with. But when the queſtion was of *real obligation*, in a metaphyſic ſenſe, then, ſeriouſly to contend, that it ariſes from *truth* or *happineſs*, or from any thing but WILL, is the very philoſophy of *taſting ſound*

ſound and *feeling colour*; and equally tends to the confuſion of all our *ideas of reflexion.*

On the whole then we ſee, that an Atheiſt, as ſuch, cannot arrive to the knowledge of MORALITY [q].

2. We now come to our ſecond concluſion againſt Mr. *Bayle*'s argument, "that the idea of the *moral* "*ſenſe*, and the knowledge of the *natural eſſential* "*difference of things*, are, even in conjunction, in-"ſufficient to influence Communities in the practice "of virtue:" But we muſt previouſly obſerve, that the arguments, which we allow to be concluſive for the *Stratonic* atheiſt's comprehenſion of the natural eſſential difference of things, take in only that ſpecies of atheiſm: the *other*, which derive all from chance and hazard, are incapable of this knowledge; and muſt be content with only the *moral ſenſe* for their guide. Let us therefore *firſt* enquire what this *moral ſenſe* is able to do alone, towards influencing virtuous practice; and *ſecondly*, what new force it acquires in conjunction with the knowledge of the *natural eſſential difference of things.*

1. Men are miſled by the name of *inſtinct* (which we allow the *moral ſenſe* to be) to imagine that its impreſſions operate very ſtrongly, by obſerving their force in brute animals. But the caſes are widely different: In Beaſts, the inſtinct is invincibly ſtrong, as it is the ſole ſpring of action: In Man, it is only a friendly monitor of the judgment; and a conciliator, as it were, between Reaſon and the ſenſual appetites; all which have their turn in the determinations of the Will. It muſt conſequently be

[q] One would not have imagined any body could be ſo wild to aſſert, that, on theſe principles, it could not be proved, that a vicious Atheiſt deſerved puniſhment at the hand of God. To ſuch ſhrewd diſcerners, I would recommend the following caſe. Your ſervant gets drunk; and, in that condition, neglects your orders, forgets your relation to him, and treats it as an impoſture. Does he, or does he not, deſerve puniſhment? When this is reſolved, the point in queſtion will be ſo too.

much

much weaker, as but ſharing the power of putting upon action with many other principles. Nor could it have been otherwiſe without deſtroying human liberty. It is indeed of ſo delicate a nature, ſo nicely interwoven into the human frame and conſtitution, and ſo eaſily loſt or effaced, that ſome have even denied the exiſtence of a quality, which, in moſt of its common ſubjects, they have hardly been able to obſerve. Inſomuch that one would be tempted to liken it to that *candid appearance*, which, as the modern philoſophy has diſcovered to us, is the reſult of a mixture of all kinds of primitive *colours*: where, if the ſeveral ſorts be not found in fit proportions, no whiteneſs will emerge from the compoſition. So, unleſs the original paſſions and appetites be rightly tempered and balanced, the *moral ſenſe* can never ſhew itſelf in any ſtrong or ſenſible effect. This being the ſtate of *moral inſtinct*, it muſt evidently, when alone, be too weak to influence human practice.

When the *moral ſenſe* is made the rule, and eſpecially when it is the only rule, it is neceſſary that its rectitude, as a rule, ſhould be known and aſcertained: But this it cannot be by an Atheiſt: For till it be allowed there was deſign in our production, it can never be ſhewn that one appetite is righter than another, though they be contrarious and inconſiſtent. The appetite therefore, which, at preſent, is moſt importunate to be gratified, will be judged to be the right, how adverſe ſoever to the *moral ſenſe*. But, ſuppoſing this *moral ſenſe* not to be ſo eaſily confounded with the other appetites; but that it may be kept diſtinct, as having this peculiar quality ſo different from the reſt, that it is objective to a *whole*, or entire ſpecies; whereas the others terminate in *ſelf*, or in the private ſyſtem; (though, as to *whole* and *parts*, an Atheiſt muſt have very ſlender and confuſed ideas) granting this, I ſay, yet national

tional Manners, the iſſue of *thoſe appetites*, would, in time, effectually, though inſenſibly, efface the idea of the *moral ſenſe*, in the generality of men. Almoſt infinite are the popular Cuſtoms, in the ſeveral nations and ages of mankind, which owe their birth to the more violent paſſions of fear, luſt, and anger. The moſt whimſical and capricious, as well as the moſt inhuman and unnatural, have ariſen from thence. It muſt needs therefore be, that cuſtoms of this original ſhould be as oppoſite to the *moral ſenſe*, as thoſe appetites are, from whence they were derived. And of how great power, Cuſtom is to eraſe the ſtrongeſt impreſſions of Nature, much ſtronger than thoſe of the *moral ſenſe*, we may learn from that general practice, which prevailed in the moſt learned and polite countries of the world, of EXPOSING THEIR CHILDREN[r]; whereby the ſtrong inſtinctive affection of Parents for their offſpring was violated without remorſe.

This would lead one into a very beaten common place. It ſuffices that the fact is too notorious to be diſputed. And what makes more particularly for

[r] Of all the moral painters, TERENCE is the man who ſeems to have copied human nature with moſt exactneſs. Yet, his Citizen of univerſal benevolence, whom he draws with ſo much life, in that maſterly ſtroke, *homo ſum, humani nihil a me alienum puto*, is the ſame perſon who commands his wife to expoſe her new-born daughter, and falls into a paſſion with her for having committed that hard taſk to another, by which means the infant eſcaped death,—*ſi meum imperium exequi voluiſſes, interemptam oportuit.* Hence even the divine PLATO reckons the expoſing of infants, if not amongſt the dictates of nature, yet amongſt the preſcripts of right reaſon: For in his *book of laws*, which he compoſed for the reformation of popular prejudices and abuſes in human Policies, he decrees, that if the parents had children, after a certain age, they ſhould *expoſe* them; and that ſo effectually, he ſays, that they ſhould not eſcape dying by famine. Chremes therefore ſpeaks both the dictates of Philoſophy and Cuſtom, when he characterizes ſuch who had any dregs of this natural inſtinct remaining, as perſons—*qui neque jus, neque bonum, atque æquum ſciant.*

my

my argument is, that *Cuſtom* is a power which oppoſes the *moral ſenſe* not partially, or at certain times and places, but univerſally. If therefore Cuſtom in the politeſt States, where a Providence was taught and acknowledged, made ſuch havock of Virtue; into what confuſion muſt things run, where there is no other barrier than the feeble idea of the *moral ſenſe?* Nor can it be replied, that the cuſtoms here ſpoken of, as ſo deſtructive to the *moral ſenſe*, are the product of falſe Religions; which ſpring and fountain-head of evil, atheiſm at once dries up: For the inſtance here given is of a Cuſtom merely civil; with which Religion had no manner of concern. And ſo are a vaſt number of others that are carefully collected by the two writers mentioned above.

2. But now, ſecondly, for our *Stratonic* atheiſt; in whom, we ſuppoſe, the *moral ſenſe*, and the *knowledge of the eſſential difference of things* act in conjunction to promote virtuous practice. And, in conjunction, they impart mutual ſtrength to one another: For as ſoon as the *eſſential difference* is eſtabliſhed and applied, it becomes a mark to diſtinguiſh the *moral ſenſe* from the other appetites, which are irregular and wrong. And, the *moral ſenſe* being thus carefully kept up and ſupported, the mind, in its metaphyſical reaſonings on the *eſſential difference*, is guarded from running into viſionary refinements.

The queſtion then is, "Whether a clear convic-"tion of right and wrong, abſtracted from all "Will and Command, and conſequently, from the "expectation of reward and puniſhment, be ſuffi-"cient to influence the generality of Men in any to-"lerable degree?" That it is not, will, I ſuppoſe, be clearly ſeen by the following conſideration. All, who have conſidered human nature attentively, have found,

found[1], that it is not enough to make men follow Virtue that it be owned to be the *greateſt* good; which, the *beauty*, *benefit*, or *reaſonableneſs* of it may evince. Before it can raiſe any deſire in them, it muſt firſt be brought home to them; and conſidered by them as a good that makes a neceſſary part of their happineſs. For it is not conceived needful, that a man's happineſs ſhould depend on the attainment of the greateſt poſſible good; and he daily forms ſchemes of complete happineſs without it. But the gratification of craving appetites, moved ſtrongly by ſelf-love, being thought to contribute much to human happineſs, and being at the ſame time ſo oppoſite to, and inconſiſtent with Virtue, the generality will never be brought to think, that the uniform practice of it makes a neceſſary part of human happineſs. To balance theſe appetites, ſomething, then, more intereſting muſt be laid in the ſcale of Virtue; and this can be only rewards and puniſhments, which Religion propoſes by a *morality founded in Will.*

But this may be farther underſtood by what hath been obſerved above, concerning the nature and original of civil Society. *Self-intereſt*, as we there ſhew, ſpurring to action by hopes and fears, cauſed all thoſe diſorders amongſt men, which required the remedy of civil Society. And *ſelf-intereſt*, again, operating by hopes and fears in Society, afforded means for the redreſs of thoſe firſt diſorders; ſo far forth as Society could carry thoſe hopes and fears. For to combat this univerſal paſſion of *ſelf-love*, another, at leaſt as ſtrong, was to be oppoſed to it; but ſuch a one not being to be found in human nature, all that could be done was to turn this very Paſſion in an oppoſite direction, and to a contrary purpoſe. Therefore, becauſe Society failed (from

[1] See *Locke's Eſſay*, Chap. *Of Power*, § 71.

the

the natural deficiency of its plan) in remedying the diſorders it was inſtituted to correct, and conſequently was obliged to call in the aid of Religion, as is above explained; it is evident it muſt proceed *ſtill* on the ſame principles of *hopes and fears*. But, of all the three grounds of Morality, the third only thus operating, and an Atheiſt not having the third, Religion, which only can give it, muſt be unavoidably neceſſary for Society. Or in other words, the *moral ſenſe*, and the knowledge of the *natural eſſential difference of things* in conjunction, will be altogether inſufficient to influence the generality in virtuous practice.

SECT. V.

BUT Mr. *Bayle*, who well underſtood the force of this Argument, is unwilling to reſt the matter here; and ſo caſts about for a motive of more general influence. This, he thinks, he finds in that ſtrong appetite for glory, praiſe, and reputation, which an Atheiſt muſt needs have as well as other men. And this makes his ſecond Argument.

II. "It is moſt certain[t], (ſays he) that a man de-
"void of all Religion may be very ſenſible of world-
"ly honour, and very covetous of praiſe and glory.
"If ſuch a one find himſelf in a country where in-
"gratitude and knavery expoſe men to contempt,
"and generoſity and virtue are admired, we need
"not doubt but he will affect the character of a
"man of honour; and be capable of reſtoring a
"truſt, even where the Laws could lay no hold upon
"him. The fear of paſſing for a knave would pre-
"vail over his avarice. And as there are men, who
"expoſe themſelves to a thouſand inconveniencies,
"and a thouſand dangers, to revenge an affront,

[t] Il eſt—fort certain, qu'un homme deſtitué de foi, peut être fort ſenſible à l'honneur du monde, &c. *Penſ. div.* c. 179.

"which

" which perhaps they have received before very few " witneſſes, and which they would readily pardon, " were it not for fear of incurring infamy amongſt " thoſe with whom they had to do; ſo I believe the " ſame here; that this perſon, whom we ſuppoſe de- " void of Religion, would, notwithſtanding all " the oppoſition of his avarice, be capable of reſtor- " ing a truſt, which it could not be legally proved " he had withheld; when he ſees that his good faith " will be attended with the applauſes of the whole " place where he reſides; while his perfidy might, " ſome time or other, be objected to him, or at leaſt " ſo ſtrongly ſuſpected, that he could not paſs in the " world's opinion for an honeſt man: For it is that " inward eſteem in the minds of others, which we " aſpire at, above all things. The words and " actions, which mark this eſteem, pleaſe us on no " other account, than as we imagine them to be the " ſigns of what paſſes in the mind: A machine ſo " ordered as to make the moſt reſpectful geſticula- " tions, and to pronounce the cleareſt articulate " ſounds, in all the detours of flattery, would never " contribute to give us a better opinion of ourſelves, " becauſe we ſhould know they were not ſigns of " eſteem in the mind of another. On theſe accounts " therefore, he, of whom I ſpeak, might ſacrifice his " avarice to his vanity, if he only thought he ſhould be " ſuſpected of having violated a truſt. And though " he might even believe himſelf ſecure from all ſuſ- " picion, yet, ſtill, he could eaſily reſolve to preſer " the honourable part to the lucrative, for fear of " falling into the inconvenience, which has happened " to ſome, of publiſhing their crimes themſelves, " while they ſlept, or in the tranſports of a fever. " *Lucretius* uſes this motive to draw men, without " Religion, to virtue."

To this, I reply, 1. That it is indeed true, that commendation and diſgrace are ſtrong motives to men

men to accommodate themſelves to the opinions and rules of thoſe, with whom they converſe; and that thoſe rules and opinions, in a good meaſure, correſpond, in moſt civilized countries, with the unchangeable rule of right, whatever *Sextus Empiricus* and *Montaigne* have been pleaſed to ſay to the contrary. For virtue evidently advancing, and vice as viſibly obſtructing the general good, it is no wonder, that *that* action ſhould be encouraged with eſteem and reputation, wherein every one finds his account; and *that*, diſcountenanced, by reproach and infamy, which hath a contrary tendency. But then we ſay, that ſeeing this good opinion of the world may be almoſt as ſurely gained, certainly with more eaſe and ſpeed, by a well acted hypocriſy than by a ſincere practice of virtue, the Atheiſt, who lies under no reſtraints with regard to the moral qualities of his actions, will rather chuſe to purſue *that* road to reputation, which is conſiſtent with an indulgence of all his other paſſions; than *that* whereby they will be at conſtant war with one another; and where he will be always finding himſelf under the hard neceſſity of *ſacrificing*, as Mr. *Bayle* well expreſſes it, *his avarice to his vanity*. Now this inconvenience he may avoid by reſolving to be honeſt only before company, which will procure him enough of reputation; and to play the rogue in ſecret, where he may fully indulge his avarice, or what other paſſion he is moſt diſpoſed to gratify. That this will be his ſyſtem, who has no motive, but popular reputation, to act virtuouſly, is ſo plain that Mr. *Bayle* was reduced to the hardeſt ſhifts imaginable to invent a reaſon why an Atheiſt, thus actuated by the love of glory, might poſſibly behave himſelf honeſtly, when he could do the contrary without ſuſpicion.—"And though he might believe "himſelf ſecure from all ſuſpicion, yet ſtill he could "eaſily reſolve to prefer the honourable part to the "lucrative, for fear of falling into the inconvenience

"which

" which hath happened to ſome, of publiſhing their " crimes themſelves, while they ſlept, or in the " tranſports of a fever." *Lucretius*, ſays he, *uſes this motive to draw men, without religion, to virtue.* It had been to the purpoſe to have told us, what man, from the time of *Lucretius* to his own, had been ever *ſo drawn.* But they muſt know little of human nature, who can ſuppoſe, that the conſideration of theſe remote, poſſible indeed, but very unlikely accidents, hath ever any ſhare in the determination of the Will, when men are deliberating on actions of importance, and diſtracted by the ſhifting uncertain views of complicated Good and Evil. But granting it to be likely, or common; the man, Mr. *Bayle* deſcribes, could never get clear of the danger of that contingency, which way ſoever he reſolved to act. Let us ſuppoſe him to take the honourable part, even then, ſleep or a fever might as eaſily deprive him of the reputation he affects: For I believe there is no man, of this turn, but would be as aſhamed to have it known, that all his virtuous actions proceeded from a ſelfiſh vanity, as to be diſcovered to have ſtretched a point of juſtice, of which civil laws could not take cognizance. It is certain, the *firſt* makes a man as contemptible, and much more ridiculous in the eyes of others, than the *latter*; becauſe the advantage aimed at is fantaſtical: And one diſcovery ſleep or a fever is as likely to make as the other.

But, 2. Suppoſing our Atheiſt to be of ſo timid a complexion, as to fear that, even in a courſe of the beſt-acted hypocriſy, he may riſque the danger of being diſcovered, yet as this practice, by which he ſo well covers all the lucrative arts of fraud, enables him to provide well for himſelf, he will be eaſily brought to hazard all the inconveniences of a detection, to which, indeed, the courſe is liable, but which it can ſo eaſily repair: for he has ample expe-

rience that though indeed eſteem is generally annexed to apparent good actions, and infamy to bad; yet that there is no virtue which ſo univerſally procures popular Opinion as *riches and power*, there being no infamy which they will not efface or cover; and this being a road to Opinion which leads him, at the ſame time, to the gratification of his other paſſions; there is no doubt but it will be his choice [u].

After many detours, Mr. *Bayle* is, at length, brought to own, that Atheiſm is, indeed, in its natural tendency, deſtructive of Society; but then, he inſiſts upon it, that it never in fact becomes ſo,

III. *Becauſe* (and this is his next argument) *men do not act according to their principles*, nor ſet their practice by their opinions. He owns this to have very much of a myſtery; but for the fact he appeals to the obſervation of mankind: "For if it were not "ſo (ſays he)[w] how is it poſſible that Chriſtians, who "know ſo clearly by a Revelation, ſupported by ſo "many miracles, that they muſt renounce vice, if "they would be eternally happy, and avoid eternal "miſery; who have ſo many excellent preachers—"ſo many zealous directors of conſcience—ſo many "books of devotion; how is it poſſible, amidſt all "this, that Chriſtians ſhould live, as they do, in the "moſt enormous diſorders of vice?" And again [x], agreeably to this obſervation, he takes notice, "that "*Cicero* hath remarked, that many *Epicureans*, con-"trary to their principles, were good friends and "honeſt men; who accommodated their actions, "not to their principle, the deſire of pleaſure, but "to the rules of reaſon." Hence he concludes: "That thoſe lived better than they talked; where-

[u] —Πλούτου δ' ἀρετὴ κὺδος ὀπηδεῖ.
Δαίμων δ' οἷος ἕκαστα——— Heſiod. *Oper. & Dies.*

[w]—Si cela n'etoit pas, comment, *&c. Penſ. div.* c. cxxxvi.

[x] Cicéron l'a remarqué à l'egard de pluſieurs Epicuriens, *&c.* c. clxvii.

"as

"as others talked better than they lived. The "ſame remark (ſays he) hath been made on the con- "duct of the *Stoics:* their principle was, that all "things arrived by an inevitable neceſſity, which "God himſelf was ſubject to. Now this ſhould "naturally have terminated in inaction; and diſpoſed "them to abſtain from exhortations, promiſes, and "menacing. On the contrary, there was no ſect of "philoſophers more given to preaching; or whoſe "whole conduct did more plainly ſhew, that they "thought themſelves the abſolute maſters of their "own deſtiny." The concluſion he draws from all this, and much more to the ſame purpoſe, is[y], that "therefore Religion doth not do that ſervice towards "reſtraining vice as is pretended, nor Atheiſm that "injury, in encouraging it: while each profeſſor "acts contrary to his proper principle."

Now from this concluſion, and from words dropped up and down[z], of the myſterious quality of this phænomenon, one would ſuſpect Mr. *Bayle* thought that there was ſome ſtrange Principle in man, that unaccountably diſpoſed him to act in oppoſition to his opinions, whatſoever they were. And indeed, ſo he muſt needs ſuppoſe, or he ſuppoſes nothing to the purpoſe: for if it ſhould be found, that this Principle ſometimes diſpoſes men as violently to act *according to* their opinions, as at other times it inclines them to act *againſt* them, *it* will do Mr. *Bayle*'s argument no ſervice. And if this Principle ſhould, after all, only prove to be the violence of the irre-

[y] *Contin. des Penſ. div.* c. cxlix.

[z] Je conçois que c'eſt une choſe bien étrange, qu'un homme qui vit bien moralement, & qui ne croit ni paradis, ni enfer. Mais j'en reviens toujours-là, que l'homme eſt une certaine creature, qui avec toute ſa raiſon, n'agit pas toujours conſequement à ſa creance; ce ſeroit une choſe plus infinie que de parcourir toutes les bizarreries de l'homme. Une Monſtre plus monſtrueux que les Centaures & que la Chimere de la fable. *Penſ. div.* c. clxxvi.

gular appetites, *it* will conclude directly againſt him. And by good luck, we have our Adverſary himſelf confeſſing, that this is indeed the caſe: for though, as I ſaid, he commonly affects to give our perverſe conduct a myſterious air, the neceſſary ſupport of the ſophiſtry of his concluſion; yet, when he is off his guard, we have him declaring the plain reaſon of it; as where he ſays, "The[a] general idea "we entertain of a man, who believes a God, a hea-"ven and a hell, leads us to think, that he would "do every thing which he knows agreeable to the "will of God; and avoid every thing which he "knows to be diſagreeable to it: But the life of "man ſhews, he does the direct contrary. The "reaſon is this: Man does not determine himſelf to "one action rather than another by the general "knowledge of what he ought to do, but by the "particular judgment he paſſes on each diſtinct caſe, "when he is on the point of proceeding to action. "This particular judgment may, indeed, be con-"formable to thoſe general ideas of *fit* and *right*; "but, for the moſt part, it is not ſo. *He complies*, "*almoſt always, with the reigning paſſion of the heart*, "*to the bias of the temperament, to the force of con-*"*tracted habits*," &c. Now if this be the caſe, as in truth it is, we muſt needs draw from this Principle the very contrary concluſion, That, if *men act not according to their opinions*, and that it is the force of the irregular appetites which cauſes this perverſity, a Religioniſt will *often act againſt his principles*; but an Atheiſt, *always conformably to them*: becauſe an Atheiſt indulges his vicious paſſions, while he acts *according to his* principles, in the ſame manner that a Religioniſt does, when he acts *againſt his*. It is therefore only *accidental* that men act contrary to their opinions; then, when they oppoſe their paſ-

[a] L'idée générale veut que, &c. *Penſ. div.* c. CXXXV.

ſions:

men's not conforming their practice to their principles, be true: for the ſole reaſon why the fataliſt did not act according to his opinions, was, becauſe they could not be uſed, while he was a Theiſt, to the gratification of his paſſions; becauſe, that though it appeared, if there were no liberty, men could have no merit; yet believing a God, the rewarder and puniſher of men, as if they had merit, he would act likewiſe as if they had. But take away from him the belief of a God, and there would be then no cauſe why he ſhould not act *according* to his principle of *fate*, as far as relates to moral practice.

2. Next, *in morals*. We own that men here likewiſe frequently act contrary to their opinions: For the view (as we obſerved above) of the greateſt confeſſed poſſible good, which, to a religioniſt, is the practice of virtue, will never, 'till it be conſidered as making a neceſſary part of *our* happineſs, excite us to the purſuit of it: and our irregular paſſions, which are of a contrary nature, while they continue importunate, and while one or other is perpetually ſoliciting us, will prevent us from thus conſidering virtue as making a neceſſary part of our happineſs. This is the true cauſe of all that diſorder in the life of man, which Philoſophers ſo much admire; which the Devout lament; and for which the Moraliſt could never find a cure: Where the appetites and reaſon are in perpetual conflict; and the man's practice is continually oppoſing his principles. But, on the other hand, an Atheiſt, whoſe opinions lead him to conclude, *ſenſual pleaſure to be the greateſt poſſible good*, muſt, by the concurrence of his paſſions, conſider it as making a neceſſary part of *his* happineſs: and then nothing can prevent his acting *according to his principles*.

We own, however, that the Atheiſt, Mr. *Bayle* deſcribes, would be as apt, nay apter, to act againſt his

ſions: or in Mr. *Bayle*'s words, when *the general knowledge of what one ought to do, doth not coincide with the particular judgment we paſs on each diſtinct caſe*; which judgment is generally directed by the paſſions: But that coincidence always happens in an Atheiſt's determination of himſelf to action: ſo that the matter, when ſtripped of the parade of eloquence, and cleared from the perplexity of the abounding verbage, lies open to this eaſy anſwer.

We allow, men frequently act contrary to their opinions, both *metaphyſical* and *moral*, in the caſes Mr. *Bayle* puts.

1. *In metaphyſical*, where the Principle contradicts common ſentiments, as the *ſtoical fate, and chriſtian predeſtination* [b]: there, men rarely act in conformity to their opinions. But this inſtance doth not at all affect the queſtion, tho' Mr. *Bayle*, by his manner of urging it, would inſinuate, that an Atheiſt might be no more influenced in practice, by his ſpeculative opinion of *no God*, than a Fataliſt, by *his*, of *no liberty*. But the caſes are widely different: for, as the exiſtence of God reſtrains all the vicious appetites by enforcing the duties of morality, the diſbelief of it, by taking off that reſtraint, would ſuffer, nay invite, the Atheiſt to act according to his principles. But the opinion of *fate* having no ſuch effect on the morality of actions, and at the ſame time contradicting common ſentiments, we eaſily conceive how the maintainers of it are brought to act contrary to their principles. Nay, it will appear, when rightly conſidered, that the Atheiſt would be ſo far from not acting according to his opinions, that were his principle of *no God*, added to the fataliſt's of *no liberty*, it would then occaſion the fataliſt to act according to his opinions, though he acted contrary to them before; at leaſt, if the cauſe Mr. *Bayle* aſſigns for

[b] *Penſ. div.* c. clxxvi.

his opinions than a Theiſt: but they are only thoſe ſlender opinions concerning *the obligation to virtuous practice* which Mr. *Bayle* hath given him: for if men do not purſue the greateſt confeſſed poſſible good, 'till they conſider it as making a neceſſary part of their happineſs; I aſk, which is the likelieſt means of bringing them ſo to conſider it? Is it the reflection of *the innate idea of the lovelineſs of virtue*; or the more abſtract contemplation on its *eſſential difference* to vice? (and theſe are the only views in which an Atheiſt can conſider it) or is it not rather the belief, that the practice of virtue, as religion teaches it, is attended with an infinite reward? To thoſe opinions, I ſay, an Atheiſt is like enough to run counter: but his principles of impiety, which cheriſh his paſſions, we muſt never look to find at variance with his actions: for our adverſary tells us, that the reaſon why practice and principle ſo much differ, is the violence of human appetites: from which, a plain diſcourſer would have drawn the contrary concluſion; that then, there is the greater neceſſity to enforce religion, as an additional curb to licentiouſneſs; for, that a curb it is, at leaſt in ſome degree, is agreed on all hands.

And here, at parting, it may not be amiſs to obſerve, how much this argument weakens one of the foregoing: *There* we are made to believe, that the *moral ſenſe* and *eſſential differences* are ſufficient to make men virtuous: *Here* we are taught, that theſe, with the *ſanction of a Providence* to boot, cannot do it in any tolerable degree.

As to the lives of his *Epicureans*, and other Atheiſts, which we now come to; the reader is firſt of all deſired to take notice of the fallacy he would here obtrude upon us, in the judgment he makes of the nature of the two different principles, by ſetting together the effects of *Atheiſm*, as they appear in the majority of half a ſcore men; and thoſe of *Religion*,

as they appear in the majority of infinite multitudes: A kind of ſophiſm, which ſmall ſects in religion have perpetually in their mouths, when they compare their own morals with thoſe in large communities, from which they diſſent. And now, to come to his palmary argument taken from fact. For,

IV. In the laſt place, he ſays [c], "that the lives "of the ſeveral Atheiſts of antiquity fully ſhew, "that this principle does not neceſſarily produce "depravity of morals." He inſtances "in *Diagoras*, "*Theodorus*, *Evemerus*, *Nicanor*, and *Hippon*: "whoſe virtue appeared ſo admirable to a Father "of the Church, that he would enrich Religion "with it, and make Theiſts of them, in ſpite of "all Antiquity." And then deſcends to "*Epicurus*, "and his followers, whom their very enemies ac-"knowledged to be unblameable in their actions, "as the *Roman Atticus*, *Caſſius*, and the elder *Pli-*"*ny*:" and cloſes this illuſtrious catalogue with an encomium on the morality of *Vanini* and *Spinoſa*. But this is not all; for he tells us farther [d], of whole nations of Atheiſts, "which modern travellers have "diſcovered in the iſlands or continents of *Afric* "and *America*, that, in point of morals, are rather "better, not worſe, than the idolaters who live "around them. It is true, that theſe Atheiſts are "ſavages, without laws, magiſtrate, or civil poli-"cy: but this (he ſays) [e] ſupplies him with an argu-"ment *à fortiori*: for if they live peaceably toge-"ther out of civil ſociety, much rather would they "do ſo in it, where equal laws reſtrain men from "injuſtice." He is ſo pleaſed with this argument, that he reduces it to this enthymeme [f]:

[c] *Penſ. diver.* c. clxxiv. & *Contin. des Penſ. diver.* c. cxliv.
[d] *Contin. des Penſ. div.* c. lxxxv. & c. cxliv.
[e] *Contin. des Penſ. div.* c. cxviii.
[f] Des peuples athées diviſes en familles independantes ſe ſont, &c.

"Whole

"Whole nations of atheiſts, divided into inde-
"pendent families, have preſerved themſelves
"from time immemorial without law.

"Therefore, much ſtronger reaſon have we to
"think they would ſtill preſerve themſelves, were
"they under one common maſter, and one com-
"mon law, the equal diſtributer of rewards and pu-
"niſhments."

In anſwer to all this, I ſay (having once again reminded the reader, that the queſtion between us is, *whether atheiſm would not have a pernicious effect on the body of a people in ſociety*) 1. That as to the lives of thoſe philoſophers, and heads of ſects, which Mr. *Bayle* hath thought fit ſo much to applaud, nothing can be collected from thence, in favour of the general influence of atheiſm on morality. We will take a view of the ſeveral motives thoſe men had to the practice of virtue: for thereby it will be ſeen, that not one of theſe motives (peculiar to their ſeveral characters, ends, and circumſtances) reaches the groſs body of a people, ſeized with the infection of this principle. In *ſome* of them it was the *moral ſenſe*, and the *eſſential difference of things*, that inclined them to virtue: but we have fully ſhewn above, that theſe are too weak to operate on the generality of mankind; though a few ſtudious, contemplative Men, of a more refined imagination and felicity of temperament, might be indeed influenced by them. In *others* it was a warm paſſion for fame, and love of glory. But though all degrees of men have this paſſion equally ſtrong, yet all have it not equally pure and delicate: ſo that though *reputation* is what all affect, yet the groſs body of mankind is little ſolicitous from whence it ariſes; and reputation, or at leaſt the *marks* of it, which is all the people aſpire to, we have ſhewn, may be eaſily gained in a road very far from the real practice of virtue: in

which road too, the people are moſt ſtrongly tempted to purſue it. Very ſmall then is the number of thoſe, on whom theſe motives would operate, as even *Pomponatius*, in his ample confeſſion taken above, hath acknowledged: and yet theſe are the moſt extenſive motives that theſe philoſophic Atheiſts had to the practice of virtue: for, in the *reſt*, the motive muſt be owned to have been leſs legitimate, and reſtrained to their peculiar ends or circumſtances; as concern for the credit of the ſect they had founded, or eſpouſed: which they endeavoured to ennoble by this ſpurious luſtre. It is not eaſy for a Modern to conceive, how tender they were of the honour of their Principles: The conference between *Pompey* and *Poſidonius* the Stoic, is a well-known ſtory [s]: and if the fear of only appearing ridiculous by their principles were ſtrong enough to make them do ſuch violence to themſelves, what muſt we believe the fear of becoming generally odious would do, where the principle has a natural tendency, as we ſee *Cardan* frankly confeſſed, to make the holder of it the object of public abhorrence? But if the ſenſe of ſhame were not ſtrong enough, ſelf-preſervation would force theſe men upon the practice of virtue: for though, of old, the Magiſtrate gave great indulgence to philoſophic ſpeculations; yet this downright principle of atheiſm being univerſally underſtood to be deſtructive to Society, He frequently let looſe his ſevereſt reſentment againſt the maintainers of it: ſo that ſuch had no other way to diſarm his vengeance, than in perſuading him by their lives, that the principle had no ſuch deſtructive tendency. In a word then, theſe motives being peculiar to the leaders of ſects, we ſee that the virtuous practice ariſing from thence makes nothing for the point in queſtion.

[s] *Tuſc. Diſp.* l. ii. c. 25.

2. But

2. But he comes much cloſer to it, in his next inſtance; which is of whole nations of modern Savages, who are all atheiſts, and yet live more virtuouſly than their idolatrous neighbours. And their being yet unpolicied, and in a ſtate of nature, makes, he thinks, the inſtance conclude more ſtrongly for him. Now, to let the truth of the fact paſs unqueſtioned; though *Homer* ſeemed to have a very different opinion of the matter, when he makes the atheiſtical *Cyclops* to be the moſt unjuſt and violent, as well as moſt brutal, race of men upon earth. And what faith might be expected from ſuch a people, the poet gives us to underſtand, in that fine circumſtance, where one of them was accoſted by *Ulyſſes*, who was then a ſtranger to their Principles. This wary hero, imploring the aſſiſtance of a *Cyclop* tells him with great openneſs who he was, whence he came, and the ſum of his adventures. But no ſooner had the Monſter profeſſed himſelf a thorough FREE-THINKER, than the experienced traveller loſt all hopes of faith or juſtice from him; and, from that moment, put himſelf upon his guard, and would not truſt him with one word of truth, more.

Ἀλλά μιν ἄψορρον προσέφην δολίοις ἐπέεσσι.

But I ſay, to let this paſs, I ſhall endeavour to detect the ſophiſtry of his concluſion (which I had before obviated in the ſecond ſection [b] concerning the inſufficiency of human Laws alone) in a fuller explanation of that reaſoning.

It is notorious, that man, in Society, is inceſſantly giving the affront to the public laws. To oppoſe which, the Community is as conſtantly buſied in adding new ſtrength and force to its ordinances. If we enquire into the cauſe of this perverſity, we ſhall find it no other than the number and violence of the ap-

[b] See p. 63.

petites. The appetites take their birth from our real or imaginary wants: our REAL wants are unalterably the ſame; and, as ariſing only from the natural imbecillity of our condition, extremely few, and eaſily relieved. Our FANTASTIC wants are infinitely numerous, to be brought under no certain meaſure or ſtandard; and increaſing exactly in proportion to our improvements in the arts of life. But the arts of life owe their original to Society[1]: and the more perfect the Policy, the higher do thoſe improvements ariſe; and, with them, are our wants, as we ſay, proportionably increaſed, and our appetites inflamed. For the violence of theſe appetites, which ſeek the gratification of our imaginary wants, is much ſtronger than that raiſed by our real wants: not only becauſe thoſe wants are more numerous, which gives conſtant exerciſe to the appetites; and more unreaſonable, which makes the gratification proportionably difficult: and altogether unnatural, to which there is no meaſure; but, principally, becauſe vicious cuſtom hath affixed a *kind of reputation* to the gratification of the fantaſtic wants, which it hath not done to the relief of the real ones. So that when things are in this ſtate, we have ſhewn above, that even the moſt provident Laws, without other aſſiſtance, are inſufficient. But in a ſtate of nature, unconſcious of the arts of life, men's wants are only real; and theſe wants, few, and eaſily ſupplied. For food and covering are all which are neceſſary to ſupport our Being. And Providence is abundant in its proviſions, for theſe wants: and while there is

[1] There is one remarkable circumſtance in the *Moſaic* hiſtory, that, I ſhould fancy, muſt needs give our *free-thinkers* a high idea either of the *veracity* or *penetration* of the author. It is, where, having repreſented *Cain* as the firſt who built a city, or made advances towards civil ſociety, he informs us, that his poſterity were the inventors of the arts of life, in the inſtances he gives of *Jabal*, *Jubal*, and *Tubal-Cain*.

more

more than enough for all, it can hardly be, that there ſhould be diſputes about each man's ſhare.

And now the reader ſees clearly how it might well be, that this rabble of Atheiſts ſhould live peaceably in a ſtate of nature, though the utmoſt force of human Laws, in the improved condition of Society, could not hinder them from running into mutual violence. But the ſophiſtry of this enthymeme is further ſeen from hence. Not even Mr. *Bayle* himſelf would pretend, that theſe Atheiſts, who live peaceably in their preſent ſtate, without the reſtraint of human laws, would live peaceably without this reſtraint, after they had underſtood and practiſed the arts of life in credit amongſt a civilized people. In Society therefore, which the arts of life inſeparably accompany, an impoſed curb, he will own, would be neceſſary. I then argue thus, If a people, who out of Society could live peaceably without the curb of Law, could not live peaceably without that curb in Society; you have no reaſon to believe, that, though out of Society they might live peaceably without the curb of religion, they could live peaceably, without that curb, in Society? The anſwer to this muſt bring on again the queſtion, How ſtrong the curb on man, in Society, ſhould be? which we have fully examined in another place. This argument, therefore, proves nothing but the folly of pretending to conclude, concerning man in Society, from what we ſee of his behaviour, out of it.

And here, in concluſion, once for all, it may not be amiſs to obſerve, the uniform ſtrain of ſophiſtry which runs through all Mr. *Bayle*'s reaſonings on this head. The queſtion is, and I have been frequently obliged to repeat it, he ſo induſtriouſly affecting to forget or miſtake it, *Whether atheiſm be deſtructive to the body of a Society?* And yet he, whoſe buſineſs it is, to prove the negative, brings all his arguments from conſiderations, which either

affect

affect not the groſs body of mankind, or affect not that body, in Society: in a word, from the lives of *Sophiſts* or *Savages*; from the example of a few ſpeculative men far above the view of the common run of *citizens*; or from *that* of a barbarous crew of *ſavages* much farther below it. All his facts and reaſonings then being granted, they ſtill fall ſhort and wide of his concluſion.

But the laſt ſtroke of his apology is more extravagant than all the reſt: for having proved atheiſm very conſiſtent with a ſtate of nature, leſt it ſhould happen to be found not ſo conſiſtent with civil ſociety, but that one of them muſt riſe upon the ruins of the other, he gives a very palpable hint which of the two he thinks ſhould be preſerved; by making it a ſerious queſtion, diſcuſſed in a ſet diſſertation [k], WHETHER CIVIL SOCIETY BE ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY FOR THE PRESERVATION OF MANKIND [l]? and very gravely reſolving it in the negative.—And here let me obſerve, that theſe PHILOSOPHERS (as Meſſ. *Voltaire* and *D'Alembert* call all thoſe who deſpiſe Religion) never ſuffer a good hint to lye unimproved. The famous Citizen of *Geneva* building upon this before us, hath ſince written a large Diſcourſe to ſhew, that CIVIL SOCIETY IS EVEN HURTFUL TO MANKIND.

SECT. VI.

I Have here given, and to the beſt advantage, all the arguments Mr. *Bayle* hath employed to prove Religion not neceſſary to civil Society; by which it may be ſeen, how little the united force of wit and eloquence is able to produce for the ſupport of ſo outrageous a paradox.

[k] *Contin. des Penſ. div.* c. cxviii.

[l] Si les ſocietéz ſont abſolument neceſſaires pour conſerver le genre humain.

The

The reader will imagine, that now nothing can hinder us from going on to our *ſecond* propoſition; after having ſo ſtrongly ſupported the *firſt*. But we have yet to combat a greater monſter in morals before we can proceed.

As the great foundation of our propoſition, *that the doctrine of a future ſtate of rewards and puniſhments is neceſſary to civil ſociety*, is this, *that religion is neceſſary to civil ſociety*; ſo the foundation of this latter propoſition is, *that* VIRTUE *is ſo*. Now, to the laſting opprobrium of our age and country, we have ſeen a writer publicly maintain, in a book ſo intituled, that PRIVATE VICES were PUBLIC BENEFITS. An unheard of impiety, wickedly advanced, and impudently avowed, againſt the univerſal voice of nature: in which *moral virtue* is repreſented as the invention of knaves; and *chriſtian virtue* as the impoſition of fools: in which (that his inſult on common ſenſe might equal what he puts on common honeſty) he aſſures his reader, that his book is a ſyſtem of moſt exalted morals and religion: And that the *juſtice of his country*, which publicly accuſed him[m], was pure calumny.

But I ſhall undertake to ſhew, and that in very few words, to the admirers of the low buffoonry and impure rhetoric of this wordy declaimer, that his whole fabric is one confuſed heap of falſhoods and abſurdities.

I. *Firſt* then, it is to be obſerved, that though his general poſition be, *that private Vices are public benefits*, yet, in his proof of it, he all along explains it by *Vice only in a certain meaſure, and to a certain degree*. And, as all other writers have deduced the neceſſity on private men in ſociety, to be virtuous, and on the magiſtrate ſeverely to puniſh vice, from the *malignity of the nature of Vice*; ſo he enforces this

[m] By the Grand-jury of *Middleſex*.

neceſſity,

neceſſity, on both, from the *malignity of its exceſs.* And indeed he had been only fit for bedlam had he not given this reſtriction to the general ſenſe of his propoſition.

However, this is full enough to expoſe the falſhood of that aſſertion, which his whole book is written to ſupport, namely, *that vice is abſolutely neceſſary for a rich and powerful Society.* For whatſoever is *abſolutely neceſſary* to the well being of another in matter of morals, muſt be ſo, by its eſſential properties; the uſe of which thing will be, then, in proportion to its degree. And this the common moraliſts obſerve of Virtue with regard to the State. But whatſoever is uſeful to another, only when in a certain degree, is not ſo by its eſſential properties; if not by its eſſential properties, then, of courſe, by accident only; and, if by accident, not neceſſary.

The firſt part of the former aſſertion may be proved thus. If A be abſolutely neceſſary to B, it is, becauſe neither C, nor D, nor any thing but A, can ſupply the wants of B. But if nothing but A can ſupply theſe wants, it is becauſe the ſupplial is afforded by the *eſſential* properties of A; which eſſential properties are incommunicable to all other beings; the communication of them to C, D, *&c.* making C and D the ſame as A, which is abſurd: for if the ſupplial of the wants of B were cauſed by what was not *eſſential* to A, but *accidental*; then might theſe wants as well be ſupplied by C, D, *&c.* as by A; becauſe that which is *accidental* only, may belong in common to ſeveral different beings. The ſecond part may be proved thus: Theſe *eſſential qualities can never be exceſſive*; as for inſtance, There can never be too much *Virtue* in a ſtate. *Specific* Virtues, indeed, may be puſhed to exceſs; but then they loſe their nature, and become *vices*; in which ſtate of things, Society will be ſo far from having too

too much, that it will have too little Virtue. It is not ſo with *generic* Virtue; therefore that *eſſential* Quality in A, which in a lower degree profits B, muſt in a higher degree be ſtill more uſeful to B. On the other hand, *accidental Qualities may be exceſſive*; ſo that, that *accidental* Quality in A, which profiteth B in a lower degree, may injure B in a higher. This is the caſe of REAL LUXURY, in its effects on Society; as will be ſhewn in the progreſs of this ſection: for tho' a ſpecific Virtue carried to an exceſs becomes Vice, yet a Vice, ſo puſhed on, never becomes Virtue; but, on the contrary, by advancing in malignity, more clearly evinces it's true nature, and expoſes its baleful effects.

From all this, it appears, that a great and powerful Community, which is, in itſelf, a natural good, and, as ſuch, deſireable, may procure and preſerve its grandeur without Vice, though Vice ſo frequently produces and ſupports it: becauſe this utility of Vice not ariſing from its eſſential qualities, but from ſome accidental circumſtances attending it, may be ſupplied by ſomething that is not Vice, attended with the ſame circumſtances. As for inſtance, the conſumption of the *products of art and nature* is the circumſtance which makes States rich and flouriſhing. Now if this conſumption may be procured by actions not vicious, then may a State become great and powerful without the aſſiſtance of Vice. That it may, in fact, be thus procured, ſhall now be ſhewn.

II. The Author, deſcending to the enumeration of his proofs, appears plainly to have ſeen, that Vice in general was only *accidentally* productive of good: and therefore avoids entering into an examination of particulars; but ſelects, out of his favourite tribe, LUXURY, to ſupport his execrable paradox; and on this alone reſts his cauſe. By the aſſiſtance of this ambiguous term, he keeps ſomething like an argu-

ment on foot, even after he hath left all the reſt of his City-crew to ſhift for themſelves. And it muſt be owned, there is no word more inconſtantly and capriciouſly applied to particular actions; or of more uncertain meaning, when denominating ſuch actions, than the term *Luxury*. For, unapplied, it has like all other moral modes, an exact and preciſe ſignification; and includes in it, *the abuſe of the gifts of Providence*. The difficulty is only to know when this queſtion is abuſed. Men have two ways of deciding: the one, by the *principles of Natural religion*; the other, by the *poſitive inſtitutions of Revealed*. In thoſe *Principles*, all men are reaſonably well agreed; but, concerning theſe *Inſtitutions*, when taken ſeparately, and independent on thoſe *Principles*, there are various opinions, which ſuperſtition and fanaticiſm have greatly diſtorted: conſequently, thoſe who eſtimate *Luxury* by this latter rule, (where obſcurity and, of courſe, confuſion, are ſo difficult to be avoided) will diſagree extremely about it: and amongſt ſuch diverſity of notions, it would be ſtrange indeed, if ſome or other had not ideas of *Luxury*, which would ſerve the wildeſt hypotheſis; and much ſtranger, if ſo corrupt a Writer did not take advantage of them. He has done it like a maſter: and with a malice and cunning to intitle him, tho' he be but a follower, to be a Leader of a ſect.

Firſt, in order to perplex and obſcure our idea of *Luxury*, he hath laboured in a previous diſſertation, on *the origin of moral virtue*, to deſtroy thoſe very principles, by whoſe aſſiſtance we are only able to clear up and aſcertain that idea: where he decries and ridicules the eſſential difference of things, the eternal notions of right and wrong; and makes VIRTUE, which common moraliſts deduce from thence, the offspring of craft and pride.

Nothing

Nothing now being left to fix the idea of *Luxury*, but the poſitive precepts of *Chriſtianity*, and he having ſtript theſe of their only true and infallible interpreter, the principles of *natural Religion*, it was eaſy for him to make thoſe precepts ſpeak in favour of any abſurdities that would ſerve his purpoſe, and as eaſy to find ſuch abſurdities ſupported by the ſuperſtition and fanaticiſm of ſome or other of thoſe many Sects and Parties of *chriſtianity*, who, deſpiſing the principles of the Religion of Nature as *the weak and beggarly elements*, ſoon came to regard the natural appetites, as the graceleſs furniture of *the old man, with his affections and luſts.*

Having got CHRISTIANITY at this advantage, he gives us for Goſpel, that meagre Phantom begot by the hypocriſy of *Monks* on the miſanthropy of *Aſcetics:* which cries out, AN ABUSE! whenever the gifts of Providence are uſed, further than for the bare ſupport of nature. So that by this rule every thing becomes *Luxury* which is more than *neceſſary.* An idea of *Luxury* exactly fitted to our Author's hypotheſis: for if no State can be rich and powerful while its members ſeek only a bare ſubſiſtence, and, if what is more than a bare ſubſiſtence be *Luxury*, and *Luxury* be *Vice*; the conſequence, we ſee, comes in pat, PRIVATE VICES ARE PUBLIC BENEFITS. Here you have the ſole iſſue of all this tumour of words. But it is difficult to think, that a Writer of ſuch depravity of heart, had not farther ends in this wicked repreſentation of *natural* and *revealed* Religion. We cannot doubt his purpoſe, when we reflect upon his gains, which are, the fixing of his followers in a propenſity for *Vice*, and in a prejudice againſt *Chriſtianity.* For what can be more in favour of *Vice*, than, that there is no moral duty? What more in diſcredit of *Chriſtianity*, than, that all the enjoyments of life are condemned by it as evil?

III. But the GOSPEL is a very different thing from what Bigots and Fanatics are wont to repreſent it. It enjoins and forbids nothing in moral practice, but what natural Religion had before enjoined and forbid. Neither indeed could it, becauſe one of God's Revelations, whether ordinary or extraordinary, cannot contradict another; and becauſe God gave us the firſt, to judge of others, by it. Accordingly we find, that though it be indeed one of the great ends of *Chriſtianity* (but not the main and peculiar end) to advance the practice of moral virtue amongſt men, yet the New Teſtament doth not contain any regular or complete ſyſtem or Digeſt of moral laws; the detached precepts enforced by our divine Maſter in it, how excellent and perfect ſoever, ariſing only from the occaſions and circumſtances which gave birth to thoſe diſcourſes or writings, in which ſuch precepts are delivered. For the reſt, for a general knowledge of the ſyſtem of moral-duty, the founders of our Religion hold open to us the great Pandect of the law of nature, and bid us ſearch and ſtudy that. *Finally*, ſays the apoſtle Paul, *whatſoever things are true, whatſoever things are honeſt, whatſoever things are juſt, whatſoever things are lovely, whatſoever things are of good report, think on theſe things.* But where vicious cuſtom, or perverſe Interpreters, had depraved the Religion of Nature, there, particular care was taken to remove the rubbiſh of time and malice, and to reinſtate the injured moralities in their primitive dignity and ſplendor.

The *Religion of Nature*, then, being reſtored, and made the rule to explain and interpret the occaſional precepts of *Chriſtianity*; what is *Luxury* by *natural* Religion, that, and that only, muſt be *Luxury* by *revealed*. So that a true and preciſe definition of it, which this Writer (triumphing in the obſcurity which, by theſe arts, he hath thrown over the idea) thinks it impoſſible to give, ſo as not to ſuit with his hypothe-

ſis,

ſis, is eaſily ſettled. Luxury *is the uſing the gifts of Providence, to the injury of the Uſer, either in his perſon or fortune; or to the injury of any other, towards whom the Uſer ſtands in any relation, which obliges him to aid and aſſiſtance.*

Now it is evident, even from the inſtances this Writer brings of the public advantages of conſumption, which he indiſcriminately, and therefore falſly, calls *Luxury*, that the utmoſt conſumption may be made, and ſo all the ends of a rich and powerful Society ſerved, without injury to the Uſer, or any one, to whom he ſtands related: conſequently without *Luxury*, and without *Vice*. When the conſumption is attended with ſuch injury, then it becomes *Luxury*, then it becomes a *Vice*. But then, let us take notice, that *this Vice*, like all others, is ſo far from being advantageous to Society, that it is the moſt certain ruin of it. It was this *Luxury* which deſtroyed *Rome*. And the very definition given above, informs us of the manner how it came to paſs; namely, by enervating the body, debauching the mind, beggaring the fortune, and bringing in the practice of univerſal rapine and injuſtice. But the wretched abſurdity of ſuppoſing *Luxury* beneficial to ſociety, cannot be better expoſed, than by conſidering, that, as *Luxury* is the abuſing the gifts of Providence, to the injury of himſelf and of thoſe to whom we ſtand related; and as the *Public* is that, to which every man ſtands neareſt related; the conſequence is, that *Luxury* is, at one and the ſame time, beneficial and injurious to the Public. Nor can the abſurdity I here charge upon him, be evaded by ſaying it is deduced from a propoſition of his, and a definition of mine, ſet together: Becauſe, however we may differ whether the uſe of things, where no one is injured, be *Luxury*; yet we both agree in this, that where there is that injury in the uſe, it is *Luxury*; and *Luxury*, in this ſenſe, he holds to be beneficial to Society.

The caſe I here put, of *Luxury*'s injuring the PUBLIC, by depriving the ſtate of that aid and aſſiſtance from particulars, which, the relation they ſtand in to it, requires them to give, is no imaginary or unlikely ſuppoſition. This effect of *Luxury* it was which contributed, more immediately than any other, to the deſtruction of the Roman Commonwealth. For in the laſt ſtruggles for liberty by a FEW, againſt the humour of a debauched *luxurious* people, when nothing but a ſufficient fund was wanting to enable thoſe godlike men to reſtore the Republic, the richeſt citizens, who yet wiſhed well to their Country, could not be prevailed upon to retrench from their private Luxury, to ſupport the Public in this critical exigency: which therefore, having been long ſhaken by the *Luxury* of its enemies, fell now a ſacrifice to the *Luxury* of its friends. Thus the great *Roman patriot* deſcribes the fatal condition of thoſe times: *Nos habemus* LUXURIAM, *atque avaritiam*; *publice egeſtatem*, *privatim opulentiam*.

In a word then, it is not *Luxury*, but the *conſumption* of the products of art and nature, which is of ſo high benefit to Society. That this *conſumption* may well be, without *Luxury*, appears plainly from the definition given above. All the difference is, and that a very eſſential one, when the *conſumption* is made without *Luxury*, infinitely greater numbers ſhare in it; when it becomes *Luxury*, it is confined to fewer. The reaſon of this, and the different effects this different conſumption muſt have on the Public, is very evident. Had the conſumption of the commodities and products of Greece when conquered (which indeed were neceſſary to render the Romans polite and wealthy) been more equally made by that people, it would have been extremely beneficial. But being unjuſtly claimed by one part, excluſive of the reſt, "omnia virtutis "præmia ambitio poſſidebat," it became luxury and deſtruction.

deſtruction. The Hiſtorian ſhews us how it was brought about: "There (ſays he) the Roman "people firſt began to intrigue, to debauch, to af- "fect a taſte for ſtatues, pictures, and high-wrought "plate. To come at which, they oppreſſed the "private, plundered the public, violated the temples "of the Gods, and polluted and confounded "every thing both ſacred and prophane[n]." Till at length,

"Sævior armis
"LUXURIA incubuit, victumque ulciſcitur orbem."

HAVING endeavoured to ſhew in this and the two following Books, *that* the PRIESTS and LAWGIVERS of former times all concurred in ſupporting the belief of a FUTURE STATE, I am ſtopped in the midſt of my courſe, by a late noble Writer, who hath taken advantage of this notorious truth, to repreſent the labours of thoſe Moderns, who have trode in the ſame ſteps, as A CONFEDERACY BETWEEN DIVINES AND ATHEISTS TO DISHONOUR AND DEGRADE THE GOD OF THE UNIVERSE.

"After pleading the cauſe of natural and revealed "Religion, (ſays his Lordſhip) I am to plead the "cauſe of God himſelf, againſt DIVINES AND "ATHEISTS IN CONFEDERACY [o].

"The conduct of Chriſtian Divines has been ſo "far from defending the Providence of God, that "they have joined in the clamour againſt it. No- "thing has hindered, even thoſe who pretend to be "his Meſſengers, his Embaſſadors, his *Plenipoten-*

[n] Ibi primum inſuevit exercitus populi Romani amare, potare, ſigna, tabulas pictas, vaſa cælata mirari, ea privatim ac publice rapere, delubra ſpoliare, ſacra profanaque omnia polluere.

[o] *Lord* BOLINGBROKE's *Works, vol.* v. *p.* 395.

" *tiaries*, from renouncing their allegiance to him, " (as they themſelves have the FRONT TO AVOW,) " but the hypotheſis of a FUTURE STATE. On *this* " *hypotheſis alone*, they inſiſt; and therefore if this " will not ſerve their turn, God is diſowned by them, " as effectually as if he was ſo, in terms [p]." " Divines, " if not Atheiſts, yet are ABETTERS of Atheiſm [q]."

" That there were ſome men, who knew not God " in all ages may be true: but the ſcandalous taſk of " COMBATING HIS EXISTENCE under the maſk of " Theiſm, was reſerved for Metaphyſicians and " Theologians [r]."

—" Divines are ſtill more to be blamed. A " CONFEDERACY WITH ATHEISTS becomes ill the " profeſſors of Theiſm. No matter. They PER- " SIST, and have done their beſt, in concert with " their allies, to DESTROY the belief of the GOOD- " NESS of God:—They endeavour to DESTROY that " of his GOODNESS, which is a farther article of their " ALLIANCE [s]."

" The CONFEDERACY between Atheiſts and Di- " vines appears to have been carried VERY FAR— " Nay the Atheiſt will appear, to that reaſon, to " which they both appeal, more conſiſtent in his ab- " ſurdity than the Divine [t]." " Divines UPBRAID " God's GOODNESS, and CENSURE his JUSTICE [u]."

—" INJUSTICE is, in this life, aſcribed to God, by " Divines [w]."

" The whole Tribe of Divines, like Wollaſton " and Clarke, do, in effect, RENOUNCE the God " whom you and I adore, as much as the rankeſt of " the Atheiſtical Tribe. Your Prieſts and our Parſons " will exclaim moſt pathetically, and RAIL OUTRA- " GEOUSLY at this aſſertion. But have a little pati- " ence, and I will prove it to their ſhame to be true [x]."

[p] Vol. v. p. 487—8. [q] Vol. v. p. 485. [r] Vol. v. p. 307. [s] Vol. v. p. 393. [t] Vol. v. p. 348—9. [u] Vol. v. p. 417. [w] Vol. v. p. 541. [x] Vol. v. p. 485.

The

The Reader will give me leave, in a few words, to vindicate the body of Divines from the horrid calumny of this imaginary Confederacy.

He may be pleaſed then to underſtand, that ATHEISM has ever endeavoured to ſupport itſelf, on a FACT, which has indeed all the certainty that the evidence of ſenſe and experience can give it; namely, *the unequal diſtribution of moral good and evil*, here below.

—" Cum res hominum tanta caligine volvi
" Adſpicerem, *lætoſque diu florere nocentes*,
" *Vexarique pios*——LABEFACTA CADEBAT
" RELIGIO,"———

was the common language of the impatient ſufferer. From hence the Atheiſt inferred, that the Univerſe was without an intelligent Ruler; and that all things were driven about by that Fate or Fortune, which firſt produced them. DIVINES oppoſed this *Concluſion*; for they did not venture to be ſo paradoxical as (with his Lordſhip) to call in queſtion *the Premiſſes*, a phenomenon which objected itſelf to all their Senſes. They firſt demonſtrated, ſtrictly demonſtrated, the Being of a God, and his MORAL ATTRIBUTES: And then ſhewed, that if the whole of man's exiſtence were included within this life, the preſent diſtribution of good and evil would contradict that Demonſtration. They, therefore, inferred, on their part, that the whole of man's exiſtence was not included within this life: but that he was reſerved for an after-reckoning; in which, an *equal diſtribution of rewards and puniſhments* would amply vindicate the providence of a righteous Governor.

But *Atheiſts* were not the only enemies whom *Divines* had to deal with. There was a ſet of men, who allowed an intelligent firſt Cauſe, endowed with thoſe MORAL ATTRIBUTES, which the Divines had demonſtrated: and, on that account, called themſelves DEISTS. Yet they agreed ſo far with *Atheiſm*, as

as to confine the whole of man's exiſtence to the preſent life. Theſe, the *Divine* combated, in their turn; and with the ſame arms; but in an inverted order. In diſputing with the ATHEISTS the principle held in common, was *the preſent unequal diſtribution of Good and Evil.* So that to cut off their concluſion from it, of NO GOD, he *demonſtrated* the Being and Attributes: and from that proof inferred that the inequality would be ſet right. With DEISTS the common principle was *the Being and Attributes of God.* Therefore, to bring them to the allowance of a FUTURE STATE, he appealed to the preſent *unequal diſtribution of good and evil,* (which theſe Men, as well as his Lordſhip, were very backward to allow and very induſtrious not to ſee) and from that inequality inferred, that there muſt be ſuch a State.

This is a ſhort and true account of the DIVINE's conteſt with ATHEISTS and DEISTS, ſo far as the ſubject of *a future ſtate* came in queſtion: In both controverſies that *ſtate* is deduced from *the moral attributes:* only with this difference. In the diſpute with Atheiſts, the demonſtration of thoſe attributes is *made*; in the diſpute with Deiſts it is *allowed.* The final purpoſe againſt Atheiſm is to prove the BEING AND ATTRIBUTES of God; the final purpoſe againſt Deiſm is to prove a FUTURE STATE: For neither *natural* nor *revealed* Religion can ſubſiſt without *believing that God* IS, *and that he is a* REWARDER *of them that ſeek him*[y]. Thus, we ſee, the *queſtion,* in each controverſy, being different; the *premiſſes,* by which each propoſition was to be proved, muſt needs be different. The difference is here explained: the premiſſes, in the argument againſt Atheiſts, were the *moral attributes*; the premiſſes, in the argument againſt Deiſts, were the *unequal diſtribution* of good and evil.

[y] St. Paul.

What

What Enemy to Religion now, could ever hope to ſee a Calumny either thrive or riſe on ſo unpromiſing a ground? or flatter himſelf with the expectation of an Advocate bold enough to tell the World, that this conduct of the DIVINES was a CONFEDERACY WITH ATHEISTS, *to decry God's Providence; to blot out his Attributes of goodneſs and juſtice; to combat his Government; and to deny his very Exiſtence?* The RIGHT HONOURABLE Author does all this: And more;—he expects to be believed. It is true, this is a fine believing age: Yet I hardly think he would have carried his confidence in our credulity ſo far, had he ſeen his way clear before him.—His Lordſhip is always ſublime, and therefore often cloudy; commonly, at too great a diſtance to look into the detail of things, or to enter into their *minuteneſs:* (for which, indeed, he is perpetually felicitating his Genius.) So that, in his *general view* of Theologic matters, he has jumbled theſe two Controverſies into one; and, in the confuſion, hath commodiouſly ſlipped in one Fact for another. He, all the way, repreſents Divines as making *a future State* THE PROOF *of God's moral attributes:* Whereas, we now ſee, on the very face of the controverſy, that they make *the moral attributes* A PROOF *of a future State.* Let us conſider how the diſpute ſtands with the *Atheiſt.* Theſe men draw their argument againſt a God, from the condition of the moral world: The Divine anſwers, by demonſtrating *God's Being and Attributes:* and, on that demonſtration, ſatisfies the objection. Conſider how it ſtands with the *Deiſt.* Here, God's Being and Attributes is a common principle: And on this ground the Divine ſtands, to deduce a *future ſtate* from the unequal diſtribution of things.—But his miſrepreſentation was to ſupport his ſlander of a CONFEDERACY: there was no room to pretend that God's Being was made precarious by proving a *future ſtate* from his Attri-

butes; but could he get it be believed, that Divines proved the Attributes from a *future ſtate*, he would eaſily find credit with his kind Reader, for all the reſt.

Well then, the whole amount of his CHIMERICAL CONFEDERACY comes to this, That *Divines and Atheiſts hold a principle in common*; but, in common too with all the reſt of mankind; namely, that there are irregularities in the diſtribution of good and evil here below. And did any thing forbid *Divines* to employ this common principle, in ſupport of Religion againſt *Atheiſm and Deiſm!* But whatever his Lordſhip might think proper to diſguiſe in this reaſoning, there is one thing, the moſt careleſs Reader will never overlook; which is, that, under all this pomp of words and ſolemnity of accuſation, you ſee lurking that poor ſpecies of a Bigot's calumny, which, from *one* principle held in common with an obnoxious Party, charges his Adverſary, with *all* the follies or impieties which have rendered that Party odious. This miſerable artifice of impoſture, had now been long hiſſed out of learned controverſy, when the noble Lord took it up; and, with true political ſkill, worked it into a SHAM PLOT; to make RELIGION diſtruſt it's beſt Friends, and take refuge in the FIRST PHILOSOPHY.

BOOK

BOOK II.

SECT. I.

HAVING now proved the firſt PROPOSITION, *That inculcating the doctrine of a future ſtate of rewards and puniſhments is neceſſary to the well-being of Society*, by conſiderations drawn from the *nature of Man*, and the *genius of civil Society*; and cleared it from the objections of licentious Wits;

I proceed to the *ſecond*; which is, THAT ALL MANKIND, ESPECIALLY THE MOST WISE AND LEARNED NATIONS OF ANTIQUITY, HAVE CONCURRED IN BELIEVING AND TEACHING, THAT THIS DOCTRINE WAS OF SUCH USE TO CIVIL SOCIETY.

This I ſhall endeavour to prove,

I. From the conduct of Lawgivers, and Inſtitutors of civil policy.

II. From the opinions of all the Learners and Teachers of wiſdom in the ſchools of ancient philoſophy.

I. FROM THE CONDUCT OF LAWGIVERS, AND INSTITUTORS OF CIVIL POLICY: who never omitted to propagate and confirm Religion, where-ever they eſtabliſhed Laws; RELIGION, I ſay, which was always firſt in their view, and laſt in their execution. They uſed it as the inſtrument to collect a body politic; and they applied it as the bond to tye and keep that body together: they *taught* it in civilizing man; and *eſtabliſhed* it to prevent his return to barbarity and a ſavage life. In a word, ſo inſeparable,

in the ancient World, were the ideas of LAWGIVING and RELIGION, that Plutarch, (in his paradoxical preference of atheism to superstition, supposes no other Origin of divine worship than what was the work of the Lawgiver. "How much happier had it "been (says he) for the Carthaginians, had their "first Lawgiver been like Critias or Diagoras, who "believed neither Gods nor Demons, rather than "such a one as enjoined the public sacrifices to Saturn[z]?"

That the Magistrate, as such, hath taken the greatest care and pains to inculcate and support Religion, we shall prove at large: That this care and pains must arise, and was employed, on account of its confessed and experienced utility to the State, will need no proof.

But here it will be necessary to remind the reader of this previous truth, *That there never was, in any age of the world, from the most early accounts of time, to this present hour, any civil-policied nation or people, who had a Religion, of which the chief foundation and support was not the doctrine of a* FUTURE STATE *of rewards and punishments; the* JEWISH PEOPLE *only excepted.* This, I presume, our adversaries will not deny. Mr. *Bayle*, the indulgent foster-father of Infidelity, confesseth it in the fullest manner, and with the utmost ingenuity: "Toutes les religions du "monde, tant la vraie que les fausses, roulent sur "ce grand pivot, qu'il y a un juge invisible qui "punit & qui recompense, *apres cette vie*, les acti-"ons de l'homme tant exterieures qu'interieures. "C'est de la que l'on supose que decoule la princi-"pale utilité de la religion:" and thinks, it was the utility of this doctrine which set the Magistrate upon inventing a Religion for the State: "C'est le

[z] Τί δὲ Καρχηδονίοις οὐκ ἐλυσιτέλει Κριτίαν λαβοῦσιν ἢ Διαγόραν νομοθέτην ἀπ' ἀρχῆς, μήτε τινὰ θεῶν μήτε δαιμόνων νομίζειν, ἢ τοιαῦτα θύειν οἷα τῷ Χρόνῳ ἔθυον;—— Περὶ δεισιδ.

"principal

" principal motif qui eut animé ceux qui l'auroient " inventée[a]."

This truth, we beg the reader always to have in mind: So that when, in the ſequel of this diſcourſe, he meets with ancient teſtimonies for the neceſſity of RELIGION to Society, he may be ſure, that the doctrine of a FUTURE STATE of rewards and puniſhments, was the chief idea included in that term. And on this account it is, that frequently, where the Ancients ſpeak of the *ſource* of thoſe utilities, which can proceed only from the doctrine of a *future ſtate*, they give it the common name of *Religion:* as, on the other hand, they often call *Religion* by the reſtrictive name of a *future ſtate:* On which account, I have not ſcrupled, throughout this diſcourſe, to uſe the ſame liberty of applying the generic or ſpecific term, one for the other, without any apprehenſion of being thought not to underſtand my argument, or of being miſunderſtood by my reader: Who when he ſees me bring facts and opinions of Antiquity, which ſhew the utility of Religion in general, to prove the utility of the doctrine of a future ſtate in particular, will underſtand that I ſpeak home to my purpoſe, and to the full proof of my ſecond propoſition.

So that, had I done no more than produce *ſuch facts and opinions*, I had done all that was neceſſary: But ſince the bare *neceſſary* is eſteemed almoſt as poor and unhandſome a thing in literature as in civil life, I have employed the greateſt part of the preſent and following books to ſhew, from ancient facts and opinions, the more than ordinary care and concern of all the wiſe and learned, for perpetuating the ſpecific doctrine of a future ſtate of rewards and puniſhments.

Having premiſed thus much to prevent miſtakes, I proceed in the firſt place,

[a] *Dict. Crit. & Hiſt.* Art. SPINOZA. *Rem.* (E.)

1. To

1. To ſhew, *in general*, the civil Magiſtrate's care in this matter.

The popular doctrine of a Providence, and, conſequently, of a future ſtate of rewards and puniſhments, was, as we have ſaid, ſo univerſally received in the ancient world, that we cannot find any civilized country where it was not of national belief. The moſt ancient *greek* poets, as *Muſæus* [b], *Orpheus* [c], *Homer*, *Heſiod*, *&c.* who have given ſyſtems of theology and religion, on the popular creed of ſuch nations, always reckon the doctrine of a future ſtate of rewards and puniſhments as a fundamental article: And all ſucceeding writers have given teſtimony to the ſame concerted plan. *Æſchylus*, *Sophocles*, *Euripides*, *Ariſtophanes*, whoſe profeſſion it was to repreſent the manners and opinions of all civilized people, whether *Greeks* or thoſe whom the *Greeks* called *Barbarians*, are full and expreſs to the ſame purpoſe. Further, it is recorded in the works of every ancient hiſtorian and philoſopher, which it would be endleſs to recite. But *Plutarch*, the moſt knowing of them all, ſhall ſpeak for the reſt: Examine [d] (ſays he, in his tract againſt *Colotes* the *Epicurean*) "the face of the globe, and you "may find Cities unfortified, unlettered, without a "regular Magiſtrate, or appropriated habitations; "without poſſeſſions, property, or the uſe of money, "and unſkilled in all the magnificent and polite "arts of life: But a City without the knowledge of "a God, or the practice of Religion; without the "uſe of vows, oaths, oracles, and ſacrifices to pro-"cure good, or of deprecatory rites to avert evil,

[b] *Plato Rep.* lib. 11. [c] Plutarch. *Vita Lucul.*

[d] —ἰδοὺ δ' ἐν ἐπιπέδῳ καὶ γεωδεῖ πάντες ἄστυ τε, ἀγράμματοι, ἀδικάστοι, ἄοικοι, ἀχρήματοι, ἀπράγμονες ἐπὶ σίτου καὶ στέγας καὶ τρυφὴν ἀπῳκισμένοι καὶ ἄλλο μὲ χρῆσιν ἀγαθὸν, ἀλλ' ἄθεοι, μηδὲ μαντικῆς, μηδὲ ὅρκους ἢ ἀρὰς, μηδὲ ἀποτροπὰς ἢ κάθαρσιν ἱερὰ ποιούμενοι; πόλις ἂν εἴη τις γυμνὴ θεῶν;

"no

"no man can or ever will find." And in his consolation to *Apollonius*, he declares it [e] was so ancient an opinion *that good men should be recompensed after death, that he could not reach either to the author or original of it.* To the same purpose had *Cicero* and *Seneca* declared themselves before him. The first in these words; "[f] As our innate ideas discover "to us that there are Gods, whose attributes we "deduce from reason; so, *from the consent of all* "*nations and people, we conclude that the soul is im-* "*mortal.*" The other thus: "When [g] we weigh "the question of the immortality of the soul, *the* "*consent of all mankind, in their fears and hopes of a* "*future state*, is of no small moment with us."

In a word, *Sextus Empiricus*, when he would discredit the argument for the being of a God, brought from universal consent, observes that it would prove too much; because it would prove the truth of the *poetic fables of hell*, in which there was as general a concurrence [h].

But of all nations, the EGYPTIAN was most celebrated for its care in cultivating Religion in general, and the doctrine of a future state in particular: insomuch that one of the most ancient *greek* historians affirms, *They were the first who built altars and erected statues and temples to the Gods* [i].—*The first who taught that the soul of man was immortal.* And *Lu-*

[e]—Καὶ ταῦθ' ὅτως ἀρχαῖα καὶ παλαιὰ διατελεῖ νενομισμένα παρ' ἡμῖν, ὥςε τὸ παράπαν ὐδεὶς οἶδεν ὐδὲ τῦ χρόνυ τὴν ἀρχὴν, ὐτε τὸν θέντα πρῶτον, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἀπειρῶν αἰωνα τυγχάνυσι διὰτέλυς ὅτω νενομισμένα.

[f]—Ut Deos esse naturâ opinamur, qualesque sint natione cognoscimus; sic permanere animos arbitramur consensu nationum omnium. *Tuscul. Disp.* l. i. c. 16.

[g] Cum de animarum æternitate disserimus, non leve momentum apud nos habet consensus hominum, aut timentium inferos aut colentium. *Ep.* 117.

[h] *Adv. Physicos*, l. viii. c. 2. *Comment*

[i] Βωμύς τε καὶ ἀγάλματα καὶ νηὺς θεοῖσι ἀπονεῖμαι σφέας πρώτυς. Herod. Euterpe, c. 4.——Πρῶτοι δὲ καὶ τόνδε τὸν λόγον Αἰγύπτιοί εἰσιν οἱ εἰπόντες ὡς ἀνθρώπυ ψυχὴ ἀθανατός ἐςι. *Id. ib.* c. 123.

cian tells us [k], *That they were ſaid to be the firſt who had the knowledge of the Gods.* Which only amounts to this, that they were the firſt and wiſeſt civil-policied people: as will appear preſently.

But, at preſent, to prove *the Magiſtrate's care from hence.*——For this account of the antiquity and univerſality of Religion is not given to evince its *truth*; for which purpoſe other writers have often and ſucceſsfully employed it; but to manifeſt its USE; which will be beſt done by inquiring what ſhare the Magiſtrate had in it.

1. Now though no civilized nation was ever without a Religion in general, and this doctrine in particular; and though it was of general belief even before civil policy was inſtituted amongſt mankind; yet were there formerly, as now there are, many ſavage nations, that, when firſt diſcovered, appeared to have long loſt all traces of religion: A fact which implies ſome extraordinary care in the Magiſtrate for its ſupport and preſervation. For if Religion hath been ſupported in all places, at all times, and under all circumſtances, where there was a Magiſtrate and civil policy; and ſcarce in any place, or under any circumſtance, where theſe were wanting; what other cauſe than the Magiſtrate's care and contrivance can be aſſigned for its ſupport?

If it ſhould be ſaid, which, I think, is the only plauſible thing can be ſaid, that the reaſon why the Citizen had religion, and the Savage none, might be, that, amongſt the advantages of civil life, the improvement and cultivation of the mind is one; and this neceſſarily brings in the knowledge of God and religious obſervance: It is ſufficient to reply, that all the national Religions of the ancient and modern Gentile world are ſo groſs and irrational,

[k] Πρῶτοι μὲν ἀνθρώπων Αἰγύπτιοι λέγονται θεῶν τε ἔννοιαν λαβεῖν. *De Dea Syria*, initio.

that

that they could not be the product of reflection or improved reaſon, but were plainly of the Magiſtrate's fitting up, adapted to the capacity of minds yet rude and uncultivated, which could bear nothing of a finer texture than what was made out of the ſtuff he found, the genius of the Nation and the nature of the Government.

To give the proof of what we have been ſaying: The *Mexicans* and *Peruvians* in the South, and the people of *Canada* in North *America*, were on a level with regard to ſpeculative knowledge. Or, if there were any natural advantage, the *Canadians* had it. Theſe, when diſcovered, ſeemed to have no rudiments of Religion: The *Mexicans* and *Peruvians* had one formed, digeſted, and eſtabliſhed: but ſuch a Religion, as diſcovered ſomething worſe than mere ignorance, but never could be the reſult of improved thinking: However a Religion it was which taught the great articles of the worſhip of a God, a providence, and a future ſtate. Now how happened it that theſe two great empires had a Religion, and the *Canadians* none, but that the Lawgivers of the former ſaw it neceſſary to countenance, add to, and perpetuate what they found[1], for the benefit of the ſtate? which advantage the *Canadians* wanting, they loſt, in courſe of time, the very footſteps of Religion. If this will not be allowed, it will be difficult to aſſign a reaſon.

Let us ſuppoſe, according to the objection, that *gentile* Religion owes its birth to the improved and cultivated mind. Now, if we make collections from the nature of things, it will be found more likely that theſe northern Savages ſhould longer preſerve the notions of God, and the practices of Religion, than the ſouthern Citizens, uninfluenced by their Magiſtrates.

[1] See Book III. Sect. 6. II. 1. and pag. *antepenult.*

The way of getting to the knowledge of a God, beſt ſuited to the common capacity of man, is that very eaſy one, the contemplation of the works of nature: For this employment, the Savage would have fitter opportunities given him by his vacant and ſedentary life; and by his conſtant view of nature, which all his labours, and all his amuſements, perpetually preſented to him naked and unſophiſticated. The *Comte de Boulainvilliers*, a writer by no means prejudiced in favour of religion, gives this reaſon why the *Arabians* preſerved ſo long, and with ſo much purity, their notions of the Divinity [m].

On the other hand, Nature, by which we come to the knowledge of a firſt Cauſe, would be quite hid from the ſouthern Citizen, buſied in the works of barbarous arts, and inhuman practices; or taken up with the ſlaviſh attendance on the will, and a more ſlaviſh imitation of the manners of a cruel and capricious Tyrant.

Nor, if we may credit the relations of travellers, do the northern people any more neglect to exerciſe their reaſon than the ſouthern: It is conſtant, they are obſerved to have ſounder intellects than thoſe nearer the ſun: which, being owing to the influence of climes, is found to hold all the world over. Notwithſtanding this, the iſſue proved juſt the contrary; and, as we ſaid, the *Peruvians* and *Mexicans* had a Religion, the *Canadians* none at all.

Who then can doubt but that this was owing to the care and contrivance of the Magiſtrate? But indeed (which makes this inſtance the more pertinent) the *fact* confirms the *reaſoning*. The Founders of theſe two monarchies pretended to be the meſſengers

[m] *La Vie de Mohammed*, p. 147. *Ed. Amſt.* 1731. Je reviens volontiers à la louange de la ſolitude des Arabes. Elle a conſervé chez eux plus longtems, & avec moins de mélange, le ſentiment naturel de la veritable divinité, *&c.*

and

and offſpring of the Gods; and, in the manner of the grecian, and other Legiſlators (of whom more hereafter) pretended to inſpiration, eſtabliſhed Religion, and conſtituted a form of worſhip.

II. But not only the *exiſtence*, but the *genius* too of pagan Religion, ſhews the Magiſtrate's hand in its ſupport.

Firſt, From the *origin* of their Gods.

Secondly, From the *attributes* given to them; and

Thirdly, From the *mode of public worſhip*.

Firſt, The idolatry of the gentile States was chiefly the worſhip of dead men; and theſe, Kings, Lawgivers, and Founders of civil policy. The benefit accruing to the State both from the *conſecration* and the *worſhip* of ſuch Gods, ſhews it to be a contrivance of the Lawgiver. For, 1. Nothing could be a greater excitement to good government than to ſhew the Magiſtrate that the public benefits, which he ſhould invent, improve, or preſerve, would be rewarded with an immortality of fame and glory? *Cicero* gives this as the original of the civil apotheoſis. "It may be eaſily underſtood, that "the reaſon, why moſt Cities proſecuted the me-"mory of their valiant men with divine honours, "was to ſpur up their Citizens to virtue, that every "the moſt deſerving of them might encounter "dangers with the greater chearfulneſs, in the "ſervice of his country. And for this very cauſe "it was that, at Athens, Erectheus and his daugh-"ters were received into the number of the Gods[n]." 2. Nothing could make the people ſo obſervant of their Laws, as a belief that the makers, framers, and

[n] Atque adeo in pleriſque civitatibus intelligi poteſt, acuendæ virtutis gratiâ, quo libentiùs reipublicæ cauſa periculum adiret optimus quiſque, virorum fortium memoriam honore deorum immortalium conſecratam. Ob eam enim ipſam cauſam Erectheus Athenis filiæque ejus in numero deorum ſunt. *Nat. Deor.* l. iii. c. 19.

adminiſtrators of them were become Gods; and did diſpenſe a peculiar providence for their protection and ſupport.

The records of antiquity ſupport this reaſoning. The EGYPTIANS were the firſt people who perfected Civil-policy, and eſtabliſhed Religion: And they were the firſt, too, who deified their kings, law-givers, and publick benefactors [o]; as we may collect from the paſſage of *Herodotus*, quoted above, which ſays, *they were the firſt who built altars, and erected* STATUES *and temples to the Gods:* For the erecting *ſtatues* was, by this hiſtorian, eſteemed a certain mark that the worſhipers believed the Gods had *human natures*; as appears from the reaſon he gives why the Perſians had no *ſtatues* of their Gods, namely, *becauſe they did not believe as the Greeks, that the Gods had human natures* [p], that is, they did not

[o] Ἄλλως δ' ἐκ τούτων ἐπιγείους γενέσθαι φασὶν, ὑπάρξαντας μὲν θνητὰς, διὰ δὲ σύνεσιν καὶ κοινὴν ἀνθρώπων εὐεργεσίαν τετυχηκότας τὴν ἀθανασίαν· ὧν ἑνίους καὶ βασιλεῖς γεγονέναι καὶ τὸν Αἴγυπτιον. *Diod. Sic.* l. i. p. 8. *Steph. Ed.*

[p] Ὡς μὲν ἐμοὶ δοκέειν, ὅτι οὐκ ἀνθρωποφυέας ἐνόμισαν τοὺς θεοὺς, καθάπερ οἱ Ἕλληνες, εἶναι. *Clio*, à 131. *Valla* explains the word ἀνθρωποφυέας by *ex hominibus ortos*; and, I think, rightly. But our learned *Stanley*, in his notes to the *Perſians* of *Æſchylus*, underſtands it otherwiſe: and that it rather ſignifies *humana forma præditos*. I ſuppoſe it appeared harſh to him, that any one could imagine the Gods had *human natures*; but the meaning is explained above. Yet the ingenious writer of the *letters concerning mythology*, p. 217. ſides with our country-man, and underſtands ἀνθρωποφυὴς to ſignify,—*made like a man*—or, *of the ſhape and figure of a man*. But if we regard the literal meaning of the two ſimples which make up this compound, we cannot avoid underſtanding it to ſignify, *being of man's nature*. How then does this learned writer ſupport his criticiſm? By a paſſage from Hecatæus: who, on pretty much the ſame occaſion, uſes (as he ſuppoſes) ἀνθρωπόμορφος, in the place of ἀνθρωποφυὴς; and ἀνθρωπόμορφος, he thinks, all will agree, muſt ſignify, *of the ſhape and figure of a man*. No, not if his own method of interpretation be right: for, if ἀνθρωποφυὴς, (transferred from the literal, to the figurative ſenſe) muſt ſignify of man's *form*, then ἀνθρωπόμορφος ſo transferred, muſt ſignify *of man's nature*. But it is not true, that Hecatæus uſes ἀνθρω-

believe

believe the Gods were dead men deified: This, as we ſay, was a practice, invented by the *Egyptians*; who, in proceſs of time, taught the reſt of the world their myſtery [q]. So when arts and civil policy were brought into *Greece* by *Cadmus* and *Ceres* (the firſt, though a *Phenician* by birth, being an inhabitant of *Thebes* in *Egypt*; and the other, though coming immediately from *Sicily*, was yet a natural *Egyptian*) then, and not till then, began the cuſtom of deify-

πόμορφος in the place of ἀνθρωποφυής. The propoſitions of Herodotus and Hecatæus are different, and therefore we may well ſuppoſe theſe two words, in the predicate of each, to be different. Herodotus, ſpeaking of the PERSIANS, ſays, they had no ſtatues of their Gods, becauſe they did not believe, with the Greeks, that the Gods had *human natures* [ἀνθρωποφυέας]. And Hecatæus, ſpeaking of MOSES, ſays, he permitted no images of the Gods, becauſe he did not hold, with the gentiles, that God had a *human form* [ἀνθρωπόμορφον]. And their uſe of different words, as we ſhall now ſee, was with accuracy and diſcernment; for they were aſſerting different things. The queſtion between the *Perſians* and the *Greeks*, (who worſhipped many gods in common) was, whether theſe Gods were *partakers of human nature*, ἀνθρωποφυέας; that is, whether they were dead men deified. But the queſtion between *Moſes* and the Gentiles, was, whether the God of the univerſe had a *human form*, ἀνθρωπόμορφος; not whether *the gods had human natures*; for theſe Gods, the Jews had nothing to do with; they worſhipped only the one God: and ſeveral of the Gentiles, who had ſome knowledge of this one God, imagined he might have a *human form*. So that we ſee, the uſe of theſe two terms, on the *ſame* occaſion, is ſo far from ſhewing their ſignification to be the *ſame*, as the learned writer ſuppoſes, that the occaſion demonſtrably ſhews their ſignification to be *different*. Let me only obſerve, it appeared ſo evident to Euſebius, that the cuſtom of making the ſtatues of the Gods in *human form* was an indication of their original from mortality, that he ſays, ὅ γέ τοι ἀληθὴς λόγος βοᾷ καὶ κέκραγε, μονονυχὶ φωνὴν ἀφιεὶς, ὅτι θνητὰς ἄνδρας μαρτυρῶν γεγονέναι τὰς ἀπεικονίσεις. Euang. προπαρ. β. γ.

[q] Προδιαρθρῶσαι δὲ ἀναγκαῖον πρὸς τὴν αἴθις σαφήνειαν, καὶ τὴν τῶν μετὰ μέρος διάλυσιν, ὅτι οἱ παλαιόταλοι τῶν βαρβάρων, ἐξαιρέτως δὲ Φοίνικές τε καὶ ΑΙΓΥΠΤΙΟΙ, παρ' ὧν καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ παρέλαβον ἄνθρωποι, θεοὺς ἐνόμιζον μεγίστους τοὺς τὰ πρὸς τὴν βιωτικὴν χρείαν εὑρόντας. ἢ καὶ κατά τι εὖ ποιήσαντας τὰ ἔθνη· εὐεργέτας τε τούτους καὶ πολλῶν αἰτίους ἀγαθῶν ἡγούμενοι, ὡς θεοὺς προσεκύνει. *Philo Bibl. apud. Euſeb. Præp. Evang.* l. ii. c. 9.

ing dead men; which ſoon over-ran all *Greece* and the reſt of *Europe*[r].

2. *The attributes and qualities aſſigned to their Gods*, always correſponded with the nature and genius of the government. If this was gentle, benign, compaſſionate, and forgiving; goodneſs and mercy were moſt eſſential to the Deity: But if ſevere, inexorable, captious, or unequal; the very Gods were Tyrants; and expiations, atonements, luſtrations, and bloody ſacrifices compoſed the ſyſtem of religious worſhip. In the words of the great Poet,

" Gods partial, changeful, paſſionate, unjuſt,
" Whoſe attributes were rage, revenge, and luſt,
" Such as the ſouls of cowards might conceive,
" And form'd like tyrants, tyrants would believe[s].

But 3. *The mode of public worſhip* was alone ſufficient to betray the Mover of the whole machine. The *object* of what we call *Religion*, being God, conſidered as the creator and preſerver of a ſpecies of rational beings, the *ſubject* of it muſt needs be each individual of that ſpecies. This is that idea of Religion, which our common reaſon approves. But now, in ancient paganiſm, *Religion* was a very different thing: It had for its *ſubject* not only the *natural man*, that is, each Individual; but likewiſe the

[r] Sir Iſaac Newton, who, probably, had not this matter in his thoughts, hath yet a remarkable paſſage to this purpoſe in his *chronology of the Greeks*: " Idolatry (ſays he) began in *Chal-*
" *dæa* and *Egypt*.—The countries upon the *Tigris* and the *Nile*
" being exceeding fertile, were firſt frequented by mankind, and
" grew firſt into kingdoms; and THEREFORE began firſt to adore
" their dead kings and queens:—Every city ſet up the worſhip
" of its own founder and kings, and by alliances and conqueſts
" they ſpread this worſhip, and at length the *Phœnicians* and
" *Egyptians* brought into *Europe* the practice of deifying the
" dead." Pag. 161.

[s] *Eſſay on Man.*

artificial

artificial man, Society; by and for whom, all the *public* rites and ceremonies of it were inſtituted and performed. And while that part of pagan Religion, whoſe *ſubject* were individuals, bore an inferior part, and was confeſſed to be under an unequal Providence, the conſideration of which brought in the doctrine of a future ſtate for the ſupport of God's government; the other, whoſe ſubject was the artificial man, Society, taught a more equal Providence, adminiſtred to the State. The conſequence of which was, that Religion and Government ran into one another; and prodigies and portents were as familiar as civil edicts; and as conſtantly bore their ſhare in the public adminiſtration: For the Oracles, without which nothing was projected or executed, always denounced them as national directions, declarative of divine favour, or diſpleaſure; in which *particulars*, as ſuch, were not at all concerned: So that to accept or to avert the omen; to gratulate the mercy, or deprecate the judgment, the conſtant method was the revival of *old rites*, or the inſtitution of *new*. A reformation of manners, or enforcement of ſumptuary laws never made part of the ſtate's atonement to the Gods.

The oddneſs and notoriety of this fact ſo forceably ſtruck Mr. *Bayle*'s imagination, that, miſtaking this for the whole of Paganiſm, he too haſtily concluded, that *the worſhip of falſe Gods in the ancient world, did not at all influence morals*[1]: And from thence formed an argument to ſupport his favourite queſtion in behalf of atheiſm. This was a ſtrange concluſion: For though it be indeed true, that the *public* part of pagan Religion had no influence on morals, it is utterly falſe that the *private* part had not: For in the doctrine of a future ſtate,

[1] *Penſées diverſes ſur un comete*, &c. And *Reponſe aux Queſtions d'un Provincial.* And *Continuation des Penſées diverſes*, &c.

which

which was the foundation of, and inſeparable from, this ſounder part of pagan Religion whoſe ſubject was the *individual*, the merit and demerit, to which rewards and puniſhments were annexed, was virtue and vice only. This will be proved at large in the fourth ſection of the preſent book: Though I am ready to allow, that the nature and adminiſtration of the public part of pagan Religion did lead *individuals* into many wrong concluſions concerning the efficacy of *exterior* acts of worſhip.

But what ſeems to have occaſioned Mr. *Bayle*'s miſtake (beſides his following the Fathers, who in their *declamations* againſt paganiſm have ſaid a great deal to the ſame purpoſe [u]) was his not reflecting that ancient Hiſtory only preſents us with *one* part of the influence of Paganiſm, that which it had on the Public as a body: The *other*, the influence it had on individuals, it paſſes over in ſilence, as not its province.

Whoever now conſiders the genius of Paganiſm in this view, (and unleſs he conſiders it in this view he will never be able to judge truly of it [x]) can hard-

[u] Yet St. *Auſtin* himſelf cannot but own that the MYSTERIES however (of which the Reader will hear a great deal in the 4th Sect. of this Book) were principally inſtituted for the promoting of virtue and a good life, even where he is accuſing *Paganiſm* in general for its neglect of moral virtue: "Nec nobis neſcio quos "ſuſurros pauciſſimorum auribus anhelatos & arcana velut religi- "one traditos jactent, quibus vitæ probitas caſtitaſque diſcatur." —*Civ. Dei*, l. ii. c. 6.—"Iidem ipſi Dæmones—perhibentur in "adytis ſuis, ſecretiſque penetralibus dare quædam bona præcep- "ta de moribus quibuſdam velut electis ſacratis ſuis—Proinde "malignitas dæmonum niſi alicubi ſe, quemadmodum ſcriptum "in noſtris litteris novimus, transfiguret in angelos lucis, non im- "plet negotium deceptionis. Foris itaque populis celeberrimo "ſtrepitu impietas impura circumſonat, & intus paucis caſtitas fi- "mulata vix ſonat: præbentur propatula pudendis, & ſecreta "laudandis: decus latet, & dedecus patet," &c. c. 26.

[x] What is here ſaid of the genius of paganiſm well accounts for a circumſtance in ancient hiſtory, which very much embaraſſes the modern critics. They cannot conceive how it happened,

ly doubt but that the civil magiſtrate had a great hand in modelling *Religion*. What it was which enabled him to give this extraordinary caſt to Paganiſm, is not difficult to diſcover: It could be nothing but that *popular diſpoſition* ariſing from, and the neceſſary conſequence of, thoſe general notions, which, by his contrivance and encouragement, had overſpread the heathen world? 1. That there were local tutelary Deities, who had taken upon themſelves, or were intruſted with, the care and protection of particular Nations and People; (of which, more hereafter.) 2. That thoſe great benefactors of mankind, who had reduced the ſcattered tribes and clans into civil Society, were become Gods. 3. and laſtly, That their ſyſtems of Laws and civil Inſtitutes were planned and digeſted by the direction of the legiſlator's patron-Deity [y].

On the whole then, The foregoing conſiderations of the *preſervation* of Religion in general; the *origine* of the pagan Gods; their *attributes*; and the *mode of public worſhip*, will, I am perſuaded, incline the reader to think that, for the *univerſality of religious belief*, the world was chiefly indebted to the civil Magiſtrate; how much ſoever the illegitimate or

that the beſt ancient hiſtorians, who underſtood ſo well what belonged to the nature of a Compoſition, and how to give every ſort of work its due form, and were beſides free from all vulgar ſuperſtition, ſhould abound ſo much in deſcriptions of religious rites and ceremonies; and in relations of omens, preſages, and portents. Many an idle hypotheſis hath been framed to give a ſolution of this difficulty; and many a tedious work compiled to juſtify theſe ancient hiſtorians, upon mere modern ideas. But now a plain and eaſy anſwer may be given to it. This part of pagan Religion was ſo interwoven with the tradition of facts, that it became eſſential to civil hiſtory. And how much ſoever it may be ſuppoſed to have deformed ancient ſtory, yet the Critic and Philoſopher gain by what diſguſts the delicacy of the Politician; the greek and roman hiſtory being the repoſitary of all that concerns the *public part* of pagan religion.

[y] See the beginning of the next ſection.

unnatural

unnatural conſtitution of particular States, or the defective views of particular Lawgivers, contributed to deprave the true Religion of *nature*; or, if you will, the *patriarchal*. The learned St. *Auſtin*, who excelled in the knowledge of antiquity, ſeems to have been determined by this way of thinking, when he gives it, as the reſult of his enquiries; that the civil Magiſtrate had a large ſhare in pagan ſuperſtition. His words are theſe [z], "—Which in- "deed ſeems to have been done on no other account "but as it was the buſineſs of princes, out of their "wiſdom and civil prudence, to deceive the people "in their Religion—princes, under the name of re- "ligion, perſuaded the people to believe thoſe "things true which they themſelves knew to be idle "fables. By this means, for their own eaſe in go- "vernment, tying them the more cloſely to civil "Society."

But if now it ſhould be objected, that it was natural for the people, left to themſelves, to run into thoſe ſuperſtitions, we may readily grant it without prejudice to the argument: For they are always ſuch notions as are apt to be entertained and cheriſhed by vulgar minds, whoſe current the wiſe Magiſtrate is accuſtomed to turn to his advantage. For to think him capable of new modelling the human mind, by *making* men religious whom he did not *find* ſo, is, as will be ſhewn hereafter, a ſenſeleſs whimſy, entertained by the Atheiſt to account for the origin of Religion. And, when it is ſeen that all theſe various modes of ſuperſtition concurred to promote the Magiſtrate's purpoſe, it can

[z]—Quod utique non aliam ob cauſam factum videtur, niſi quia hominum principum velut prudentium & ſapientium negotium fuit populum in religionibus fallere—Homines principes ea, quæ vana eſſe noverant, religionis nomine populis tanquam vera ſuadebant: Hoc modo eos civili ſocietati velut arctius alligantes, quo ſubditos poſſiderent. *De Civit. Dei*, l. iv. c. 32.

hardly

hardly be doubted but he gave them that general direction. The *particular* parts of gentile Religion, which further ſtrengthen and confirm this reaſoning, are not here to be inſiſted on. Their original will be clearly ſeen, when we come to ſhew the ſeveral methods which the Magiſtrate employed for this great purpoſe. What theſe methods were, the courſe of the argument now leads us to conſider.

SECT. II.

IT hath been ſhewn in general, from the EFFECT, that Lawgivers and founders of civil policy did indeed ſupport and propagate Religion. We ſhall now endeavour to explain the CAUSES of that effect, in a particular enumeration of the arts they employed to that purpoſe.

1. The FIRST ſtep the Legiſlator took, was to pretend a Miſſion and revelation from ſome God, by whoſe command and direction he had framed the Policy he would eſtabliſh. Thus *Amaſis* and *Mneves*, lawgivers of the *Egyptians* (from whence this cuſtom ſpread over *Greece* and *Aſia*) pretended to receive their laws from *Mercury*; *Zoroaſter* the lawgiver of the *Bactrians*, and *Zamolxis* lawgiver of the *Getes*, from *Veſta*; *Zathrauſtes* the lawgiver of the *Arimaſpi*, from a good ſpirit or genius; and all theſe moſt induſtriouſly and profeſſedly propagated the doctrine of a future ſtate of rewards and puniſhments. *Rhadamanthus* and *Minos* lawgivers of *Crete*, and *Lycaon* of *Arcadia*, pretended to an intercourſe with *Jupiter*; *Triptolemus* lawgiver of the *Athenians*, affected to be inſpired by *Ceres*; *Pythagoras*, and *Zaleucus*, who made laws for the *Crotoniates* and *Locrians*, aſcribed their inſtitutions to *Minerva*; *Lycurgus* of *Sparta*, profeſſed to act by the direction of *Apollo*; and *Romulus* and

and *Numa* of *Rome* put themſelves under the guidance of *Conſus*, and the Goddeſs *Egeria* [a]. In a word, there is hardly an old Lawgiver on record, but what thus pretended to revelation, and the divine aſſiſtance. But had we the loſt books *of Legiſlators* written by *Hermippus*, *Theophraſtus*, and *Apollodorus* [b], we ſhould have had a much fuller liſt of theſe inſpired ſtateſmen, and doubtleſs, many further lights on the ſubject. The ſame method was practiſed by the founders of the *great outlying empires*, as Sir *William Temple* calls them. Thus the firſt of the *Chineſe* monarchs was called *Fagfour* or *Fanfur*, the *ſon of Heaven*, as we are told by the jeſuits, from his pretenſions to that relation. The *royal commentaries of Peru* inform us, that the founders of that empire were *Mango Copac*, and his wife and ſiſter *Coya Mama*, who proclaimed themſelves the ſon and daughter of the *Sun*, ſent from their father to reduce mankind from their ſavage and beſtial life, to one of order and ſociety. *Tuiſco* the founder of the German nations pretended to be ſent upon the ſame meſſage, as appears from his name, which ſignifies the interpreter [c], that is, of the Gods. *Thor* and *Odin*, the lawgivers of the *Weſtern Goths*, laid claim likewiſe to inſpiration and even to divinity [d]. The *Revelations* of *Mahomet* are too well known to be inſiſted on. But the race of theſe

[a] *Diod. Sic.* l. i. & v. Ephorus apud Strabonem, l. x.—teſte veteri ſcriptore apud *Suidam* in [Ανακτων]—*Ariſt. apud Schol. Pind. ad* x. *Olymp.*

[b] *Athen.* l. xiv. *D. Laertius.*

[c] Vide Sheringham, De Anglorum gentis origine, p. 56.

[d] Olim quidam magicæ artis imbuti, Thor videlicet & Othinus, obtentis ſimplicium animis, divinitatis ſibi faſtigium arrogare cœperunt.—Adeo namque fallaciæ eorum effectus percrebuit, ut in ipſis cæteri quandam numinum potentiam venerantes, eoſque deos, vel *deorum complices* autumantes veneficiorum auctoribus ſolennia vota dependerent, & errori ſacrilego reſpectum ſacris debitum exhiberent. *Saxo-Gram.* l. vi. *Hiſtor.*

inſpired

inſpired Lawgivers ſeems to have ended in *Genghizcan* the founder of the *Mogul* empire [e].

Such was the univerſal cuſtom of the ancient world, to make *Gods* and *Prophets* of their firſt kings and lawgivers. Hence it is, that *Plato* makes *legiſlation* to have come from God, and not from man [f]: and that the conſtant epithets to kings, in *Homer*, are ΔΙΟΓΕΝΕΙΣ *born of the Gods*, and ΔΙΟΤΡΕΦΕΙΣ *bred* or *tutored by the Gods* [g].

From this general pretence to revelation we may collect the ſentiments of the ancient lawgivers concerning the uſe of Religion to Society. For we muſt always have in mind what *Diodorus Siculus* ſo truly obſerves, *That they did this, not only to beget a veneration to their laws, but likewiſe to eſtabliſh the opinion of the ſuperintendency of the Gods over human affairs* [h]. One may venture to go further,

[e] Ils ont attribué des revelations à *Zamolxis*; le premier pour inſpirer la veneration des peuples aux loix qu'elle pouvoit faire, dit un auteur donné de la divinité. Ceux qui s'intereſſent à l'honneur de cet homme ne rougirent même d'inſolence de le faire paſſer pour fils de Dieu. La nation plus modeſte, dit ſeulement qu'il étoit [illegible] *Mr. Petis de la Croix, le pere, Hiſtoire de Genghizcan, t. 1.*

[f] Θεὸς ἢ τις ἀνθρώπων ὑμῖν, ὦ ξένοι, ἐστὶν ὁ κατὰ τὸν παλαιὸν τὸν τῶν νόμων ἀθέσμιος; ΚΛ. Θεός, ὦ ξένε, ὅτι μὲς γε τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ἐστὶν ὁ δὲ λόγος ἡμῖν.

[g] Θυμὸς δὲ μεγας ἐπὶ διογενεῖ βασιλῆϊ ἐκαλέσθη. *Il. B. ver. 196.* which title of διογενὴς is not given, ſays Eustathius on the place, to ſignify that ſuch a one is deſcended from Jupiter, but that he receives his honour and authority from him. Ἐπεὶ καὶ ἄλλοι διογενεῖς καὶ ΔΙΟΤΡΕΦΕΙΣ τοὺς ἐπιτρόπους τοῦ Διὸς ἔχοντες, οὐχ ὅτι ἐκ Διὸς τὸ γένος ἔλαχον, ἀλλ' ὅτι ΕΞ ΕΚΕΙΝΟΥ ΑΥΤΟΙΣ Η ΤΙΜΗ.

[h] Μιᾷ γὰρ τῶν παλαιῶν τὸ κατ' Αἴγυπτον ἔθνος ἐπιτάττει, τὰ μὲν ἀνθρωπίνως λογιζόμενα γενέσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν ἡρώων καὶ τῶν θεῶν, ὅπως ἂν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἀγάπης τιμῆς χρησάμενοι τὰ πλείω μέρη τῆς οἰκουμένης, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῇ ψυχῇ μέγα καὶ τὰ ὅλα κοινὰ τῶν ὑπ' οὐρανὸν, τυγχάνωσιν· τοῖς δὲ αὐτῷ τῷ Ἑρμῇ λέγουσι τοῦτο, καὶ σύμπαντα τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν οἰκεῖσθαι καθάπερ παρ' Ἕλλησι φασὶ καὶ τὸν Δία νομίζεσθαι· παρὰ δὲ Λακεδαιμονίοις Λυκοῦργον τὰ μὲν τοῦ Διὸς, τὰ δὲ παρ' Ἀπόλλωνος φησαντα τοῦτο ὑπάρξαι καὶ παρ' ἡμῖν ἡ πάτριος ἱστορία παραδέδωκε τοῦτο τὸ γένος τῆς ἱστορίας ἀκούσμα, ἢ πολλὴν ὠφέλειαν αὐτῶν γενέσθαι τοῖς πεισθεῖσιν—

—εἴτε ἡ παρὰ τῶν ἀστέρων ἢ δύναμιν τῶν ὑπὸ σελήνην, τῆς ὑλικῆς ἀπολήψεως ἰσοδυναμοῦσα, μᾶλλον ἐπαναγκάζουσα ἐκπλήττειν. *Lib. i.*

and ſay, that to *eſtabliſh this ſuperintendency* was their principal and direct aim, in all their pretenſions to inſpiration.

The reader may obſerve, that *Diodorus* does not ſo much as ſuſpect them of having a third end, diſtinct from theſe two; that is to ſay, the advancement of their own private intereſt. And this with great judgment. He knew well the difference between a LAWGIVER and a TYRANT; though the World ſoon after ſeems to have loſt the memory of that diſtinction [i]. Such views became not the former; they deſtroyed his character, and changed him into his direct oppoſite; who applied every thing to his own intereſt; and this amongſt the reſt. *Ariſtotle*, in his maxims for ſetting up, and ſupporting a tyranny, lays this down for one, *to ſeem extremely attached to the worſhip of the Gods, for that men have no apprehenſion of injuſtice from ſuch as they take to be religious and to have a high ſenſe of providence. Nor will the people be apt to run into plots and conſpiracies againſt thoſe, whom they believe the Gods will, in their turn, fight for, and ſupport* [k]. And here it is worth noting, that, anciently, *Tyrants*, as well as Lawgivers, gave all encouragement to Religion; and endeavoured to eſtabliſh their irregular Wills, not by convincing men that there was no juſt nor unjuſt in actions; but by perſuading them that the privilege of *divine right* exempted the Tyrant from all moral obligation. Hence may be ſeen the abſurdity of

[i] Quintilian L. VIII. C. 6. *de Tropis* ſays, that *Paſtor Populi*, though uſed by Homer, is ſo POETICAL that he would not venture to uſe it in an oration; and ranks it with Virgil's—*Volucres pennis remigare.* What could occaſion ſo ſtrange a piece of Criticiſm, but that when Quintilian wrote under the *Tyrants* of Rome, the People had loſt the very idea of the *Kingly Office?*

[k] Ἔτι δὲ τὰ πρὸς τὰς θεὰς φαίνεσθαι ἀεὶ σπουδάζοντα διαφερόντως, ἥτιόν τε γὰρ φοβεῖσθαι, τὸ παθεῖν τι παράνομον ὑπὸ τῶν τοιούτων, ἐὰν δεισιδαίμονα νομίζωσιν εἶναι τὸν ἄρχοντα καὶ φροντίζειν τῶν θεῶν καὶ ἐπιβουλεύσω ἧττον, ὡς συμμάχους ἔχοντι καὶ τὰς θεάς. Polit. l. v. c. 11.

Hobbes's

Hobbes's ſcheme of Politics, who, for the ſake of the Magiſtrate, was for eradicating Religion. But the ancients knew better; and ſo too did ſome of the moderns [1].

The queſtion then is, whether theſe pretenſions of the ancient Lawgivers were feigned in *the firſt intention*, for the ſake of Society or of Religion? For it is no queſtion, but that what we here ſhew was contrived by the Magiſtrate for the ſervice of Religion, was done *ultimately* for the ſake of Civil Government. Or in other words, the queſtion, I ſay, is, Whether this pretence to inſpiration was made to eſtabliſh a *civil* or a *religious* Society? If a *civil*; the ends aimed at muſt be the *reception of his policy*, or *proviſion for its perpetuity*. I ſpeak not here of that third end, *the ſecuring a veneration, for them, to poſterity*; and for a good reaſon, becauſe *this* is the very thing I contend for; ſuch *veneration* being only to be procured by the influence of Religion; the peculiar mode of which, the pretended inſpiration introduces. The ends then in queſtion, are *reception for the policy*; *or* proviſion for the perpetual *duration* of it.

1. For the *reception*, there would be ſmall need of this expedient. 1. Civil laws are ſeen by all to be ſo neceſſary for the well being of every individual, that one can hardly conceive any need of the belief of divine command or extraordinary aſſiſtance to bring men to embrace a ſcheme for aſſociating, or to manifeſt the right they have of ſo doing. *For* (as the great *Geographer* ſays) *Man was born with this inclination to aſſociate. It is an appetite common both to* Greeks *and* Barbarians: *for, being by nature a civil animal, he lives readily under one common policy or*

[1] Et non è coſa piu neceſſaria à parere d'havere che queſta ultima qualita [religione] perche gli huomini in univerſale giudicano piu a gli occhi che alle mani, perché tocca à vedere a ciaſcuno a ſentire à pochi. *Machiavel del Principe*, c. 18.

law [m]. Beſides ſeveral of theſe Legiſlators gave laws to a *willing people*, on the ſtrength of their perſonal character of virtue and wiſdom; and were called upon to that office, in which nothing was wanting to beget the neceſſary veneration to him who diſcharged it. And though it might poſſibly have happened to a people to be ſo far ſunk into brutality, as to be diſinclined towards the recovery of a reaſonable nature, like thoſe with whom it is ſaid *Orpheus* had to deal; who *(being ſavages, without the knowledge of morality or law)* reduced them into ſociety, *by recommending to them piety to the Gods, and inſtructing them in the ways of ſuperſtition* [n]: yet this was not the caſe of the generality of thoſe with whom theſe Lawgivers were concerned: and therefore if we would aſſign a cauſe *of this pretence to revelation* as extenſive as the fact, it muſt be that which is here given. But, 2[dly], we find, that where Religion was previouſly ſettled, no inſpiration was pretended. On this account neither *Draco* nor *Solon*, Lawgivers of Athens, laid claim to any: for they found Religion well ſecured by the inſtitutions of *Triptolemus* and *Ion*. And we know, that, had *pretended inſpiration* been only, or principally, for the eaſier introduction and reception of civil policy, the ſanguinary laws of *Draco* had ſtood in more need of the ſanction of a revelation, than any other of antiquity. Indeed, *Maximus Tyrius* goes ſo far as to ſay, that *Draco* and *Solon* preſcribed nothing in their laws, concerning the Gods, and their worſhip [o]; which, if

[m] Πίφυκε γὰρ ὕτω. Καὶ κοινόν ἐστι τοῦτο καὶ τοῖς Ἕλλησι καὶ τοῖς Βαρβάροις· πολιτικοὶ γὰρ ὄντες, ἀπὸ φρονήσεως καὶ κοινῇ ζῶσιν. Strabo, *Geogr.* l. xvi.

[n] —Ὅτι θηριώδεις ὄντας τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, καὶ ὅτε ἴδοι, ὅτε νόμους εἰδότας, εἰς δεισιδαιμονίαν ἀγαθὴν, καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ εὐσεβεῖν παρακαλέσας. *Heraclit. de Incred.* c. 23.

[o] Πῶ γὰρ Ἀθηναίοις συνέῖναι, τὶ μὲν τὸ δαιμόνιον, πῶς δὲ τιμητέον; ἃ γὰρ τῷ κυάμῳ λαχόντες δικασταὶ χίλιοι ταῦτα ἐξεδίδαξαν, οὐδὲ Σόλων τὶ ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν γέγραφε, οὐδὲ οἱ Δράκοντος σεμνοὶ νόμοι. *Dissert.* xxxix.

true, would make as much againſt us, on the other hand. But in this he is miſtaken. *Porphyry* quotes an expreſs law of *Draco*'s concerning the mode of divine worſhip. *Let the Gods and our own country heroes be publicly worſhipped, according to the eſtabliſhed rites; when privately, according to every man's abilities, with terms of the greateſt regard and reverence; with the firſt fruits of their labours, and with annual libations*[p]. *Andocides*[q] quotes another of *Solon*, which provides for the due and regular celebration of the ELEUSINIAN MYSTERIES. *Athenæus* does the ſame. And how conſiderable a part theſe were of divine worſhip, and of what importance to the very eſſence of religion, we ſhall ſee hereafter.

2. As to *a proviſion for the perpetuity of national laws and inſtitutions*; This entered not into the intention of the old *Greek* legiſlation; nor, if it had, could it have been obtained by giving them a divine original. Amongſt the wild projects of the barbarous eaſtern policy, one might find, perhaps, ſomething like a ſyſtem of *immutable* laws; but the *Grecian* Lawgivers were too well acquainted with the nature of man, the genius of Society, and the viciſſitude of human things, ever to conceive ſo ridiculous a deſign. Beſides, the *Egyptian* legiſlation, from which they borrowed all their civil wiſdom, went upon very different principles. It directed public laws to be occaſionally accommodated to the variety of times, places, and manners. But had they aimed at perpetuity, the belief of a divine impoſition would not have ſerved the turn; for it never entered their heads, that civil inſtitutes became irre-

[p] Θεοὺς τιμᾶν καὶ Ἥρωας ἐγχωρίους ἐν κοινῷ, ἑπομένους νόμοις πατρίοις, ἰδίᾳ κατὰ δύναμιν σὺν εὐφημίᾳ καὶ ἀπαρχαῖς καρπῶν, καὶ σπλάγχνοις ἐπετείοις. *De Abſt.* l. iv. § 22. according to the emendations of *Petit* and *Valentinus*.—The law is thus introduced, Θεσμὸς αἰδοῦς τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις νεμομένοις. Κυρίως· τὸν ἄπαιδα χρόνον.

[q] *Orat.* Περὶ Μυστηρίων, *apud Decem Orat.*

vocable by their iſſuing from the mouth of a God; or that the divinity of the ſanction altered the mutability of their nature: the honour of this diſcovery is due to certain modern writers, who have found out that divine authority reduces all its commands to one and the ſame ſpecies. We have a notable inſtance of this in the conduct of *Lycurgus*. He was the only exception to the general method, and ſingular in the idle attempt of making his laws perpetual. For his whole ſyſtem being forced and unnatural, the ſenſe of that imperfection, it is probable, put him upon the expedient of tying them on an unwilling people. But then *he did not apply* divine authority to this purpoſe; for, though he pretended to inſpiration like the reſt, and had his revelations from *Apollo*, yet he well knew that the authority of *Apollo* would not be thought ſufficient to change the nature of poſitive laws: and therefore he bound the People by an oath, to obſerve his policy till his return from a voyage, which he had determined beforehand never to bring to that period.

Having ſhewn that there was no need of a pretence to revelation, for the eſtabliſhment of *civil Policy*, it follows, that it was made for the ſake of *Religion*.

SECT. III.

THE SECOND ſtep the Legiſlators took to propagate and eſtabliſh *Religion*, was to make the general doctrine of a Providence (with which they prefaced and introduced their laws) the great ſanction of their Inſtitutes. To this, *Plutarch*, in his tract againſt *Colotes* the *Epicurean*, refers, where he obſerves, that *Colotes himſelf praiſes it*; *that, in civil Inſtitutes, the firſt and moſt important article is the belief of the Gods. And ſo it was* (ſays he) *that, with vows, oaths, divinations, and omens*, Lycurgus *ſanctified*

tified the Lacedemonians, Numa *the* Romans, *ancient* Ion *the* Athenians, *and* Deucalion *all the* Greeks *in general: And by* HOPES *and* FEARS *kept up amongſt them the awe and reverence of religion*[r]. On this practice was formed the precept of the celebrated *Archytas* the *Pythagorean*; which ſect, as we ſhall ſee hereafter, gave itſelf up more profeſſedly to legiſlation; and produced the moſt famous founders of civil policy. This Lawgiver in the fragments of his work *de lege*, preſerved by *Stobæus*, delivers himſelf in this manner: *The firſt law of the Conſtitution ſhould be for the ſupport of what relates to the Gods, the Dæmons and our Parents, and, in general, of whatſoever is good and venerable*[s]. And in this manner, if we may believe Antiquity, all their civil Inſtitutes were prefaced; its conſtant phraſe being, when ſpeaking of a Lawgiver, ΔΙΕΚΟΣΜΕΙ ΤΗΝ ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΝ ΑΠΟ ΘΕΩΝ ΑΡΧΟΜΕΝΟΣ.

The only things of this kind now remaining, are the PREFACES to the laws of ZALEUCUS and CHARONDAS, Lawgivers of the *Locrians* and of the *Chalcidic* cities of Italy and Sicily, contemporaries with Lycurgus[t]. Theſe, by good fortune, are preſerved in Diodorus and Stobæus. A great Critic has indeed arraigned their authority; declared them ſpurious; and adjudged them for an impoſture of the *Ptolemaic* Age[u]. And were it as he ſuppoſes, the fragments would be rather ſtronger to our purpoſe: for, in that caſe, we muſt needs conclude, the very

[r] —Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἥ γε κ) Κολώτης ἐπαινεῖ διαλέξεως τῶν νόμων πρῶτόν ἐστι τὸ περὶ θεῶν δόξα, κ) μέγιστον· ἡ κ) Λυκοῦργ☉ Λακεδαιμονίοις, κ) Νόμας Ῥωμαίοις, κ) Ἴων ὁ παλαιὸς Ἀθηναίοις, κ) Δευκαλίων Ἕλλησας ὁμῶ τοι πάντας καθωσίωσαν εὐχαῖς, κ) ὅρκοις, κ) μαντεύμασι, κ) φήμαις, ἐμπαθῆς πρὸς τὰ θεῖα δ' ἐλπίδων ἅμα κ) φόβων καλαστήσαντες.

[s] Διῖ τὸν νόμον τὰ πρῶτα θεοὺς κ) δαίμονας κ) γονέας, κ) ὅλως τὰ καλὰ κ) τίμια πρῶτα τίθεσθαι. Stob. *de Rep.* Serm. xli.

[t] Ariſt. *Pol.* xii.

[u] *Diſſert. on the Epiſtles of* Phalaris, *with an Anſwer to the objections of Mr.* Boyle.

learned SOPHISTS who forged them had copied from the general practice of antiquity: And that very learned they were, appears both from the excellence of the composition, and the age of the pretended composers. Whereas, if the fragments be genuine, they do not so directly prove the *universality*, as the *antiquity*, of the practice. But as my aim is truth, and truth seeming to bear hard against this learned Critic's determination, we must hold to the common opinion, and examine what hath been offered in discredit of it.

The universal current of antiquity runs in favour of these remains, and for the reality of their author's legislative quality. Aristotle, Theophrastus, Tully, Diodorus Siculus, and Plutarch, the most learned and inquisitive writers of their several ages, declare for their being genuine. However, TIMÆUS thought fit to deny that *Zaleucus* had given laws to the *Locrians*; nay, that there was ever such a Lawgiver existing. We shall be the less surprised at this paradox, when we come to know the character and studies of the man: he was by profession an historian, but turned his talents to invent, to aggravate, and expose the faults and errors of all preceding writers of name and reputation. Polybius, Strabo, and Diodorus Siculus, three of the wisest and most candid historians of Greece, have concurred to draw him in the most odious colours. The first speaks of him in this manner: *How he came to be placed amongst the principal writers of history, I know not.—He deserves neither credit nor pardon of any one; having so manifestly transgressed all the rules of decency and decorum in his excessive calumnies, springing from an innate malignity of heart* [w]. This envious rabid

[w] Οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπως ἐκφέρεται δόξαν, ὡς ἕλκωντὴν τούτου συγγραφέως προστασίαν,—Ἐκεῖνος δ' ἂν οὐκ εἰκότως τυγχάνοι συγγνώμης οὐδὲ πίστεως ὑπ' οὐδενὸς, διὰ τὸ προφανῶς ἐν ταῖς λοιδορίαις ἐκπίπτειν τοῦ καθήκοντος, διὰ τὸν ἔμφυτον πικρίαν. *Excerp. ex l.* xii. *Hist.*

temper,

temper, joined to a perverſity of mind, delighting in contradiction, gained him the title of EPITIMÆUS, the CALUMNIATOR. And, what is a certain mark of a baſe and abject heart, he was as exceſſive in his flattery; as when he makes *Timoleon greater than the greateſt Gods*[x]. He took ſo much pleaſure in contradicting the moſt received truths, that he wrote a long treatiſe, with great fury and ill language, to prove that the bull of Phalaris was a mere fable. And yet Diodorus and Polybius, who tell us this, tell us likewiſe, that the very bull itſelf was exiſting in their time: To all which, he was ſo little ſolicitous about truth, that Suidas ſays, he was nick named ΓΡΑΟΣΤΑΛΕΚΤΡΙΑ, *a compoſer of old wives fables. Polybius* informs us with what juſtice it was given him. *In cenſuring the faults of others, he puts on ſuch an air of ſeverity and confidence, as if he himſelf were exempt from failings, and ſtood in no need of indulgence. Yet are his own hiſtories ſtuffed with dreams and prodigies, with the moſt wild and improbable fables. In ſhort, full of old wives wonders, and of the loweſt and baſeſt ſuperſtition*[y]. Agreeable to all this, Clemens Alexandrinus gives him as the very pattern of a fabulous and ſatyric writer. And he appeared in every reſpect of ſo ill a character to Mr. Bayle, that this excellent Critic did not ſcruple to ſay, that, "in all appearance, he had no better "authority when he denied that *Zaleucus* had given "laws to the *Locrians*[z]." To ſay all in a word, he was the OLDMIXON[a] of the Greeks; and yet this

[x] *Suidas in Timæo.* Τίμαιος δὲ μείζω ποιεῖ Τιμολέοντα τῶν ἐπιφανεστάτων Θεῶν.

[y] Οὗτος γὰρ ἐν μὲν ταῖς τῶν ἄλλας καθηγορίαις πολλὴν ἐπιφαίνει δεινότητα καὶ τόλμαν· ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἰδίαις ἀποφάσεσιν ἀνυπεύθυνον καὶ τεράτων καὶ μυθῶν ἀπιθάνων, καὶ συλλήβδην καὶ δεισιδαιμονίας ἀγεννοῦς καὶ τερατείας; γυναικώδης ἐστὶ πλήρης. *Excerpt. de Virt. & Vit. ex* l. xii

[z] Et apparemment il ne fut pas mieux fondé, quand il nia que *Zaleucus* eût donné des loix à ce peuple, [les *Locriens.*]

[a] See *Clarendon and Whitlock compared.*

is the man, whom the learned writer hath thought fit to oppoſe to all antiquity, againſt *Zaleucus*'s legiſlation and exiſtence. It appears the more extraordinary, becauſe he himſelf hath furniſhed his reader with a violent preſumption againſt Timæus's authority, where he ſays [b], *That* Polybius *charges him with falſe repreſentations relating to the* Locrians. He adds indeed, *that nothing is now extant that ſhews* Polybius *thought* Timæus *miſtaken concerning* Zaleucus. But ſince Polybius quotes a law as a law of *Zaleucus*, it ſeems a proof, in ſo exact a writer, of his being well aſſured that, amongſt Timæus's falſhoods concerning the *Locrians*, one was his denying *Zaleucus* to be their Lawgiver.

Timæus's reaſons are not come down to us from Antiquity: But the fragments of Polybius [c], mentioning his outrageous treatment of Ariſtotle concerning the origin of the *Locrians*, ſpeak of one Echecrates a *Locrian*, from whom Timæus boaſted he had received information on certain points in queſtion: Hence the learned Critic, as it would ſeem, concludes this to have been a part of the *Locrian*'s intelligence, *that there was no ſuch man as Zaleucus* [d]. As if, becauſe Timæus relied on Echecrates's information in the diſpute between him and Ariſtotle, therefore Echecrates muſt, of neceſſity, ſupport all his paradoxes concerning that people. But admit Echecrates to have been of the ſame opinion with Timæus, in this matter; Is he, who, for aught we know, might be as ſingular and as whimſical, in his love of contradiction, as Timæus himſelf, an evidence to be oppoſed to Cicero's? who tells us, that his Clients the *Locrians* had, in his time, a Tradition of *Zaleucus*'s legiſlation [e]. And

[b] *Diſſert. upon* Phalaris, p. 337.
[c] *Excerpta ex* Polybio *de Virt. & Vitiis, ex* l. xii.
[d] P. 336. *Diſſert. upon* Phalaris.
[e] *De Legibus*, l. ii. c. 6.

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we may well preſume, that Cicero, inquiſitive, and even curious, as he was in matters of antiquity, would examine this point with care: and, had their archives reclaimed it, he had hardly thought it worth his while to mention their Tradition. But, ſays the learned Critic, *if* Echecrates, *in that age, did not believe there was any* Zaleucus, *he is certainly as credible as* Cicero's Locrians, *who came ſo many generations afterwards, after ſo many revolutions and changes in their Government*[f]. This reaſoning has ſmall force, becauſe, from the ſame premiſes, we may argue juſt the other way, and ſay, that if the Tradition kept its ground through all thoſe changes and revolutions of State, it would ſeem to have had a very ſtrong foundation.

The authority then of Timæus againſt the exiſtence and legiſlation of *Zaleucus* in general, is of no weight. Let us next ſee what the learned Critic hath to urge againſt the authenticity of thoſe laws which go under *Zaleucus*'s name. His arguments are of two ſorts: the one drawn from the *dialect*, and from the uſe of ſeveral *words*, which are indeed later than his time; the other, from *Zaleucus*'s being no Pythagorean.

1. The *words* objected to, are theſe,—Λεπίδος καὶ παχείας—ἰσομιλήσιον—Κόσμου—Τραλῳδίαις. This, and the fragments being written in the *common dialect*, inſtead of the *Doric*, are, in the Critic's opinion, ſufficient evidence of the forgery.

He has employed a deal of good[g] learning, to prove the *words* to be all later than the time of *Zaleucus*.

Let us ſee then the moſt that can be made of this ſort of argument. And becauſe it is the beſt approved, and readieſt at hand, for the detection of

[f] P. 336. *Diſſert. upon* Phalaris.
[g] From p. 346 to 356 of the *Diſſert.*

forgery,

forgery, and ſuppoſed by ſome not a little to affect the ſacred writings themſelves, we will enquire into its force in general.

It muſt be owned, that an inſtrument offered as the writing of any certain perſon, or age, which hath words or phraſes poſterior to its date, carries with it the deciſive marks of forgery. A public Deed, or Diploma, ſo diſcredited, is loſt for ever. And to ſuch, was this canon of criticiſm firſt applied with great ſucceſs. This encouraged following critics to try it on writings of another kind; and then, for want of a reaſonable diſtinction, they began to make very wild work indeed. For though in compoſitions of *abſtract ſpeculation*, or of *mere fancy and amuſement*, this touch might be applied with tolerable ſecurity, there being, for the moſt part, no occaſion or temptation to alter the diction of ſuch writings, eſpecially in the ancient languages, which ſuffered ſmall and ſlow change, becauſe one ſort of theſe works was only for the uſe of a few learned men; and the principal rarity, and often the beauty, of the other ſort, conſiſted in the original phraſe; yet in public and practical writings of Law and Religion, this would be found a very fallacious teſt: It was the matter only which was regarded here. And, as the matter reſpected the whole people, it was of importance that the words and phraſes ſhould be neither obſcure, ambiguous, nor equivocal: This would neceſſitate alterations in the ſtile, both as to words and phraſes. Hence it appears to me, that the anſwer, which commentators give to the like objection againſt the Pentateuch, is founded in good ſenſe, and fully juſtified by the ſolution here attempted. The Religion, Law, and Hiſtory of the Jews were incorporated; and, conſequently, it was the concern of every one to underſtand the Scriptures. Nor doth the ſuperſtitious regard, well known to have been long paid to the

words,

words, and even *letters* of scripture, at all weaken the force of this argument: for that superstition arose but from the time when the masoret doctors fixed the reading, and added the vowel points. I have taken the opportunity, the subject afforded me, to touch upon this matter, because it is the only argument of moment, urged by Spinosa, against the antiquity of the *Pentateuch*; on which antiquity the general argument of this work is supported.

The application of all this is very easy to the case in hand: The fragment of *Zaleucus* was part of a body of Laws, which the people were obliged to understand; so that a change of old words and obsolete phrases would be necessary: and to make *this* an argument against the antiquity of the fragment, would be the same good reasoning as to suppose, that the remains of the *Twelve Tables*, or the earlier laws in our common *Statute books*, were the forgeries of later times, because full of words unknown to the respective ages in which those laws were composed and enacted. But, indeed, the change of obscure words, or obsolete phrases, for others more clear and intelligible, was a common practice amongst the Pagan writers. Porphyry, making a collection of heathen oracles, professes to have given them just as he found them, without the least alteration; except, says he, changing an obscure word, now and then, for one more clear: a practice, which, for its fairness and frequency, he ranks with amending a corrupted word, or reforming the metre[h]. But this licence was not confined to the Ancients; for, being encouraged by the reason of things, it was likely enough (as is, in fact, the case) that all times should

[h] ἐπεὶ κἀγώ τι θεοὺς μαρτύρομαι, ὡς οὐδὲν οὔτε προστέθεικα, οὔτε ἀφεῖλον τῶν χρησθέντων νοημάτων· εἰ μή που λέξιν ἠμαρτημένην διώρθωσα, ἢ ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟ ΣΑΦΕΣΤΕΡΟΝ ΜΕΤΑΒΕΒΛΗΚΑ, ἢ τὸ μέτρον ἐλλεῖπον ἀνεπλήρωσα, ἤ τι τῶν μὴ πρὸς τὴν πρόθεσιν συντεινόντων διέγραψα. *Porph.* apud Euseb. Præp. Evang. lib. iii. cap. 7.

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afford examples of it. One of the editors of *Froiſſart*, ſpeaking of his author's text, ſays, "touchant "le ſtile, & ancienne maniere d'eſcrire de noſtre au- "teur, je ne doute point qu'il n'ayt eſté quelques "autrefois changé & aucunement renouvellé ſelon "les temps[j]." All the Editions of Joinville's life of St. Louis bear teſtimony to the ſame practice; which was ſo general that Paſquier ſays, "s'il y eut "un bon livre compoſé par nos Ancêtres, lorſqu'il "fut queſtion de le tranſcrire, les Copiſtes le copi- "oient non ſelon la naïfe langue de l' Auteur, ains "ſelon la leur[k]."

As to the change of *dialect*, the great Critic thus expreſſes himſelf: *The laſt argument I ſhall offer againſt the Laws of* Zaleucus, *is this, that the Preface of them, which* Stobæus *has produced, is written in the common dialect, whereas, it ought to be in the* Doric, *for that was the language of the* Locri.—*The laws of* Zaleucus *therefore are commentitious, becauſe they are not in* Doric[l].

What hath been ſaid above will ſhew this argument to have ſmall force; but it is urged with a peculiar ill grace by the learned Critic, who, in his *diſſertation upon Phalaris*, hath diſcovered, that Ocellus Lucanus wrote the treatiſe *Of the nature of the univerſe* in *Doric*[m]: and from thence rightly concludes, it ought *to be acknowledged for a genuine work, which hitherto learned men have doubted of, from this very buſineſs of its being writ in the* common *dialect. For we now ſee that every word of the true book is faithfully preſerved*; *the* Doric *being only changed into the ordinary language, at the fancy of ſome copier*[n]. Now, ſurely, the raſh ſuſpicions of thoſe *learned men* in the caſe of Ocellus Lucanus, ſhould have made him more cautious in indulging

[j] *Denis Sauvage, Avertiſement aux Leſteurs.*
[k] Rech. L. viii. c. 3. [l] P. 135, and 358.
[m] P. 47. [n] P. 49.

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his own. He ſhould have concluded, if this liberty was taken with books of mere ſpeculation, it was more likely to be indulged in works ſo neceſſary to be underſtood as a body of laws; eſpecially when he had obſerved (after Porphyry) *that the* Doric *is always clouded with obſcurity* [o].

Hence, doubtleſs, *trans-dialecting* was no rare practice. For, beſides this inſtance of Ocellus Lucanus, we have another, in the poems going under the name of Orpheus: which, Jamblichus ſays, were written in the *doric* dialect. But now the fragments of theſe poems, left us by thoſe who did not write in *Doric*, are in the common dialect. It is plain then, they have been *trans-dialected.*

2. The learned Critic's other argument for the impoſture runs thus: *The Report of* Zaleucus *being a* Pythagorean, *was gathered from ſome paſſages in the ſyſtem of laws aſcribed to him, for where elſe could they meet with it? ſo that, if it can be proved he was more ancient than* Pythagoras, *this falſe ſtory of his being a* Pythagorean *being taken from that ſyſtem, muſt convict it of being a cheat* [p]. He then proceeds to prove him more ancient than Pythagoras; which he does, on the whole, with great force of learning and reaſoning, though his arguments are not all equally well choſen. As where he brings this for a proof that *Zaleucus* was no ſcholar of Pythagoras, "Becauſe he aſcribed all his laws to Minerva, "from whom he pretended to receive them in "dreams: which (in the learned Critic's opinion) "has nothing of a Pythagorean in it. For Pythago-"ras's ſcholars aſcribed every thing to their maſter: "it was always αὐτὸς ἔφα with them, *he ſaid it.* There-"fore if *Zaleucus* had been of that ſociety, he would "certainly have honoured his maſter, by imputing his "laws to his inſtructions [q]." But this argument is

[o] P. 317. [p] P. 337. [q] P. 338.

of

of no weight: for, 1. From what has been ſaid above of the genius of ancient legiſlation, it appears, that the general practice required, and the nature of the thing diſpoſed the Lawgiver to aſcribe his laws to the inſpiration of ſome God. 2. As to the famous αὐτὸς ἔφα, it was not peculiar to the Pythagoreans, but common to all the ſects of *Greece*, *jurare in verba magiſtri*. A device to keep them diſtinct and ſeparate from each other; and a compendious way of arguing amongſt thoſe of the ſame ſchool. It would then have been ridiculous to have urged its authority to any out of the ſect; more ſo, to the common people; and moſt of all, to them, upon public and practical matters; the αὐτὸς ἔφα being uſed only in points of ſpeculation, and in the ſchools of philoſophy. Indeed, ſo unlucky is this argument, that, on the contrary, the reader will be apt to conclude, that this very circumſtance of *Zaleucus*'s aſcribing his laws to Minerva, was one of the things that gave riſe and credit to the report of his being a Pythagorean. And, doubtleſs, it would have much weight with thoſe who did not carefully enough attend to the chronology. For *Zaleucus*, in this, might be thought to follow both the example and the precept of Pythagoras, who himſelf pretended to be inſpired by Minerva; and taught it to his ſcholars as the moſt efficacious way of eſtabliſhing civil juſtice, *to propagate the opinion of the Gods having an intimate intercourſe with mankind*[r].

But notwithſtanding the defect of this argument, the learned critic, as we ſaid, proves his point with great clearneſs, that *Zaleucus* was earlier than Pythagoras: and, in concluſion, draws the inference abovementioned, in theſe terms: *It was generally reported* Zaleucus *was a* Pythagorean; *it is proved he was not. This will refute the book itſelf. For if any*

[r] See *Jamblichus's Life of Pythagoras.*

inti-

intimation was given in the book, that the author was a Pythagorean, *the impoſture is evident.* "*And yet it* "*is hard to give any other reaſon, that ſhould induce* "*the later writers to call him a* Pythagorean." *Some impoſtor, therefore, made a ſyſtem of laws under the name of* Zaleucus, *and in it gave a broad hint that he was a ſcholar of* Pythagoras.

Here he reſts his point. *If, then, it be not hard to give another reaſon, that ſhould induce the later writers to call him a Pythagorean,* his long diſcourſe to prove *Zaleucus* the earlier of the two, is of no kind of uſe to convict the pretended laws of impoſture. I have already hinted at another not improbable reaſon, which was his having the ſame inſpiring Goddeſs with Pythagoras: And this will be much ſtrengthened by the obſervation, that Minerva became the peculiar patroneſs of the Pythagorean Lawgivers, on account of the aſſiſtance ſhe had given to their maſter. To which we may add theſe further circumſtances, that the laws were in *Doric* (and ſuppoſing them genuine, they certainly were ſo) which idiom was peculiar to the Pythagoric ſchool[a]:

[a] This we are told by *Jamblichus:* his words are, λέγεται τοῖς γυν ὡς φωνῇ χρῆσθαι τῇ παλαιᾷ ἑκάστοις παρηγγελλον, *Vit. Pythag.* 194. *Kuſt. Ed.* Dr. Bentley underſtands them to ſignify, that *every one ſhould uſe his own mother-tongue.* And, indeed, without reading the context, one could ſcarce avoid giving this ſenſe to the paſſage. VIZZANIUS,—*that every one ſhould uſe the mother-tongue of Crotona*; which was the *Doric. Of theſe,* the learned Critic ſays, *which is the true, perhaps all competent readers will not be of one mind,* p. 386. But I believe there will be no great difference of opinions amongſt thoſe who weigh the following reaſons: 1. Jamblichus adds, τὸ γὰρ ξενίζειν οὐκ ἐδοκίμαζον; by which I underſtand him to mean, that *the* Pythagoric *ſect did not approve of a foreign or ſtranger dialect.* For if he meant, not the ſect in general, but the particulars of which it was compoſed, the ſeveral provincial *Greeks* who entered into it, no *dialect* could be called *foreign* to one or other of them: if he meant the Sect, which we may ſuppoſe had a *dialect* peculiar and conſecrated to the Community, all, but that, was *foreign* to it; and the expreſſion becomes proper and pertinent. 2. *Jamblichus,* in the ſame place,

and,

and, that the whole proem of *Zaleucus*'s laws was formed agreeably to the precepts of Pythagoras in this matter; who directs, that, next after the wor-

tells us, that Pythagoras valued the *Doric* above the other greek Dialects, as most agreeable to the laws of harmony, Τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν διάλεκτον ἁρμονίαν εἶναι: Now having made the essence of the soul to be harmony, it was no wonder he should chuse a dialect, which he supposed approached nearest to its nature; that the mind and tongue might go together. 3. Pythagoras seems here to have imitated his master Orpheus, from whom, as we shall see hereafter, he borrowed much of his philosophy; for Jamblichus tells us, that the old writings that went under the name of Orpheus, were composed in *Doric*. 4. But, lastly, a passage in Porphyry's *Life of Pythagoras*, seems alone sufficient to determine this matter: Porphyry giving the causes of the decay of the Pythagoric philosophy, assigns this for one, that *their commentaries were written in* Doric. Ἔπειτα διὰ τὸ καὶ τὰ γεγραμμένα Δωρίδι γεγράφθαι, p. 49. *Kust. Ed.* This is the clearest comment on the words in question, and determines them to the sense contended for. One would wonder, indeed, that so learned a Critic could take them in any other. But the secret was this, Dr. Bentley having pretended to discover, that Ocellus Lucanus did not write his book in the common dialect, as it is now extant, but in *Doric*; (*Dissert. upon Phalaris, &c.* p. 47.) his adversaries (*Dissert. examined*, p. 54.) charge him with having stolen this discovery from *Vizzanius*. This, Dr. Bentley flatly denies; (*Dissert. defended*, p. 384.) But the only proof he gives of his innocence, is, that the greek passage, quoted above from Jamblichus, on which both he and *Vizzanius* had founded their discoveries, is differently translated by them. "The thing, as I said it (says the Dr.) is thus; the "*Pythagoreans* enjoined all the *Greeks* that entered themselves into "the society, to use every man his mother tongue (φωνῇ χρῆσθαι "τῇ πατρίῳ.) *Ocellus*, therefore, being a *Dorian* of *Lucania*, must "have writ in the *Doric*. This I *took* to be Jamblichus's meaning. But *Vizzanius* has represented it thus: that they enjoined "all that came to them to use the mother-tongue of Crotona, "which was the *Doric*.—Whether *Vizzanius* or I have hit upon "the true meaning of Jamblichus, perhaps all competent readers "will not be of a mind." The diffidence of this conclusion would make one suspect the Dr. was now convinced, that *Vizzanius*'s was the right meaning. Yet, I will venture to say, that the words of Jamblichus, as quoted by *Vizzanius* without the context, would have been understood by every man, skilled, as Dr. Bentley was, in Greek, in the different sense he has given to them. From whence I conclude, that, when Dr. Bentley wrote his *Dissertation on Phalaris*, he had seen the words of Jamblichus no where but in *Vizzanius*.

ship

ſhip of the Gods, *Dæmon*, and *Parent* worſhip ſhould be enjoined [t]. Now, later writers, ſeeing theſe two viſible marks of a Pythagorean, might, without further reflexion, be reaſonably diſpoſed to think *Zaleucus* of that ſect. But, as the learned critic has well made out, from ſure chronological evidence, that this was a miſtake, we muſt ſeek for ſome other cauſe of the uniformity between them; which I take to be this: *Zaleucus*, when Pythagoras flouriſhed, was in the higheſt repute in Greece for legiſlation; which might incline this philoſopher to imitate him, both in his inſpiring Goddeſs, and in the proem of his laws: ſo that poſterity only miſtook the copy for the original. This they might very well do; for Pythagoras and his ſect had ſoon engroſſed all the glory in the practice of lawgiving: and this leads me to another probable cauſe of the common opinion of *Zaleucus*'s being a Pythagorean: The character of this ſect, as will be ſeen hereafter, was ſo great for legiſlation, that after-ages thought nothing could be done to purpoſe in that way, which had not a Pythagorean for its author. So, beſides *Zaleucus*, the ancients ſuppoſed Charondas, Numa [u], Zamolxis [w], Phytius, Theocles, Elicaon, Ariſtocrates, nay the very Druids [x], the legiſlators of Gaul, and, in a word, all the eminent Lawgivers who lived any where about the time of Pythagoras, to be inſtructed by him. But will the learned Critic ſay, that, *therefore*, all theſe Legiſlators were imaginary perſons, and did not give laws to their ſeveral cities? This notion, ariſing from Pythagoras's great charac-

[t] Μιᾷ δὲ τὸ θεῖόν τε καὶ τὸ δαιμόνιον, πλεῖστον ποιεῖσθαι λόγον γονέων. *Jamb. Vit. Pyth.* c. xxx.

[u] Quinetiam arbitror propter *Pythagoreorum* admirationem, Numam quoque regem *Pythagoreum* à poſteriòribus exiſtimatum. *Tul. Tuſc. Diſp.* lib. iv. c. 1.

[w] *Herod.* lib. iv. [x] *Ammian. Marcell.* lib. xv. c. 9.

ter and reputation, was nurſed up and improved by his followers themſelves, to beget honour to their maſter; as, in fact, appears from ſeveral paſſages in Jamblichus's life of that Philoſopher. So that was there no more in it than this; as *Zaleucus*'s Inſtitutions were in great repute, we might very naturally account for the miſtake.

But, laſtly, it is, indeed, very true, (as the learned Critic ſuſpected) that the principal ground *of the report of* Zaleucus *being a* Pythagorean, *was from ſome paſſages in the ſyſtem of laws aſcribed to him.* He is only too haſty in his concluſion, that therefore *theſe muſt needs convict the ſyſtem of a cheat.* What hurried him on, was his ſuppoſing, that no ſuch *report could be gathered from paſſages in the ſyſtem,* but ſuch as muſt be *an intimation that the author was a Pythagorean:* and that there is no difference between *giving* and *taking* an intimation. If, then, this report might be gathered from paſſages which contained no *intimation,* and if the reader might underſtand that to be ſuch which the writer never intended; the conſequence will be, that the credit of theſe fragments will remain unſhaken, though we grant the learned Critic his whole premiſes, and all the facts he contends for.

It ſeems, then, to be certain, that the report of *Zaleucus*'s being a Pythagorean aroſe principally from a paſſage in his ſyſtem of laws. And it is not difficult to diſcover what it was. *Zaleucus* in his preface ſpeaks of an EVIL GENIUS or *Dæmon,* ΔΑΙΜΩΝ ΚΑΚΟΣ, as influencing men to wickedneſs. This, though a notion of the higheſt [y] antiquity, whoſe origin and author are much diſputed, yet became at

[y] Ἀριστοτέλης δ' ἐν πρώτῳ περὶ φιλοσοφίας, καὶ πρεσβυτέρους εἶναι (Μάγους) τῶν Αἰγυπτίων· καὶ δύο κατ' αὐτοὺς εἶναι ἀρχάς, ἀγαθὸν δαίμονα, καὶ ΚΑΚΟΝ ΔΑΙΜΟΝΑ. *Diog. Laert. Vit. Phil.* Procem. Seg. 8.

length

length the distinguishing doctrine of the Pythagoreans. Plutarch, speaking of Pythagoras's opinion of the first principle, says, that that philosopher called the *Monad*, God, and *Duad*, the EVIL GENIUS[z]. Which *Duad* the Pythagoreans used extremely to vilify, as the cause of all evil, under the name of the BAD PRINCIPLE, as Plutarch would make us believe[a]. The application of this doctrine I suppose Pythagoras might borrow from *Zaleucus*, and here again posterity be mistaken only in the original author. However, we may collect from the same Plutarch, that that opinion was cultivated by all the ancient Lawgivers. For this learned man, who favoured the notion of TWO PRINCIPLES, the one good, the other evil, affects, I observe, to draw every ancient writer, who but mentions an *evil dæmon*, into his own sect. In his treatise of Isis and Osiris, he speaks to this purpose, "That it was a most ancient "opinion, delivered as well by LAWGIVERS as Di-

Οὐκ οἶδα μὴ τῶν ΠΑΝΥ ΠΑΛΑΙΩΝ τῶν ἀτοπώτατον ἀναγκασθῶμεν προσδέχεσθαι λόγον ὡς τὰ φαῦλα δαιμόνια καὶ βάσκανα, προσφθωῦντα τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἀνδράσιν καὶ ταῖς πράξεσιν ἀνιστάμενα, ταραχὰς καὶ φόβους ἐπάγει, σείοντα καὶ σφάλλοντα τὴν ἀρετήν· ὡς μὴ διαμείναντες ἀπτῶτες ἐν τῷ καλῷ καὶ ἀκέραιοι, βελτίονος ἐκείνων μοίρας μετὰ τὴν τελευτὴν τύχωσιν. *Plut. Vita Dionis.*

[z] Πυθαγόρας τῶν ἀρχῶν τὴν μὲν μονάδα θεὸν, καὶ τ' ἀγαθὸν, ἥτις ἐστὶν ἡ τοῦ ἑνὸς φύσις, αὐτὸς ὁ νοῦς· τὴν δ' ἀόριστον δυάδα, ΔΑΙΜΟΝΑ, καὶ τὸ ΚΑΚΟΝ, περὶ ἣν ἐστι τὸ ὑλικὸν πλῆθος. *De Plac. Phil.* lib. i. c. 7. p. 1624. E. S.

[a] Οἱ μὲν Πυθαγορικοὶ διὰ πλειόνων ὀνομάτων κατηγοροῦσι, τοῦ μὲν ἀγαθοῦ τὸ ἓν πεπερασμένον, τὸ μένον, τὸ εὐθὺ, τὸ περισσὸν, τὸ τετράγωνον, τὸ δεξιὸν, τὸ λαμπρόν· τοῦ δὲ ΚΑΚΟΥ, τὴν ΔΥΑΔΑ, τὸ ἄπειρον, τὸ φερόμενον, τὸ καμπύλον, τὸ ἄρτιον, τὸ ἑτερόμηκες, τὸ ἄνισον, τὸ ἀριστερὸν, τὸ σκοτεινόν· ὥστε ταύτας ἀρχὰς γενέσεως ὑποκειμένας. Περὶ ΙΣ. καὶ ΟΣΙΡ. p. 660. *St. Ed.* I suppose the reason, why Δυὰς was amongst the ill names said to be given by the Pythagoreans, to the *bad principle*, was, because, in their superstitious designations of the various qualities of numbers, this Δυὰς is very heavily loaded. Ὅτι ἡ μὲν ΜΟΝΑΣ κατὰ τὴν ἰσότητα καὶ τὸ μέτρον λαμβάνεται· ἡ δὲ Δυὰς καθ' ὑπερβολὴν καὶ ἔλλειψιν. *Anon. de Vita Pythag. apud Photium.*

" vines, that the world was neither made by Chance, " neither did one Cause govern all things, without " opposition[b]."

This notion therefore, delivered in the proem of *Zaleucus*'s law, might be very well *taken* for an *intimation of the author's being a* Pythagorean, and yet, not being so *given*, it has not the least tendency to discredit the compilation.

On the whole then, I presume, it appears, that the credit of these remains stands unshaken by any thing the learned Critic has advanced to the contrary; and that we may safely produce them as of the antiquity they lay claim to.

Thus *Zaleucus* begins his preface: " Every inhabitant, whether of town or country, should first " of all be firmly persuaded of the being and existence of the Gods: which belief he will be readily " induced to entertain, when he contemplates the " heavens, regards the world, and observes the disposition, order, and harmony of the universe; " which can neither be the work of blind chance, nor " of man. These Gods are to be worshipped as the " cause of all the real good we enjoy. Every one " therefore should so purify, and possess his mind, " as to have it clear of all kinds of evil; being persuaded that God is not honoured by a wicked person, nor acceptably served, like miserable man, " with sumptuous ceremonies, or taken with costly " sacrifices, but with Virtue only, and a constant " disposition to good and just actions. On which " account, every one should labour all he can to become good, both in practice and principle, whereby he will render himself dear and acceptable to " God; should fear more that which leads to igno-

[b] Διὸ καὶ παμπάλαιος αὕτη κάτεισιν ἐκ Θεολόγων καὶ ΝΟΜΟΘΕΤΩΝ — ὡς οὔτ' ἄνευ καὶ ἄλογον καὶ ἀκυβέρνητον αἰωρεῖται τῷ αὐτομάτῳ τὸ πᾶν, οὔτε εἷς ἐστιν ὁ κρατῶν καὶ κατευθύνων, ὥσπερ οἴαξιν ἤ τισι πειθηνίοις χαλινοῖς λόγος.

" miny

" miny and diſhonour, than that which leads to loſs " of wealth and fortune; and eſteem him the beſt " Citizen, who gives up his worldly goods, rather " than renounce his honeſty and love of juſtice: But " thoſe, whoſe headſtrong appetites will not ſuffer " them to be reſtrained within the limits of theſe " things, and whoſe hearts are turned with a natural " bias towards evil, whether they be men or women, " citizens or ſojourners, ſhould be told, to have the " Gods always in mind, to think upon their nature, " and of the judgments they have in ſtore for wicked " men; to *ſet before themſelves the dreadful hour of* " *death*, a period they muſt all arrive at; *when the* " *memory of evil actions paſt will ſeize the ſinner with* " *remorſe, accompanied with the fruitleſs wiſh, that he* " *had ſubmitted his actions to the rules of juſtice.* Every " one, therefore, ſhould ſo watch over his beha'i- " our, *as if that hour were ſtill preſent with him*, and " attended all his motions: which will be the way " to keep up in himſelf an exact regard to right and " juſtice. BUT IF THE WICKED DEMON BE IN- " STANT TO INFLUENCE HIM TO EVIL, let him " fly to the altars and temples of the Gods, as the " ſureſt aſylum from that crueleſt and wickedeſt of " tyrants, EVIL, and implore their aſſiſtance to drive " her far from him. To this end, let him alſo have " recourſe to thoſe, whoſe reputations are high for " probity and virtue [c]; whom he may hear diſcourſe " of the happineſs of good, and the vengeance at- " tending evil men [d]."

[c] Meaning the men ſet apart for the ſervice of religion, ſuch as Virgil deſcribes in his Elyſium,

Quique ſacerdotes caſti, dum vita manebat;
Quique pii vates & Phœbo digna locuti.

Which not only ſhews the Legiſlator's ſenſe of their uſe, but of the neceſſity of their practiſing what they teach to others.

[d] Τὰς καλοκἀγαθίας τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὴν χώραν, πάντας πρῶτον πεπεῖσθαι χρὴ, καὶ νομίζειν θεὺς εἶναι, καὶ ἀναβλέπουσας ἐς ὑρανὸν, καὶ τὸν κόσμον καὶ τὴν ἐν αὐτοῖς διακόσμησιν, καὶ τάξιν· ἃ γὰρ τύχης, οὐδ' ἀνθρώπων εἶναι δη-

One would wonder, that any man, who had attentively conſidered this admirable fragment, could think it the forgery of a Sophiſt. It is plain, the author of it underſtood human nature and ſociety at another rate. He hath not only given us an exact portrait of natural Religion; but, in applying it to the State, hath explained the uſe and ſubſerviency of its parts to the three great claſſes of mankind. He hath recommended the intrinſic excellence of virtue, and compliance with the *Will* and example of the Gods, to thoſe who are of ſo ingenuous and well-framed a nature as to be always diſpoſed to embrace truth and right: to others, of a leſs heroic turn of mind, ſuch who idolize their *honour*, he holds out fame and ignominy, as the inſeparable attendants of good and evil actions: and, to the common run of more intractable and perverſe tempers, he preaches up the doctrine of *future rewards and puniſhments*[e].

μιεξ ημαλα· σίδεισθαι δὲ τύτες ϗ τιμᾶν, ὡς αἰτίες ὄνλας ἀπαίλων ἡμῶ ἀγαθῶν, τῶν καλὰ λόγον γιγνομένων. Ἕκαστον ἓν ἔχειν ϗ παρασκευάζειν δεῖ τὴν αὐτῦ ψυχὴν, παίλων τῶν κακῶν καθαράν· ὡς ὑ τιμᾶται θεὸς ὑπ' ἀνθρώπυ φαύλυ, ὐδὲ θεραπεύεται δαπάναις, ἐδὲ τραλῳδίαις τῶ αἰσχρμίων, καθάπερ μοχθηρὸς ἄνθρωπ⊙, ἀλλ' ἀρεῖῃ ϗ προαιρέσει τῶν καλῶν ἔργων ϗ δικαίων. Διὸ ἕκαστον δεῖ εἰς δύναμιν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι ϗ θεράξει ϗ θρησκείσει τὸν μέλλοντα ἔσεσθαι θεοφιλῆ· ϗ μὴ φοβεῖσθαι τας εἰς χρήματα ζημίας μᾶλλον τῶν εἰς αἰσχύνην τεινόντων· ϗ πολίτην ἀμείνονα ὀνομάζειν τὸν τὴν ὑσίαν πρεῖσμενον μαλλον τῦ καλῦ ϗ δικαίυ· ὅσοις δὲ μὴ ῥᾴδιον πρὸς ταῦτα τὴν ὁρμὴν πεπεῖσθαι, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν ἔχυσιν εὐκίνηλον πρὸς ἀδικίαν· ὧδ' ἡμῖν παρηγγέλθω· πᾶσι τοῖς τοιύτοις πολίταις, ϗ πολίτισι ϗ ξινοίκοις μεμηκθαι θεῶν ὡς ὄνλων, ϗ δίκας ἐπιπεμπόνλων τοῖς ἀδίκοις· ϗ τίθεσθαι πρὸ ὀμμάτων τὸν καιρὸν τῦτον, ἐν ᾧ γίνεται τὸ τέλ⊙ ἑκάστῳ τῆς ἀπαλλαγῆς τῦ ζῆν, πᾶσι γαρ ἐμπίπλει μεταμέλεια τοῖς μέλλεσι τελευτᾶν, μεμνημένοις ὧν ἀδικήκασι, ϗ ὁρμὴ τῦ βέ⊙σθαι πανία πεπράχθαι δικαίως αὐτοῖς. Διὸ δεῖ ἕκαστον παρ' ἑκάστην πράξιν ἀεὶ συνοικειῶν τὸν καιρὸν τῦτον, ὡς δὴ παρόνλα· ὕτω γαρ ἂν μάλιστα τῦ καλῦ ϗ τῦ δικαίυ φροντιεῖν· ἐὰν δέ τῳ παρασῇ ΔΑΙΜΩΝ ΚΑΚΟΣ πείσεται πρὸς ἀδικίαν, διαφθείρει πρὸς νοσοις ϗ βωμοῖς ϗ τεμένεσι, φεύγειν τὴν ἀδικίαν, ὡς δεσποτικὸν ἀσεβεστάτην ϗ χαλεπωτάτην ἐκείνοις τοὺς θεὸς συναπολλύειν αὐτῷ· εἶναι δὲ ϗ πρὸς ἄνδρας δύσκολον ἔχοντας ἐπ' ἀνδραποδισμὸν ἀκριτομύθ⊙ περὶ εὐδαίμον⊙ βίυ, ϗ κακῶν ἀνδρῶν τιμωρίας ἵνα ἀπολείπῃ τῶν ἀδίκων ἔργων. Apud Stobæum, *Serm.* xlii.

[e] Some have affected not to underſtand, where it is, in the foregoing paſſage, that Zaleucus inculcates this doctrine. The

I will

I will only observe, it appears to have been from hence, that POMPONATIUS borrowed the beautiful passage, which is quoted at large, in the first book of this discourse.

Thus ZALEUCUS. And much in the same fashion does CHARONDAS introduce his Laws.

In imitation of this practice, PLATO likewise, and CICERO both preface their *Laws* with the sanctions of Religion. And though these two great men were not, strictly speaking, Lawgivers in form; yet we

place, methinks, was not hard to find: it is, where *wicked men* are bid *to set before themselves the dreadful hour of death.* For how should a picture of this scene allure men to virtue, or deter them from vice, but as it opens to them a view of those rewards and punishments they are just going to receive. Hence, too, we learn what those *hopes and fears* were, which Plutarch, in the passage p. 164, says the *ancient lawgivers* impressed upon the minds of the people, to keep up the awe and reverence of religion: for Plato assures us it was their general practice, to inculcate the distinction between soul and body; and to teach, that, at their separation, the soul survived the body; and this, says he, we should believe upon their word, unless we would be thought to be out of our senses.—πιστεύειν δ' αὖ καὶ τοῖς ΝΟΜΟΘΕΤΟΥΣΙ ταυθ' ὅτως ἔχειν, ἅνπερ μὴ παντάπασιν ἄφρονες φαίνωνται. *De Legg.* lib. xi. But, in his next book, he informs us, more at large, why the ancient Lawgivers inculcated that *distinction.* It was, in order to build upon it the belief of *a future state of rewards and punishments:* for he says, the Lawgivers were to be believed, when they teach the total difference between soul and body, that the former is immortal, and that when it is on the point of departing for the regions of immortali y (where it must give an account of its conduct in the body) the good man will meet death with courage and constancy, and the evil man with affright and terrour. And then takes occasion to mention the punishments reserved for the latter: πείθεσθαι δ' ἐστὶ τῷ νομοθέτη χρεὼν τά τε ἄλλα, καὶ λέγοντι ψυχὴν σώματος εἶναι τὸ πᾶν διαφέρουσαν·—τὸν δὲ ὄντα ἡμῶν ἕκαστον ὄντως ἀθάνατον εἶναι, ψυχὴν ἐπονομαζόμενον, παρὰ θεοὺς ἄλλους ἀπιέναι δώσοντα λόγον, καθάπερ ὁ νόμος ὁ πάτριος λέγει, τῷ μὲν ἀγαθῷ θαῤῥαλέον, τῷ δὲ κακῷ μάλα φοβερόν—ἀτιμώτερος ἂν κακῶν ἁμαρτημάτων ἐγίγνετο τῶν μετὰ τὸν ἐνθάδε βίον. And here let me observe, that Plato, in the words τῷ ἀγαθῷ θαῤῥαλέον, &c. seems to have had the very passage of Zaleucus in his eye, τίθεσθαι πρὸ ὀμμάτων τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον, &c.—— But this cavil had been obviated, Sect. I. of this Second Book, p. 142.

are not to ſuppoſe that what they wrote in this ſcience, was like the dreams of the Sophiſts, for the amuſement of the idle and curious. They were both well practiſed in affairs, and deeply converſant in human nature; and they formed their ſpeculative Inſtitutes on the plan, and in the ſpirit and views of ancient legiſlation: the foundation of Plato's being the *Attic Laws*; and the foundation of Cicero's, the *Twelve Tables*: who himſelf takes care to warn us of this particular. "In imitation of Plato, the moſt "learned, and, at the ſame time, the wiſeſt of the "philoſophers, who wrote beſt [f] of a republic, and "likewiſe, ſeparately, of the laws thereof, I think "it will be proper, before I give the law itſelf [g], to "ſay ſomewhat in recommendation of it: which, I

[f] I read here, with Turnebus, *qui princeps de rep. conſcripſit.* Lambin objects to this reading, becauſe we gather from Ariſtotle, that *Plato was not the firſt who wrote of a republic*; he ſuppoſing *princeps* ſignified *primus*, whereas it means *optimus*. This was Tully's opinion of Plato, as may be gathered, from many places in his writings. And in this ſenſe Turnebus, without doubt, underſtood the word; a ſenſe familiar to his author, as in *Ver.* lib. iv. cap. 49. "in qua [*Patria*] multis virtutibus & beneficiis "florait PRINCEPS." But the word *primus* itſelf is ſometimes uſed in *this* ſenſe of *princeps*; as in Virgil,

Prima quod ad Trojam——

[g] "Ut priuſquam ipſam *legem* recitem, de ejus legis *laude* "dicam." This paſſage is not without its difficulty. If by LEX be meant the whole ſyſtem of his laws, which the tenor of the diſcourſe leads one to ſuppoſe; then, by LAUS, the *recommendation* of it, we are to underſtand his ſhewing, as he does in the following chapter, that the Gods intereſted themſelves very much in the obſervance of civil laws; which implies, that they were indeed their laws: and ſo Tully calls them, in the 4th chapter of this book: "Ita principem legem illam, & ultimam, mentem eſſe "dicebant omnia ratione aut cogentis, aut vetantis Dei; ex qua "illa lex quam Dii humano generi dederunt, recte eſt LAUDA-"TA." And the ſhewing that civil laws came originally from the Gods, was the higheſt recommendation of them. But if by LEX we are to underſtand only the *firſt* law of the ſyſtem, which begins, "Ad Divos adeunto caſte," &c. then by LAUS is meant his ſhewing, as he does likewiſe in the following chapter, the uſe and ſervice of religion to civil ſociety.

"obſerve,

" obſerve, was the method of Zaleucus and Charon-
" das. For their ſyſtem of laws was not an exerciſe
" of wit, or deſigned for the amuſement of the in-
" dolent and curious, but compoſed for the uſe of
" the public in their ſeveral cities. *Theſe, Plato*
" *imitated*; as thinking this likewiſe to be the buſi-
" neſs of Law; to gain ſomewhat of its end by the
" gentler methods of perſuaſion, and not carry every
" thing by mere force and fear of puniſhment [h]."

Here, we ſee, he intimates, that Plato and himſelf had the ſame view, in writing laws, with Zaleucus and Charondas; namely, the ſervice of a Public. The difference between them was, that the two Originals were employed by their country; and the two Copieſts generouſly undertook an office they were not called to.

However, Plato and Cicero are the greateſt authorities antiquity could afford, and the moſt deſerving to be heard in this matter. Plato makes it the neceſſary introduction to his laws, to eſtabliſh the *being and providence of the Gods* by a law againſt SACRILEGE. And he explains what he means by *ſacrilege*, in the following words: " Either the denial of
" the being of the Gods; or, if that be owned, the
" denial of their providence over men; or, thirdly,
" the teaching, that they are flexible, and eaſy to be
" cajoled by prayer and ſacrifice [i]." And after-

[h] Sed, ut vir doctiſſimus fecit Plato, atque idem graviſſimus philoſophorum omnium, qui princeps de republica conſcripſit, idemque ſeparatim de legibus ejus, id mihi credo eſſe faciendum; ut priuſquam ipſam legem recitem, de ejus legis laude dicam. Quod idem & Zaleucum & Charondam feciſſe video; cum quidem illi non ſtudii & delectationis, ſed reipublicæ cauſa leges civitatibus ſuis ſcripſerunt. Quos imitatos Plato, videlicet hoc quoque legis putavit eſſe, perſuadere aliquid, non omnia vi ac minis cogere. *De Legg.* lib. ii. cap. 6.

[i] ἀλλὰ ἢ δή τι τῶν τριῶν πάσχων, ἢ τοῦτο——οὐχ ἡγούμενος, ἢ τὸ δεύτερον ὄλλας, ὃ φρονίζειν ἀνθρώπων, ἢ τρίτον, εὐπαραμυθήτους εἶναι, θυσιαῖς τε καὶ εὐχαῖς παρακλωμένους. *De Legg.* lib. x.

wards;

wards; "It is not of ſmall conſequence, that what "we here reaſon about the Gods, ſhould, by all "means, be made probable; as, that they ARE; "and, that they are GOOD; and that their concern "for juſtice takes place of all other human conſider- "ations. For this, in our opinion, ſeems to be the "nobleſt and beſt PREFACE that can be made to a "body of laws [k]." In compliance with this declaration, Cicero's *Preface* to his laws, is conceived in the following terms: "Let our citizen then be firſt of "all firmly perſuaded of the government and domi- "nion of the Gods; that they are the lords and maſ- "ters of the world; that all things are diſpoſed by "their power, direction, and providence; and that "the whole race of mankind is in the higheſt man- "ner indebted to them; that they are intimately ac- "quainted with every one's ſtate and condition; that "they know what he does, what he thinks; with "what diſpoſition of mind, and with what degree of "piety he performs the acts and offices of religion; "and that, accordingly, they make a diſtinction be- "tween the good and bad. The mind being im- "bued with theſe opinions, will never deviate from "TRUTH and UTILITY. And what *truth* is more "evident than this, that no one ſhould be ſo ſtu- "pidly arrogant, as to ſuppoſe, there is Mind and "Reaſon in himſelf, and yet none in the Heavens "and the World; or, that thoſe things, whoſe uſes "and directions can ſcarce be comprehended with "the utmoſt ſtretch of human faculties, may yet "perform their motions without an underſtanding "Ruler? But, He whom the courſes of the hea- "venly bodies, the viciſſitudes of day and night, "the orderly temperature of the ſeaſons, and the

[k] διαφέρει δ' ὐ σμικρὸν ἁμωσγέπως πιθανότητά τινα τοῖς λόγοις ἡμῶν ἔχειν, ὡς θεοί τ' εἰσι, κ) ἀγαθοὶ, δίκην τιμωντες διαφερόντως ἀνθρώπων· σχεδὸν γὰρ τοῦτο ἡμῖν ὑπὲρ ἁπάντων τῶν νομῶν κάλλιστόν τε κ) ἄριστον προοίμιον ἂν εἴη. id. ibid.

"vari-

" various bleſſings which the earth pours out for our " ſuſtenance and pleaſure, will not excite, nay com- " pel to gratitude, is unfit even to be reckoned in " the number of men. And ſince things endowed " with reaſon, are more excellent than thoſe which " want it; and that it is impiety to ſay, any parti- " cular is more excellent than the univerſal Nature; " we muſt needs confeſs this Nature to be endowed " with reaſon. That theſe opinions are likewiſe *uſe-* " *ful*, who can deny, when he conſiders what ſtabi- " lity is derived to the Public from within, by the " religion of an oath; and what ſecurity it enjoys " from without, by thoſe holy rites which affirm na- " tional treaties and conventions: how efficacious the " fear of divine puniſhment is, to deter men from " wickedneſs; and what purity of manners muſt " reign in that Society, where the immortal Gods " themſelves are believed to interpoſe both as judges " and witneſſes? Here you have the PROEM of the " law; for ſo Plato calls it[1]."

[1] Sit igitur hoc a principio perſuaſum civibus, dominos eſſe omnium rerum ac moderatores Deos, eaque quæ gerantur, eorum geri vi, ditione, ac numine, eoſdemque optime de genere hominum mereri; & qualis quiſque ſit, quid agat, quid in ſe admittat, qua mente, qua pietate colat religiones, intueri; piorumque & impiorum habere rationem. His enim rebus imbutæ mentes, haud ſane abhorrebunt ab utili, & a vera ſententia. Quid eſt enim verius, quàm neminem eſſe oportere tam ſtulte arrogantem, ut in ſe rationem & mentem putet ineſſe, in cœlo mundoque non putet? aut ut ea, quæ vix ſumma ingenii ratione comprehendat, nulla ratione moveri putet? Quem vero aſtrorum ordines, quem dierum noctiumque viciſſitudines, quem menſium temperatio, quemque ea, quæ gignuntur nobis ad fruendum, non gratum eſſe cogant, hunc hominem omnino numerari qui decet? Cumque omnia, quæ rationem habent, præſtent iis, quæ ſint rationis expertia, nefaſque ſit dicere ullam rem præſtare naturæ omnium rerum; rationem ineſſe in ea confitendum eſt. Utiles eſſe autem opiniones has, quis neget, cum intelligat, quàm multa firmentur jurejurando, quantæ ſalutis ſint fœderum religiones, quàm multos divini ſupplicii metus a ſcelere revocarit; quamque ſancta ſit ſocietas civium inter ipſos, Diis immortalibus interpoſitis tum judicibus tum teſtibus. Habes legis procœmium; ſic enim hoc appellat Plato. *De Legg.* lib. ii. c. 7.

And then follow the laws themſelves; the firſt of which is conceived in theſe words: "Let thoſe who "approach the Gods, be pure and undefiled; let "their offerings be ſeaſoned with piety, and all oſ- "tentation of pomp omitted: the God himſelf will "be his own avenger on tranſgreſſors. Let the "Gods, and thoſe who were ever reckoned in the "number of Celeſtials, be worſhiped: and thoſe "likewiſe, whom their merits have raiſed to heaven; "ſuch as HERCULES, BACCHUS, ÆSCULAPIUS, "CASTOR, POLLUX, and ROMULUS. And let cha- "pels be erected in honour to thoſe qualities, by "whoſe aid mortals arrive thither, ſuch as REASON, "VIRTUE, PIETY, and GOOD-FAITH [m]."

SECT. IV.

THE NEXT ſtep the Legiſlator took, was to ſupport and affirm the general doctrine of a PROVIDENCE, which he had delivered in his laws, by a very circumſtantial and popular method of inculcating the belief of a *future ſtate of rewards and puniſhments.*

This was by the inſtitution of the MYSTERIES, the moſt ſacred part of pagan Religion; and artfully framed to ſtrike deeply and forcibly into the minds and imaginations of the people.

I propoſe, therefore, to give a full and diſtinct account of this whole matter: and the rather, becauſe it is a thing little known or attended to: the Ancients, who wrote expreſly on the *Myſteries*, ſuch

[m] Ad divos adeunto caſtè; pietatem adhibento; opes amoventō: qui ſecus faxit, Deus ipſe vindex erit.——Divos, & eos qui cœleſtes ſemper habiti, colunto: & ollos, quos endo cœlo merita locaverunt, Herculem, Liberum, Æſculapium, Caſtorem, Pollucem, Quirinum. Aſt olla, propter quæ datur homini adſcenſus in cœlum, mentem, virtutem, pietatem, fidem, earumque laudum delubra ſunto. *De Legg.* lib. ii. c. 8.

as

as Melanthius, Menander, Hicesius, Sotades, and others, not being come down to us. So that the modern writers on this subject are altogether in the dark concerning their origine and end; not excepting Meursius himself: to whom, however, I am much indebted, for abridging my labour in the search of those passages of antiquity, which make mention of the ELEUSINIAN *Mysteries*, and for bringing the greater part of them together under one view [n].

To avoid ambiguity, it will be proper to explain the term. Each of the *pagan* Gods had (besides the *public* and *open*) a *secret worship* [o] paid unto him: to which none were admitted but those who had been selected by preparatory ceremonies, called INITIATION. This *secret worship* was termed the MYSTERIES.

But though every God had, besides his *open* worship, the *secret* likewise; yet this latter did not *every where* attend the former; but only *there*, where he was the patron God, or in principal esteem. Thus, when in consequence of that intercommunity of paganism, which will be explained hereafter, one nation adopted the Gods of another, they did not always take in at the same time, the *secret worship* or *Mysteries* of that God: so, in Rome, the public and open worship of Bacchus was in use long before his *Mysteries* were admitted. But, on the other hand again, the worship of the strange God was sometimes introduced only for the sake of his *Mysteries*: as, in the same city, that of Isis and Osiris.

[n] *Eleusinia: sive de Cereris Eleusinæ sacro.*

[o] Strabo, in his tenth book of his Geography, p. 716. Gron. Ed. writes thus: Κοινὸν δὴ τοῦτο, καὶ τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ τῶν βαρβάρων ἐστὶ, τὸ τὰς ἱεροποιΐας μετὰ ἀνέσεως ἑορταστικῆς ποιεῖσθαι, τὰς μὲν σὺν ἐνθουσιασμῷ, τὰς δὲ χωρὶς· καὶ ταῖς μὲν μετὰ μουσικῆς, τὰς δὲ μή· ΚΑΙ ΤΑΣ ΜΕΝ ΜΥΣΤΙΚΩΣ, ΤΑΣ ΔΕ ΕΝ ΦΑΝΕΡΩι· καὶ τοῦθ' ἡ φύσις οὕτως ὑπαγορεύει.

Thus

Thus ſtood the caſe in general; the particular exceptions to it, will be ſeen in the ſequel of this diſſertation.

The firſt and original *Myſteries*, of which we have any ſure account, were thoſe of Iſis and Oſiris in EGYPT; from whence they were derived to the GREEKS[p], under the preſidency of various Gods[q], as the inſtitutor thought moſt for his purpoſe: Zoroaſter brought them into Perſia; Cadmus and Inachus into Greece at large[r]; Orpheus into Thrace; Melampus into Argis; Trophonius

[p] Diod. Sic. lib. i. Eudoxus ſaid, as Plutarch informs us, that the Egyptians invented this fable concerning Jupiter Ammon or the Supreme God,—That his Legs being unſeparated, very ſhame drove him into ſolitude; but that Iſis ſplit and divided them, and by that means ſet him at liberty to walk about the World. Φησὶ περὶ τοῦ Διὸς ὁ Εὔδοξος, μυθολογεῖν Αἰγυπτίους, ὡς τὴν σκελῶν συμπεφυκότων αὐτῷ μὴ δυνάμενος βαδίζειν, ὑπ' αἰσχύνης, ἐτ μίαν διέτριβεν. Ἡ δὲ Ἶσις διατεμοῦσα καὶ διαστήσασα τὰ μέρη ταῦτα τ σώματος, ἀρτίποδα, τὴν πόρειαν παρεσκεν. *De Iſ. & Oſir.* The moral of the fable is plainly this, as we ſhall ſee more plainly hereafter, That the FIRST CAUSE was kept unknown, till the Egyptian *Myſteries* of Iſis revealed him amongſt their ἀπορρήτα; which *Myſteries* were communicated to the Greeks, and, thro' them, to the reſt of mankind. But the Image under which the fable is conveyed, was taken from the form of the Egyptian Statues of the Gods, which the workmen made with their Legs undivided. When the Greek Artiſts firſt ſhewed them how to form their Gods in a walking Poſture, the attitude ſo alarmed their Worſhippers, that they bound them with Chains, leſt they ſhould deſert their own Country. For the People imagined that their Gods, on the leaſt ill humour or diſguſt, had a ſtrange propenſity to ſhew them a fair pair of heels.

[q] Ὅτι δὲ τῶν Διονυσίων, καὶ τῶν Παναθηναίων, καὶ μέντοι τῶν Θεσμοφορίων, καὶ τῶν Ἐλευσινίων τὰς τελετὰς Ὀρφεὺς, ἀνὴρ Ὀδρύσης, εἰς τὰς Ἀθήνας ἐκόμισεν, καὶ εἰς ΑΙΓΥΠΤΟΝ ἀφικόμενος, τὰ τῆς Ἴσιδος καὶ τοῦ Ὀσίριδος εἰς τὰ τῆς Δηοῦς καὶ τοῦ Διονύσου μετατέθεικεν ὄργια. Theodoretus, *Therapeut.* i.

[r] Ἐκεῖθεν δὲ ἀρχὴν ἔσχε τὰ παρ' Ἕλλησι μυστήριά τε καὶ τελεταὶ πρόσθεν παρ' ΑΙΓΥΠΤΙΟΙΣ, καὶ παρὰ Φρυξὶ, καὶ Φοινιξὶ, καὶ Βαβυλωνίοις, κακῶς ἐπινενοημένα μετενεχθέντα τε εἰς Ἕλληνας ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν ΑΙΓΥΠΤΙΩΝ χώρας ὑπο Κάδμου καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ Ἰνάχου. Ἀπιόντα πρότερον κληθέντα, καὶ οἰκοδομήσαντα τὴν Μέμφιν. Epiphan. *adv. Her.* lib. i.

into

into Bœotia; Minos into Crete; Cinyras into Cyprus; and Erechtheus into Athens. And as in Egypt they were to Iſis and Oſiris; ſo in Aſia they were to Mithras; in Samothrace to the Mother of the Gods; in Bœotia to Bacchus; in Cyprus to Venus; in Crete to Jupiter; in Athens to Ceres and Proſerpine; in Amphiſſa to Caſtor and Pollux; in Lemnus to Vulcan, and ſo to others, in other places, the number of which is incredible [s].

But their end, as well as nature, was the ſame in all; to teach the doctrine of a FUTURE STATE. In this, Origen and Celſus agree; the two moſt learned writers of their ſeveral parties. The firſt, minding his adverſary of the difference between the *future life* promiſed by the Goſpel, and that taught in Paganiſm, bids him compare the Chriſtian doctrine with what all the ſects of Philoſophy, and all the *Myſteries*, amongſt Greeks and Barbarians, taught concerning it [t]: And Celſus, in his turn, endeavouring to ſhew that chriſtianity had no advantage over paganiſm in the efficacy of ſtronger ſanctions, expreſſes himſelf to this purpoſe; "But now, after all, juſt as you be-"lieve eternal puniſhments, ſo do the Miniſters of "the ſacred rites, and thoſe who initiate into, and "preſide in the *Myſteries*[u]."

[s] Poſtulat quidem magnitudo materiæ, atque ipſius defenſionis officium, ut ſimiliter cæteras turpitudinum ſpecies perſequamur: vel quas produnt antiquitatis hiſtoriæ, vel myſteria illa continent ſacra, quibus initiis nomen eſt, & quæ non omnibus vulgo, ſed paucorum taciturnitatibus tradi licet. Sed *Sacrorum innumeri ritus*, atque affixa deformitas ſingulis, corporaliter prohibet univerſa nos exequi. Arnob. *adv. Gentes*, lib. v. p. 168.

[t] —Καθ' ἑκάστην φιλοσόφων αἵρεσιν ἐν Ἕλλησιν ἢ βαρβάροις ἢ ΜΥΣΤΗΡΙΩΔΗ. Orig. *cont. Celſ.* lib. iii. p. 160. Sp. Ed.

[u] Μάλιστα μὲν, ὦ βέλτιστε, ὥσπερ σὺ κολάσεις αἰωνίους νομίζεις· ἴσως δὲ καὶ οἱ τῶν ἱερῶν ἐκείνων ἐξηγηταὶ τελεσταί τε καὶ μυσταγωγοί, lib. viii. p. 408. And that nothing very heterodox was taught in the myſteries concerning a future ſtate, I collect from the anſwer Origen makes to Celſus, who had preferred what was taught in the *Myſteries* of Bacchus on that point, to what the Chriſtian Religion revealed

They

They continued long in religious reverence: ſome were more famous and more extenſive than others; to which many accidents concurred. The moſt noted were the Orphic, the Bacchic, the Eleusinian, the Samothracian, the Cabiric, and the Mithriac.

Euripides makes Bacchus ſay, in his tragedy of that name[w], that the *Orgies* were celebrated by all foreign nations, and that he came to introduce them amongſt the Greeks. And it is not improbable, but ſeveral barbarous nations might have learned them of the Egyptians long before they came into Greece. The Druids of Britain, who had, as well as the Brachmans of India, divers of their religious rites from thence, celebrated the *Orgies* of Bacchus, as we learn from Dionyſius the African. And Strabo having quoted Artemidorus for a fabulous ſtory, ſubjoins, "But what he ſays of Ceres and Proſerpine is more credible, namely, that there is an iſland near Britain, where they perform the ſame rites to thoſe two Goddeſſes as are uſed in Samothrace[x]." But, of all the Mysteries, thoſe which bore that name, by way of eminence, the Eleusinian, celebrated at Athens in honour of Ceres, were by far the moſt renowned; and, in courſe of time, eclipſed, and almoſt ſwallowed up the reſt. Their neighbours round about very early practiſed theſe *Myſteries* to the neglect of their own: in a little time all Greece and Aſia Minor were initiated into them: and at length they ſpread over the whole Roman empire, and even beyond the limits of it. "I inſiſt

concerning it—περὶ μὲν ὧν τῶν Βακχικῶν τελετῶν εἴτε τίς ἐστι σαφὴς λόγος, εἴτε μηδεὶς τοιοῦτος——lib. iv. p. 167.

[w] Act. II.

[x] Περὶ δὲ τῆς Δήμητρος καὶ τῆς κόρης πιστότερα· ὅτι φησὶν εἶναι πρὸς τῇ Βρεττανικῇ, καθ' ἣν ὁμοια τοῖς ἐν Σαμοθρᾴκῃ περὶ τὴν Δήμητρα καὶ τὴν Κόρην ἱεροποιεῖται. Strabonis *Geogr.* lib. iv. The nature of theſe Samothracian rites is explained afterwards.

"not

" not (ſays Tully) on thoſe ſacred and auguſt rites " of ELEUSIS, where, from the remoteſt regions, " men come to be initiated [y]." And we are told in Zoſimus, that " theſe moſt holy rites were then " ſo extenſive, as to take in the whole race of man- " kind [z]." Ariſtides calls Eleuſis, *the common temple of the earth* [a]. And Pauſanias ſays, the rites performed there for the promotion of piety and virtue, as much excelled all other rites, as the Gods excelled the Heroes [b].

How this happened, the nature and turn of the People, who introduced theſe *Myſteries*, will account for. Athens was a city the moſt devoted to Religion of any upon the face of the earth. On this account their poet Sophocles calls it *the ſacred building of the Gods* [c], his figure of ſpeech alluding to its fabulous foundation. Nor was it a leſs compliment St. Paul intended to pay the Athenians, when he ſaid, Ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, κατα πάντα ὡς δεισιδαιμονεστέρους ὑμᾶς θεωρῶ [d]. And Joſephus tells us, that *they were univerſally eſteemed the moſt religious people of Greece* [e]. Hence, in theſe matters, Athens became the pattern and ſtandard to the reſt of the world.

In diſcourſing, therefore, of the MYSTERIES in general, we ſhall be forced to take our ideas of them chiefly from what we find practiſed in the *Eleuſinian.*

[y] Omitto ELEUSINAM ſanctam illam & auguſtam; ubi initiantur gentes orarum ultimæ. *Nat. Deor.* lib. i.

[z] Τὰ συνέχοντο τὸ ἀνθρώπειον μέχρι ἀγιωτάτης μυήσεως. lib. iv.

[a] Ὅσις ἢ κοινόν τι τῆς γῆς τέμενος τὴν Ἐλευσῖνα ἡγεῖτο. Ariſtidis *Eleuſinia.*

[b] Οἱ γὰρ ἀρχαιόταλοι τῶν Ἑλλήνων τελετὴν τὴν Ἐλευσινίαν πάλαι ὅσα ἐς εὐσέβειαν ἦκει, τοσούτῳ ἦγον ἱλιμώτεραν, ὅσῳ καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς ἐπιστροσθιωτέρους ἡρώων. *Photius.* In this elegant ſimilitude he ſeems plainly to allude to the *ſecret* of the *myſteries*; which, as we ſhall ſee, conſiſted in an explanation of the *origin of hero-worſhip*, and the *nature of the deity.*

[c] *Electra*, act. ii. ſc. i. ΑΘΗΝΩΝ ΤΩΝ ΘΕΟΔΜΗΤΩΝ.——

[d] Act. Apoſt. xvii. 22.

[e] ——εὐσεβέστατοι τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἅπαντες λέγεσθαι. *Cont. Ap.* lib. ii.

Nor need we fear to be mistaken; the END of all being the same, and all having their common ORIGINAL from Egypt.

To begin with the general purpose and design of their Institution. This will be understood, by shewing what they *communicated* promiscuously to all.

To support the doctrine of a PROVIDENCE, which they taught, governed the world[f], they inforced the belief of a FUTURE STATE of rewards and punishments[g], by every sort of contrivance. But as this did not quite clear up the intricate ways of Providence, they added the doctrine of a METEMPSYCHOSIS, or the belief of a *prior state*: as we learn from Cicero, and Porphyry[h]; the latter of whom informs us, that it was taught in the *Mysteries* of the Persian Mithras. This was an ingenious solution, invented by the Egyptian Lawgivers, to remove all doubts concerning the moral attributes of God[i]; and so, by adding a *prior* to a *future state*, to establish the firm belief of his Providence. For the Lawgiver well knew how precarious that belief was, while the moral attributes of God remained doubtful and uncertain.

In cultivating the doctrine of a *future life*, it was taught, that the *Initiated* should be happier in that state than all other mortals: that while the souls of the profane, at their leaving the body, stuck fast in mire and filth, and remained in darkness, the souls of the

[f] Plutarch. *de Is. & Osir.*

[g] [Mysteriis] neque solum, &c.—Sed etiam cum SPE MELIORI MORIENDI. Tull. *de Legg.* lib. ii. c. 14.

[h] Καὶ γὰρ ὄντμα πάντων ἐστὶ τῶν πρώτων, τὴν ΜΕΤΕΜΨΥΧΩΣΙΝ εἶναι· ὃ καὶ ἐμφαίνειν ἐοίκασιν ἐν τοῖς τοῦ Μίθρα μυστηρίοις. *De Abst.* lib. iv. § 16.

[i] So Tully. Ex quibus humanæ vitæ erroribus & ærumnis fit, ut interdum veteres illi sive vates, sive in sacris INITIISQUE tradendis divinæ mentis interpretes, qui nos ob aliqua scelera suscepta in vitâ superiore, pœnarum luendarum caussa, natos esse dixerunt, aliquid vidisse videantur. *Fragm. ex lib. de Philosophia.*

Initiated

Initiated winged their flight directly to the happy iſlands, and the habitations of the Gods[k]. This doctrine was as neceſſary for the ſupport of the *Myſteries*, as the *Myſteries* were for the ſupport of the doctrine. But now, leſt it ſhould be miſtaken, that *initiation* alone, or any other means than a virtuous life, intitled men to this future happineſs, the *Myſteries* openly proclaimed it as their chief buſineſs, to reſtore the ſoul to its original purity. "It was the "end and deſign of *initiation* (ſays Plato) to reſtore "the ſoul to that ſtate, from whence it fell, as from "its native ſeat of perfection[l]." They contrived that every thing ſhould tend to ſhew the neceſſity of virtue; as appears from Epictetus. "Thus the *My-* "*ſteries* become uſeful; thus we ſeize the true ſpirit "of them; when we begin to apprehend that every "thing therein was inſtituted by the Ancients, for "inſtruction and amendment of life[m]." Porphyry gives us ſome of thoſe moral precepts, which were inforced in the Myſteries, as *to honour their parents, to offer up fruits to the Gods, and to forbear cruelty towards animals*[n]. For the accompliſhment of this purpoſe, it was required in the *Aſpirant* to the Myſteries, that he ſhould be of a clear and unblemiſhed Character, and free even from the ſuſpicion of any

[k] Plato *in Phædone*—Ariſtides *Eleuſiniâ & apud Stobæum, Serm.* 119, *&c. Schol. Ariſt. in Ranis.* Diog. Laert. *in vita Diog. Cynici.*

[l] Σκοπὸς τῶν τελετῶν ἐστιν, εἰς τέλος ἀναλαμβάνειν τὰς ψυχὰς ἐκεῖσε ἀφ' ὅθεν τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐποιήσαντο κάθοδον, ὡς ἀπ' ἀρχῆς. In *Phædone.*

[m] Οὕτως ὠφέλιμα γίνεται τὰ μυστήρια· ἔστως εἰς φαντασίαν ἐρχόμεθα· ὅτι ἐπὶ παιδιᾷ καὶ ἐπανορθώσει τοῦ βίου καθιεράθη πάντα ταῦτα ἀπὸ τῶν παλαιῶν. Apud *Arrian. Diſſert.* lib. iii. cap. 21. My reaſon for tranſlating εἰς φαντασίαν, in this manner, was, becauſe I imagined the author, in this obſcure expreſſion, alluded to the cuſtom in the Myſteries of calling thoſe who were initiated only in the leſſer, Μύται; but thoſe, in the greater, Ἐπόπται.

[n] Τοιῆς τιμᾶν, Θεὺς καρποῖς ἀγαλλειν, ζῶα μὴ σίνεσθαι. *De Abſt.* lib. iv. § 22.

notorious crime[o]. To come at the truth of his Character, he was severely interrogated by the Priest or Hierophant, impressing on him the same sense of obligation to conceal nothing, as is now done at the roman Confessional[p]. Hence it was, that when Nero, after the murder of his mother, took a journey into Greece, and had a mind to be present at the celebration of the *Eleusinian Mysteries*, the conscience of his parricide deterred him from attempting it[q]. On the same account, the good emperor M. Antoninus, when he would purge himself to the world of the death of Avidius Cassius, chose to be initiated into the *Eleusinian Mysteries*[r]; it being notorious, that none were admitted into them, who laboured under the just suspicion of any heinous immorality. And Philostratus tells us, that Apollonius was desirous of being initiated in these *Mysteries*; but that the Hierophant refused to admit him, because he esteemed the Aspirant to be no better than a Magician; for the *Eleusinian* stood open to none who did not approach the Gods with a pure and holy worship[s]. This was, originally, an indispensable condition of *initiation*, observed in common, by all the Mysteries; and instituted by Bacchus, or Osiris himself, the first In-

[o] Οὗτοι γὰρ τά τ' ἄλλα καθαροῖς εἶναι τοῖς μύσταις ἐν κοινῷ προαγορεύουσιν, οἷον τὰς χεῖρας τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι. Libanius *Decl.* xix.

[p] As appears from the repartee which Plutarch records, in his *Laconic apothegms of Lysander*, when he went to be initiated into the Samothracean mysteries; Ἐν δὲ Σαμοθρᾴκῃ χρηστηριοζομένῳ αὐτῷ ὁ ἱερεὺς ἐκέλευσεν εἰπεῖν ὅ, τί ἀνομώτατον ἔργον αὐτῷ ἐν τῷ βίῳ πεπρᾶκται πότερον ἂν σοῦ τοῦτο κελεύσαντος ἢ τῶν θεῶν, τοῦτο δεῖ ποιεῖν; ἐπηρώτησε. Φαμενόν δὲ τῶν θεῶν, Σὺ τοίνυν. ἔφη, ἐκποδὼν μὲν κατάστηθι, κἀκείνοις ἐρῶ ἐὰν πυνθάνων ται —Why initiation into these Mysteries is called, enquiring of the oracle, will be seen afterwards.

[q] Peregrinatione quidem Græciæ, Eleusiniis sacris, quorum initiatione impii & scelerati voce præconis submoverentur, interesse non ausus est Sueton. *Vita Neron.* cap. 34.

[r] Jul. Capit. *Vita Ant. Phil.* and Dion Cass.

[s] Ὁ δὲ ἱεροφάντης οὐκ ἐβούλετο παρέχειν τὰ ἱερά, μὴ γὰρ ἄν ποτε μυῆσαι γόητα μὴ δὲ τὴν Ἐλευσῖνα ἀνοῖξαι ἀνθρώπῳ μὴ καθαρῷ τὰ Δαιμόνια. *De Vita Apollonii Tyanensis*, l. iv. c. 18.

venter

venter of them; who, as Diodorus tells us, initiated none but pious and virtuous men [t]. During the *celebration* of the Mysteries, they were enjoined the greatest sanctity, and highest elevation of mind. "When you sacrifice or pray (says Epictetus in Arrian) go with a prepared purity of mind, and with "dispositions so previously ordered, as are required "of you when you approach the ancient *rites and* "*Mysteries* [u]." And Proclus tells us that the Mysteries and the Initiations drew the souls of men from a material, sensual, and merely human life, and joined them in *communion* with the Gods [w]. Nor was a less degree of purity required of the Initiated for their *future* conduct [x]. They were obliged by solemn engagements to commence a new life of strictest piety and virtue; into which they were entered by a severe course of penance, proper to purge the mind of its natural defilements. Gregory Nazianzen tells us, that "no one could be initiated into the "*Mysteries of Mithras*, till he had undergone all sorts "of mortifying trials, and had approved himself "holy and impassible [y]." The consideration of all this made Tertullian say, that, in the *Mysteries*, "Truth herself took on every shape, to oppose and "combat Truth [z]." And St. Austin, "That the de-

[t] — καταδεῖξαι δὲ καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς τελετὰς, καὶ μεταδοῦναι τῶν μυστηρίων τοῖς εὐσεβέσι τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ δίκαιον βίον ἀσκοῦσι. Lib. iii. p. 138. St. Ed.

[u] Καὶ μετὰ θυσίας δὲ, καὶ μετ' εὐχῶν, καὶ προηγνευκότα, καὶ προδιακείμενον τῇ γνώμῃ, ὅτι ἱεροῖς προσελεύσεται καὶ ἱεροῖς παλαιοῖς. Arrian. *Dissert.* lib. iii. cap. 21.

[w] Τά τε μυστήρια καὶ τὰς τελετὰς ἀνάγειν μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐνύλου καὶ θνητοειδοῦς ζωῆς τὰς ψυχάς, καὶ συνάπτειν τοῖς θεοῖς. In *Remp. Plat.* lib. i.

[x] Καὶ τῶν μυστηρίων ἀξιοθεὶς ἐδεόμην καὶ τῆς παρ' ὑμῶν ἀρίστης παιδεύσεως. Quidam apud Sopatrum, in *Div. Quæst.*

[y] οὐδεὶς δὲ δύνασθαι τελεῖσθαι τὰς τοῦ Μίτρου τελετὰς, εἰ μὴ διὰ πασῶν τῶν κολάσεων παρέλθοι, καὶ δείξει ἑαυτὸν ἀπαθῆ καὶ ὅσιον. 1 *Orat. cont. Julian.*

[z] Omnia adversus veritatem, de ipsa veritate constructa esse. *Apol.* cap. 47.

" vil hurried away deluded ſouls to their deſtruction, " when he promiſed to *purify* them by thoſe cere- " monies, called INITIATIONS [a]."

The *Initiated*, under this diſcipline, and with theſe promiſes, were eſteemed the only happy amongſt men. Ariſtophanes, who ſpeaks the ſenſe of the people, makes them exult and triumph after this manner: " On us only does the ſun diſpenſe his bleſſings; " we only receive pleaſure from his beams: we, " who are *initiated*, and perform towards citizens " and ſtrangers all acts of piety and juſtice [b]." And Sophocles, to the ſame purpoſe, " LIFE, only is to be " had there: all other places are full of miſery and " evil [c]." " Happy (ſays Euripides) is the man " who hath been initiated into the greater *Myſteries*, " and leads a life of piety and religion [d]." And the longer any one had been *initiated*, the more honourable was he deemed [e]. It was even ſcandalous not to be initiated: and however virtuous the perſon otherwiſe appeared, he became ſuſpicious to the people: As was the caſe of Socrates, and, in after-times, of Demonax [f]. No wonder, then, if the ſuperior advantages of the *Initiated*, both here and hereafter, ſhould make the *Myſteries* univerſally aſpired to.

[a] Diabolum animas deceptas illuſaſque præcipitaſſe, quum polliceretur purgationem animæ per eas, quas ΤΕΛΕΤΑΣ appellant. *De Trinitate*, lib. iii. c. 10.

[b] Μόνοις γὰρ ἡμῖν ἥλιος
Καὶ φέγγος ἱλαρὸν ἐστιν,
Ὅσοι μεμυήμεθ', εὐ-
σεβῆ τε διηγόμεν
Τρόπον περί τε ξένους
Καὶ τοὺς ἰδιώτας. *Chorus in Ranis*, act. i.

[c] Τοῖς δὲ μύοις ἔκεῖ
Ζῆν ἐστι· τοῖς δ' ἄλλοισι πάντ' ἐκεῖ κακά.

[d] Ὦ μάκαρ ὅστις εὐδαίμων τελετὰς θεῶν
Εἶδως, βιᾶται ἁγιστεύει. *Bacch.*

[e] Καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀξιωτικὸς μύστης ἀτιμώτερος τοῦ πάλαι μύστου. Ariſtides in *Orat. περὶ παραγράμματος*.

[f] Lucian. *Vit. Dem.*

And, indeed, they ſoon grew as comprehenſive in the numbers they embraced, as in the regions and countries to which they extended: men, women, and children ran to be initiated. Thus Apuleius[g] deſcribes the ſtate of the Myſteries even in his time: "Influunt turbæ, ſacris divinis initiatæ, viri fœmi-"næque, omnis ætatis & omnis dignitatis." The Pagans, we ſee, ſeemed to think *initiation* as neceſſary, as the Chriſtians did *baptiſm*. And the cuſtom of initiating children appears from a paſſage of Terence[h], to have been general.

"Ferietur alio munere, ubi hera pepererit;
"Porro autem alio, ubi erit puero natalis dies,
"Ubi INITIABUNT."

Nay they had even the ſame ſuperſtition in the adminiſtration of it, which ſome Chriſtians had of Baptiſm, to defer it till the approach of death; ſo the honeſt farmer Trygæus, in the *Pax* of Ariſtophanes:

Δεῖ γὰρ μυηθῆναί με πρὶν τεθνηκέναι.

The occaſion of this ſolicitude is told us by the ſcholiaſt on the *Ranæ* of the ſame poet. "The Athenians believed, that he who was initiated, and in-"ſtructed in the *Myſteries*, would obtain celeſtial ho-"nour after death: and THEREFORE all ran to be "initiated[i]." Their fondneſs for it became ſo great, that at ſuch times as the public Treaſury was low, the Magiſtrates could have recourſe to the *Myſteries*,

[g] *Met.* lib. xi.

[h] *Phorm.* act. i. ſc. i. And Donatus, on the place, tells us, the ſame cuſtom prevailed in the Samothracian myſteries: "Terentius Apollodorum ſequitur, apud quem legitur, in inſula "Samothracum à certo tempore pueros initiari, more Athenien-"ſium."

[i] Λύγος γὰρ ἐκράτει παρ' Ἀθηναίοις, ὡς ὁ τὰ μυστήρια διδαχθεὶς, μετὰ τὴν ἐνθένδε τελευτὴν θείας ἠξιοῦτο τιμῆς· διὸ καὶ πάντας πρὸς τὴν μύησιν ἔσπευδον.

as a fund to ſupply the exigencies of the State. "Ariſtogiton (ſays the commentator on Hermoge-"nes) in a great ſcarcity of public money, procured "a law, that in Athens every one ſhould pay a cer-"tain ſum for his *initiation* [k]."

Every thing in theſe Rites was myſteriouſly conducted, and under the moſt ſolemn obligations to ſecrecy [l]. Which how it could agree to our repreſentation of the *Myſteries*, as an inſtitution for the uſe of the people, we ſhall now endeavour to explain.

They were hidden and kept ſecret for two reaſons:

I. Nothing excites our curioſity like that which retires from our obſervation, and ſeems to forbid our ſearch. Of this opinion we find the learned Syneſius, where he ſays, "The people will deſpiſe "what is eaſy and intelligible, and therefore they "muſt always be provided with ſomething won-"derful and myſterious in Religion, to hit their taſte, "and ſtimulate their curioſity [m]." And again, "The "ignorance of the myſteries preſerves their venera-"tion; for which reaſon they are entruſted only to

[k] Ἀριστογείτων ἐν σπάνει χρημάτων, γράφει νόμον, παρ' Ἀθηναίοις μισθοῦ μνεῖσθαι. *Syrianus.*

[l] Cum ignotis hominibus Orpheus ſacrorum ceremonias aperiret, nihil aliud ab his quos initiabat in primo veſtibulo niſi juriſjurandi neceſſitatem, & cum terribili quadam auctoritate religionis, exegit, ne profanis auribus inventæ ac compoſitæ religionis ſecreta proderentur. Firmicus in limine lib. vii. *Aſtrol.*—Nota ſunt hæc Græcæ ſuperſtitionis Hierophantis, quibus inviolabili lege interdictum erat, ne hæc atque hujuſmodi Myſteria apud eos, qui nis ſacris minimè initiati eſſent, evulgarent.—Nicetas in *Gregorii Nazianzeni Orat.* εἰς τὰ ἅγια φῶτα. This obligation of the initiated to ſecreſy was the reaſon that the *Egyptian hieroglyphic* for them, was a graſhopper, which was ſuppoſed to have no mouth. See *Horapollo Hieroglyph.* lib. ii. cap. 55.

[m] Τὸ δὲ ῥᾷστον καταγελάσεται ὁ δῆμος· δεῖται γὰρ τερατείας· To the ſame purpoſe, Nicephorus Gregoras, *Hiſt.* lib. v. Τὰ γὰρ τοῖς πᾶσι πρόχειρα κόρον τε ἔσχε, καὶ ἀχρηστία σφίσιν ὡς τὰ πολλὰ περικέχυται.

"the

"the cover of night [n]." "The veil or miſt (ſays "Clemens Alex.) thro' which things are only *per-* "*mitted to be ſeen*, renders the truths contained under it "more venerable and majeſtic [o]." On theſe principles the *Myſteries* were framed. They were kept ſecret, to excite curioſity: They were celebrated in the night, to impreſs veneration and religious horror [p]: And they were performed with variety of ſhews and repreſentations (of which more hereafter) to fix and perpetuate thoſe impreſſions [q]. Hitherto, then, the *Myſteries* are to be conſidered as invented, not to *deter*, but to *invite* the curioſity of the people. But,

II. They were kept ſecret from a neceſſity of teaching the Initiated ſome things, improper to be communicated to ALL. The learned Varro in a fragment of his book *Of Religions*, preſerved by St. Auguſtin, tells us, that "There were many truths, "which it was inconvenient for the State to be ge- "nerally known; and many things, which, though "falſe, it was expedient the People ſhould believe; "and that therefore the Greeks ſhut up their MYS- "TERIES in the ſilence of their ſacred inclo- "ſures [r]."

[n] Ἀγνωσία σεμνότης ἐστὶ τελείων· καὶ νὺξ τοῦτο πιστεύεται τὰ μυστήρια. *Libro de Providentia.*

[o] ἄλλως τε καὶ πάνυ ὅσα διὰ τίνος παρακαλύμματος ὑποφαίνεται, μείζονά τε καὶ σεμνοτέραν δείκνυσι τὴν ἀλήθειαν.

[p] Euripides, in the *Bacchantes*, act. ii. makes Bacchus ſay, that the orgies were celebrated in the night, becauſe darkneſs has ſomething ſolemn and auguſt in it, and proper to fill the mind with ſacred horror.

[q] Διὸ καὶ τὰ μυστήρια ἐν ΑΛΛΗΓΟΡΙΑΙΣ λέγεται, ὡρὸς ἔκπληξιν καὶ φρίκην, ὥσπερ ἐν ΣΚΟΤΩι, καὶ ΝΥΚΤΙ· ἔοικε δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀλληγορία τῷ σκότῳ καὶ τῇ νυκτί. Demet. Phalereus *de Elocutione*, § 110.

[r] Multa eſſe vera, quæ vulgo ſcire non ſit utile; multaque, quæ, tametſi falſa ſint, aliter exiſtimare populum expediat. Et ideo *Græci* TELETAS ac MYSTERIA taciturnitate parietibusque clauſiſſe. *Civ. Dei*, lib. iv. cap. 31.

Now

Now to reconcile this seeming contradiction, in supposing the *Mysteries* to be instituted to invite the People into them, and, at the same time, to keep them from the People's knowledge, we are to observe, that in the *Eleusinian rites* there were two celebrations of the Mysteries, the GREATER and the LESS [s]. The end of the *less* must be referred to what we said of the Institutor's intention to invite the people into them; and of the *greater*, to his intention of keeping some truths from the people's knowledge. Nor is this said without sufficient warrant: Antiquity is very express for this distinction. We are told that the *lesser Mysteries* were only a kind of preparatory purification for the *Greater* [t], and might be easily communicated to all [u]. That four years [w] was the usual time of probation for those *greater* Mysteries; in which (as Clemens Alexandrinus expresly informs us) the SECRETS were deposited [x].

However, as it is very certain, that both the *greater* and *lesser* Mysteries were instituted for the benefit of the State, it follows, that the DOCTRINES taught in both, were equally for the service of Society; only with this difference; some without inconvenience might be taught promiscuously, others could not.

On the whole, the secret in the *lesser* Mysteries was principally contained in some hidden *rites and shews* to

[s] Ἦσαν τὰ μὲν μεγάλα τῆς Δήμητρος· τὰ δὲ μικρὰ Περσεφόνης τῆς αὐτῆς θυγατρός. Interp. Græc. *ad Plut. Aristophanis.*

[t] Ἔστι τὰ μικρὰ ὥσπερ προκάθαρσις, καὶ προάγνευσις των μεγάλων. *Schol. ad Plut. secund. Aristoph.*

[u] Ἐπενόησαν μυστήρια εὐμεταδοτα. *Schol. Aristoph.*

[w] —Cùm epoptas ante quinquennium instituunt. ut opinionem suspendio cognitionis ædificent. Tertul. *adv. Valentinianos.*

[x] Μετὰ ταῦτα δέ ἐστι τὰ μικρὰ μυστήρια, διδασκαλίας τινὰ ὑπόθεσιν ἔχοντα, καὶ προπαρασκευῆς τῶν μελλόντων· τὰ δὲ μεγάλα περὶ τῶν συμπάντων οὐ μανθάνειν ἔτι ὑπολείπεται, ἐποπτεύειν δὲ, καὶ περινοεῖν τὴν φύσιν, καὶ τὰ πράγματα. *Strom.* V.

be

be kept from the open view of the people, only to invite their curioſity: And the ſecret in the *greater*, ſome hidden *doctrines* to be kept from the people's knowledge, for the very contrary purpoſe. For the *Shews* common both to the *greater* and *leſſer myſteries*, were only deſigned to engage the attention, and raiſe their devotion.

But it may be worth while to enquire more particularly into the HIDDEN DOCTRINES of the *greater* Myſteries: for ſo religiouſly was the ſecret kept, that the thing ſeems ſtill to lie involved in darkneſs. We ſhall, therefore, proceed cautiouſly; and try, from the obſcure hints dropped up and down in Antiquity,

"Pandere res alta terra & caligine merſas."

Firſt, as to the general nature of theſe *hidden doctrines*, it appears, they muſt needs be ſuch which, if promiſcuouſly taught, would bring prejudice to the State; Why elſe were they ſecreted? and, at the ſame time, benefit, if communicated with caution and prudence; Why elſe were they taught at all?

From their general nature, we come by degrees to their particular. And firſt,

1. To the certain knowledge of what they were not: which is one ſtep to the knowledge of what they were.

1. They were not the common doctrines of a Providence and future ſtate; for ancient teſtimony is expreſs, that theſe doctrines were taught promiſcuouſly to all the initiated; and were of the very eſſence of theſe Rites.—Theſe doctrines were not capable of being hid and ſecreted, becauſe they were of univerſal credit amongſt the civilized part of mankind. There was no need to hide them; becauſe the common knowledge of them was ſo far from being detrimental to Society, that, as we have ſhewn, Society could not even ſubſiſt without their being generally known and believed.

2. Theſe

2. Theſe ſecret doctrines could not be the metaphyſical ſpeculations of the Philoſophers concerning the *Deity*, and the *human ſoul*. 1. Becauſe this would be making the *hidden doctrines* of the *ſchools* of Philoſophy, and of the *myſteries* of Religion, one and the ſame; which they could not be, becauſe their ends were different: the end of pagan Philoſophy being only Truth; the end of pagan Religion, only Utility. Theſe indeed were their profeſſed ends. But Both being ignorant of this important verity, *That Truth and general Utility do coincide*[y], they Both, in many caſes, miſſed ſhamefully of their end. The Philoſopher, while he neglected *utility*, falling into the moſt abſurd and fatal errors concerning the nature of God and of the Soul[z]: And the Lawgiver, while ſo little ſolicitous of *truth*, encouraged a Polytheiſm very miſchievous to Society. However, as we ſhall now ſee, he invented and ſucceſsfully employed theſe *Myſteries* to remedy the diſorders ariſing from it—2. Becauſe revealing ſuch metaphyſical ſpeculations to the members of civil Society, with what caution ſoever, would be injurious to the State, and productive of no good to Religion; as will be ſeen when we come, in the third book, to examine what thoſe metaphyſical ſpeculations were.—3. Becauſe ſuch ſpeculations (as we ſhall then ſee) would overthrow every thing taught to ALL, in the *Myſteries*, concerning a Providence, and a future ſtate: And yet we are told by the Ancients, that the doctrines of a Providence, and future ſtate, were the FOUNDATION of the more *ſecret* ones, after which we are now enquiring.

I have been the more particular in refuting this notion, that the ſecret doctrines of the *Schools*, and of the *Myſteries* might be the ſame; becauſe I find it to be an error, into which ſome, even of the moſt knowing of the Ancients, were apt to fall.

[y] See B. III. Sect. 2. [z] See B. III. Sect. 4.

What

What miſled them, was, 1. That the *Schools* and *Myſteries* both pretended *to reſtore the ſoul to its original purity and perfection.* We have ſeen how much the *Myſteries* pretended to it. As to the Philoſophers, Porphyry, ſpeaking of Pythagoras, tells us, that "he profeſſed philoſophy, whoſe end is to free "and vindicate the ſoul from thoſe chains and con- "finements, to which its abode with us hath made it "ſubject[a]." 2. That the Schools and Myſteries had each their *hidden* doctrines, which went under the common name of ΑΠΟΡΡΗΤΑ; and that, which had a common name, was underſtood to have a common nature. 3. And chiefly, that the Philoſopher and Lawgiver, being frequently in one and the ſame perſon, and, conſequently, the Inſtitutions of the *Myſteries* and the Schools eſtabliſhed by the ſame hand, it appeared reaſonable to think, that the ἀπόῤῥητα, in both, were the ſame; they not diſtinguiſhing the twofold character of the ancient Sage, which ſhall be explained hereafter[b].

II. Having, from the diſcovery of the general end and purpoſe of theſe SECRETS, ſeen what they could not be, we ſhall now be enabled to find what, in fact, they were.

To begin with a paſſage of Clemens Alexandrinus.—"After theſe (namely, luſtrations) are the "LESSER *Myſteries*, in which is laid the FOUNDA- "TION of the *hidden doctrines*, and preparations for "what is to come afterwards[c]." From a knowledge of the *foundation*, we may be able to form an idea of the *ſuperſtructure*. This foundation (as hath been ſhewn) was the belief of a Providence, and fu-

[a] Φιλοσοφίαν δ' ἐφιλοσόφησεν, ἧς ὁ σκοπὸς, ῥύσασθαι καὶ διελευθερῶσαι τῶν τοιούτων εἱρμῶν τε καὶ συνδέσμων τὸν καλακεχωρισμένον ἡμῖν νοῦν. *De Vita Pythag.*

[b] See B. III. Sect. 2.

[c] Μετὰ ταῦτα δὲ ἐστι τὰ μικρὰ μυστήρια, διδασκαλίας τινὰ ὑπόθεσιν ἔχοντα, καὶ προπαρασκευὴν τῶν μελλόντων. *Strom.* v. Ἀγωγὴ γάρ καὶ ὁ προαγων, καὶ μυστήρια τὰ πρὸ μυστηρίων. *Strom.* i.

ture ſtate; and, its conſequence on practice, inducement to a virtuous life. But there was one inſuperable obſtacle to a life of purity and holineſs, the vicious examples of their Gods. EGO HOMUNCIO HOC NON FACEREM [d]? was the abſolving Formula, whenever any one was reſolved to give a looſe to his appetites [e]. But the miſchief went ſtill farther; They not only thought themſelves excuſed by the example, but even drawn, by a divine impulſe of their Gods. When the young man in the Aulularia of Plautus apologiſes to Euclio for having debauched his Daughter, he ſays

"Deus mihi IMPULSOR fuit, Is me ad illam
"ILLEXIT [f].

And by a paſſage in his Amphitruo, where he makes Mercury joke upon the office of a Paraſite in the deſcription he gives of his own obſequiouſneſs to his father Jupiter, we ſee it was grown up into an avowed Principle.

"Amanti [patri] ſupparaſitor, hortor, aſto, ad-
"moneo, gaudeo.
"Siquid patri volup' eſt, voluptas ea mihi multo
"maxima eſt.

[d] Terence, *Eun.* act. iii. ſc. v.---Euripides puts this argument into the mouth of ſeveral of his ſpeakers, up and down his tragedies. Helen, in the iv^th act of *the Trojan dames*, ſays, "How "could I reſiſt a Goddeſs, whom Jupiter himſelf obeys?" Ion, in his play of that name, in the latter end of the firſt act, ſpeaks to the ſame purpoſe: and in the vth act of *Hercules Furens*, Theſeus comforts his friend by the examples of the crimes of the Gods. See likewiſe his *Hippolytus*, act. ii. ſc ii. The learned and ingenious Mr. Seward, in his tract of *the conformity between popery and paganiſm*, has taken notice of a difficult paſſage in this tragedy, which he has very ably explained, on the ſyſtem here delivered of the detection of polytheiſm in the ſacred *Myſteries*.

[e] —ὁ δὲ πολὺς καὶ ἀφιλοσόφητος ὄχλος ἐπὶ τὰ χείρω λαμβάνειν φιλεῖ τοὺς περὶ αὐτῶν λόγους, καὶ πάσχει θάτερον, ἢ καταφρονεῖν τῶν θεῶν, ὡς ἐν πολλῇ κακοδαιμονίᾳ κυλινδουμένων· ἢ τῶν αἰσχίστων τε καὶ παρανομωτάτων οὐδενὸς ἀπέχεται, θεοῖς ὁρῶν αὐτὰ προσκείμενα. Dion. Halicar. apud Euſeb. *Præp. Evang.* lib. ii. cap. 8.

[f] Act 4. Sc. 10.

"Amat

"Amat, ſapit: recte facit, animo quando obſe-
"quitur ſuo[g].

He then addreſſes himſelf to the audience, and tells them gravely, that men, in like manner, after the example of Jupiter, ſhould indulge their paſſions, where they can do it decently.——

"Quod omnes homines facere OPORTET, dum id
"modo fiat bono."

And the licentious rites, in the OPEN worſhip of their Gods, gave ſtill greater encouragement to theſe concluſions. Plato, in his book *Of Laws*, forbids drinking to exceſs; unleſs, ſays he, during the feaſts of Bacchus, and in honour of that God[h]. And Ariſtotle, in his *Politics*, having blamed all lewd and obſcene images and pictures, excepts thoſe of the Gods, which Religion had ſanctified. When St. Auſtin[i] had quoted the *Ego homuncio hoc non facerem*, to ſhew his adverſaries what miſchief theſe ſtories did to the morals of the people; he makes the defenders of Paganiſm reply, that it was true; but then (ſay they) theſe things were only taught in the Fables of the poets, which, an attention to the MYSTERIES would rectify: "At enim non traduntur
"iſta SACRIS deorum, ſed Fabulis poetarum[k]."

For the *Myſteries* profeſſed to exact nothing difficult, of the initiated[l], which they would not aſſiſt him to perform. It was neceſſary, then, to re-

[g] Act. iii. Sc. iv. [h] Lib. vi. [i] Civ. Dei, L. II. Cap. 7—8.

[k] This the *Father* could not deny; but obſerves, however, that in the THEN *corrupt ſtate* of the *Myſteries* the remedy was become part of the diſeaſe: "Nolo dicere ILLA MYSTICA quam iſta
"*theatrica* eſſe turpiora."

[l] Ἀλλ' ἕσομαι διὰ τὴν τελετὴν πρὸς πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν ἑτοιμότατος. Sopat. in *Div. Quæſt.* Καθάπερ ἄλλῳ μυστηρίῳ προσελισθεὶς τῇ σιωπῇ, τῶν ἄλλων ἁμαρτημάτων λοιπὸν τὸν ἐμαυτοῦ βίον ἐκάθαιρον, κ᾽, πρὸς τὴν θείαν τῶν θεῶν τελετὴν ἐπειγόμενος, ἐκκλίνειν τῶν ἁμαρτάτων ἐσπούδαζον. Sopat. ibidem.

medy

medy this evil; which they did, by ſtriking at the root of it. So that, ſuch of the *Initiated* as were judged capable, were made acquainted with the whole deluſion. The MYSTAGOGUE taught them, that Jupiter, Mercury, Bacchus, Venus, Mars, and the whole rabble of licentious Deities, were only DEAD MORTALS; ſubject, in life, to the ſame paſſions and infirmities with themſelves; but having been, on other accounts, Benefactors to mankind, grateful Poſterity had deified them; and, with their virtues, had indiſcreetly canonized their vices. The fabulous Gods being thus routed, the ſupreme cauſe of all things naturally took their place. HIM they were taught to conſider as the Creator of the Univerſe, who pervaded all things by his virtue, and governed all by his power. But here it muſt be obſerved, that the diſcovery of this *ſupreme Cauſe* they made to be conſiſtent with the notion of local tutelary Deities, Beings ſuperior to men, and inferior to God, and by him ſet over the ſeveral parts of his creation. This was an opinion univerſally holden by learned Antiquity, and never brought into queſtion by any Theiſt. What the ἀπόῤῥητα overthrew in their reformed theology, was the vulgar polytheiſm, the worſhip of dead men. From this time, the initiated had the title of ΕΠΟΠΤΗΣ, by which was meant *one that ſees things as they are, and without diſguiſe*; whereas before, he was called ΜΥΣΤΗΣ, which has a contrary ſignification.

But, beſides the prevention of vice, their bringing the Initiated acquainted with the national Gods had another important uſe, which was to excite them to HEROIC VIRTUE, by ſhewing them what honours the benefactors of nations had acquired, by the free exerciſe of it. And this (as will be ſhewn hereafter) was the chief reaſon why Princes, Stateſmen, and Leaders of colonies and armies all aſpired to be partakers of the GREATER MYSTERIES.

Thus

Thus we ſee, how what was taught and required in the *leſſer Myſteries*, became the foundation of inſtruction in the GREATER: the obligation to a good life *there*, made it neceſſary to remove the errors of vulgar polytheiſm *here*; and the doctrine of a Providence taught previouſly in *thoſe*, facilitated the reception of the ſole Cauſe of all things, when finally revealed in *theſe*.

Such were the TRUTHS which Varro, as quoted above, tells us it was inexpedient for the People to know: for indeed he ſuppoſed, the error of vulgar Polytheiſm to be ſo inveterate, that it was not to be expelled without throwing Society into convulſions. But Plato ſpoke out: he owned it to be "difficult "to find the Father and Creator of the univerſe: "and, when found, impoſſible to diſcover him to "all the world[l]."

Beſides, there was another reaſon why the Inſtitutors of the *Myſteries*, who were LAWGIVERS, ſhould be for ſecreting this truth. They themſelves had the chief hand in the riſe of vulgar Polytheiſm [m]. They contrived it for the ſake of the State; and to keep the people in awe, under a greater veneration for their laws. *This* Polytheiſm, the poets had depraved, by inventing or recording vicious ſtories of the Gods and Heroes, which the Lawgivers were willing ſhould be ſtifled [n]. And they were only

[l] Τὸν μὲν οὖν ποιητὴν καὶ πατέρα τῦδε τῦ παντὸς εὑρεῖν τε ἔργον, καὶ εὑρόντα εἰς πᾶσιν ἀδύνατον λέγειν. *In Timæo.*

[m] See the ſecond Section of this Book.

[n] Plato has a remarkable paſſage to this purpoſe. Speaking, in the beginning of his xi^th^ book *Of Laws*, concerning theft, and fraud, and rapine, he takes notice of the popular ſtories told of Mercury, as if he delighted in ſuch things, and patronized thoſe who did; the philoſopher ſays they are not true; and cautions men from being led away by ſuch pretended examples. However, to make all ſure, he takes up the method of the *myſteries*, and adds, that if, indeed, Mercury did, or encouraged ſuch things, he was neither a God, nor of celeſtial original.—καλοῦσι

ſuch ſtories, that, in their opinion, (as may be ſeen in Plato) made polytheiſm hurtful to the State.

Scævola, that moſt learned Pontifex, as St. Auſtin calls him, gives this very account of the matter, where he ſays, There were three Syſtems concerning the Gods, the *Poetic*, the *Philoſophic*, and the *Civil*: the firſt he ſays was *nugatory*, and therefore hurtful to the virtue of the State: the ſecond *incongruous* to public eſtabliſhments, by creating diſorder and confuſion in the ſpeculative opinions of the People; ſuch as the teaching them, promiſcuouſly, that the Popular Gods were dead men deified. The directors of the *third* Syſtem therefore prevented the miſchiefs of the *firſt* by ſuch a partial communication of the *ſecond* Syſtem, as was neceſſary for that purpoſe °.

That this account of the SECRET, in the *greater Myſteries*, is no precarious hypotheſis, ſtanding on mere conjecture, I ſhall now endeavour to ſhew,

Firſt, from the clear evidence of Antiquity, which expreſly informs us of theſe two particulars; That the ERRORS OF POLYTHEISM were detected, and the DOCTRINE OF THE UNITY was taught and explained in the *Myſteries*. But here it is to be obſerved, that

μὲν χρημάτων, ἀνελεύθερον, ἁρπαγὴ δὲ, ἀναίσχυντον· τῶν Διὸς δὲ υἱεῶν οὐδεὶς οὔτε δόλοις, οὔτε βίᾳ χαίρων ἐπιτετήδευκε τούτοιν οὐδέτερον· μηδεὶς ὦν ὑπὸ ποιητῶν, μηδ' ἄλλως ὑπὸ τινῶν μυθολόγων, πλημμελῶν περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἐξαπατώμενος ἀναπειθέσθω· καὶ κλέπτων ἢ βιαζόμενος, οἰέσθω μηδὲν αἰσχρὸν ποιεῖν, ἀλλ' ἅπερ αὐτοὶ θεοὶ δρῶσιν. οὔτε γὰρ ἀληθὲς, οὔτ' εἰκός· ἀλλ' ὅστις δρᾷ τοιοῦτον παρανόμως, οὔτε θεὸς, οὔτε παῖς ἐστί ποτε θεῶν.

° Relatum eſt in literas, doctiſſimum Pontificem Scævolam diſputaſſe tria genera tradita Deorum; unum a poetis, alterum a philoſophis, tertium a principibus civitatis. Primum genus nugatorium dicit eſſe—Secundum non congruere civitatibus, quod habeant aliqua—quæ obſit populis noſſe—Quæ ſunt autem illa quæ prolata in multitudinem nocent? "Hæc, inquit; non eſſe "deos Herculem, Æſculapium, Caſtorem, Pollucem: proditur "enim a doctis, quod homines fuerint, & humana conditione de- "fecerint."—Auguſtin. *De Civit. Dei*, lib. iv. cap. 27.

when

when the Ancients ſpeak of *Myſteries* indefinitely, they generally mean the *greater.*

It hath been ſhewn, that the Grecian and Aſiatic *Myſteries* came originally from Egypt. Now of the EGYPTIAN, St. Auſtin giveth us this remarkable account.——"Of the ſame nature, too, are thoſe "things which Alexander of Macedon wrote to his "mother, as revealed unto him by one LEO [P], chief "Hierophant of the Egyptian *Myſteries:* whereby "it appeared, that not only ſuch as Picus, and "Faunus, and Æneas, and Romulus, nay Hercu-"les, and Æſculapius, and Bacchus the ſon of Se-"mele, and Caſtor, and Pollux, and all others of "the ſame rank, had been advanced, from the con-"dition of mortal Men, into Gods; but that even "thoſe Deities of the higher order, the *Dii majorum* "*gentium*, thoſe whom Cicero, without naming, "ſeems to hint at, in his *Tuſculans*, ſuch as Jupiter, "Juno, Saturn, Neptune, Vulcan, Veſta, and ma-"ny others (whom Varro endeavours to allegorize "into the elements or parts of the world) were, in "truth, only deceaſed mortals. But the Prieſt be-"ing under great fears and apprehenſions, while he "was telling this, as conſcious that he was betray-"ing the SECRET OF THE MYSTERIES, begged of "Alexander, when he found that he intended to

[P] It is not unlikely but this might be a name of office. Porphyry, in his iv[th] book *Of Abſtinence*, informs us, that the prieſts of the *Myſteries* of Mithras were called *Lions*; the prieſteſſes *Lioneſſes*; and the inferior miniſters, *Ravens*. Τὰς μὲν αὐτῶν ὀργίων μύστας, Λέοντας καλεῖν· τὰς δὲ γυναῖκας, Λεαίνας· τοὺς δὲ ὑπηρετοῦντας, Κόρακας: for there was a great conformity, in the practices and ceremonies of the ſeveral *Myſteries*, throughout the whole pagan world. And this conjecture is ſupported by a paſſage in Eunapius, which ſeems to ſay, that it was unlawful to reveal the *name* of the Hierophant.——τῷ δὲ Ἱεροφάντῃ, κατ' ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον ὅσις ἦν τὸνομα ἢ μοι θέμις λέγειν—*in Maximo.*—It looks as if the corruptions and debaucheries of ſome of the *Myſteries*, in later times, had made this further proviſion for *ſecrecy.*

"communicate it to his mother[s], that he would "enjoin her to burn the letter, as ſoon as ſhe had "read it[t]."

To underſtand the concluding part, we are to know, that Cyprian (who has alſo preſerved this curious anecdote) tells us, it was the dread of Alexander's power which extorted the ſecret from the hierophant[u].

[s] I ſuppoſe this communication to his Mother, might be with a purpoſe to let her underſtand, that he was no longer the dupe of her fine ſtory of Jupiter's invaſion, and the intrigue of his divine original. For Eratoſthenes, according to Plutarch, ſays, that Olympias, when ſhe brought Alexander on his way to the army, in his firſt military expedition, acquainted him, in private, with this ſecret of his birth; and exhorted him to behave himſelf as became the ſon of Jupiter Hammon. This, I ſuppoſe, Alexander might boaſt of to the Prieſt, and ſo the murder came out.

[t] In eo genere ſunt etiam illa quæ Alexander Macedo ſcribit ad matrem, ſibi a magno antiſtite ſacrorum Ægyptiorum quodam LEONE patefacta: ubi non Picus & Faunus, & Æneas & Romulus, vel etiam Hercules & Æſculapius, & Liber Semele natus, & Tyndardidæ fratres, & ſi quos alios ex mortalibus pro diis habent; ſed ipſi etiam majorum gentium dii, quos Cicero in Tuſculanis, taciris nominibus, videtur attingere, Jupiter, Juno, Saturnus, Neptunus, Vulcanus, Veſta, & alii plurimi, quos Varro conatur ad mundi partes ſive elementa transferre, homines fuiſſe produ tur. Timens enim & ille quaſi revelata myſteria, petens admonet Alexandrum, ut cum ea matri conſcripta inſinuaverit, flammis jubeat concremari. *De Civit. Dei*, lib. viii. cap. 5.

[u] —metu ſuæ poteſtatis proditum ſibi de diis hominibus a ſacerdote SECRETUM. *De laol. Ven.* But this is a miſtake, at leaſt it is expreſſed inaccurately. What was extorted by the dread of Alexander's power, was not the *ſecret* (which the initiated had a right to) but the Prieſt's conſent that he ſhould *communicate* the ſecret to another, which was contrary to the laws of the *Myſteries*. Plutarch, in his life of Alexander, appears to refer to this very Epiſtle of Alexander to his Mother, where he ſays,—Ἀλέξανδρος ἐν ἐπιστολῇ πρὸς τὴν μητέρα, φησὶν γεγονέναι τινὰς αὐτῷ μαντείας ἀποῤῥήτους, ἃς ἐπανελθὼν φράσει πρὸς μόνην ἐκείνην. "Alexander in the Epiſtle ſays, that there were certain Oracular Myſteries imparted to him, which on his return he would communicate to her under the ſame ſeal of ſecrecy." For at this time the *Myſteries* foretold the future, as well as revealed the paſt.

But

But Tully brings the matter home to the ELEUSINIAN *Myſteries* themſelves. "What (ſays he) is "not almoſt all Heaven, not to carry on this detail "any further, filled with the Human race? But if "I ſhould ſearch and examine Antiquity, and from "thoſe things which the grecian writers have deli-"vered, go to the bottom of this affair, it would "be found, that even thoſe very Gods themſelves "who are deemed the *Dii majorum gentium*, had "their original here below; and aſcended from hence "into Heaven. Enquire, to whom thoſe Sepulchres "belong, which are ſo commonly ſhewn in Greece[t]. "REMEMBER, for you are initiated, WHAT YOU "HAVE BEEN TAUGHT IN THE MYSTERIES; YOU "WILL THEN AT LENGTH UNDERSTAND HOW FAR "THIS MATTER MAY BE CARRIED[u]." Indeed, he

[t] Alluding to that of Jupiter in Crete.

[u] Quid? totum prope cœlum, ne plures perſequar, nonne humano genere completum eſt? Si vero ſcrutari vetera, & ex his ea, quæ ſcriptores *Græciæ* prodiderunt, eruere coner; ipſi illi, majorum gentium Dii qui habentur, hinc a nobis profecti in cœlum reperiuntur. Quære, quorum demonſtrantur ſepulchra in *Græciâ*: REMINISCERE, QUONIAM ES INITIATUS, QUÆ TRADANTUR MYSTERIIS; TUM DENIQUE QUAM HOC LATE PATEAT, INTELLIGES. *Tuſc. Diſp.* lib. i. cap. 13.——*Paul Erneſt Jablonſki*, a learned German Divine, in his book called *Pantheon Ægyptiorum, ſive de Diis eorum Commentarius*, having taken it into his head, for ſome reaſon or other, to contend, that the Ægyptian Gods were not *dead men deified*, thought rightly that this account of the *Myſteries* ſtood in his way. "Inter omnia argumenta (ſays he) quibus utuntur viri docti, ad probandum, Ægyptios coluiſſe homines, poſt mortem divinis honoribus, donatos illud ſine dubio primum meretur locum, quod ex MYSTERIIS Græcorum et ipſorum quoque Ægyptiorum petitum eſt. Obſervavit nempe Theologus Anglus præſtantiſſimus, omnique doctrinæ genere cultus, in Myſteriis Græcorum, hanc etiam initiatis doctrinam tradi conſueviſſe, Deos illos, quos vulgo adorarent omnes, re ipſa mortales extitiſſe homines, idque teſtimoniis quibuſdam e CICERONE perquam opportune allatis demonſtraſſe, et extra omnem dubitationis aleam poſuiſſe videtur. He then quotes this paſſage of the *Tuſcular queſtions*, and the following from the firſt book, *of the nature of the Gods*; and thus proceeds—

carries it further himſelf; for he tells us, in another place, that not only the *Eleuſinian Myſteries*, but the *Samothracian* likewiſe, and the *Lemnian*

Cui quidem loco ex priori lux eſt ac tendenda. Jubebantur ergo omnes, initiati Græcorum Myſteriis, credere Deos quos Græcia coleret cunctos, in lucem hanc aliquando editos fuiſſe, inter homines vixiſſe et tandem mortem quoque oppetiiſſe. All this is ſaid with the candour of a true ſcholar. How unlike to that miſerable chicane lately publiſhed at home on this queſtion! Where things are denied no leſs inconteſtible than that two and two make four. However the learned Doctor *Jablonſki* muſt not deſert his Syſtem. His firſt evaſion therefore of the force ariſing from my account of the *Myſteries* is this,——I had repreſented them as the invention of Legiſlators; and had ſhewn that it was the practice of ancient Lawgivers and Philoſophers to teach one doctrine openly and another ſecretly. Having got me at this advantage, Who knows then, ſays he, Whether theſe Inſtitutors of the *Myſteries* believed what they taught? But hear him in his own words—"At quæri non immerito poteſt, fuerintne Legiſlatores & Conditores Myſteriorum, de eo, quod credere volebant alios, ipſi certo perſuaſi. Docere nos voluit ingeniosus ille Auctor, qui arcana Myſteriorum Eleuſiniorum nobis non ſine ſucceſſu explicare conatus eſt, Legiſlatores et Philoſophos veteres permulta ſuis inculcaſſe, et vehementer commendaſſe, quæ credebant hominibus fore utilia, etiamſi ea reipſa judicarent eſſe falſa. *Quid vetat nos credere* ex illorum numero fuiſſe etiam doctrinam in *Myſteriis* traditam de mortalibus ad honores divinos evectis—— *Prolegom.* Sect. xiii.——Nay I know of nothing that *hinders us from believing*, but common ſenſe: Which aſſures us, that if theſe Men practiſed the method of the *double doctrine*, one ſet of opinions taught publicly to all, and another ſecretly to a few ſelect Auditors, in whom they could particularly confide, the opinions *believed* by them were certainly the latter. But he has another evaſion, in ſupport of his Syſtem. Tho' the *Grecian Myſteries* taught the human nature of the National Gods, how does it appear that the *Egyptian Myſteries* taught the ſame? I anſwer, From the *Grecian Myſteries* being borrowed from the *Egyptian*, and from a thouſand teſtimonies beſides; particularly from the famous tranſaction between Alexander the Great and Leo the Egyptian prieſt. This the learned Writer conſiders as a fable, a very ready way of getting rid of difficulties which obſtruct our Syſtems. —He endeavours to prove, that in the accounts which *Minutius Felix* and *Athenagoras* give of this matter, there were ſome circumſtances inconſiſtent with the avowed hiſtory of Alexander: and from thence he concludes—"Ita ad conſtituendam illam Fabellam, mendaciis meriſque figmentis opus erat. Sect. xv.

taught

taught the error of polytheiſm, agreeably to this ſyſtem; which ſuppoſes all the *Myſteries* derived from the ſame original, and inſtituted for the ſame ends.

But if this be ſufficient to convict the adventure of impoſture, the beſt atteſted facts of Antiquity will be in danger; ſuch, for inſtance, as the defeat of Julian's impious purpoſe to rebuild the Temple of Jeruſalem; to the true circumſtances of which defeat, the Relators of it have added many very fabulous and abſurd. However he acknowleges, that if Alexander did write ſuch a Letter to his mother, the Fact will admit no further controverſy. But the Letter, he ſays, was a forgery of ſome indiſcreet Chriſtian Writers, who being notorious Trickſters, and at the ſame time got into the general Opinion that the *national Gods of the Pagans were dead men*—what then?—"Eſtne igitur mirum Tenebrionem *neſcio quem*, in eorum gratiam talem Alexandri Epiſtolam confinxiſſe, eamque poſtea certatim alios in uſum ſuum convertiſſe." Sect. xvi. Falſarys, of whatever time or profeſſion, I ſuppoſe never forge but to ſupply ſome imaginary or real want. Thus theſe Chriſtian Falſarys (as this learned writer obſerves) forged ſome *Sibylline Oracles* and books of *Hermes Triſmegiſtus*. But why did they ſo? Becauſe they fooliſhly imagined the FAITH wanted ſome ſupport from the Prophecies and doctrines of the Pagans themſelves. But with regard to the Opinion that *their Gods were dead men deified*, the Prophane Writings of beſt Authority were now full. Nothing therefore can be leſs founded than this ſuſpicion. His next argument againſt the authenticity of the EPISTLE is indeed a pleaſant one. If, ſays he, the ancient Philoſophers had known any thing of this *Epiſtle*, their eternal diſputations concerning the eſſence, nature and origine of the *Egyptian Gods* muſt have been at an end. "Si Epiſtola illa, quam Patres laudant, genuina eſſet, tum quæſtio de eſſentia, natura, & origine Deorum Ægyptiorum quæ veteres Philoſophos tantopere exercuit, ſic deciſa et penitus finita fuiſſet, ut nemini amplius dubium ſupereſſe potuerit." Sect. xvi. Did not the ancient Philoſophers diſpute full as much concerning the Eſſence, nature and origin of the *Grecian Gods?* And yet this learned Writer confeſſes that the Grecian Myſteries taught that they were *dead men deified*. He muſt know little of the temper of the ancient Philoſophers, who ſuppoſes that even an ORACLE, whether without or within the walls of the *Myſteries*, (for oracular Reſponces were given there as well as at Delphi) could ſtop them in the career of Diſputation. Cicero, (we know) who is the Repreſentative of them all, did not ſuffer his knowlege of what the *Eleuſinian Myſteries* taught, to debar him from advancing a hundred different tenets and conjectures concerning the eſſence, nature and origine both of the *Egyptian* and *Grecian* Gods.

"What think you (ſays he) of thoſe who aſſert, that "valiant, or famous, or powerful men have obtained divine honours after death; and that theſe are "the very Gods, now become the object of our "worſhip, our prayers, and adoration? EUHEMERUS tells us, when theſe Gods died, and where they "lie buried. *I forbear to ſpeak of the ſacred and au-*

But, continues the learned Doctor, "none of the prophane Writers, Greek or Roman, ever mention this Epiſtle." "Non certe videmus unquam aliquem ad hoc oraculum confugere, aut ejus vel leviſſimam mentionem facere; non Varronem—non Ciceronem—non Diodorum Siculum—non Plutarchum"—Sect. xvi. Nothing indeed is more common, yet nothing is more ſophiſtical, than to argue againſt a fact recorded by one ſingle Ancient, or by one ſet of Ancients, becauſe we cannot find it in any other. As if we had all Antiquity before us, and did not know that a few fragments only, of that rich Cargo remain, of the Wreck of Barbarous Times. Beſide, the ſilence (on this head) in thoſe fragments we have gathered up, may be naturally accounted for. What the *Myſteries* every where taught was ſo well known to the Learned, from numerous and authentic teſtimonies, concerning the *Eleuſinian* and others, that it was nothing ſtrange that neither Varro, Cicero, nor Diodorus Siculus ſhould take any particular notice of this EPISTLE. I do not put *Plutarch* into the number of the ſilent, becauſe the learned Dr. himſelf is forced to confeſs that, in the opinion of ſome learned men, this Ancient hath alluded to the Epiſtle in queſtion. The words of Plutarch quoted above run thus, *Alexander in his Epiſtle to his mother ſays, that there were certain Oracular Myſteries imparted to him, which, on his return, he would communicate to her under the ſame ſeal of Secrecy.* Our learned Dr. thinks otherwiſe: and that what is ſaid, in the *Epiſtle* quoted by Plutarch, means the reſponſe of a *Common Oracle*; while the *Epiſtle* mentioned by the Chriſtian Writers refers to what Alexander learnt in the *Myſteries*. "Verum an dices, obſecro, hanc eſſe Epiſtolam illam, quam Patres laudant? Sed in hac agebatur de *doctrinis Myſticis Theologiæ Ægyptiorum*, ante non auditis, in illa, Sermo tantum eſt de *divinitionibus et prædictionibus ſibi divinitus factis*," &c. Sect. xvi. This ſlender reaſoning, is ſpun out of his ignorance, that the words, μαντείας ἀποῤῥήτους, here uſed by Plutarch, can only ſignify *Oracles delivered in the celebration of the Myſteries*. The caſe was this, The Hierophants of the Myſteries had by this time, to invite cuſtom, erected *their* Oracles alſo, like to thoſe at the other public Shrines of the Gods: Of which, an account is given elſewhere.

"*guſt*

" *guſt rites of* ELEUSIS—*I paſs by* Samothrace, *and* " *the* Myſteries *of* Lemnos, *whoſe hidden rites are* " *celebrated in darkneſs, and amidſt the thick ſhades of* " *groves and foreſts* [w]."

[w] Quid, qui aut fortes, aut claros aut potentes viros tradunt, *poſt mortem ad Deos veniſſe*, eoſque eſſe ipſos, quos nos colere, precari, venerarique ſoleamus—Ab Euhemero & *mortes & ſepulturæ demonſtrantur deorum.* Omitto *Eleuſinem* ſanctam illam & auguſtam—Prætereo *Samothraciam*, eaque

Quæ *Lemni*
Nocturno aditu occulta coluntur
Silveſtribus ſepibus denſa. *De Nat. Deor.* lib. 1. cap. 42.

The words that follow, are, " Quibus explicatis ad rationem-" que revocatis, rerum magis natura cognoſcitur, quam Deorum." Which M. Pluche, in his *Hiſtoire du Ciel*, brings to prove, that the purpoſe of the *Myſteries* was not to explain the nature of the Gods; and tranſlates thus, " Quand ces myſteres ſont expliqués " & ramenés à leur vrai ſens, il ſe trouve que c'eſt moins la na-" ture des Dieux, qu'on nous y apprend, que la nature des choſes " mêmes, ou des vérités dont nous avons beſoin." p. 401. *Hiſt. du Ciel*, ſeconde edit. But had he attended to the diſpute carried on in the dialogue, from whence theſe words of Cicero are quoted, he could hardly have thus groſly miſtaken the ſenſe of his author. The reader has now the whole paſſage before him; in which it is ſaid, that Euhemerus taught the nature of the Gods; that they were dead men deified: and in which, it is clearly enough intimated, that the *Eleuſinian* and *Samothracian Myſteries* taught the ſame doctrine. Yet, according to this tranſlator, Tully immediately adds, that, " when theſe *Myſteries* are explained " and brought back to their true ſenſe, it is found, that not ſo " much the nature of the Gods is taught in them, as the nature " of things, or thoſe truths which our wants require us to be in-" ſtructed in." That is, the Myſteries *did*, and they *did not* teach the nature of the Gods. But it is not for ſuch kind of prate that Cicero has been ſo long admired. The words, *quibus explicatis, ad rationemque revocatis*, &c. have a quite different meaning. Velleius, the Epicurean, had undertaken to explain the nature of the Gods. Cotta, the Academic, ſhews, in his anſwer, that, under pretence of teaching the nature of the Gods, he, Velleius, took away all Religion; juſt as thoſe did, who ſaid, the notion of the Gods was invented by Politicians, for the uſe of Society; juſt as Prodicus Chius did, who ſaid, men made Gods of every thing they found beneficial to them; juſt as Euhemerus did, who ſaid, they were dead men deified: I forbear (ſays Cotta) to ſpeak of what is taught in the *Myſteries*: and then follow the words in

Julius

Julius Firmicus, ſpeaks much to the ſame purpoſe, and even more directly, Adhuc ſuperſunt aliæ ſuperſtitiones, quarum ſecreta pandenda ſunt Liberi & Liberæ, quæ omnia ſacris ſenſibus veſtris ſpecialiter intimanda ſunt, ut in iſtis profanis religionibus ſciatis MORTES ESSE HOMINUM CONSECRATAS. *Liber* itaque, Jovis fuit filius, regis ſcil. Cretici, &c[x].

What hath been here ſaid, will let us into the meaning of Plutarch's hint, in the following words of his tract *Concerning the ceaſing of oracles.* "As "to the *Myſteries*, in whoſe repreſentations the true "NATURE OF DEMONS is clearly and accurately held

queſtion: "Quibus explicatis, ad rationemque revocatis, rerum "magis natura cognoſcitur quam deorum." That is, "If you "will weigh (ſays Cotta) and conſider all theſe opinions, ſo like "your own, they will lead you to the knowledge, not of the "nature of the Gods, which you, Velleius, propoſed to diſ-"courſe of, but to the nature of things, which is quite another "conſideration." Or, in clearer terms, it was, he tells us, Velleius's drift to bring men from *Religion* to *Naturaliſm*. This obſervation is to the purpoſe; and ſhews that Velleius had deviated from his argument. But what M. Pluche makes him ſay, is to no body's purpoſe but his own. In a word, *quibus explicatis* &c. relates to all that Cotta had ſaid of the Epicureans—of thoſe who made religion the invention of Stateſmen—of Prodicus Chius—of Euhemerus, and of the *Myſteries*. But M. Pluche makes it relate only to the *Myſteries*. It had hardly been worth while to mention this M. Pluche, had it not been evident, that his purpoſe in this interpretation of Cicero was to diſguiſe the liberty he took of tranſcribing the general explanation of the MYSTERIES, as delivered in the firſt edition of this volume, printed in 1738, into the *ſecond* edition (for when he publiſhed the *firſt*, he knew nothing of the matter) of his book, called *Hiſtoire du Ciel*, printed 1741, without the leaſt notice or acknowledgment. But for a further account of this piece of plagiariſm, I refer the reader to a diſcourſe, intitled *Obſervations ſur l'explication que M. l'Abbé Pluche donne des myſteres & de la mythologie des payens dans ſon Hiſtoire du Ciel*, written with much judgment and ſolidity, by M. de Silhouette: who has intirely ſubverted M. Pluche's fanciful ſyſtem, as well as proved, that he took his idea of the *Myſteries* from the *Divine Legation*. It is in the fifth diſſertation of a work, intitled *Diſſertations ſur l'union de la religion, de la morale, & de la politique.*

[x] De errore profan. relig. cap. vi.

"forth,

"forth, a sacred silence, to use an expression of He-"rodotus, is to be observed [y]." All this well illustrates a passage in Lucian's *Council of the Gods*; when, after Momus had ridiculed the monstrous Deities of Egypt, Jupiter replies, "It is true, these are "abominable things, which you mention of the "Egyptian Worship. But then, consider, Momus, "that much of it is *enigmatical*; and so, conse-"quently, a very unfit subject for the buffoonry of "the Prophane and Uninitiated." To which, the other answers with much spirit, "Yes, indeed, we "have great occasion for the MYSTERIES, to know "that Gods are Gods, and monsters, monsters [z]."

Thus far in detection of the vulgar Polytheism.—With regard to the other part of the SECRET, the *doctrine of the* UNITY, Clemens Alexandrinus informs us, that the Egyptian Mystagogues taught it amongst their *greater secrets*. "The Egyptians (says "he) did not use to reveal their *Mysteries* indiscrimi-"nately to all, nor expose their truths concerning "their Gods to the Prophane, but to those only who "were to succeed to the administration of the State: "and to such of the Priests as were most approved, "by their education, learning, and quality [a]."

But, to come to the Grecian *Mysteries*. Chrysippus, as quoted by the author of the *Etymol. magnum*, speaks to this purpose. "And Chrysippus

[y] Περὶ τῶν μυστικῶν ἐν οἷς τὰς μεγίστας ἐμφάσεις καὶ διαφάσεις λαβεῖν ἐστι τῆς περὶ δαιμόνων ἀληθείας, εὔστομά μοι κείσθω, καθ' Ἡρόδοτον. P. 742. Steph. edit.

[z] Αἰσχρὰ ὡς ἀληθῶς ταῦτα φὴς τὰ περὶ τῶν Αἰγυπτίων· ὅμως δ' οὖν, ὦ Μῶμε, τὰ πολλὰ αὐτῶν αἰνίγματά ἐστι καὶ οὐ πάνυ χρὴ καταγελᾶν ἀμύητον ὄντα. ΜΩΜ. Πάνυ γοῦν ΜΥΣΤΗΡΙΩΝ, ὦ Ζεῦ, δεῖ ἡμῖν, ὡς εἰδέναι θεοὺς μὲν τοὺς θεούς· κυνοκεφάλους δὲ τοὺς κυνοκεφάλους.

[a] Αἰγύπτιοι οὐ τοῖς ἐπιτυχοῦσι τὰ παρὰ σφίσιν ἀνετίθεντο μυστήρια οὐδενὶ μὴν βεβήλοις τὴν τῶν θείων εἴδησιν ἐξέφερον, ἀλλ' ἢ μόνοις γε τοῖς μέλλουσιν ἐπὶ τὴν βασιλείαν προϊέναι· καὶ τῶν ἱερέων τοῖς κριθεῖσιν εἶναι δοκιμωτάτοις ἀπὸ τῆς τροφῆς, καὶ τῆς παιδείας καὶ τοῦ γένους. *Strom.* lib. v. p. 566. edit. Lut.

"says,

" ſays, that the ſecret doctrines concerning divine " matters, are rightly called ΤΕΛΕΤΑΙ, for that " theſe are the laſt things the initiated ſhould be in- " formed of: The ſoul having gained an able ſup- " port; and, being poſſeſſed of her deſires [b], can " keep ſilent before the Uninitiated and Prophane [c]." To the ſame purpoſe, Clemens: " The doctrines " delivered in the *greater Myſteries*, are concerning " the UNIVERSE. Here all inſtruction ends. Things " are ſeen as they are; and Nature, and the things " of Nature, are given to be comprehended [d]."

Strabo having ſaid [e], that *Nature dictated to men the inſtitution of the Myſteries*, as well as the other rites of Religion, gives this remarkable reaſon for his aſſertion, " that the ſecret celebration of the " *Myſteries* preſerves the majeſty due to the Divini- " ty, and, at the ſame time, imitates its nature, " which hides itſelf from our ſenſes [f]." A plain intimation of what kind the *ſecret* was. But had there been any ambiguity, he preſently removes it, where, ſpeaking of the different faculties exerciſed in the different rites of Religion, he makes *Philoſophy* to be the object of the *Myſteries* [g]. Plutarch expreſly ſays, that the FIRST CAUSE of all things is communicated to thoſe who approach the temple

[b] i. e. miſtreſs of herſelf.

[c] Χρύσιππος δὲ φησὶ, τὰς περὶ τῶν θείων λόγους εἰκότως καλεῖσθαι τελείας· χρῆναι γὰρ τυτους τελευταίους, καὶ ἐπὶ πᾶσι διδάσκεσθαι· τῆς ψυχῆς ἐχούσης ἔρμα, καὶ κεκραλημένης, καὶ πρὸς ἀμυήτους σιωπᾶν δυναμένης· μέλλα γὰρ εἶναι τὸ ἄθλον, ὑπερ θεῶν αἰσθέσθαί τε ὀρθὰ, καὶ ἐγκραλεῖς γενέσθαι αὐτῶν. *Etymol. Auctor*, in ΤΕΛΕΤΗ.

[d] Τὰ δὲ μεγάλα περὶ τῶν συμπάντων· ἃ μανθάνει ἔτι ὑπολείπεται, ἐποπτεύειν δὲ καὶ περιοδεῖν τὴν φύσιν καὶ τὰ πραίματα. *Strom.* v.

[e] ἡ φύσις ἔτως ὑπαγορεύει. lib. x.

[f] ἅτε κρύψις ἡ μυστικὴ, τῶν ἱερῶν σεμνότητι τὸ θεῖον, μιμεμένη τὴν φύσιν αὐτῦ ἐκφεύγουσαν ἡμῶν τὴν αἴσθησιν. Here Strabo takes in all that is ſaid, both of the *Gods*, and of *nature*, in the two preceding paſſages from Chryſippus and Clemens; and ſhews that by *nature* is not meant the *cauſal* but *theological* nature.

[g] —καὶ τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν.

of

of Isis with prudence and sanctity [h]. By which words he means, the *necessary qualifications for Initiation.*

We have seen Tully expresly declaring, that the *Eleusinian* and *Samothracian Mysteries* were partly employed in detecting the error of Polytheism. We shall now find Galen intimating, not obscurely, that the doctrine of the divine nature was taught in those very *Mysteries.* In his excellent tract *Of the use of the parts* of the human body, he has these words— "The study, therefore, of *the use of the parts*, is "not only of service to the mere physician, but of "much greater to him who joins Philosophy to the "art of healing; and, in order to perfect himself "in this *Mystery*, labours to investigate the *universal Nature.* They who *initiate* themselves here, "whether private men or bodies, will find, in my "opinion, nobler instruction than in the rites either "of ELEUSIS or SAMOTHRACE [i]." By which he means, that the study of the *use of the parts of animals*, leads us easier and sooner up to the knowledge of the FIRST CAUSE, than the most venerable of the *Mysteries*, such as the *Eleusinian* and *Samothracian.* A clear implication, that to lead men thither was their special business.

But this seems to have been so well known to the learned in the time of EUSEBIUS, that where this writer takes occasion to observe, that the Hebrews were the only people whose object, in their *public and national worship*, was the GOD OF THE UNI-

[h] —ὀνομάζεται γὰρ Ἴσιον ὡς εἰσόμενον τὸ ὄν, ἂν μετὰ λόγου καὶ ὁσίως εἰς τὰ ἱερὰ παρέλθωμεν τῆς θεοῦ. ΙΣ. καὶ ΟΣ.

[i] οὐκ οὖν ἰατρῷ μόνον ἡ περὶ χρείαις μορίων ἐστὶ πραγματεία χρησίμη, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον ἰατρῷ φιλοσόφῳ, τῆς ὅλης φύσεως ἐπιστήμην κτήσασθαι σπεύδοντι, καὶ κατ' αὐτὴν χρὴ τελεῖσθαι τὴν τελευτὴν, ἅπαντας γὰρ, ὡς οἶμαι, καὶ κατ' ἔθνος, καὶ κατ' ἀριθμὸν ἀνθρώπους, ὅσοι τι μυῶσιν ἑαυτοὺς, οὐδὲν ὅμοιον ἔχουσιν Ἐλευσινίοις τε καὶ Σαμοθρᾳκίοις ὀργίοις. Gal. *De usu par.* lib. xvii. Petit, instead of ὅσοι τιμῶσιν ἑαυτοὺς, reads very ingeniously ὅσοι τι μυῶσιν ἑαυτούς.

VERSE,

VERSE, he ſuits his whole expreſſion, by one continued metaphor, to the uſages of the *Myſteries*. "For "the Hebrew people alone (ſays he) was reſerved "the honour of being INITIATED into the know-"ledge of God the Creator of all things, and of "being inſtructed in the practice of true piety to-"wards him[k]." Where, ΕΠΟΠΤΕΙΑ, which ſig-

[k] μόνω δὲ τῷ Ἑβραίων γένει τὴν ΕΠΟΠΤΕΙΑΝ ἀνατεθεῖσθαι τῆς ΘΕΩΡΙΑΣ τοῦ τῶν ὅλων ποιητοῦ καὶ ΔΗΜΙΟΥΡΓΟΣ Θεοῦ, καὶ τῆς εἰς αὐτὸν ἀληθοῦς εὐσεβείας. *Præp. Evang.* lib. i. cap. 9. *Euſebius* ſays, Scripture tells us this, τοῦτο δὲ καὶ οἱ ἱεροὶ καθ' ἡμᾶς διδάσκουσι λόγοι. And ſo indeed it does even in the general tenor of its hiſtory. But I am perſuaded this learned writer had his eye on ſome particular paſſage; probably on the xlv^th chapter of *Iſaiah*, where the prophet foretelling the conqueſts of *Cyrus*, and the exaltation of his Empire, apoſtrophizes the God of *Iſrael* in this manner, *Verily thou art a God* THAT HIDEST THYSELF, *O God of* Iſrael, *the Saviour*, ver. 15. This was ſaid with great propriety of the Creator of all things, the ſubject of the ΑΠΟΡΡΗΤΑ, or *Secret*, in all the *Myſteries* throughout the *Gentile* World; and particularly of thoſe of *Mithras*, in that Country which was the ſcene of the prophecy. That this is the true ſenſe of this obſcure paſſage, appears from the following words of the ſame chapter, where God himſelf addreſſeth the Jewiſh people: *I have not ſpoken* IN SECRET, IN A DARK PLACE *of the earth: I ſaid not unto the ſeed of* Jacob, *Seek ye me* IN VAIN, ver. 19. This was ſaid, to ſhew that he was taught amongſt them in a different way from that participation of his Nature to a *few ſelect Gentiles*, in their *Myſteries*; celebrated *in ſecret, and in dark* ſubterraneous *places*; which not being done in order to give him glory, by promoting his public and general worſhip, was done *in vain*. Theſe were the two places, (explained by one another) which, I preſume, furniſhed *Euſebius* with his obſervation, *That for the* Hebrew *people alone was reſerved the honour of being initiated into the knowledge of God the Creator of all Things, and of being inſtructed in the practice of true piety towards him.*—This naturally leads us to the explanation of thoſe oracles of *Apollo*, quoted by *Euſebius* [*Præp. Evang.* l. ix. c. x.] from *Porphyry*; the ſenſe of which neither thoſe ancient writers, nor our Sir *John Marſham* ſeem rightly to have underſtood. The firſt is in theſe Words,

Αἰπεινὴ γὰρ ὁδὸς μακάρων, τρηχεῖά τε πολλὸν,
Χαλκοδέτοις τὰ πρῶτα διοιγομένη πυλεῶσιν.
Ἀτραπιτοὶ δὲ ἔασσιν ἀθέσφατοι ἐγγεγαυῖαι,
Ἃς πρῶτοι μερόπων ἐπ' ἀπείρονα πρῆξιν ἔφυσαν
Οἱ τὸ καλὸν πίνοντες ὕδωρ Νειλώτιδος αἴης.

nifies

nifies *the inſpection of the ſecret*; ΘΕΩΡΙΑ, the *contemplation* of it; and ΔΗΜΙΟΥΡΓΟΣ, the *Creator*, the ſubject of it, are all words appropriated to the *ſecret* of the *greater Myſteries.*

The Way to the Knowledge of the Divine Nature is extremely rugged, and of difficult Aſcent. The Entrance is ſecured by brazen gates, opening to the adventurer; and the winding roads, to be paſſed thro', impoſſible to be deſcrib'd. Theſe, to the vaſt benefit of mankind, were firſt marked out by the EGYPTIANS.

The ſecond is as follows:

Μοῦνοι Χαλδαῖοι σοφίαν λάχον ἠδ' ἀρ' Ἑβραῖοι,
Αὐτογενεθλιον ἄναχτα σεβαζόμενοι Θεὸν ἀγνῶς.

True wiſdom was the lot only of the CHALDEANS *and* HEBREWS, *who worſhip the Governor of the world, the ſelf-exiſtent Deity, with pure and holy rites.*

Marſham, ſuppoſing after *Euſebius*, that the SAME THING was ſpoken of in both the Oracles, ſays, *Certe nulla eſt controverſiæ quin περὶ μοναρχίας, de unius regimine ſive de unico Deo, reverens fuerit & rectiſſima Ebræorum, non item recta Egyptiorum exiſtimatio.* And again,—*Verum Apollo parum ſibi conſtans.* [*Canon. Chron* p. 255—6. edit. *Fr.*] becauſe in the one Oracle, the *Egyptians* are ſaid to be the *firſt*; and in the other, the *Chaldeans* and *Hebrews* the *only* People who knew the true God. But they are very conſiſtent; they treat of DIFFERENT THINGS: The firſt, of the *Knowledge* of the true God; and the ſecond, of his *public Worſhip.* This appears by the different terms in which the Oracles are delivered: The *Hebrews*, whom the Oracle calls *Chaldæans*, were well known to be the *only* people who *publicly worſhiped* the true God. But the *knowledge* of him being likewiſe taught, tho' to *few*, all over the *Gentile* world, and only in the *Myſteries*, and the *Myſteries* coming, as we have ſhewn, originally from *Egypt*, the Oracle ſays, that the *Egyptians firſt taught men the knowledge of the divine Natures.* But that it was in *this way*, his words plainly intimate:

Ἀτραπιτοὶ δὲ ἔασιν ἀθέσφατοι ἐγγεγαυῖαι,

which exactly deſcribe the embarraſſed and perplexed condition of the *Initiated* before they came to the participation of this knowledge. But when the ſame Oracle ſpeaks of the *Hebrews'* knowledge of God, he uſes a very different language,

σεβαζόμενοι Θεὸν ἀγνῶς,

evidently reſpecting the calm and ſettled ſtate of public worſhip. I will only obſerve, that the frights and terrors to which the initiated were expoſed, gave birth to all thoſe metaphorical terms of *Difficulty* and *Danger* ſo conſtantly employed by the *Greek* writers, whenever they ſpeak of the Communication of the true God.

JOSEPHUS

Josephus is ſtill more expreſs. He tells Appion, that that high and ſublime knowledge, which the Gentiles with difficulty attained unto, in the rare and temporary celebration of their *Myſteries*, was habitually taught to the Jews, at all times. And what was this ſublime knowledge, but the doctrine of the UNITY? "Can any Government (ſays he) be "more holy than this? or any Religion better ad-"apted to the nature of the Deity? Where, in any "place but in this, are the whole People, by the "ſpecial diligence of the Prieſts, to whom the care "of public inſtruction is committed, accurately "taught the principles of true piety? So that the "body-politic ſeems, as it were, one great *Aſſembly*, "conſtantly kept together, for the celebration of "ſome ſacred *Myſteries*. For thoſe things which the "Gentiles keep up for a few days only, that is, du-"ring thoſe ſolemnities they call MYSTERIES and INI-"TIATIONS, we, with vaſt delight, and a plenitude "of knowledge, which admits of no error, fully en-"joy, and perpetually contemplate through the "whole courſe of our lives. If you aſk (continues "he) the nature of thoſe things, which in our ſacred "rites are enjoined and forbidden; I anſwer they "are ſimple, and eaſily underſtood. The firſt in-"ſtruction relates to the DEITY, and teaches that "GOD CONTAINS ALL THINGS, and is a Being every "way perfect and happy: that he is ſelf-exiſtent, "and the SOLE CAUSE of all exiſtence; the begin-"ning, the middle, and the end of all things[1]," &c.

[1] Τίς ἂν ἐν ἀρχῇ γένοιτο ταύτης ὁσιωτέρα; τίς δὲ θεῷ τιμὴ μᾶλλον ἁρμόζουσα, παντὸς μὲν τοῦ πλήθους καθεσκευασμένου πρὸς τὴν εὐσέβειαν, ἐξαιρέτου δὲ τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν τῶν ἱερέων πεπιστευμένων, ὥσπερ δὲ τελετῆς τινος τῆς ὅλης πολιτείας οἰκονομουμένης; ἃ γὰρ ὀλίγων ἡμερῶν ἀριθμὸν ἐπιτηδεύοντες ἀλλόφυλοι φυλάττειν οὐ δύνανται, μυστήρια καὶ τελετὰς ὀνομάζοντες, ταῦτα μεθ' ἡδονῆς καὶ γνώμης ἀμεταπτώτου φυλάττομεν ἡμεῖς διὰ τοῦ παντὸς αἰῶνος. τίνες δ' εἰσὶν αἱ προρρήσεις καὶ ἀπαγορεύσεις; ἀπ-

Nothing

Nothing can be more explicit than the testimony of this learned Jew. He not only alludes to the *greater Mysteries*, by the direct terms of τελετῆς and μυςήρια, but uses several expressions relative to what the gentile *Mystagogues* taught therein; such as ἄλλοφυλοι φυλάττειν ὀ δυνανται, referring to the unfitness of the doctrine of the unity for general instruction: such as μετὰ πολλῆς ἡδονῆς, in contradiction to what they taught of the labours, pain, and difficulties to be encountered by those who aspired to the knowledge of the first cause: such as α πλαῖ κ̀ γνώριμοι, in contradiction to what they taught of the great intricacy and obscurity of the question: and such, again, as ὁ Θεὸς ἔχει τὰ πάντα, the characteristic of the ΔΗΜΙΟΥΡΓΟΣ of the *Mysteries*.

Thus, I think, it appears, that the ΑΠΟΡΡΗΤΑ, in the *greater mysteries*, were the detection of the origine of vulgar *Polytheism* [m]; and the discovery of the doctrine of the *Unity* [n].

λαῖ τε κ̀ γνώριμοι. πρώτη δ' ἡγεῖται περὶ Θεοῦ, λέγουσα, ὁ Θεὸς ἔχει τὰ πάντα παντελὴς κ̀ μακάριος, αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ κ̀ πᾶσιν αὐτάρκης, ἀρχὴ κ̀ μέσα, κ̀ τέλος πάντων. *Cont. Ap.* lib. ii. cap. 22.

[m] What hath been said will give light to a strange story told by Thucydides, Plutarch, Cornelius Nepos, Justin, and others, of a debauch and night-ramble of Alcibiades, just before his expedition to Syracuse. In which, they say, he revealed to, and acted over with, his companions, the *Mysteries of Ceres*: that he assumed the office of *Hierophant*, and called some of those he initiated Μύςαι, and others, Ἐπόπται: and that, lastly, they broke all the statues of Hermes. These are mentioned by the Historians as distinct actions, and unconnected with one another. But now we see their relation, and how one arose from the other: for Alcibiades having revealed the origine of Polytheism and the doctrine of the Unity to his companions, nothing was more natural than for men, heated with wine, to run forth, in a kind of religious fury, and break the statues of their idols. For, what he acted over, was the celebration of the *greater mysteries*, as appears from Plutarch's calling them the *Mysteries of Ceres*, she presiding in the *greater*, as Proserpine presided in the *lesser*; and from Alcibiades's calling some Ἐπόπται, the name of those who participated of the *greater Mysteries*. [n] See this account supported, and the objections to it clearly confuted, in a well reasoned tract lately printed, intitled, *A Dissertation on the ancient Pagan Mysteries*.

But now I have gone thus far, I will venture one ſtep further; and undertake to give the very HISTORY repeated, and the very HYMN ſung, on theſe occaſions, to the *initiated*. In the *firſt* of which was delivered the true origine and progreſs of VULGAR POLYTHEISM; and in the *other*, the doctrine of the UNITY.

For I am much miſtaken, if that celebrated fragment of SANCHONIATHO, the Phœnician, tranſlated by Philo-Byblius, and preſerved by Euſebius, containing a genealogical account of the firſt ages, be not that very HISTORY; as it was wont to be read to the *initiated*, in the celebration of the *Egyptian* and *Phœnician Myſteries*. The purpoſe of it being to inform us, that their popular Gods (whoſe chronicle is there given according to their generations) were only dead men deified.

And as this curious and authentic *record* (for ſuch we ſhall find it was) not only ſerves to illuſtrate the ſubject we are now upon, but will be of uſe to ſupport what is ſaid hereafter of the riſe, progreſs, and order of the ſeveral ſpecies of ancient idolatry, it may not be improper to give a ſhort extract of it in this place.

I. He tells us then, that, "of the two firſt mortals, Protogonus and Æon, (the latter of whom was the author of ſeeking and procuring food from foreſt-trees) were begotten Genos and Genea. Theſe, in the time of great droughts, ſtretched their hands upwards to the SUN, whom they regarded as a God, and ſole ruler of the heavens. From theſe, after two or three generations, came Upſouranios and his brother Ouſous. One of them invented the art of building cottages of reeds and ruſhes; the other the art of making garments of the ſkins of wild beaſts. In their time, violent tempeſts of wind and rain having rubbed the large branches of the foreſt-trees againſt one another, they took fire, and burnt up the woods.

woods. Of the bare trunks of trees, they first made vessels to pass the waters: they consecrated two pillars to FIRE and WIND, and then offered bloody sacrifices to them as to Gods [n]." And here let it be observed, that this *worship of the Elements* and heavenly Bodies is truly represented as the FIRST species of idolatry.

II. "After many generations, came Chrysor; and he likewise invented many things useful to civil life; for which, after his decease, he was worshipped as a God [o]. Then flourished Ouranos and his sister Ge; who deified and offered sacrifices to their father, Upsistos, when he had been torn in pieces by wild beasts [p]. Afterwards Cronos consecrated Muth his son, and was himself consecrated by his subjects. [q]" And this is as truly represented to be the SECOND species of idolatry; the *worship of dead men.*

III. He goes on, and says, that "Ouranos was the inventor of the Bætylia, a kind of animated stones, framed with great art [r]. And that Taautus

[n] Αἰῶνα καὶ Πρωτόγονον θνητοὺς ἄνδρας. οὕτω καλουμένους· εὑρεῖν δὲ τὸν Αἰῶνα τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν δένδρων τροφήν. ἐκ τούτων τοὺς γενομένους κληθῆναι Γένος, καὶ Γενεὰν—αὐχμῶν δὲ γενομένων, τὰς χεῖρας ὀρέγειν εἰς οὐρανοὺς πρὸς τὸν ἥλιον. τοῦτον γάρ, φησὶ, θεὸν ἐνόμιζον μόνον οὐρανοῦ κύριον—εἶτά φησι τὸν Ὑψουράνιον οἰκῆσαι Τύρον, καλύβας τε ἐπινοῆσαι ἀπὸ καλάμων, καὶ θρύων, καὶ παπύρων· στασιάσαι δὲ πρὸς τὸν ἀδελφὸν Ουσωὸν. ὃς σκέπην τῷ σώματι πρῶτος ἐκ δερμάτων ὧν ἴσχυσε συλλαβεῖν θηρίων εὗρε. ῥαγδαίων δὲ γενομένων ὄμβρων καὶ πνευμάτων παρατριβέντα τὰ ἐν τῇ Τύρῳ δένδρα πῦρ ἀνάψαι, καὶ τὴν αὐτόθι ὕλην καταφλέξαι. δένδρου δὲ λαβόμενον τὸν Ουσωὸν καὶ ἀποκλαδεύσαντα πρῶτον τολμῆσαι εἰς θαλασσαν ἐμβῆναι· ἀνιερῶσαι δὲ δύο στήλας πυρί τε καὶ πνεύματι καὶ προσκυνῆσαι, ἅμα τε σπένδειν αὐταῖς, ἐξ ὧν ἤγρευε θηρίων.

[o] —ἐξ ὧν γενέσθαι δύο ἀδεγφοὺς σιδήρου εὑρετὰς, καὶ τῆς τούτου ἐργασίας· ὧν θάτερον τὸν Ἥφαιστον. ευρεῖν δὲ καὶ ἄγκιστρον, καὶ δέλεαρ, καὶ ὁρμιὰν, καὶ σχεδιὰν· πρῶτόν τε πάντων ἀνθρωπων πλεῦσαι. διὸ καὶ ὡς θεὸν αὐτὸν μετὰ θάνατον ἐσεβάσθησαν.

[p] Ο δὲ τουτων πατὴρ ὁ Ὕψιστος ἐκ συμβολῆς θηρίων τελευτήσας ἀφιερώθη, ᾧ καὶ χοὰς καὶ θυσίας οἱ παῖδες ἐτελεσαν.

[q] —Καὶ μετ' οὐ πολὺ, ἕτερον αὐτοῦ παῖδα ἀπὸ Ῥέας ὀνομαζόμενον Μοῦθ ἀποθανόντα ἀφιεροῖ—Κρόνος τοίνυν, βασιλεύων τῆς χώρας, καὶ ὕστερον μετὰ τὴν τοῦ βίου τελευτὴν εἰς τὸν τοῦ Κρόνου ἀστέρα καθιερωθείς.

[r] ἔτι δὲ, φησὶν, ἐπενόησε Θεὸς Οὐρανὸς Βαιτύλια, λίθους ἐμψύχους μηχανησάμενος—

formed allegoric figures, characters, and images of the celeſtial Gods and elements[s]." In which is delivered the THIRD ſpecies of idolatry, *ſtatue and brute worſhip*. For by the animated ſtones, is meant ſtones cut into a human ſhape[t]; brute, unformed ſtones being before this invention conſecrated and adored. As by Taautus's invention of allegoric figures, is inſinuated (what was truly the fact) the origine of brute worſhip [u] from the uſe of HIEROGLYPHICS.

This is a very ſhort and imperfect extract of the *Fragment*; many particulars, to avoid tedioufneſs, are omitted, which would much ſupport what we are upon, particularly a minute detail of the principal arts invented for the uſe of civil life. But what has been ſelected on this head will afford a good comment to a celebrated paſſage of Cicero, quoted, in this ſection, on another occaſion.—As the two important doctrines, taught *in ſecret*, were the detection of *Polytheiſm*, and the diſcovery of the *Unity*; ſo, the two capital doctrines taught more *openly*, were the origin of Society with the arts of life, and the exiſtence of the ſoul after death, in a ſtate of reward or puniſhments. Theſe latter doctrines Tully hints at in the following words: "—mihi cum multa exi- "mia divinaque videntur Athenæ peperiſſe—tum "nihil melius illis *Myſteriis*, quibus ex AGRESTI im- "manique vita EXCULTI ad humanitatem & miti- "gati ſumus:—neque ſolum cum lætitia vivendi "rationem accepimus, ſed etiam cum ſpe meliore "moriendi[w]." The Fragment explains what Tully

[s] —περὶ δὲ τούτων θεὸς Τααυτὸς μεμησάμενος τὸν Οὐρανὸν τῶν ἰδίων ὄψεως, Κρόνῳ τε καὶ Δαγὼνι, καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν διέγραψεν τὰς ἰδέας τῶν στοιχείων χαρακτῆρας, &c.

[t] So when the Egyptians firſt ſaw the Grecian artiſts ſeparate the legs of their ſtatues, they put fetters on them, to prevent their running away.

[u] See *Div. Leg.* book iv. § 4.

[w] *De Legg.* lib. ii. cap. 14.

meant

meant by *men's being drawn by the Myſteries from an irrational and ſavage life, and tamed, as it were, and broken to humanity.* It was, we ſee, by the information given them, concerning the origine of SOCIETY, and the Inventors of the ARTS OF LIFE; and the rewards they received from grateful Poſterity, for having made themſelves Benefactors to mankind. Tully, who thought this a ſtrong excitement to public virtue, provides for it in his *Laws*:—"Divos & "eos qui cæleſtes ſemper habiti, colunto: & ollos, "quos endo cælo MERITA locaverunt Herculem, "Liberum, Æſculapium[x]." &c.

The reaſons which induce me to think this Fragment the very *Hiſtory* narrated to the Ἐποπται, in the celebration of the *greater Myſteries*, are theſe:

1. It bears an exact conformity with what the Ancients tell us that *Hiſtory* contained in general, namely, an inſtruction, that all the national Gods, as well thoſe *majorum* (ſuch as Hypſiſtus, Ouranos, and Cronos) as thoſe *minorum gentium*, were only dead men deified: together with a recommendation of the advantages of civil life above the ſtate of nature, and an excitement to the moſt conſiderable of the initiated (the *ſummatibus viris*, as Macrobius calls them) to procure it. And theſe two ends are ſerved together, in the hiſtory of the riſe and progreſs of idolatry as delivered in this Fragment. In the date it gives to the origine of idolatry, they were inſtructed that the two firſt mortals were not idolaters, and conſequently, that idolatry was the corruption of a better Religion; a matter of importance, where the purpoſe was to diſcredit Polytheiſm. The Hiſtory ſhews us too, that this had the common fate of all corruptions, of falling from bad to worſe, from *elementary* worſhip to *human*, and from *human* to *brutal*. But this was not enough; it was neceſſary too to expoſe the unreaſon-

[x] *De Legg.* lib. ii. cap. 8.

blenefs of all theſe modes of ſuperſtition. And as this could be only done by ſhewing what gave birth to the ſeveral ſpecies's, we are told, that not any occult or metaphyſic influences of the heavenly or elementary Bodies upon men, but their common phyſical effects felt by us, occaſioned the firſt worſhip to be paid unto them: that no imaginary Divinity in the minds of patriarchs and heroes occaſioned Poſterity to bring them into the number of the Gods; but a warm ſenſe of gratitude for what they had invented for the introduction and promotion of civil life: and that even *brute-worſhip* was brought in without the leaſt conſideration to the animal, but as its figure was a ſymbol only of the properties of the two other ſpecies's. Again, in order to recommend civil life, and to excite men to promote it's advantages, a lively picture is given of his miſerable condition; and how obnoxious he was, in that ſtate, to the rage of all the elements, and how imperfectly, while he continued in it, he could, with all his induſtry, fence againſt them, by food of acorns, by cottages of reeds, and by garments of ſkins: a matter the *Myſteries* thought ſo neceſſary to be impreſſed, that we find, by Diodorus Siculus, there was a ſcenical repreſentation of this ſtate exhibited in their SHEWS. And what ſtronger excitement had heroic minds, than to be taught, (as they are in this Fragment) that public benefits to their fellow-creatures were rewarded with immortality. As all theſe things, therefore, ſo eſſential to the inſtruction of the *Myſteries*, are here taught with an art and diſpoſition peculiarly calculated to promote thoſe ends, we have reaſon to conclude, that this Hiſtory was compoſed for the uſe of the *Myſteries*.

2. My ſecond reaſon for ſuppoſing it to be that very Hiſtory, is our being told, that Sanchoniatho tranſcribed the account from ſecret records, kept in the penetralia of the temples, and written in a ſacred

ſacerdotal

sacerdotal character, called the Ammonean[y], from the place where they were first deposited; (which, as Marsham reasonably supposes, was Ammonno, or Thebes, in Egypt[z]) a kind of writing employed, as we have shewn elsewhere, by the Hierophants of the *Mysteries.*

3. Thirdly, we are informed, that this sacred commentary was composed by the CABIRI, at the command, and by the direction of, Thoth[a]. Now These were the principal Hierophants of the *Mysteries.* The name CABIRI is, indeed, used by the Ancients, to signify indifferently three several persons; the GODS, in whose honour the *Mysteries* were instituted; the INSTITUTORS of the *Mysteries*; and the principal HIEROPHANTS who officiated in them. In the first sense we find it used by Herodotus, who speaks of the images of the *Cabiri* in the Egyptian temples[b]; and by the scholiast on Apollonius, who tells us, there were four samothracian *Cabiri*, Axieros, Axiokersa, Axiokersos, and Casmilus; that is to say, Ceres, Proserpine, Pluto, and Mercury. Pausanias, in his *Beotics*, uses the word in the second sense, where he makes mention of the *Cabiri* Prometheus and his son Ætnæus, to whom was committed the sacred deposit of the *Mysteries* by Ceres[c]. And Strabo uses it in the third sense,

[y] —ὁ δὲ συμβαλὼν τοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν ἀδύτων εὑρεθεῖσαν ἀποκρύφοις Ἀμμοννέων γράμμασι συγκειμένοις, ἃ δὴ οὐκ ἦν πᾶσι γνώριμα, τὴν μάθησιν ἁπάντων αὐτὸς ἤσκησε.

[z] Chron. Can. p. 234. Lond. edit.

[a] Ταῦτα δὲ, φησὶ, πρῶτοι πάντων ὑπεμνηματίσαντο οἱ ἑπτὰ Συδὲκ παῖδες ΚΑΒΕΙΡΟΙ, καὶ ὄγδοος αὐτῶν ἀδελφὸς Ἀσκληπιὸς, ὡς αὐτοῖς ἐνετείλατο θεὸς Τααυτός.

[b] Καμβύσης—ἐσῆλθε δὲ καὶ ἐς τῶν Καβείρων τὸ ἱρὸν, ἐς τὸ οὐ θεμιτόν ἐστι ἐσιέναι ἄλλον γε ἢ τὸν ἱρέα. ταῦτα δὲ τ' ἀγάλματα καὶ ἐνέπρησε, πολλὰ κατασκώψας. lib. iii. cap. 37.

[c] Πόλιν γάρ ποτε ἐν τούτῳ φασὶν εἶναι τῷ χωρίῳ, καὶ ἄνδρας ὀνομαζομένους Καβείρους. Προμεθεῖ δὲ ἐνὶ τῶν Καβειραίων καὶ Αἰταίῳ τῷ Προμηθέως ἀφικομένην Δήμητραν ἐς γνῶσιν παρακαταθέσθαι σφίσιν. ἥτις μὲν δὴ ἦν ἡ παρακαταθήκη, καὶ τὰ ἐς αὐτὴν γενόμενα, οὐκ ἐφαίνετο ὅσιόν μοι γράφειν. Δημητρὸς γοῦν Καβειραίοις δῶρόν ἐστιν ἡ τελετή. *Baot.* lib. ix. cap. 25.

where he speaks of the *Cabiri* as Ministers in the sacred *Mysteries*[d]. It is no wonder there should be this difference amongst the ancients in their accounts of these Wights. *Cabiri* was a sacred appellation, which was transferred from the *God* of the Mysteries, through the *Institutors* of them, down to the *Ministers* who officiated in them: And in this last sense it is used by Sanchoniatho. The same kind of confusion, and proceeding from the same cause, we find in the ancient accounts concerning the founder of the *Eleusinian Mysteries*, as we shall see hereafter; Some ascribing the institution to Ceres or Triptolemus, the Gods in whose honour they were celebrated; others, to Erectheus, who, indeed, founded them: and others again, to Eumolpus and Musæus, the first who ministred there in the office of Hierophants.

4. But, fourthly and lastly, We are told, that when this genealogical history came into the hands of a certain son of Thabion, the first Hierophant on record amongst the Phœnicians, he, after having corrupted it with allegories and intermixed physical and cosmical affections with historical (that is, made the one significative of the other) DELIVERED IT TO THE PROPHETS OF THE ORGIES, AND THE HIEROPHANTS OF THE MYSTERIES; who left it to their successors (one of which was Osiris) and to the Initiated[e]. So that now we have an express testimony for the fact here advanced, that this was the very

[d] —τῶν μὲν, τὺς αὐτὺς τοῖς Κυρῆσι τὺς Κορύβαντας καὶ ΚΑΒΕΙΡΟΥΣ καὶ Ἰδαίους Δακτύλους, καὶ Τελχῖνας ἀποφαινόντων· τῶν δὲ συγγενεῖς ἀλλήλων, καὶ μικράς τινας αὐτῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλους διαφορὰς διαστελλόντων. lib. x.

[e] Ταῦτα πάντα ὁ Θαβίωνος παῖς, πρῶτος τῶν ἀπ' αἰῶνος γεγονότων Φοινικων ἱεροψάντης ἀλληγορήσας, τοῖς τε φυσικοῖς καὶ κοσμικοῖς πάθεσιν ἀναμίξας παρέδωκε τοῖς ΟΡΓΙΩΣΙ καὶ ΤΕΛΕΤΩΝ κατάρχουσι ΠΡΟΦΗΤΑΙΣ. οἱ δὲ τὸν τύφον αὔξειν ἐκ παντὸς ἐπινοοῦντες, τοῖς αὐτῶν διαδόκοις παρέδωσαν καὶ τοῖς ἐπεισάκτοις. ᾧ εἷς ἦν Ἴσιρις.

history

hiſtory read to the ΕΠΟΠΤΑΙ in the celebration of the *great Myſteries.*

But one thing is too remarkable to paſs by unobſerved: and that is, Sanchoniatho's account of the corruption of this Hiſtory with *allegories* and *phyſical affections*, by one of his own countrymen; and of it's delivery, in that ſtate, to the Egyptians, (for Iſiris is the ſame as Oſiris) who corrupted it ſtill more. That the Pagan Mythology was, indeed, thus corrupted, I have ſhewn at large, in ſeveral parts of this work: but I believe, not ſo early as is here pretended; which makes me ſuſpect that Sanchoniatho lived in a later age than his interpreter, Philo, aſſigns to him. And what confirms me in this ſuſpicion, is that mark of national vanity and partiality, common to after-times, in making the *Myſteries* of his own country original, and conveyed from Phœnicia to Egypt. Whereas it is very certain, they came firſt from Egypt. But of this elſewhere. However, let the reader take notice, that the queſtion concerning the *antiquity* of Sanchoniatho does not at all affect our inference concerning the nature and uſe of this Hiſtory [f].

We

[f] A criticiſm of that very knowing and ſagacious writer, father Simon of the Oratory, will ſhew the reader how groundleſs the ſuſpicions of learned men are concerning the genuineneſs of this Fragment. Father Simon imagines that Porphyry forged the hiſtory of Sanchoniatho, under the name of a tranſlation by Philo Byblius; and conjectures that his purpoſe in ſo doing was to ſupport Paganiſm; by taking from it, its *Mythology* and *Allegories*, which the Chriſtian writers perpetually objected to it. "Il ſe "peut faire—pour repondre aux objections qu'on leur faiſoit de "toutes parts, ſur ce, que leur Theologie etoit une pure Mytho-"logie—ils remonterent juſques aux tems qui avoient precedé "les allegories & les fictions des ſacrificateurs." *Bib. Crit.* vol. i. p. 140. But this learned man totally miſtakes the matter. The Chriſtians objected to vulgar Paganiſm, that the ſtories told of their Gods, were *immoral*. To this their Prieſts and Philoſophers replied, that theſe ſtories were only *mythologic Allegories*, which veiled all the great truths of *Theology*, *Ethics*, and *Phyſics*. The Chriſtians ſaid, this could not be; for that the ſtories of

We now come to the HYMN celebrating the Unity of the Godhead, which was ſung in the *Eleuſinian Myſteries* by the Hierophant, habited like the CREATOR [g]. And this, I take [h] to be the little ORPHIC poem quoted by Clemens Alexandrinus [i] and Euſebius [k]; which begins thus: "I will declare a SECRET to the Initiated; but let the doors be ſhut "againſt the profane. But thou, O Muſæus, the "offſpring of bright Selene, attend carefully to my "ſong; for I ſhall deliver the truth without diſguiſe. Suffer not, therefore, thy former prejudices to debar thee of that happy life, which the "knowledge of theſe ſublime truths will procure "unto thee: but carefully contemplate this divine

of the Gods had a *ſubſtantial foundation in fact*, theſe Gods being only dead men deified, who, in life, had like paſſions and infirmities with other mortals. For the truth of which they appealed to ſuch writers as Sanchoniatho, who had given the Hiſtory both of their mortal and immortal ſtations and conditions. How then could ſo acute an adverſary as Porphyry, deeply engaged in this controverſy, ſo far miſtake the ſtate of the queſtion, and grounds of his defence, as to forge a book in ſupport of his cauſe, which totally overthrew it?

[g] Ἐν δὲ τοῖς κατ' ΕΛΕΥΣΙΝΑ μυσηρίοις, ὁ μὲν Ἱεροφάντης εἰς εἰκόνα τοῦ δημιουργοῦ ἐνσκευάζεται. Euſeb. *Præp. Evang.* lib. iii. A paſſage in Porphyry well explains this of Euſebius, and ſhews by what kind of perſonage the *Creator* was repreſented; and that this, like all the reſt, was of Egyptian original; and introduced into theſe ſecret myſteries, for the reaſon above explained. Τὰ δὲ τῶν ΑΙΓΥΠΤΙΩΝ πάλιν τοιαῦτά φησιν ἔχειν σύμβολα. Τὸν ΔΗΜΙΟΥΡΓΟΝ, ὃν Κνὴφ, οἱ Αἰγυπτίοι προσαγορεύουσιν ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΕΙΔΗ, τὴν δὲ χροιὰν ἐκ κυανοῦ μέλανα ἔχοντα, κραδίαν τε ζώνῃ καὶ σκήπτρον· ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς κεφαλῆς, πῖλον βασίλειον περικείμενον, ΟΤΙ ΛΟΓΟΣ ΔΥΣΕΥΡΕΤΟΣ ΚΑΙ ΚΕΚΡΥΜΜΕΝΟΣ, ΚΑΙ ΟΥ ΦΑΝΟΣ, καὶ ὅτι ζωυποιὸς, καὶ ὅτι βασιλεὺς, καὶ ὅτι νοερῶς κινεῖται· διὸ καὶ τοῦ πίλου φύσις ἐν τῇ κεφαλῇ κεῖται. apud Euſeb. *Præp. Evang.* lib. iii. cap. 11.

[h] M. Voltaire, in his remarks on his fine Tragedy of Olympia, has done me the honour of advancing this conjecture into a certainty; and what is more, of a known and acknowledged fact. "On chantait (ſays he) *l'Hymne de Orphée*"—and then gives it as he finds it here.——

[i] *Admonitio ad gentes.*

[k] *Præp. Evang.* lib. xiii.

"Oracle,

"Oracle, and preſerve it in purity of mind and "heart. Go on, in the right way, and contem- "plate THE SOLE GOVERNOR OF THE WORLD: HE "IS ONE, AND OF HIMSELF ALONE; AND TO THAT "ONE ALL THINGS OWE THEIR BEING. HE OPE- "RATES THROUGH ALL, WAS NEVER SEEN BY "MORTAL EYES, BUT DOES HIMSELF SEE EVERY "ONE[1]."

The reaſons which ſupport my conjecture are theſe: 1. We learn from the ſcholiaſt on Ariſtophanes and others, that hymns were ſung in the myſteries, and what were the ſubject of them. And Dion. Chryſ. in his Oration De divina Civitate aut Gubernatione, ſays expreſsly, that in the Mithriac Myſteries the Magi ſung an awful Hymn in which the glories of the ſupreme God who governs all things were celebrated [m]—And further ſays, that this knowledge of the *One ſupreme* was kept a SECRET amongſt the *initiated* Perſians. 2. Orpheus, as we have ſaid, firſt brought the *Myſteries* from Egypt into Thrace, and even Religion itſelf: hence it was called Θρησκεία, as being ſuppoſed the invention of the Thracian. 3. The verſes, which go under the name of Orpheus, are, at leaſt, more ancient than Plato and Herodotus; though ſince interpolated. It was the common opinion, that they were genuine;

[1] Φθέγξομαι οἷς θέμις ἐστι, θύρας δ' ἐπίθεσθε βεβήλοις
Πᾶσιν ὁμῶς· σὺ δ' ἄκουε, Φαεσφόρου ἔκγονε μήνης,
Μουσαῖ', ἰξερέω γὰρ ἀληθέα, μηδέ σε τὰ πρὶν
Ἐν στήθεσσι φανεῖσα φίλης αἰῶνος ἀμέρσῃ·
Εἰς δὲ λόγον θεῖον βλέψας, τέτῳ προσέδρευε,
Ἰθύνων ἡραδίης νοερὸν κύτος· εὖ δ' ἐπίβαινε
Ἀτραπιτοῦ. μοῦνον δ' ἐσόρα κόσμοιο ἄνακτα.
Εἷς δ' ἓς' αὐτογενής, ἐνὶς ἔκγονα πάντα τέτυκται,
Ἐν δ' αὐτοῖς αὐτὸς περινίσσεται· οὐδέ τις αὐτὸν
Εἰσορόᾳ θνητῶν, αὐτὸς δὲ γε πάντας ὁρᾶται.

[m] μῦθος ἐν ἀποῤῥήτοις τελεταῖς ὑπὸ Μάγων ἀνδρῶν ἀδεται θαυμαζόμενος. οἱ τὸν θεὸν τοῦτον ὑμνοῦσιν ὡς τελείοντε καὶ πρῶτον ἡνίοχον τῦ τελειοτάτυ ἄγματος.

and

and thoſe who doubted of that, yet gave them to the earlieſt Pythagoreans[n]. 4. The ſubject of them are the *Myſteries*, under the ſeveral titles of [o] Θρονισμὸς μυήσεως τελεταὶ, ἱερὸς λόγος, and ἡ εἰς ᾅδου καταβασις. 5. Pauſanias tells us, that Orpheus's hymns were ſung in the rites of Ceres, in preference to Homer's, though more elegant, for the reaſons given above[p]. 6. This hymn is addreſſed to Muſæus, his diſciple, who was ſaid, though falſely, to inſtitute the *Myſteries* at Athens, as his maſter had done in Thrace[q]; and begins with the *formula* uſed by the Myſtagogue on that occaſion, warning the PROPHANE to keep at diſtance: and in the fourth line, mentions that *new life* or *regeneration*, to which the Initiated were taught to aſpire. 7. No other original than ſinging the hymns of Orpheus in the *Eleuſinian Myſteries*, can be well imagined of that popular opinion, mentioned by Theodoret, that Orpheus inſtituted *thoſe Myſteries*[r], when the Athenians had ſuch certain records of another Founder. 8. We are told that one article of the Athenians' charge againſt Diagoras for revealing the *Myſteries*, was his making the *Orphic ſpeech*, or hymn, the ſubject of his common converſation[s]. 9. But laſtly, the account, which Clemens

[n] Laertius in *Vita Pythag.* and Suidas, voce Ὀρφεύς.

[o] The following paſſage of Dion. Chryſ. will explain the meaning of this Θρονισμὸς —— Καθάπερ εἰώθασιν ἐν τῷ καλουμένῳ ΘΡΟΝΙΣΜΩ, καθισαντες τὰς μυουμένας οἱ τελοῦντες, κύκλῳ περιχορεύειν. *Orat.* xii.

[p] Ὅσις δὲ περὶ ποιήσεως ἐπολυπραγμόνησεν, ἤδη τὰς Ὀρφέως ὕμνους οἶδεν ὄντας, ἑκασταχοῦ τε αὐτῶν, ἐπὶ βραχύταλον, καὶ τὸ σύμπαν οὐκ ἐς ἀριθμὸν πολὺν περιοιμένους. Λυομένδαι δὲ ἴσασί τε καὶ ἐπᾴδουσι τοῖς δρωμένοις· κόσμῳ μὲν δὴ τῶν ἐπῶν ὑστερεῖται φέρουσιν ἂν, μετὰ Ὁμήρου γε τὸν ὕμνον· τιμῆς δὲ ἕνεκα τοῦ θείου καὶ ἐς πλέον ἐκείνων ἔχουσι. *Pauſan.* lib. ix. cap. 30. ſub. fin. and again, to the ſame purpoſe, cap. 27.

[q] Tertull. Apol.

[r] See note p. 138.

[s] Διαγόρα μὲν γὰρ εἰκότως ἐνεκάλεσαν Ἀθηναῖοι, μὴ μόνον τὸν ΟΡΦΙΚΟΝ εἰς μέσον καταλιπόντι ΛΟΓΟΝ, καὶ τὰ ἐν Ἐλευσῖνι, καὶ τὰ τῶν Καβείρων ἀπορρήτως μυούμενα μυστήρια. Athenagoras in *Legat.*

gives

gives of this hymn, seems to put the matter out of question: his words are these: "But the Thracian "Mystagogue, who was at the same time a poet, "*Orpheus*, the son of Oeager, after he had opened "the *Mysteries*, and sung the whole THEOLOGY OF "IDOLS, recants all he had said, and introduceth "TRUTH. The Sacreds then truly begin, though "late, and thus he enters upon the matter[t]." To understand the force of this passage, we are to know, that the Mystagogue explained the representations in the *Mysteries*; where, as we learn from Apuleius[u], the supernal and infernal Gods passed in review. To each of these they sung an hymn; which Clemens calls the *theology of images*, or *idols*. These are yet to be seen amongst the works ascribed to Orpheus. When all this was over, then came the ΑΠΟΡΡΗΤΑ, delivered in the HYMN in question. And, after that, the Assembly was dismissed, with these two barbarous words, ΚΟΓΞ ΟΜΠΑΞ, which shews the *Mysteries* not to have been originally Greek. The learned Mr. Le Clerc well observes, that this seems to be only an ill pronounciation of *kots* and *omphets*, which, he tells us, signify in the Phœnician tongue, *watch and abstain from evil*[w].

Thus the reader is brought acquainted with the end and use both of the *greater* and *lesser Mysteries*; and sees that, as well in what they *hid*, as in what they *divulged*, all aimed at the benefit of the State. To this end, they were to draw in as many as they could to their general participation; which they did by spreading abroad the doctrine of a Providence,

[t] Ὁ δὲ Θρᾴκιος ἱεροφάντης καὶ ποιητὴς ἅμα, ὁ τοῦ Οἰάγρου Ὀρφεὺς, μετὰ τὴν τῶν Ὀργίων ἱεροφαντίαν, καὶ τῶν εἰδώλων τὴν θεολογίαν, παλινῳδίαν ἀληθείας εἰσάγει, τὸν ἱερὸν ὄντως ὀψέ ποτε, ὅμως δ' οὖν ᾄδων λόγον. *Admon. ad Gentes.*

[u] Accessi confinium mortis, deos inferos, & deos superos accessi coram, & adoravi de proximo. *Met.* lib. xi.

[w] *Bibl. Univ.* tom. vi. p. 86.

and

and a future ſtate; and how much happier the Initiated ſhould be, and what ſuperior felicities they were intitled to, in another life. It was on this account that Antiquity is ſo full and expreſs in this part. But then, they were to make thoſe, they had got in, as virtuous as was poſſible; which they did, by diſcovering, to ſuch as were judged capable of the *ſecret*, the whole deluſion of Polytheiſm. Now this being ſuppoſed the ſhaking foundations, was to be done with all poſſible circumſpection, and under the moſt tremendous ſeal of ſecrecy[x]. For they taught, that the Gods themſelves puniſhed the *revealers of the* SECRET; and not them only, but the *bearers* of it likewiſe[y]. Nor did they altogether truſt to that alone: for, more effectually to curb an ungovernable curioſity, the State decreed capital puniſhment againſt the betrayers of the *Myſteries*, and inflicted it with mercileſs ſeverity[z]. The caſe of Diagoras, the Melian, is too remarkable to be omitted. This man had revealed the *Orphic* and *Eleuſinian Myſteries*: and ſo, paſſed with the people for an Atheiſt; which at once confirms what hath been ſaid of the object of the *ſecret doctrines*, and of the miſchief which would attend an indiſcreet communication of them. For the charge of ATHEISM was the common lot of all thoſe who communicated their knowledge of the *one only God*; whether they learnt it by natural light, or were afterwards taught it by *Revelation*. He likewiſe diſſuaded his friends from being initiated into theſe rites: the conſequence of

[x] See cap. 20. of Meurſius's *Eleuſinia*.

[y] — Quæras forſitan ſatis anxie, ſtudioſe lector, quid deinde dictum, quid factum? Dicerem, ſi *dicere* liceret; cognoſceres, ſi liceret *audire*; ſed parem noxam contraherent *aures & linguæ temerariæ curioſitatis*. Apul. *Met.* lib. xi.

[z] Si quis arcanæ myſteria Cereris ſacra vulgâſſet, lege morti addicebatur. Τὸν ἐξειπόντα τὰ μυστήρια τεθνάναι. Meminit hujus legis Sopater in Diviſione quæſtionis. Sam. Petit in *Leges Atticas*, p. 33.

which

which was, that the city of Athens proscribed him, and set a price upon his head[a]. While Socrates, who preached up the latter part of this doctrine (and was on that account a reputed Atheist likewise) and Epicurus, who taught the former (and was a real one) were suffered, because they delivered their opinions only as points of philosophic speculation; amongst their followers, to live a long time unmolested. And to avoid the danger of those laws, which secured the *secret* of the Mysteries, was perhaps the reason why Socrates declined initiation[b]. And this appearing a singular affectation, exposed him to much censure[c]. But he declined it with his usual prudence. He remembered, that Æschylus[d], on a mere imagination of his having given a hint of something in the *Mysteries*, had like to have been torn in pieces on the stage by the people; and only escaped by an appeal to the Areopagus; which venerable court acquitted him of this dangerous Charge, on his proving that he had never been initiated. The famous EUHEMERUS, who assumed the same office of Hierophant to the People at large, with more boldness than Socrates, and more temper than Epicurus, employed another expedient to screen himself from the laws, though he fell, and not (like the rest) undeservedly[e], under the same imputation of *Atheism*. This

[a] Suidas voce Διαγόρας ὁ Μήλιος——& etiam Athenagoras in *Legatione*.

[b] For that he had a good opinion of the *Mysteries* appears from the *Phædo* of Plato.

[c] Κατηγορῶντες—ὅτι ἐμύνθη μόνος ἁπάντων ταῖς Ἐλευσινίαις. Lucianus, *Demonacte*.

[d] Clem. Alex. Strom. ii. & Arist. lib. iii. cap. 1. *Nicom. Eth.*

[e] Some modern Critics think, with *Theophilus*, that Euhemerus was rightly charged with ATHEISM; some think, with *Clemens Alex.* that he was not. There is a circumstance in the case which seems to me decisive, and would incline one to conclude, concerning him, with the generality of the Ancients: It is this, that the earlier policy of the *Mysteries* and the later of the *Philosophers* concurring to think it expedient for the sake of Religion to keep

This man gave a fabulous relation of a voyage to the imaginary iſland of Panchæa [f], a kind of ancient Utopia; where, in a temple of Jupiter, he found a genealogical record, which diſcovered to him the births and deaths of the greater Gods; and, in ſhort, every thing that the Hierophant revealed to the initiated on this ſubject. Thus he too avoided the ſuſpicion of a *betrayer of the Myſteries*. A character infamous in ſocial life. And to this the Son of Sirac alludes, where he ſpeaks of this ſpecies of infidelity in general [g]—"Whoſo diſcovereth SECRETS, "[μυστήρια] loſeth his credit, and ſhall never find "friend to his mind." This, therefore, is the reaſon why ſo little is to be met with, concerning the ΑΠΟΡΡΗΤΑ. Varro and Cicero, the two moſt inquiſitive perſons in antiquity, affording but a glimmering light. The *firſt* giving us a ſhort account of the *cauſe* only of the SECRET, without mentioning the *doctrine*; and the *other*, a hint of the *doctrine*, without mentioning the *cauſe*.

But now a remarkable exception to all we have been ſaying, concerning the *ſecrecy* of the *Myſteries*, obtrudes itſelf upon us, in the caſe of the CRETANS; who, as Diodorus Siculus aſſures us, celebrated their *Myſteries* OPENLY, and taught their ἀπόῤῥητα without reſerve. His words are theſe: "At Cnoſſus in "Crete, it was provided for, by an ancient law, "that theſe *Myſteries* ſhould be ſhewn openly to all: "and that thoſe things, which in other places were "delivered in ſecret, ſhould be hid from none who

keep that truth a ſecret which Euhemerus divulged. He who, by divulging it, overthrew Paganiſm, and never troubled himſelf to ſubſtitute any other ſcheme of Public Worſhip in it's room, might fairly be ſuppoſed to intend the deſtruction of Religion in general.

[f] Euſeb. *Præp. Evang.* lib. ii. cap. 2.

[g] ὁ ἀποκαλύπτων ΜΥΣΤΗΡΙΑ, ἀπώλεσε πίστιν, καὶ οὐ μὴ εὕρῃ φίλον κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ. Cap. xxvii. v. 16.

" were deſirous of knowing them [h]." But, as contrary as this ſeems to the principles delivered above, it will be found, on attentive reflection, altogether to confirm them. We have ſhewn, that the *great ſecret* was the detection of Polytheiſm; which was done by teaching the original of the Gods; their birth from mortals; and their advancement to divine honour, for benefits done to their Country, or Mankind. But it is to be obſerved, that the Cretans proclaimed this to all the world, by ſhewing, and boaſting of the tomb of Jupiter himſelf, the *Father of Gods and Men.* How then could they tell that as a ſecret in their *Myſteries*, which they told to every one out of them? Nor is it leſs remarkable that the Cretans themſelves, as Diodorus, in the ſame place, tells us, gave this very circumſtance of their celebrating the *Myſteries openly* as a proof of their being the firſt who had conſecrated dead mortals. " Theſe are the old ſtories which " the Cretans tell of their Gods, who, they pretend " to ſay, were born amongſt them. And they urge " this as an invincible reaſon to prove that the ado- " ration, the worſhip, and the MYSTERIES of theſe " Gods were firſt derived from Crete to the reſt of " the world; for, whereas, amongſt the Athenians, " thoſe moſt illuſtrious *Myſteries* of all, called the " *Eleuſinian*, thoſe of Samothrace, and thoſe of the " Ciconians in Thrace, of Orpheus's inſtitution, are " all celebrated in SECRET: yet in Crete [i]"——and

[h] Καλὰ δὲ τὴν Κρήτην ἐν Κνωσσῷ νόμιμον ἐξ ἀρχαίων εἶναι φανερῶς τὰς τελετὰς ταύτας πᾶσι παραδίδοσθαι, καὶ τὰ παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ παραδιδομένα, παρ' αὐτοῖς μηδένα κρύπτειν τῶν βαλομένων τὰ τοιαῦτα γινώσκειν. *Bibliotb.* lib. v.

[i] Περὶ μὲν ὧν τῶν θεῶν οἱ Κρῆτες τῶν παρ' αὐτοῖς λεγομένων γεγενῆσθαι τοιαῦτα μυθολογοῦσι· τὰς δὲ τιμὰς καὶ θυσίας καὶ τὰς περὶ τὰ μυστήρια τελετὰς ἐκ Κρήτης εἰς τὰς ἄλλας ἀνθρώπους παραδεδόσθαι λέγοντες, τοῦτο φέρουσι, ὡς οἴονται, μέγιστον τεκμήριον· τῆτε γὰρ παρ' Ἀθηναίοις ἐν Ἐλευσῖνι γινομένης τελέτης, ἐπιφανεστάτης σχεδὸν ὔσαν ἁπασῶν, καὶ τὴν ἐν Σαμοθράκῃ, καὶ τὴν ἐν Θράκῃ ἐν τοῖς Κικόσιν (ὅθεν ὁ καλαδειξας Ὀρφεὺς ἦν) μυστικῶς παραδίδοσθαι· κατὰ δὲ τὴν Κρήτην ——

ſo on as above. For it ſeems the Cretans were proud of their invention; and uſed this method to proclaim and perpetuate the notice of it. So when Pythagoras, as Porphyry [k] informs us, had been initiated into the *Cretan myſteries*, and had continued in the *Idean* cave three times nine days, he wrote this epigram on the tomb of Jupiter,

Ὧδε θανὼν κεῖται Ζᾶν, ὃν Δία κικλήσκουσιν.

Zan, whom men call Jupiter, lies here deceaſed.

It was this which ſo much exaſperated the other Grecians againſt them; and gave birth to the common proverb of ΚΡΗΤΕΣ ΑΕΙ ΨΕΥΣΤΑΙ [l], *The Cretans are eternal liars.* For nothing could more affront theſe ſuperſtitious idolaters than aſſerting the fact, or more diſpleaſe the politic protectors of the *Myſteries* than the divulging it [m].

[k] *De vita Pythag.* n. xvii.

[l] Κρῆτες ἀεὶ ψεῦσται· κ) ΓΑΡ τάφον, ὦ ἄνα, σεῖο
Κρῆτες ἐτεκτήναντο. Callim. *Hymn. in Jovem.*

And Nonnus;

Οὐ γὰρ ἀεὶ φαρίμυθοι Διὸς ΨΕΥΔΗΜΟΝΙ ΤΥΜΒΩ,
Τερπομένη Κρήτισσιν, ἐπεὶ πίλοι ἠπεροπῆες. *Dionyſ.* lib. viii.

And Lucan;

Tam mendax Magni tumulo, quam Creta Tonantis.
lib. viii.

[m] The celebrated French Poet, in a late work intitled, *Le Philoſophie de L' Hiſtoire*, c. 37. *Des Miſteres de Ceres Eleuſine*, hath done me the honour of giving his Reader an exact abridgement of all that is here ſaid on the ſubject of the Myſteries: not as collected from the *Divine Legation*, but as the reſult of his own reſearches in Antiquity; ſave that when he ſpeaks of the 6th Book of Virgil, he ſays——De tres ſavants hommes ont prouvé que le ſixième livre de l' Enéide n'eſt que la peinture de ce qui ſe pratiquait dans ces ſpectacles [des Miſteres de Ceres Eleuſ.] ſi ſecrets & ſi renommés: and when he ſpeaks of the unity of the Godhead revealed in theſe Myſteries he ſays, Le ſavant Eveque Warburton, quoique *tres injuſte dans pluſieurs de ſes deciſions audacieuſes*, donne beaucoup de force à tout ce que *je viens de dire* de la neceſſité de cacher le dogme de l'unite, &c.

My *audacious deciſions* I ſuppoſe are nothing elſe than my unmaſking the ignorance and ill faith of thoſe moderns, which he and his Colleague D'Alembert conſtantly call THE PHILOSOPHERS, meaning thereby all kind of Unbelievers whatſoever.

The

The MYSTERIES then being of so great service to the state, we shall not be surprized to hear the wisest of the Ancients speaking highly in their commendation; and their ablest Lawgivers, and reformers, providing carefully for their support. "Ceres (says "Isocrates) hath made the Athenians two presents "of the greatest consequence: corn, which brought "us out of a state of brutality; and the MYSTE-"RIES, which teach the initiated to entertain the "most agreeable expectations touching death and "eternity [n]." And Plato introduceth Socrates speaking after this manner: "In my opinion, those who "established the MYSTERIES, whoever they were, "were well skilled in human nature. For in these "rites it was of old signified to the aspirants, that "those who died without being initiated, stuck fast "in mire and filth: but that he who was purified "and initiated, should, at his death, have his habi-"tation with the Gods [o]." And Tully thought them of such use to Society, for preserving and propagating the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments, that in the law where he forbids nocturnal sacrifices offered by women, he makes an express exception for the *Mysteries* of Ceres, as well as for the sacrifices to the GOOD GODDESS. "Noc-"turna mulierum sacrificia ne sunto, præter olla, "quæ pro populo rite fiant. Neve quem initianto, "nisi, ut assolet, Cereri, Græco sacro." Which law he thus comments:—"*M.* But now, Titus, as "to what follows, I would fain know how you can "give your assent, or I blame you for with-holding

[n] Δήμητρος——δούσης δωρεὰς διττὰς, αἵπερ μέγισται τυγχάνουσιν οὖσαι· τούς τε καρποὺς οἳ τοῦ μὴ θηριωδῶς ζῆν ἡμᾶς αἴτιοι γεγόνασι· καὶ τὴν τελετὴν, ἧς οἱ μετέχοντες περί τε τῆς τοῦ βίου τελευτῆς, καὶ τοῦ σύμπαντος αἰῶνος ἡδίους τὰς ἐλπίδας ἔχουσιν. *Panegyr.*

[o] Καὶ κινδυνεύουσι καὶ οἱ τὰς τελετὰς ἡμῖν οὗτοι καταστήσαντες, οὐ φαῦλοί τινες εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι πάλαι αἰνίττεσθαι, ὅτι ὃς ἂν ἀμύητος, καὶ ἀτέλεστος, εἰς ᾅδου ἀφίκεται, ἐν βορβόρῳ κείσεται· ὁ δὲ κεκαθαρμένος τε καὶ τετελεσμένος, ἔκεισε ἀφικόμενος, μετὰ θεῶν οἰκήσει. In *Phædone.*

" it? *A.* What is that, I pray you? *M.* The " law concerning the nocturnal ſacrifices of women. " *A.* I aſſent to it, eſpecially as there is an expreſs " exception to the public and ſolemn ſacrifice. *M.* " What then will become of our *Eleuſinian Rites*, " thoſe reverend and auguſt *Myſteries*, if, indeed, " we take away nocturnal celebrations? *For our* " *laws are calculated, not only for the Roman, but* " *for all juſt and well eſtabliſhed policies.* *A.* I think " you except thoſe, into which we ourſelves have " been initiated. *M.* Doubtleſs I do: for as, in " my opinion, your Athens hath produced many ex- " cellent and even divine inventions, and applied " them to the uſe of life; ſo has ſhe given nothing " better than thoſe *Myſteries*, by which we are drawn " from an irrational and ſavage life, and tamed, as " it were, and broken to humanity. They are truly " called INITIA, for they are indeed the beginnings " of a life of reaſon and virtue. From whence we " not only receive the benefits of a more comfort- " able and elegant ſubſiſtence here, but are taught " to *hope for, and aſpire to a better life hereafter.* " But what it is that diſpleaſes me in nocturnal rites, " the comic poets will ſhew you [p]. Which liberty " of celebration, had it been permitted at Rome,

[p] The common reading, in which all the mſs. agree, is, *Quid mihi diſpliceat*, INNOCENTES *poetæ indicant comici*. Victorius conjectured, that, inſtead of *innocentes*, Tully wrote IN NOCTURNIS, which is certainly right. By the *poetæ comici*, I ſuppoſe Cicero meant the writers of the NEW COMEDY. The abuſes he hints at, as perpetrated in the *Myſteries*, were of a libidinous kind: which occaſioned an intrigue proper for the new comedy. And we may ſee by Fabricius's *Notitia comicorum deperditorum*, *Bibl. Græc.* lib. ii. cap. 22. how frequently the writers of the new comedy laid the ſcene of their plots in a religious feſtival or *Myſtery*. Plautus, who copied from them, opens the ſubject of his *Aulularia* in theſe words,

—— Senex
Is adoleſcentis illius eſt avunculus,
Qui eam ſtupravit noctu Cereris vigiliis.

" what

"what wickedneſs would not HE [q] have attempted, "who came with a premeditated purpoſe of indulg-"ing his luſt, to a Sacrifice where even the miſbe-"haviour [r] of the eye was deeply criminal?"

We have ſeen, that the other exception to this law againſt nocturnal ſacrifices, was in favour of the rites performed to the GOOD GODDESS, called *the*

[q] By *ille* is here meant P. Clodius, the mortal enemy of Cicero. So that his reaſoning ſeems to ſtand thus—"I allow an exception for the Eleuſinian myſteries, on account of their great uſe to civil life. But yet their celebration in the night is attended with ſtrange inconveniencies, as appears from the comic poets. And had this liberty of celebrating nocturnal rites by men and women promiſcuouſly, as in the Eleuſinian *Myſteries*, been practiſed in Rome, what enormities muſt we believe ſuch a one as Clodius would have committed, who contrived to violate the nocturnal rites of the GOOD GODDESS, to which only women were admitted?" For that the Grecian *Myſteries* were thus promiſcuouſly celebrated, appears from what Dionyſius Hal. obſerves of the purity of the early Roman worſhip; where no nocturnal vigil (ſays he) was kept promiſcuouſly by men and women, in the celebration of their *Myſteries*.——ὃ διαπαννυχιασμὸς ἐν ἱεροῖς θεῶν, ἀνδρῶν σὺν γυναιξὶν——

[r] The Ancients eſteemed *that* to be the greateſt miſbehaviour of the eye, where the ſight of *men* obtruded, though only by accident, upon thoſe *Myſteries*, which it was only lawful for *women* to behold.

[s] *M.* At vero, quod ſequitur, quomodo aut tu aſſentiare, aut ego reprehendam, ſane quæro, Tite. *A.* Quid tandem id eſt? *M.* De nocturnis ſacrificiis mulierum. *A.* Ego vero aſſentior, excepto præſertim in ipſa lege ſolemni ſacrificio ac publico. *M.* Quid ergo aget Iacchus Eumolpidæque noſtri, & auguſta illa myſteria, ſiquidem ſacra nocturna tollimus? non enim populo Romano, ſed omnibus bonis firmiſque populis leges damus. *A.* Excipis, credo, illa, quibus ipſi initiati ſumus. *M.* Ego vero excipiam. Nam mihi cum multa eximia divinaque videntur Athenæ tuæ peperiſſe, atque in vita hominum attuliſſe, tum nihil melius illis myſteriis, quibus ex agreſti immanique vita exculti ad humanitatem, & mitigati ſumus; initiaque, ut appellantur, ita revera principia vitæ cognovimus; neque ſolum cum lætitia vivendi rationem accepimus, ſed etiam cum ſpe meliore moriendi. Quid autem mihi diſpliceat IN NOCTURNIS, Poëtæ indicant Comici. Qua licentia Romæ data, quidnam egiſſet ille, qui in ſacrificium cogitatam libidinem intulit, quo ne imprudentiam quidem oculorum adjici fas fuit? *De Legg.* lib. ii. cap. 14.

public and solemn sacrifice. This was offered pro populo, for the safety of the people. So that Cicero, ranking the *Eleusinian* with these rites, appears to have thought them in the number of such as were celebrated for the public safety. Solon, the famous lawgiver of Athens, long before him, had the same high opinion of these *Mysteries*, as is seen by the care he took of their regulation; and so had Prætextatus, a most accomplished Roman magistrate, long after him: For when his master, Valentinian, had divided the Empire with his brother, and projected a general reform of the laws, and, amongst the rest, had forbid NOCTURNAL SACRIFICES; he was persuaded by Prætextatus, who governed for him in Greece, to make an exception for the *Mysteries of Ceres*; which had been brought to Rome very early[t], and incorporated into the national worship[u], and long afterwards regulated anew by the wise emperor Hadrian[w].

Zosimus tells the story in this manner: "The "supreme power being thus divided, Valentinian "entered on his new command with a more serious "attention to his office. He reformed the Magi-"stracy, he regulated the Revenue, and, by a rigid "exaction of the Duties secured the pay of the sol-"diery, which arose out of that fund: and having "determined likewise to new model and promulge "the imperial Institutes, *beginning*, as they say, from "the foundation, he forbad the celebration of all "NOCTURNAL rites and sacrifices; with design to "obviate the enormities which the opportunity of

[t] As appears by Tully's Oration for Corn. Balbus, and by a passage in his second book, cap. 24. *Of the nature of the Gods*, quoted above; and likewise from Dionys. Hal. lib. i. cap. 33. *Antiq.* Ἱδρύσαντο δὲ καὶ Δήμητρος ἱερὸν, καὶ τὰς θυσίας αὐτῇ διὰ γυναικῶν τε καὶ νηφαλίους ἔθυσαν, ὡς Ἕλλησι νόμος, ὧν οὐδὲν ὁ καθ' ἡμᾶς ἠλλαξε χρόνος.

[u] Suetonius, *Vita Aug.* cap. 93.

[w] Aurel. Victor. in *Hadr.*

"these

"theſe ſeaſons gave birth to, and enflamed. But "when Prætextatus, a man adorned with every vir- "tue both of public and private life, who then go- "verned Greece in quality of proconſul, had given "him to underſtand that this law would occaſion "great diſorders in Greece, and even throw the in- "habitants into deſpair, when they ſhould find that "they were forbidden to celebrate, according to an- "cient cuſtom, thoſe moſt holy *Myſteries*, which "had now taken in the whole race of mankind, he "gave leave to a ſuſpenſion of his law, with regard "to Theſe; on condition, however, that every "thing ſhould be reduced to the primitive purity "and ſimplicity[x]." Thus the ELEUSINIAN MYSTERIES got a reprieve, till the reign of Theodoſius the elder, when they were finally aboliſhed. The terms Prætextatus uſed to ſhew the ill conſequence of the ſuppreſſion, are very remarkable: he ſaid, the Greeks would, from thenceforth, lead ΑΒΙΩΤΟΝ ΒΙΟΝ, *a comfortleſs lifeleſs life.* But this could not be ſaid, with any truth, or propriety, of the taking away a mere religious rite, how venerable ſoever it was become by its antiquity. To apprehend the force of the expreſſion, we muſt have in mind what hath been ſaid of the doctrines taught in thoſe Rites, namely, a *Providence*, and a *future ſtate of rewards and puniſhments*, on whoſe ſole account the Rites

[x] Τῆς τοίνυν ἀρχῆς ὕτω διαιρεθείσης ὁ Ουαλεντινιανὸς ἐμβριθέστερον τῇ ἀρχῇ προσιλθών, ἀρχοντάς τε ἐν κόσμῳ προῆγεν, καὶ περὶ τὰς εἰσπραξεις τῶν εἰσφορῶν, καὶ τὰς ἐκ τούτων χορηγημάτας τραπιωλικὰς σιτήσεις, ἀκριβέστατα· ἡν· ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ νόμων εἰσφορὰς ἐγνώκει ποιήσασθαι, ἀφ' ἑτέρας ὥσπερ ἀρξάμενος, τὰς κυκλικὰς ἐκόλυε θυσίας ἐπιτελεῖσθαι, τοῖς μυσαρῶς μὲν ἐν πρατηγμένοις ἐμποδὼν διὰ τὸ τοιῦδε νόμῳ γενέσθαι βεβλόμενος· ἐπεὶ δὲ Πραιλεξτάτου, ὁ τῆς Ἑλλάδος τὴν αὐθύπαλον ἔχων ἀρχὴν, αὐτὸς ἐν πᾶσαις διαπρέπων ταῖς ἀρεταῖς, τοῦτον ἔφη τὸν νόμον ΑΒΙΩΤΟΝ τοῖς Ἕλλησι καλεῖσθαι τὸν BION, εἰ μέλλοιεν κωλύεσθαι τὰ συνέχοντα τὸ ἀνθρώπειον γένος ἁγιώτατα μυστήρια κατὰ θεσμὸν ἐκπλεῖν ἐπέτρεψεν, ἀρχαίοις τῷ νόμῳ πρᾶγμα δὲ παλαὶ κατὰ τὰ ἐξ ἀρχῆς πάτρια. Lib. iv. *Hiſt. Nouæ.*

were inſtituted. Now theſe doctrines being in themſelves of the moſt engaging nature; taught here in the moſt intereſting manner; and receiving from hence their chief credit; it was no wonder that the Greeks ſhould eſteem the abolition of the MYSTERIES as the greateſt evil: the life of man being, indeed, without the comfort and ſupport of theſe doctrines, no better than a *living death*: hence it was, that the ſage Iſocrates called the MYSTERIES, *the thing, human nature principally ſtands in need of*[y]. And that Ariſtides ſaid, *the welfare of Greece was ſecured by the Eleuſinian Myſteries alone*[z]. Indeed the Greeks ſeemed to place their chief happineſs in them: ſo Euripides makes Hercules ſay[a], *I was bleſt, when I got a ſight of the myſteries:* and it was a proverbial ſpeech, when any one thought himſelf in the higheſt degree happy, to ſay, *I ſeem as if I had been initiated in the higher myſteries*[b].

1. But now, ſuch is the fate of human things, Theſe MYSTERIES, venerable as they were, in their firſt inſtitution, did, it muſt be owned, in courſe of time, fearfully degenerate; and thoſe very proviſions made by the State, to enable the *Myſteries* to obtain the end of their eſtabliſhment, became the very means of defeating it. For we can aſſign no ſurer CAUSE of the horrid abuſes and corruptions of the *Myſteries* (beſides time, which naturally and fatally depraves and vitiates all things) than the SEASON in which they were repreſented; and the profound SILENCE in which they were buried. For NIGHT gave opportunity to wicked men to attempt evil actions; and SECRECY, encouragement to perpetrate them; and the inviolable nature of that ſecrecy, which encouraged abuſes, kept them from

[y] Οὗ πρῶτον ἡ φύσις ἡμῶν ἐδεήθη. *Panegyr.*
[z] μόνοις Ἐλευσινίοις ὑγίαινεν ἡ Ἑλλάς. *Eleuſ.*
[a] Τὰ μυστῶν δ' ὄρφ' εὐτύχησ' ἰδών. *Herc. furens*, v. 613.
[b] Ἐποπτεύειν μοι δοκῶ.

the

the Magiſtrate's knowledge ſo long, till it was too late to reform them. In a word, we muſt own, that theſe *Myſteries*, ſo powerful in their firſt inſtitution for the promotion of VIRTUE and KNOWLEDGE [c], became, in time, horribly ſubſervient to the gratification of LUST and REVENGE [d]. Nor will this appear at all ſtrange after what hath been ſaid above. A like corruption, from the ſame cauſe, crept even into the CHURCH, during the pureſt ages of it. The primitive chriſtians, in *imitation*, perhaps, of theſe pagan rites, or from the *ſame kind of ſpirit*, had a cuſtom of celebrating VIGILS in the night; which, at firſt, were performed with all becoming ſanctity: but, in a little time, they were ſo over-run with abuſes, that it was neceſſary to aboliſh them. The account Bellarmine gives of the matter, is this: "Quoniam occaſione nocturnarum vigiliarum ab-"uſus quidam irrepere cœperant, vel potius flagitia "non raro committi, placuit eccleſiæ nocturnos "conventus & vigilias proprie dictas intermittere, "ac ſolum in iiſdem diebus celebrare jejunia [e]." And the ſame remedy, Cicero [f] tells us, Diagondas the Theban was forced to apply to the diſorders of the *Myſteries*.

2. However, this was not the only, though it was the moſt powerful cauſe of the depravation of the *Myſteries*. Another doubtleſs was their being ſometimes under the patronage of thoſe Deities, who were ſuppoſed to inſpire and preſide over ſenſual

[c] ——Τὰ μυστήρια—ὅτι ἐπὶ παιδείᾳ καὶ ἐπανορθώσει τοῦ βίου καλεῖσθη πάλαι ταῦτα ὑπὸ τῶν παλαιῶν.

[d] Ἡ γὰρ τεκνοφόνους ΤΕΛΕΤΑΣ, ἢ ΚΡΥΦΙΑ ΜΥΣΤΗΡΙΑ, ἢ ἐμμανεῖς ἐξ ἄλλων θεσμῶν κόμους ἄγουσες, οὔτε βίους ἔτι γάμους καθαροὺς ἔτι φυλάσσουσιν, ἕτερος δ' ἕτερον ἢ ΛΟΚΩΝ ΑΝΑΙΡΕΙ, ἢ ΝΟΘΕΥΩΝ ΟΔΥΝΑ. *Wiſdom of Sol.* xiv. 23, 24.

[e] *De Eccl. Triumph.* lib. iii. cap. ult.

[f] —Atque omnia nocturna, ne nos duriores forte videamur, in media Græcia Diagondas Thebanus lege perpetua ſuſtulit. *De Legg.* lib. ii. cap. 15.

paſſions,

passions, such as Bacchus, Venus, and Cupid; for these had all their *Mysteries*: And where was the wonder, if the *Initiated* should be sometimes inclined to give a loose to those vices, in which the patron God was supposed to delight? And in this case, the HIDDEN DOCTRINE came too late to put a stop to the disorder. However, it is remarkable, and confirms what hath been said concerning the origin of the *Mysteries*, and of their being invented to perpetuate the doctrine of a future state, that this doctrine continued to be taught even in the most debauched celebrations of the Mysteries of Cupid [g] and Bacchus [h]. Nay, even that very flagitious part of the mysterious rites when at worst, *the carrying the* ΚΤΕΙΣ *and* ΦΑΛΛΟΣ *in procession*, was introduced but under pretence of their being *emblems* [i] of the mystical regeneration

[g] Ἀγαθὸν μὲν, ὦ ἑταῖρε, τῆς ἐν Ἐλευσῖνι τελετῆς μετασχεῖν, ἐγὼ δὲ ὁρῶ τοῖς ΕΡΩΤΟΣ ὁρτιασταῖς καὶ μύσταις ἐν ᾅδου βελτίωνα μοῖραν οὖσαν. Plutarchus Ἐρωτικῶ.

[h] Κέλσος—οἰέταί γε ἐπὶ θάμβει τῶν ἰδιωτῶν ταῦθ' ἡμᾶς ποιεῖν, οὐχὶ δὲ τἀληθῆ περὶ κολάσεων λέγοντας ἀναγκαίων τοῖς ἡμαρτηκόσι· διόπερ ἐξομοῖσι ἡμᾶς τοῖς ἐν ταῖς ΒΑΚΧΙΚΑΙΣ τελεταῖς τὰ φάσματα καὶ δείματα προεισάγουσι. Orig. *contra Celsum*, lib. iv. p. 167. Sp.

[i] Καὶ γὰρ αἱ τελεταὶ, καὶ τὰ ὄρτια, τὰ τούτων εἶχεν ΑΙΝΙΓΜΑΤΑ. τὴν κτένα μὲν ἡ Ἐλευσὶς, ἡ φαλλαγωγία δὲ τὸν φαλλόν. Theodoret, *Therapeut.* lib. i. Here the father uses the word αἰνίγματα ironically, and in derision of the pagans, who pretended, that these processions were mystical, symbolical, and enigmatical; otherwise he had used the word improperly; for the κτεὶς and φαλλὸς could never be the αἰνίγματα of the pollutions committed by them: αἴνιγμα signifying the obscure imitation of a thing represented by a *different* image.—So Tertullian against the Valentinians says, "Virile membrum totum esse MYSTERIUM." Jamblichus gives another reason for these things: διὰ τοῦτο ἔν τε κωμῳδίᾳ καὶ τραγῳδίᾳ ἀλλότρια παθη θεωρῶντες, ἵσταμεν τὰ οἰκεῖα πάθη, καὶ μετριώτερα ἀπεργαζόμεθα, καὶ ἀποκαθαίρομεν· ἔν τε τοῖς ἱεροῖς, θεάμασι τισι καὶ ἀκούσμασι τῶν αἰσχρῶν, ἀπολυόμεθα τῆς ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων ἀπ' αὐτῶν συμπιπτούσης βλάβης. *De mysteriis*, § i. cap. 11. However, in common life, *figuram pudendi virilis ad fascini omne genus expugnandum multum valere crederent.* A superstition, which, without doubt, arose from its *enigmatic* station in the *mysteries*; and to this day keeps its hold amongst the common people in Italy.—On les portoit

generation and new life, into which the Initiated had engaged themſelves to enter.

3. The laſt *cauſe* to which one may aſcribe their corruption, was the Hierophant's withdrawing the *Myſteries* from the care and inſpection of the civil Magiſtrate; whoſe original Inſtitution they were: and, therefore, in the purer ages of Greece, the deputies of the States preſided in them: and, ſo long, they were ſafe from notorious abuſes. But in after-times it would happen, that a little prieſt, who had borne an inferior ſhare in theſe rites, would leave his ſociety and country, and ſet up for himſelf; and in a clandeſtine manner, without the allowance or knowledge of the Magiſtrate, inſtitute and celebrate the *Myſteries* in private Conventicles. From rites ſo managed, it is eaſy to believe, many enormities would ariſe. This was the original of thoſe horrid impieties committed in the *Myſteries of Bacchus* at Rome; of which the hiſtorian Livy has given ſo circumſtantial an account: for, in the beginning of his ſtory, he tells us, the miſchief was occaſioned by one of theſe prieſt's bringing the *Myſteries* into Etruria, on his own head, uncommiſſioned by his ſuperiors in Greece, from whom he learnt them; and unauthorized by the State, into which he had introduced them. The words of Livy ſhew that the *Myſteries* were, in their own nature, a very different affair; and invented for the improvement of Knowledge and Virtue. "A Greek of mean extraction (ſays "he[k]) a little prieſt and ſoothſayer, came firſt into

portoit comme des préſervatifs contre les charmes, les mauvais regards & les enchantemens.—Cette pratique ſuperſtitieuſe ne s'en eſt pas moins conſervée juſqu' a preſent dans le bas Peuple du Royaume de Naples. L'on m'a fait voir pluſieurs de ces *Priapes*, que des gens ont la ſimplicité de porter au bras ou ſur la poitrine. *Winkelman ſur les decouvertes D'Herculanum, p.* 41.

[k] Græcus ignobilis in Etruriam primum venit, nulla cum arte earum, quas multas ad animorum corporumque cultum nobis eruditissima omnium gens invexit, ſed ſacrificulus & vates. *Hiſt.* lib. xxxix.

"Etruria,

"Etruria, WITHOUT ANY SKILL OR WISDOM IN "MYSTERIOUS RITES, MANY SORTS OF WHICH, "THAT MOST IMPROVED PEOPLE HAVE BROUGHT "IN AMONGST US, FOR THE CULTURE AND "PERFECTION BOTH OF MIND AND BODY[l]. It is farther obſervable, that this prieſt brought the *Myſteries* pure with him out of Greece, and that they received their corruption in Italy; for, as Hiſpala tells the ſtory to the Conſul, at firſt WOMEN only celebrated the Rites; till Paculla Minia Campana became prieſteſs; who, on a ſudden, as by order of the Gods, made a total alteration in the Ceremonies, and initiated her SONS; which gave occaſion to all the debaucheries that followed[m]. The conſequence of this diſcovery was the abolition of the *Rites of Bacchus* throughout Italy, by a decree of the Senate[n].

However,

[l] What Livy means by the *culture of the body*, will be ſeen hereafter, when we come to ſpeak of the probationary and toilſome trials undergone by thoſe *aſpirants* to the *Myſteries*, called the SOLDIERS OF MITHRAS.

[m] Hiſpala's confeſſion will fully inſtruct the reader in the nature and degree of theſe corruptions.—"Tum Hiſpala originem ſa-"crorum expromit. Primo ſacrarium id fœminarum fuiſſe, nec "quemquam virum eo admitti ſolitum.—Paculam ſacerdotem "omnia, tanquam Deûm monitis, immutaſſe: nam & viros "eam primam ſuos filios initiaſſe; & nocturnum ſacrum ex di-"urno, & pro tribus in anno diebus quinos ſingulis menſibus dies "initiorum feciſſe. Ex quo in promiſcuo ſacra ſint, & permiſti "viri fœminis, & noctis licentia acceſſerit; nihil ibi facinoris, ni-"hil flagitii prætermiſſum; plura virorum inter ſeſe, quam fœmi-"narum eſſe ſtupra. Si qui minus patientes dedecoris ſint, & "pigriores ad facinus, pro victimis immolari: nihil nefas ducere. "Hanc ſummam inter eos religionem eſſe; viros velut mente "captâ cum jactatione fanatica corporis vaticinari—Raptos a Diis "homines dici, quos machinæ illigatos ex conſpectu in abditos "ſpecus abripiant; eos eſſe, qui aut conjurare, aut ſociari facino-"ribus, aut ſtuprum pati noluerint Multitudinem ingentem, al-"terum jam prope populum eſſe: in his nobiles quoſdam viros, "fœminaſque. Biennio proximo inſtitutum eſſe, ne quis major "viginti annis initiaretur; captari ætatis & erroris & ſtupri pati-"entes."

[n] After I had thus diſtinguiſhed, as here, and elſewhere (in my diſcourſe on the 6th *Æneis* and on the *Golden Aſs of Apuleius*) the

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However, it is very true, that in Greece itſelf the *Myſteries* became abominably abuſed [o]: a proof of which we have even in the conduct of their Comic writers, who frequently lay the action of the Drama (ſuch as the rape of a young girl, and the like) at the celebration of a religious *Myſtery*; and from that *Myſtery* denominate the Piece [p]. So that in the time of Cicero, the terms, *myſteries* and *abominations* were almoſt ſynonymous. The *Academic* having ſaid they had ſecrets and *Myſteries*, Lucullus replies, "Quæ ſunt tandem iſta MYSTERIA? aut "cur celatis, quaſi TURPE aliquid, veſtram ſenten-"tiam [q]?" However, in ſpite of all occaſions and opportunities, ſome of theſe *Myſteries*, as the ELEUSINIAN particularly, continued, for many ages pure and undefiled. The two capital corruptions of the Myſteries were MAGIC and IMPURITIES. Yet, ſo late as the age of Apollonius Tyan; the *Eleuſinian* kept ſo clear of the firſt imputation, that the hierophant refuſed to initiate that impoſtor, becauſe he

PURE from the CORRUPT *Myſteries*, the reader will be ſurprized at the following paſſage of the very learned and candid Chancellor *Moſheim*—"Pererudite non ita pridem, quanquam non tam ſemper feliciter quam ingenioſe, de MYSTERIIS diſputavit *Wilhelmus Warburtonus* libro celeberrimo: *The Divine Legation of Moſes demonſtrated.* Cenſet vir eruditiſſimus, ad humanarum mentium immortalitatem docendam omnia inſtituta fuiſſe MYSTERIA. Dederim, in *nonnullis* religionis illius, quam recta ratio tradit, præcepta inculcata, & publicarum religionum vanitatem patefactam fuiſſe: *omnium vero hanc rationem fuiſſe, nunquam ſibi perſuadebit, qui vel* BACCHI MYSTERIA *cogitaverit, quæ teſte* LIVIO Romani ferre nolebant. *De rebus Chriſtianorum ante Conſtantinum M. Commentarii.* Cap. i. Sect. 13. not. (***). But as to the pure and uncorrupt *Myſteries* of Bacchus, authorized by the magiſtrate, the learned Writer might have ſeen p. 139, note (r), that Celſus expreſly affirms, even theſe taught a future ſtate; which truth his adverſary Origin confeſſes.

[o] See Clemens Alexandrinus, in his *Admonitio ad Gentes.*

[p] See Fabricius's *Notitia comicorum deperditorum*, in his firſt vol. of the *Bibl. Græc.* lib. ii. cap. 22.

[q] *Acad. quæſt.* lib. i.

was

was suspected to be a Magician[r]. And, indeed, their long-continued immunity, both from one and the other corruption, will not appear extraordinary, if we consider, that, by a law of Solon, the senate was always to meet the day after the celebration of these Mysteries, to see that nothing had been done amiss during the performance[s]. So that these were the very last that submitted to the common fate of all human institutions[t].

It

[r] Ὁ δὲ Ἱεροφάντης οὐκ ἐβούλετο παρέχειν τὰ ἱερὰ, μὴ γὰρ ἂν ποτε μιήσαι γόητα, μὴ δὲ τὴν Ἐλευσῖνα ἀνοίξαι ἀνθρώπῳ μὴ καθαρῷ τὰ δαιμόνια. *Philost.* lib. iv. cap. 18.

[s] ἡ γὰρ βουλὴ ἐκεῖ καθεδεῖσθαι ἔμελλε, κατὰ τὸν Σόλωνος νόμον, ὃς κελεύει, τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ, τῶν μυστηρίων ἕδραν ποιεῖν ἐν τῷ Ἐλευσινίῳ. Andoc. *Orat.*

[t] This short historical deduction of the rise and fall of the *Mysteries* will afford much light to the following passage of St. Paul, speaking of the *leaders* and *instructors* of the gentile world, —"So that they are without excuse: because that *when they* "*knew God, they glorified him not as God,* neither were thankful; "but became *vain in their imaginations,* and their foolish heart "was darkened. Professing themselves to be wise, they became "fools: and *changed the glory of the uncorruptible God into an* "*image made like a corruptible man, and to birds and four-footed* "*beasts, and creeping things.* Wherefore God gave them up to "*uncleanness,* through the lusts of their own hearts, to dishonour "their own bodies between themselves. Who changed the *truth* "*of God into a lie,* and worshiped and *served the creature more* "*than the creator,* who is blessed for ever, amen. For this cause "God gave them up *unto vile affections,*" *&c. Rom.* i. 20, *& seq.* In these words, the holy apostle evidently condemns the foolish policy of the gentile sages, who, *when they knew God* (that is, discovered God, as Paul intimates, by the light of nature) yet *glorified him not as God,* by preaching him up to the people; but, carried away, in the *vanity of their imagination,* by a mistaken principle of politics, that a vulgar knowledge of him would be injurious to society, shut up his *glory* in their MYSTERIES, and gave the people, in exchange for an *uncorruptible God, an image made like to corruptible man and birds, &c.* Wherefore God, in punishment for their thus *turning his truth into a lie,* suffered even their *Mysteries,* which they erected (though on these wrong principles) for a school of virtue, to degenerate into an odious sink of vice and immorality; *giving them up unto all uncleanness and vile affections.* That this was the apostle's meaning,

It is true, if uncertain report were to be believed, the *Myſteries* were corrupted very early: for Orpheus himſelf is ſaid to have abuſed them [u]. But this was a ſigment which the debauched *Myſtæ* of later times invented to varniſh over their enormities; as the deteſtable Pæderaſts of after-ages ſcandalized the blameleſs Socrates. Beſides, the ſtory is ſo ill laid, that it is detected by the ſureſt records of Antiquity: for, in conſequence of the crime which they fabled Orpheus committed in the *Myſteries*, they pretended, that he was torn in pieces by the women: whereas it appeared from the inſcription on his monument at Dium in Macedonia, that he was ſtruck dead with lightening, the envied death of the reputed favourites of the Gods [x].

And here the chriſtian FATHERS will hardly eſcape the cenſure of thoſe who will not allow high provocation to be an excuſe for an unfair repreſentation of an adverſary. I ſay, they will hardly eſcape cenſure, for accuſtoming themſelves to ſpeak of the *Myſteries* as groſs impieties and immoralities in their very original [y]. Clemens Alexandrinus, in a heat of zeal, breaks

ing, appears not only from the general tenor of the paſſage, but from ſeveral particular expreſſions; as where he ſpeaks of *changing the glory of God to birds, beaſts, and creeping things*: for this was the peculiar ſuperſtition of Egypt: and Egypt we have ſhewn to be the firſt inventreſs of the *Myſteries*. Again, he ſays, *they worſhiped and ſerved the creature more than the creator*, παρὰ τὸν κτίσαντα. This was ſtrictly true with regard to the MYSTERIES: the CREATOR was there acknowledged by a ſmall and ſelect number of the Participants; but the general and ſolemn worſhip even in theſe celebrations was to their national idols. In the OPEN worſhip of paganiſm, either *public* or *particular*, it was not at all true, for there the CREATURE was the ſole object of adoration.

[u] See Diog. Laert. *Proœmium, Segm.* 5.

[x] Idem, ibid.

[y] What hath been ſaid above, ſhews that M. Le Clerc hath gone into the other extreme of party prejudice, when he contends (*Bibl. Univ.* tom. vi. p. 73.) that the *Myſteries* were not corrupted at all. I can conceive no reaſon for ſo violent a paradox, but as it favoured an accuſation againſt the *Fathers*, who have much

breaks out, "Let him be accurſed, who firſt infected "the world with theſe impoſtures, whether it was "Dardanus—or—*&c.* Theſe I make no ſcruple to "call wicked authors of impious fables; the fathers "of an execrable ſuperſtition, who, by this Inſtitu- "tion, ſowed in human life the ſeeds of vice and "corruption [z]." But the wiſeſt and beſt of the pagan world invariably hold, that the *Myſteries* were inſtituted pure; and propoſed the nobleſt end, by the worthieſt means. And even though the expreſs teſtimony of theſe writers, ſupported by the reaſon of the thing, ſhould be deemed inſufficient, yet the character and quality of their Inſtitutor muſt put the matter out of all doubt. This Inſtitutor, as will be ſeen preſently, was no other than the Lawgiver, or CIVIL MAGISTRATE himſelf. Wherever the *Myſteries* found public admittance, it was by his introduction; and as oft as ever they were celebrated, it was under his inſpection. Now virtue is as eſſential to the preſervation, and vice to the deſtruction of that Society, over which he preſides, as obedience and diſobedience are to his office and authority. So that to conceive him diſpoſed to bring in, and to encourage, immoral practices under the maſk of Religion, is the ſame thing as to ſuſpect the Phyſician of mixing Poiſons with his antidotes.

much inſiſted on the corruption of them—"Les peres ont dit "qu'on commettoit toute ſorte d'ordures dans ces céremonies: "mais quoi qu'ils diſent, il n'eſt pas croiable que toute la Greece, "quelque corrompuë qu'elle ait été, ait jamais conſenti que les "filles & les femmes ſe proſtituaſſent dans les myſteres—Mais "quelques auteurs chrétiens n'ont fait aucune difficulté de dire "mille choſes peu conformes à la verité, pour diffamer le paga- "niſme: de peur qu'il n'y eût que les payens à qui on pût repro- "cher leurs calomnies. *Bibl. Univ.* tom. vi. p. 120.

[z] Ὅλλοιο δὲ ὁ τῆσδε ἄρξας ἀπάτης ἀνθρώποις· εἴτε ὁ Δάρδανος—εἴτε —τότες ἐγώγ' ἂν ἀρχικακεῖς φήσαιμι μύθου ἀθέων, καὶ δεισιδαιμονίας ἐλεθρίου πολέως, σπέρμα κακίας καὶ φθορᾶς ἐγκαλαφιεύσαντας τῷ βίῳ τὰ μυστήρια. *Admon. tio ad Gentes.*

The

The truth of the matter was this: the *Fathers* bore a ſecret grudge to the *Myſteries* for their injurious treatment of Chriſtianity on its firſt appearance in the world. We are to obſerve, that ATHEISM, by which was meant a contempt of the Gods, was reckoned, in the *Myſteries*, amongſt the greateſt crimes. So, in the ſixth book of the *Æneis* (of which more hereafter) the hotteſt ſeats in Tartarus are allotted to the Atheiſt, ſuch as Salmoneus, Tityus, and the Titans, &c. Now the Chriſtians, for their contempt of the national Gods, were, on their firſt appearance, deemed Atheiſts by the people; and ſo branded by the Myſtagogue, as we find in Lucian [a], and expoſed amongſt the reſt in Tartarus, in their ſolemn ſhews and repreſentations. This may be gathered from a remarkable paſſage in Origen, where Celſus thus addreſſes his adverſary: "But now, as "you, good man, believe eternal puniſhments, even "ſo do the interpreters of theſe holy *Myſteries*, the "Hierophants and Initiators: you threaten others "with theſe puniſhments: THESE, on the contrary, "THREATEN YOU [b]." This explains a paſſage in Jerom's catalogue of eccleſiaſtical writers; and will be explained by it. The Father, ſpeaking of Quadratus, ſays; "Cumque Hadrianus Athenis exegiſ- "ſet hiemem inviſens Eleuſinem, & omnibus pene "Græciæ ſacris initiatus, dediſſet occaſionem iis, qui "Chriſtianos oderunt, absque præcepto Imperatoris "vexare credentes, porrexit ei librum pro religione "noſtra." Now what *occaſion* was afforded at this juncture to the enemies of Chriſtianity, but only this, That, the Grecian *Myſteries* repreſenting the Faithful in an odious light, the Emperor (who but juſt

[a] Καὶ ἐν μὲν τῇ πρώτῃ [τῆς τελετῆς ἡμέρᾳ] πρόρρησις ἦν, ὥσπερ Ἀθήνησι, τοιαύτη· εἴ τις ἄθεος, ἢ ΧΡΙΣΤΙΑΝΟΣ, ἢ Ἐπικούρειος, ἥκει καταλάσκοπος τῶν ὑργίων, φευγέτω—*Pſeudomantis.*

[b] Μάλιστα μὲν, ὦ βέλτιστε, ὥσπερ σὺ κολάσεις αἰωνίους νομίζεις· οὕτω καὶ οἱ τῶν ἱερῶν ἐκείνων ἐξηγηταὶ τελεταί τε καὶ μυσταγωγοί· ὃς σὺ μὲν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀπειλεῖς, ἐκεῖνοι δὲ σοί. lib. viii.

then had been initiated into almoſt all of them) might be reaſonably thought eſtranged and indiſpoſed towards Chriſtianity; and ſo the eaſier drawn to countenance, or connive at, any injuſtice done unto it?

This, without doubt, was what ſharpened the Fathers againſt the *Myſteries*; and they were not over tender in loading what they did not approve. On this account they gave eaſy credit to what had been told to them of the abominations in the *Myſteries*; and the rather, perhaps, on account of the *ſecrecy* with which they were celebrated. The ſame *Secrecy* in the Chriſtian Rites, and the ſame language introduced by the Fathers in ſpeaking of them, as we ſee below, procured as eaſy credit to thoſe calumnies of murder and inceſt charged upon them by the Pagans. Nay, what is ſtill more remarkable, thoſe ſpecific enormities, in which their own *Myſteries* were known to offend, they objected to the Chriſtians. "Alii "eos [Chriſtianos] ferunt ipſius Antiſtitis ac Sacer"dotis colere genitalia [c]." But here comes in the ſtrange part of the ſtory; that, after this, they ſhould ſo ſtudiouſly and formally transfer the terms, phraſes, rites, ceremonies, and diſcipline of theſe *odious Myſteries* into our holy Religion; and, thereby, very early vitiate and deprave, what a pagan writer [d] could ſee, and acknowledge, to be ABSOLUTA & SIMPLEX, as it came out of the hands of its Author. Sure then it was ſome more than ordinary veneration the People had for theſe *Myſteries*, that could incline the Fathers of the Church to ſo fatal a counſel: however, the thing is notorious [e], and the effects have been ſeverely felt.

We

[c] *Cæcil. apud Minut. in Octav.*

[d] Amm. Marcellinus, lib. xxi. cap. 16. *Hiſt.*

[e] The reader will not be diſpleaſed to find here an exact account of this whole matter, extracted from a very curious diſſertation of Is. Caſaubon, a great and unexceptionable writer, in his xvi[th] *Exer.* on the *Annals* of Baronius.—"Pii patres quum intelligerent,

We have all along supposed the *Mysteries* an invention of the Lawgiver: and, indeed, we had nothing to do with them, but in that view. Now though,

" telligerent, quo facilius ad veritatis amorem corruptas superstitione mentes traducerent; & verba sacrorum illorum quam plurima, in suos usus transtulerunt; & cum doctrinæ veræ capita aliquot sic tractarunt, tum ritus etiam nonullos ejusmodi instituerunt; ut videantur cum Paulo dicere gentibus voluisse, ἃ ἀγνοοῦντες εὐσεβεῖτε, ταῦτα καταγγέλλομεν ὑμῖν. Hinc igitur est, quod sacramenta patres appellarunt *mysteria*, μύησεις, τελετὰς, τελειώσεις, ἐποπτείας, sive ἐποψείας, τελεστήρια; interdum etiam ὄργια, sed rarius: peculiariter vero eucharistiam τελετῶν τελετήν. Dicitur etiam antonomacite τὸ μυστήριον, aut numero multitudinis τὰ μυστήρια. Apud patres passim de sacra communione leges φρικτὰ μυστήρια vel τὸ εὐπόρρητον μυστήριον; Gregorio Magno, *magnum & pavendum mysterium*. Μυεῖσθαι in veterum monumentis sæpe leges pro cœnæ dominicæ fieri particeps; μύησιν pro ipsa actione; μύστης est sacerdos, qui etiam dicitur ὁ μυσταγωγὸς & ὁ ἱεροτελεστής. In liturgiis Græcis & alibi etiam ἡ ἱερὰ τελετὴ, & ἡ κρυφία καὶ ἐπίφοβος τελετὴ, est eucharistia. Quemadmodum autem gradus quidem in mysteriis paganicis servati sunt, sic Dionysius universam τῶν τελετῶν τὴν ἱερουργίαν, traditionem sacramentorum distinguit in tres actiones, quæ & ritibus & temporibus erant divisæ: prima est κάθαρσις, *purgatio*; altera μύησις, *initiatio*; tertia, τελείωσις, *consummatio*; quam & ἐποψίαν sæpe nominat. Spem meliorem morientibus attulisse mysteria Attica dicebat paulo ante M. Tullius. Patres contra, certam salutem & vitam æternam Christi mysteria digne percipientibus afferre, confirmabant: qui illa contemnerent, servari non posse: finem vero & fructum ultimum sacramentorum θίωσιν, *deificationem*, dicere non dubitarunt; quum scirent vanarum superstitionum auctores, suis *epoptis* eum honorem audere spondere. Passim igitur legas apud Patres, τῆς ἱερᾶς μυσταγωγίας τέλος εἶναι θίωσιν, finem sacramentorum esse, ut qui vera fide illa perciperent, in futura vita dii evadant. Athanasius verbo θεοποιεῖσθαι in eam rem est usus; quod mox ab eodem explicatur, *participatione spiritus conjungimur deitati*. De symbolis sacramentorum, per quæ divinæ illæ ceremoniæ celebrantur, nihil attinet hoc loco dicere; illud vero, quod est & appellatur fidei symbolum, diversi est generis, & fidelibus tesseræ usum præstat, per quam se mutuo agnoscunt, qui pietati sacramento dixerunt; cujusmodi tesseras fuisse etiam in paganorum mysteriis ostendimus. Formulæ illi in mysteriis peragendis usurpatæ, *Procul este, profani*, respondet in liturgia hæc per diaconos pronuntiari solita; ὅσοι κατηχούμενοι προέλθετε; vel, ἔξω περιπατεῖτε ὅσοι ἐνεργούμενοι, ὅσοι ἀμύητοι; *omnes catechumeni, foras discedite, omnes possessi, omnes non*

 " *initiati*.

though, from what hath been ſaid, the intelligent reader will collect, we have not ſuppoſed amiſs, yet ſince the pertinency of the whole diſcourſe, as here applied, depends upon it, he may perhaps expect us to be a little more particular.

" *iniati.* Noctu ritus multi in myſteriis peragebantur; noctu etiam initiatio Chriſtianorum inchoabatur; Gaudentio nominatur " *ſplendidiſſima nox vigiliarum.* Quod autem dicebamus de ſilentio in ſacris opertaneis ſervari a paginis ſolito, id inſtitutum veteres chriſtiani ſic probarunt, ut religioſa ejus obſervatione myſtas omnes longe ſuperarint. Quemadmodum igitur dicit Seneca, ſanctiora ſacrorum ſolis initiatis fuiſſe nota, & Jamblichus de Philoſophia Pythagoreorum in τὰ ἀπόῤῥητα, quæ efferri non poterant, & τὰ ἐκφορα, quæ foras efferre jus erat; ita univerſam doctrinam chriſtianam veteres diſtinguebant in τὰ ἐκφορα, id eſt, ea quæ enuntiari apud omnes poterant, & τὰ ἀπόῤῥητα arcana tenere non vulganda; τὰ δογματα, inquit Baſilius, σιωπᾶται· τὰ δὲ κηρύγματα δημοσιεύεται, *dogmata ſilentio premuntur; præconia publicantur.* Chryſoſtomus, de iis qui baptizantur pro mortuis; *Cupio quidem perſpicue rem dicere; ſed propter non initiatos non audeo: bi interpretationem reddunt nobis difficiliorem; dum nos cogunt, aut perſpicue non dicere, aut arcana, quæ taceri debent, apud ipſos efferre.* Atque ut ἐξορχεῖσθαι τὰ μυστήρια dixerunt pagani, de iis qui arcana myſteriorum evulgabant; ita dixit Dionyſius, *Vide ne enuntiet, aut parum reverenter habeas ſancta ſanctorum.* Paſſim apud Auguſtinum leges, *Sacramentum quod norunt fideles.* In Johannem tract. xi. autem ſic; *Omnes catechumeni jam credunt in nomine Chriſti,* SED " JESUS NON SE CREDIT EIS. Mox *Interrogemus catechumenum, Manducas carnem filii hominis? neſcit quid dicimus.* Iterum, " *Neſciunt catechumeni quid accipiant chriſtiani: erubeſcant ergo quia neſciunt.*" But the worſt part of the ſtory is ſtill behind, which the concluding words of the quotation will not ſuffer me to paſs over in ſilence. Theſe Fathers uſed ſo ſtrange a language, in ſpeaking of the *laſt Supper*, that it gave occaſion to a corrupt and barbarous Church, in after times, to ingraft upon it a doctrine more ſtupendiouſly abſurd and blaſphemous than ever iſſued from the mouth of a Pagan Prieſt. What is further to be lamented in the affair is this, that the Fathers, who ſo complaiſantly ſuffered themſelves to be miſled by theſe *Myſteries*, in their repreſentation of the Chriſtian Faith, would not ſuffer the *Myſteries* to ſet them right in the meaning of a term frequently found in the New Teſtament, and borrowed from thoſe Rites, namely the very word itſelf, MYSTERY: which, amongſt the men from whom it was taken, did not ſignify the revealing of a thing incomprehenſible to human reaſon; but the revealing of a thing kept hid, and ſecreted, which yet, in its nature was very plain and intelligible.

That the *Myſteries* were invented, eſtabliſhed, and ſupported by LAWGIVERS, may be ſeen,

1. From the place of their original; which was EGYPT. This, Herodotus, Diodorus, and Plutarch, who collect from ancient teſtimonies, expreſly affirm; and in this all Antiquity concurs: the *Eleuſinian* Myſteries, particularly, retaining the very *Egyptian* Gods, in whoſe honour they were celebrated; Ceres and Triptolemus being only two other names for Iſis[f], and Oſiris; as we have ſeen above from Theodoret: and ſo Tibullus,—

Primus aratra manu ſollerti fecit OSIRIS,
Et teneram ferro ſollicitavit humum [g].

Hence it is, that the UNIVERSAL NATURE, or the *firſt Cauſe*, the object of all the *Myſteries*, yet diſ-

[f] Ἶσις δέ ἐστι κατὰ τὴν Ἑλλήνων γλῶσσαν Δημήτηρ. *Herodot.* lib. ii. cap. 59. And again, cap. 156. Δημήτηρ δὲ Ἶσις.

[g] Mr. Le Clerc owns, that Plutarch, Diodorus, and Theodoret have all ſaid this; yet, the better to ſupport his ſcheme in the interpretation of the hiſtory of Ceres, he has thought fit to contradict them; but his reaſon is very ſingular.—"C'etoit la coûtume des payens de dire que des divinitez étoient les mêmes, "lors qu'ils avoient remarqué quelque legere reſſemblance entre "elles, *dans la fauſſe penſée où ils etoient que le plus grands de leurs "dieux s'étoient fait connoître dans toute la terre:* au lieu qu'il n'y "en avoit aucun qui ne fut TOPIQUE, c'eſt à dire particulier à "un lieu—On en trouvera divers exemples dans le petit traité "*De la deeſſe de Syrie.*" *Bib. univ.* tom. vi. p. 121. It is very true, that the Gods of the Pagans were local deities; but to think the Ancients could be ignorant of this, when it is from the nature and genius of Paganiſm, as delivered by them, that we come to know it, is a very extraordinary conceit. Indeed the Moderns, poſſeſſed with their own ideas, were and are generally unattentive to this truth; and ſo have committed many errors in their reaſonings on the ſubject. But that principle of the *intercommunity of worſhip* in ancient paganiſm (explained in another place) would have the ſame effect in ſpreading the worſhip, as if their Gods were univerſal and not local; which ſhews the Ancients not miſtaken in the point in queſtion. Yet Mr. Le Clerc, in another place, could ſee that Aſtarte was certainly Iſis, as Adonis was Oſiris; and this, merely from the ſimilitude, or rather, identity of their ceremonies.

guised under diverse NAMES, speaking of herself in Apuleius, concludes the enumeration of her various mystic rites, in these words,—" Priscaque doctrina " pollentes ÆGYPTII, CEREMONIIS me prorsus PRO- " PRIIS [h] percolentes, appellant VERO NOMINE regi- " nam ISIDEM [i]."

But

[h] There is a remarkable passage in Syncellus relating to this subject, which hath been little understood. This Writer speaking, from Africanus, of the very early Egyptian King, Suphis, says, οὗτος δὲ καὶ ΠΕΡΙΟΠΤΗΣ εἰς Θεοὺς ἐγένετο καὶ τὴν ἱερὰν συνέγραψε βίβλον, *This King was a Contemplator of the Gods and wrote a sacred Book*. The Reader may see by what Sir J. Marsham hath said on this passage [Can. Chron. p. 53.] how much it wants explaining. What increases the difficulty is the contrary account which Eusebius, in Syncellus, gives of this matter. He says that *this King was a Contemner of the Gods, and that on his repentance he wrote a sacred book*; ὃς καὶ ΥΠΕΡΟΠΤΗΣ εἰς θεοὺς γέγονεν, ὡς μετανοήσαντα αὐτὸν τὴν ἱερὰν συγγράψαι βίβλον. These obscure and inconsistent tracts of History can be only explained and reconciled by what is here delivered concerning the *Mysteries* (originally Egyptian) which had for their grand *secrets* or ἈΠΟ'Ρ'ΡΗΤΑ the detection of Polytheism, and the doctrine of the first Cause. I regard therefore this passage of Africanus, as a remarkable piece of history, which conveys to us the memory of the first Institutor of the ἈΠΟ'Ρ'ΡΗΤΑ of the *Mysteries*. The term περιόπτης peculiar to these Rites, and the ἱερὰ βίβλος, the name of that book which was read to the Initiated, very much support this interpretation. To which let me add this further circumstance,—Suphis, according to Marsham, died about forty years after Abraham. The Patriarch without question instructed the idolatrous Egyptians in the knowledge of the true God. Suphis therefore might take advantage of that knowledge, (which he found amongst the priests, with whom Abraham, as Damascenus in Eusebius informs us, had many disputes and conferences about Religion) and apply it to this purpose: And then Eusebius's account that Suphis was *a contemner of the Gods* will be so far from giving us any trouble to reconcile it to Africanus's, who calls this same Suphis a *Contemplator* of them, that they jointly tend to elucidate the general subject. For if Suphis instituted ἀπόῤῥητα in his *Mysteries*, which exposed and disgraced Polytheism, he certainly would be esteemed, by all those who had heard it, as an ATHEIST or *Contemner of the Gods*; the character given to all who opposed Polytheism both in the earlier and later times of Paganism. Now Eusebius finding this charged upon Suphis, by the same authority which says he *wrote a sacred Book*, not apprehending to what the thing referred, and

But the ſimilitude between the Rites practiſed, and the Doctrines taught in the Grecian and Egyptian

and therefore not conceiving how a *prophane* man ſhould be diſpoſed to *write a ſacred Book* or a Ritual of Worſhip, he tried to reconcile matters, by ſuppoſing that the Monarch repented of his *impiety* before he wrote his *book*. Laſtly, to confirm all that hath been here ſaid, we may obſerve, that the mode of ſpeech here uſed concerning Suphis, is the very ſame which the Egyptian Chroniclers employ when they ſpeak more plainly of the INITIATIONS of their ſucceeding Kings. Joſephus from Manetho, ſpeaking of Amenophis, hath a remarkable paſſage to this purpoſe. Φησὶ τοῦτον ἐπιθυμῆσαι Θεῶν γενέσθαι ΘΕΑΤΗΝ, ὥσπερ Ὧρος εἷς τῶν πρὸ αὐτοῦ βασιλευκότων· ἀπειπεῖν δὲ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ὁμωνύμῳ μὲν αὐτῷ Ἀμενώφει, παιδὸς δὲ Παάπιος ὄντι, θείως δὲ δυκοῦντι μετισχηκέναι φύσεως, καὶ τὰ σοφίαν τῇ προγνώσει τῶν ἐσομένων· εἰπεῖν ἐν αὐτῷ τοῦτον τὸν ὁμώνυμον, ὅτι δυνησεῖται Θεὸς ΙΔΕΙΝ, εἰ καθαρὰν ἀπὸ τε λεπρῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων μιαρῶν ἀνθρώπων τὴν χώραν ἅπασαν ποιήσειε. [*Cont. Apion.* l. i. c. 26.] "He ſays, that Amenophis *deſired to be made* "*a Contemplator* of the Gods, as was Orus one of his Predeceſ-"ſors in the Kingdom: and that he communicated this deſire to "his nameſake Amenophis, the ſon of Papis, who, by his wiſ-"dom and preſcience of futurity, was underſtood to have *partici-*"*pated of the Divine Nature*. His nameſake hereupon told him "that he might have the Privilege of *ſeeing the Gods*, if he would "*purge* the whole country from leprous and *unclean* perſons." We ſee plainly that what was here deſired by Amenophis, of his nameſake, was an INITIATION. This ſon of Papis appears to have been the HIEROPHANT of the *Myſteries*, and under that character celebrated for his ſkill in *divining*. The requeſt is enforced by the favour granted to his Predeceſſor, Orus, as Æneas's requeſt to the Sibyl, that he might viſit the infernal Regions, by the example of Orpheus, Hercules, &c.

"Si potuit Manis arceſſere conjugis Orpheus, *&c.*

The propoſed adventures are related in the high terms of *ſeeing the Gods* and *viſiting the infernal Regions*, agreeably to what has been, and will preſently be further explained concerning this ſublime phraſeology, ariſing partly from the high veneration paid to *initiation* into the *Myſteries*, and partly from the amazement occaſioned by the *Shews* and the *Machinery* exhibited in the celebration of them. The *Aſpirant* is required by his nameſake the *Hierophant*, to purify the land from the *unclean*, in conformity to thoſe previous ceremonies of luſtration which we have ſhewn were to be performed before admiſſion to the *Myſteries*. And now we ſee of how little avail, to the ſervice of infidelity, that *Parallel* is, which Sir J. Marſham has drawn between all theſe paſſages from Africanus and Manatho, and Moſes's *Viſions of God* at the *Buſh* and in the *Mount*.

[*] *Metam.* lib. xi.

Myſteries, would be alone ſufficient to point up to their original: ſuch as the *ſecrecy* required of the Initiated; which, as we ſhall ſee hereafter, peculiarly characterized the Egyptian teaching; ſuch as the doctrines taught of a *metempſychoſis*, and a future ſtate of rewards and puniſhments, which the Greek writers agree to have been firſt ſet abroach by the Egyptians [k]; ſuch as *abſtinence* enjoined from domeſtic fowl, fiſh, and beans [l], the peculiar ſuperſtition of the Egyptians; ſuch as the Ritual compoſed in *hieroglyphics*, an invention of the Egyptians [m]. But it would be endleſs to reckon up all the particulars in which the Egyptian and Grecian Myſteries agreed: it ſhall ſuffice to ſay, that they were in all things the ſame [n].

Again; nothing but the ſuppoſition of this common original to all the Grecian *Myſteries* can clear up and reconcile the diſputes which aroſe amongſt the Grecian States and Cities, concerning the original of theſe Rites; every one claiming to be the Prototype to the reſt. Thus Thrace pretended that they came firſt from thence; Crete conteſted the honour with thoſe barbarians; and Athens claimed it from both. And at that time, when they had forgotten the true original, it was impoſſible to ſettle and adjuſt their

[k] Timæus the Locrian, in his book *Of the ſoul of the world*, ſpeaking of the neceſſity of inculcating the doctrine of future puniſhments, calls them TIMΩPIAI ΞENAI, FOREIGN TORMENTS; by which name both Latin and Greek writers generally mean, *Egyptian*, where the ſubject is Religion.

[l] See Porphyrius *De Abſtin.*

[m] Senex comiſſimus ducit me protinus ad ipſas fores ædis ampliſſimæ, rituque ſolenni aſperſionis celebrato myſterio, ac matutino peracto ſacrificio, de opertis adyti profert quoſdam libros, literis ignorabilibus prænotatos; partim FIGURIS CUJUSCEMODI ANIMALIUM, CONCEPTI SERMONIS COMPENDIOSA VERBA SUGGERENTES, partim nodoſis, & in modum rotæ tortuoſis, capreolatimque condenſis apicibus. Apul. *Metam.* lib. xi.

[n] Περὶ δὲ τούτοις αἱ τελεταὶ καὶ τὰ μυστήρια ταύτης τῆς θεοῦ [Δήμητρος] τότε καλουμένης ἐν Ἐλευσῖνι, τά τε περὶ τὰς θυσίας καὶ τὰς ἀρχαιότητας ὁσαύτως ἴσχειν Ἀθηναίους καὶ τοὺς Αἰγυπτίους. *Diod. Sic.* lib. i.

differences:

differences: for each could prove that he did not borrow from others; and, at the ſame time, ſeeing a ſimilitude in the Rites [o], would conclude that they had borrowed from him. But the owning EGYPT for their common Parent, clears up all difficulties: by accounting for that general likeneſs which gave birth to every one's pretenſions.

Now, in Egypt all religious Worſhip being planned and eſtabliſhed by Stateſmen, and directed to the ends of civil policy, we muſt conclude, that the *Myſteries* were originally invented by LEGISLATORS.

2. The Sages who brought them out of Egypt, and propagated them in Aſia, in Greece, and Britain, were all Kings or Lawgivers; ſuch as Zoroaſter, Inachus, Orpheus [p], Melampus, Trophonius, Minos, Cinyras, Erectheus, and the Druids.

3. They were under the ſuperintendence of the State. A Magiſtrate, intitled ΒΑΣΙΛΕΥΣ, or King, preſided in the *Eleuſinian Myſteries.* Lyſias informs us, that this King was to offer up the public prayers, according to their country Rites; and to ſee that nothing impious or immoral crept into the celebration [q]. This title given to the Preſident of the *Myſteries*, was, doubtleſs, in memory of the firſt Founder: to whom were joined four officers, choſen by the people, called ΕΠΙΜΕΛΗΤΑΙ or Curators [r]; the prieſts were only under-officers to theſe, and had no ſhare in the direction: for this being the Legiſlator's

[o] —— Καὶ τὰ ἱερὰ τρόπον τινὰ κοινοποιεῖσθαι· ταῦτά τε, καὶ τῶν Σαμοθρᾳκίων, καὶ τὰ ἐν Λήμνῳ, καὶ ἄλλα πολλά· διὰ τὸ τὰς προσηκούσας λέγεσθαι τὰς αὐτάς. *Strabo*, lib. x.

[p] Of whom Ariſtophanes ſays, Ὀρφεὺς μὲν γὰρ τελετὰς θ' ἡμῖν καθέδειξε, φόνων τ' ἀπέχεσθαι· "Orpheus taught us the *Myſteries*; and to abſtain from murder," i. e. from a life of rapine and violence, ſuch as men lived in the *ſtate of nature.*

[q] — Καὶ εὐχὰς εὐξάσθαι καλὰ τὰ πάτρια—ὅπως ἂν μηδὲν ἀδίκῃ, μηδὲ ἀσεβῇ περὶ τὰ ἱερά—*in Andoc.*

[r] See Meurſius's *Eleuſinia*, cap. xv.

favourite

favourite inſtitution, he took all poſſible care for its ſupport; which could not be done more effectually, than by his watching over it himſelf. On the other hand, his interfering too openly in religious matters would have defeated his end; and the people would ſoon have come to regard this high ſolemnity as a mere engine of State; on which account he carefully kept behind the curtain. For though it be now apparent that the *Myſteries* were the invention of the Civil Magiſtrate, yet even ſome Ancients, who have mentioned the *Myſteries*, ſeemed not to be apprized of it; and their ignorance hath occaſioned great embroilment in all they ſay on this ſubject. The reader may ſee by the ſecond chapter of Meurſius's *Eleuſinia*, how much the Ancients were at a loſs for the true founder of thoſe *Myſteries*; ſome giving the inſtitution to Ceres; ſome to Triptolemus; others to Eumolpus; others to Muſæus; and ſome again to Erectheus. How then ſhall we diſengage ourſelves from this labyrinth, into which Meurſius hath led us, and in which, his guard of Ancients keep us incloſed? This clue will eaſily conduct us through it. It appears, from what has been ſaid, that Erectheus, KING of Athens, eſtabliſhed the *Myſteries*[1]; but that the people unluckily confounded the Inſtitutor, with the PRIESTS, Eumolpus and Muſæus, who firſt officiated in the rites; and, with Ceres and Triptolemus, the DEITIES, in whoſe honour they were celebrated. And theſe miſtakes were natural enough[2]: the poets would be apt, in the licence of their figurative ſtyle, to call the Gods, in whoſe name the *Myſteries* were performed, the Founders of

[1] And ſo ſays Diodorus Siculus, lib. i. *Bibl.*

[2] They were committed where no Myſtery was affected, in what concerned the open worſhip of their Gods. Tacitus, ſpeaking of the Temple of the Paphian Venus, ſays, "Conditorem "Templi Regem Aërian vetus memoria, quidam ipſius Deæ no- "men id perhibent." *Hiſt.* lib. ii.

thoſe

thoſe *Myſteries*; and the people, ſeeing only the miniſtry of the officiating prieſts (the Legiſlator keeping out of ſight) in good earneſt believed thoſe Myſtagogues to be the founders. And yet, if it were reaſonable to expect from Poets or People, attention to their own fancies and opinions, one would think they might have diſtinguiſhed better, by the help of that mark, which Erectheus left behind him, to aſcertain his title; namely, the erection of the officer called βασιλεὺς, or *King*.

4. But this original is ſtill further ſeen from the qualities required in the aſpirants to the *Myſteries*. According to their original inſtitution, neither *ſlaves* nor *foreigners* were to be admitted into them[u]. Now if the *Myſteries* were inſtituted, primarily for the ſake of teaching religious truths, there can be no reaſon given why every man, with the proper moral qualifications, ſhould not be admitted: but ſuppoſing them inſtituted by the State for civil purpoſes, a very good one may be aſſigned; for *ſlaves* and *foreigners* have there, neither property nor country. When afterwards the Greeks, by frequent confederations againſt the Perſian, the common enemy of their liberties, began to conſider themſelves as one people and Community, the *Myſteries* were extended to all who ſpoke the GREEK LANGUAGE. Yet the Ancients, not reflecting on the original and end of their inſtitution, were much perplexed for the reaſons of an excluſion ſo apparently capricious. Lucian tells us, in *The life of* his friend *Demonax*, that this great philoſopher had the courage, one day, to aſk

[u] — ἦλθε [Ἡρακλῆς] πρὸς Εὔμολπον εἰς Ἐλευσῖνα, βυλόμενος μυηθῆναι· ἦν δὲ οὐκ ἐξὸν ΞΕΝΟΙΣ τότε μυεῖσθαι—Schol. Hom. *Il.* Θ. It was the ſame in the Cabiric Myſteries, as we learn from Diodorus Siculus, lib. v. who ſpeaks of the like innovation made there.—δοκεῖ δὲ οὗτος πρῶτος ΞΕΝΟΥΣ μυῆσαι. As to ſlaves, hear Ariſtophanes in his Θεσμοφόριαζ.

——σὺ δ' ἄπιθ' ὦ Θρᾷττ' ἐκποδών
ΔΟΥΛΟΙΣ γὰρ οὐκ ἐξεστ' ἀκούειν τῶν λόγων.

the

the Athenians, why they excluded barbarians from their *Myſteries*, when Eumolpus, a barbarous Thracian, had eſtabliſhed them[w]. But he does not tell us their anſwer. One of the moſt judicious of our modern critics was as much at a loſs; and therefore thinks the reſtraint ridiculous, as implying, that the Inſtitutors ſuppoſed that ſpeaking the Greek tongue contributed to the advancement of piety[x].

5. Another proof of this original may be deduced from what was taught promiſcuouſly to all the Initiated; which was, *the neceſſity of a virtuous and holy life, to obtain a happy immortality.* Now this, we know, could not come from the ſacerdotal warehouſe: the prieſts could afford a better penny-worth of their Elyſium, at the eaſy expence of oblations and ſacrifices: for, as our great Philoſopher well obſerves (who, however, was not aware of this extraordinary inſtitution for the ſupport of virtue, and therefore concludes too generally) "The Prieſts "made it not their buſineſs to teach the people "virtue: if they were diligent in their obſervations "and ceremonies, punctual in their feaſts and ſolem-"nities, and the tricks of religion, the holy tribe aſ-"ſured them that the Gods were pleaſed, and they "looked no further: few went to the ſchools of "Philoſophers, to be inſtructed in their duty, and "to know what was good and evil in their actions:

[w] Ἐτόλμησε δέ ποτε καὶ Ἀθηναίους ἐρωτῆσαι δημοσίᾳ, τῆς προῤῥήσεως ἀκούσας, διὰ τίνα αἰτίαν ἀποκλείουσι τοὺς βαρβάρους· καὶ ταῦτα τοῦ τετελέτην αὐτοῖς καταστησαμένου Εὐμόλπου, βαρβάρου καὶ Θρᾳκὸς ὄντος. But the fact, that they were not a *grecian* but a *foreign*, that is, barbarous invention, is proved by their very name, μυστήρια, from the eaſtern dialect, *miſtor* or *miſtur*, res aut locus abſconditus.

[x] Auctor eſt Libanius in Corinthiorum actione, myſtagogos ſumma diligentia initiandos ante omnia monuiſſe, ut manus puras animumque ſibi ſervarent purum: καὶ τὴν φωνὴν Ἕλληνας εἶναι; & ut *in voce* ſive *ſermone Græcos ſe præſtarent*: hoc quidem profecto ridiculum, quaſi faceret ad veram pietatem, Græca potius quam alia lingua loqui. Iſ. Caſauboni *Exercit.* xvi. *ad Annales Eccl. Baron.*

"the

" the Prieſts ſold the better penny-worths, and there-
" fore had all the cuſtom: for luſtrations and ſacri-
" fices were much eaſier than a clean conſcience and
" a ſteddy courſe of virtue; and an expiatory ſacri-
" fice, that atoned for the want of it, much more
" convenient than a ſtrict and holy life[y]." Now we may be aſſured, that an Inſtitution, which taught the neceſſity of a ſtrict and holy life, could not but be the invention of Lawgivers, to whoſe ſchemes moral virtue was ſo neceſſary.

6. Another ſtrong preſumption of this original is the great uſe of the *Myſteries* to the State: ſo amply confeſſed by the wiſeſt writers of antiquity, and ſo clearly ſeen from the nature of the thing itſelf.

7. But, laſtly, we have the teſtimony of the knowing Plutarch for this original; who, in his treatiſe *Of Iſis and Oſiris*, expreſly tells us, that it was " a
" moſt ancient opinion, delivered down, from LE-
" GISLATORS and Divines, to Poets and Philoſo-
" phers, the author of it entirely unknown, but the
" belief of it indelibly eſtabliſhed, not only in tradi-
" tion, and the talk of the vulgar, but in the MYS-
" TERIES and in the ſacred offices of religion, both
" amongſt Greeks and Barbarians, ſpread all over
" the face of the globe, That the Univerſe was not
" upheld fortuitouſly, without Mind, Reaſon, or a
" Governor to preſide over its revolutions[z]."

It is now ſubmitted to the candid reader, Whether it be not fairly proved, that the MYSTERIES *were invented by the* LEGISLATOR, *to affirm and eſtabliſh the general doctrine of a Providence, by inculcating the belief of a future ſtate of rewards and puniſh-*

[y] Locke's *Reaſonableneſs of Chriſtianity.*

[z] Διὸ καὶ παμπάλαιον αὕτη κάτεισιν εἰκ θεολόγων καὶ NOMOΘΕΤΩΝ εἰς τε ποιητὰς καὶ φιλοσόφους δόξα, τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀδέσποτον ἔχουσα, τὴν δὲ πίστιν ἰσχυρὰν καὶ δυσεξάλειπτον οὐκ ἐν λόγοις μόνον, οὐδ' ἐν φήμαις, ἀλλὰ ἔν τε ΤΕΛΕΤΑΙΣ, ἔν τε θυσίαις, καὶ βαρβάροις καὶ Ἕλλησι πολλαχοῦ περιφερομένη, ὡς ἔστ' ἄνευ καὶ ἄλογον καὶ ἀκυβέρνητον αἰωρεῖσθαι τῷ αὐτομάτῳ τὸ πᾶν.

ments,

ments. Indeed, if we may believe a certain Ancient, who appears to have been well verſed in theſe matters, they gained their end, by clearing up all doubts concerning the righteous government of the Gods [a].

We have ſeen in general, how fond and tenacious ancient Paganiſm was of this extraordinary Rite, as of an Inſtitution ſupremely uſeful both to SOCIETY and RELIGION. But this will be ſeen more fully in what I now proceed to lay before the Public; an examination of two celebrated pieces of Antiquity, the famous SIXTH BOOK OF VIRGIL'S ÆNEIS, and the METAMORPHOSIS OF APULEIUS: The firſt of which will ſhew us of what uſe the *Myſteries* were eſteemed to SOCIETY; and the ſecond, of what ſupport to RELIGION.

An inquiry into Æneas's adventure to the Shades, will have this farther advantage, the inſtructing us in the *ſhews and repreſentations of the* MYSTERIES; a part of their hiſtory, which the form of this diſcourſe hath not yet afforded us an opportunity of giving. So that nothing will be now wanting to a perfect knowledge of this moſt extraordinary and important Inſtitution.

For, the deſcent of Virgil's Hero into the infernal regions, I preſume, was no other than a figurative deſcription of an INITIATION; and particularly, a very exact picture of the SPECTACLES in the ELEUSINIAN MYSTERIES; where every thing was done in ſhew and machinery; and where a repreſentation [b] of the hiſtory of Ceres afforded opportunity

[a] Ὁ δὲ τοῖς μυστικοῖς ἐγκαρτερῆσαι παραλογίλμασιν ὑπομείνας, καὶ περὶ τὰς τελετὰς αὐτὰς εὐσεβὴς καὶ δεισιδαίμων γενόμενος. περὶ οὐδενὸς ἔτι τὸν περὶ τῶν θεῶν ἔχει θρησκείαν ἀμφίβολον. Sopater in *Diviſ. Quæſt.*

[b] —ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν Πλούτευς τὴν Κόρην ἥρπασε· καὶ ἡ Δήμητρα ἀλωμένη κατὰ τὰς ἱερὰς τὸ τέκνον ἐζήτει· καὶ τοῦτο τὸ μῦθον εἰς ὕψος ἤγαγε τὸ τῶν Ἐλευσῖνι μυῶν. Juſt. Mart. *Orat. ad Græc.* prope init. Δρᾶ δὲ καὶ Κόρη δρᾶμα ἤδη ἐγνώσθην μυστικὸν· καὶ τὴν πλάνην, καὶ τὴν ἁρπαγὴν, καὶ τὸ πένθος αὐταῖν Ἐλευσὶς δεδέχεται. Clemens Alex. in *Protreptico*, p. 9.

of bringing in the ſcenes of heaven, hell, elyſium, purgatory, and whatever related to the future ſtate of men and heroes.

But to ſoften this paradox all we can, it may be proper to enquire into the nature of the *Æneis*.

Homer's two poems had each a plain and entire ſtory, to convey as plain and ſimple a moral: and in this, he is juſtly eſteemed excellent. The Roman poet could make no improvements here: the Greek was complete and perfect; ſo that the patrons of Virgil, even Scaliger himſelf, are forced to ſeek for his ſuperior advantages in his epiſodes, deſcriptions, ſimilies, and in the chaſtity and correctneſs of his thoughts and diction. In the mean time they have all overlooked the principal advantage he had over his great Exemplar.

Virgil found the epic poem in the firſt rank of human compoſitions; but this was too narrow a circuit for his enlarged ambition: he was not content that its ſubject ſhould be to inſtruct the world in MORALS; much leſs did he think of PHYSICS, though he was fond of natural enquiries, and Homer's Allegorizers had opened a back-door to let in the Philoſopher with the Poet; but he aſpired to make it a SYSTEM OF POLITICS. On this plan he wrote the *Æneis*; which is, indeed, as compleat an Inſtitute in verſe, by EXAMPLE, as the *Republics* of Plato and Tully were in proſe by PRECEPT. Thus he enlarged the bounds, and added a new province to epic poeſy. But though every one ſaw that AUGUSTUS was ſhadowed in the perſon of ÆNEAS, yet it being ſuppoſed that thoſe political inſtructions, which the poet deſigned for the ſervice of mankind, were ſolely for the uſe of his Maſter, they miſſed of the true nature of the poem. And in this ignorance, the ſucceeding epic writers, following a work whoſe genius they did not underſtand, wrote worſe than if they

they had only taken Homer, and his ſimpler plans for their direction. A great modern Poet, and beſt judge of their merit, aſſures us of this fact; and what has been ſaid will help us to explain the reaſon of it: "The other epic poets (ſays this admirable writer) have uſed the ſame practice [that of Virgil, of running two fables into one] but generally carry it ſo far, as to ſuperinduce a multiplicity of fables, deſtroy the unity of action, and loſe their readers in an unreaſonable length of time[c]."

Such was the revolution Virgil brought about in this nobleſt region of poeſy; an improvement ſo great, that the trueſt poet had need of all the aſſiſtance the ſublimeſt genius could lend him: nothing leſs than the joint aid of the Iliad and Odyſſes being able to furniſh out the execution of his great idea: for a *ſyſtem of Politics* delivered in the example of a great Prince, muſt ſhew him in every public adventure of life. Hence Æneas was, of neceſſity, to be found voyaging, with Ulyſſes, and fighting, with Achilles.

But if the improved nature of his ſubject compelled him to depart from that ſimplicity in the fable, which Ariſtotle, and his beſt interpreter, Boſſu, find ſo divine in Homer[d]; he gained conſiderable advantages by it in other circumſtances of the compoſition: for now, thoſe ornaments and decorations, for whoſe inſertion the critics could give no other reaſon than to raiſe the *dignity* of the Poem, become *eſſential* to the Subject. Thus the choice of Princes and Heroes for his perſonages, which were, before, only uſed to grace the ſcene, now conſtitute the na-

[c] *Preface* to the *Iliad of Homer*.

[d] Nous ne trouverons point, dans la fable de l'*Eneide*, cette ſimplicité qu' Ariſtote a trouvée ſi divine dans Homére. *Traité du poeme epique*, lib. i. cap. xi.

ture

ture of the action [e]: and the machinery of the Gods, and their intervention on every occaſion, which was to create the MARVELLOUS, becomes, in this improvement, an indiſpenſable part of the poem. A *divine interpoſition* is in the very ſpirit of ancient legiſlation; where, we ſee, the principal care of the Lawgiver was to poſſeſs the people with the full belief of an over-ruling Providence. This is the true reaſon of ſo much machinery in the Æneis; for which, modern critics impeach the author's judgment, who, in a poem written in the refined and enlightened age of Rome [f], followed the *marvellous* of Homer ſo cloſely. An excellent writer, ſpeaking of Virgil in this view, ſays, "If there be any inſtance in the Æneid liable to exception upon this account, it is in the beginning of the third book, where Æneas is repreſented as tearing up the myrtle that dropped blood. This circumſtance ſeems to have the *marvellous* without the probable, becauſe it is repreſented as proceeding from natural cauſes without the interpoſition of any God, or rather, ſupernatural power capable of producing it [g]." But ſurely this inſtance was ill choſen. The poet makes Æneas ſay, on this occaſion,

[e] —"Le retour (ſays Boſſu) d'un homme en ſa maiſon, & la querelle de deux autres, n'ayant rien de grand en ſoi, deviennent des actions illuſtres & importantes, lorſque dans le choix des noms, le poete dit que c'eſt l'Ulyſſe qui retourne en Ithaque, & que c'eſt Achille & Agamemnon qui querellent."—He goes on, "Mais il y a des actions qui d'elles mêmes ſont trés importantes, comme *l'eſtabliſſement, ou la ruine d'un état, ou d'une religion.* Telle eſt donc l'action de l'Eneide." lib. ii. cap. 19. He ſaw here a remarkable difference in the ſubjects; it is ſtrange this ſhould not have led him to ſee that the *Æneis* is of a different ſpecies.

[f] Ce qui eſt beau dans Homére pourroit avoir été mal reçû dans les ouvrages d'un poete du tems d'Auguſte. *Idem*, lib. iii. cap. 8. *De l'admirable.*

[g] Mr. Addiſon's *Works*, vol. iii. p. 316. quarto edit. 1721.

Nymphas venerabar agreſtes,
Gradivumque patrem, Geticis qui præſidet arvis,
Rite ſecundarent viſus OMENque levarent[h].

Now *omens* were of two kinds[i], the natural and ſupernatural. This in queſtion, was of the latter ſort, produced by the intervention of the Gods, as appears by his calling this adventure, MONSTRA DEUM: it was of the nature of thoſe *portentous ſhowers of blood* ſo frequently occurring in the roman hiſtory. And the poet was certainly within the bounds of the probable, while he told no more than what their graveſt writers did not ſcruple to record in their annals.

But this was not done merely to raiſe admiration. He is here (as we obſerve) in his legiſlative character; and writes to poſſeſs the people of the interpoſition of the Gods, in OMENS and PRODIGIES. This was the method of the old Lawgivers. So Plutarch, as quoted above, tells us, "that with divinations

[h] Lib. iii.

[i] Ulyſſes, in Homer, mentions both theſe ſorts in the following lines,

Ζεῦ πάτερ, εἴ μ'——
Φήμην τίς μοι φάσθω ἐγειρομένων ἀνθρώπων
Ἔνδοθεν, ἔκτοσθεν δὲ Διὸς τέρας ἄλλο φανήτω.

The word *omen* in its proper ſenſe ſignifies *futuræ rei ſignum, quod ex ſermone loquentis capitur.* Tully ſays, lib. i. *Divin.* "Pythagorei non ſolum voces deorum obſervarunt, ſed etiam hominum, quæ vocant omina." This ſort of omen was ſuppoſed to depend much upon the will of the perſon concerned in the event. Hence the phraſes *accepit omen, arripuit omen.* This, as we ſay, was its firſt and proper ſignification. It was afterwards applied to *things*, as well as *words*. So Paterculus ſpeaking of the head of Sulpicius on the roſtrum, ſays it was *velut omen imminentis proſcriptionis.* And Suetonius of Auguſtus: "Auſpicia quædam & omina pro certiſſimis obſervabat. Si mane ſibi calceus perperam, ac ſiniſter pro dextero induceretur, ut dirum." It was uſed ſtill in a larger ſenſe to ſignify an *augury*, as by Tully, *De Div.* lib. i.

Sic aquilæ clarum firmavit Jupiter *omen.*

And laſtly, in the moſt generical ſenſe of all, for a portent or *prodigy* in general, as in the place before us.

"and

" and OMENS, Lycurgus ſanctified the Lacedemo-
" nians, Numa the Romans, Ion the Athenians, and
" Deucalion all the Greeks in general; and by hopes
" and fears kept up in them the awe and reverence
" of Religion." The ſcene of this adventure is laid, with the utmoſt propriety, on the uncivilized, inhoſpitable ſhores of Thrace, to inſpire horror for *barbarous manners*, and an appetite for ſocial life. On this account it is that our poet here deſerts the Mythologiſts, and makes the age of CIVIL POLICY, (the time when men were firſt brought out of a ſtate of nature) *the golden age*, and SATURN to govern in it. Thus Evander ſays,

Hæc nemora indigenæ fauni nymphæque tenebant——
Queis neque mos, neque cultus erat; neque jungere tauros,
Aut componere opes norant, aut parcere parto:
Sed rami atque aſper victu venatus alebat.
Primus ab ætherio venit SATURNUS Olympo—
Is genus indocile, ac diſperſum montibus altis,
COMPOSUIT, LEGESQUE DEDIT [k].

Whereas Ovid, who ſpeaks the ſenſe of the Mythologiſts, makes the *golden age* to be *the ſtate of nature*, and SATURN to govern there, before the erection of *civil policy*.

Aurea prima ſata eſt ætas, quæ, vindice nullo,
Sponte ſua, SINE LEGE fidem rectumque colebat.
Pœna metuſque aberant: NEC VERBA MINACIA FIXO
Ære legebantur: nec ſupplex turba timebant
JUDICIS ora ſui.——
Ipſa quoque immunis raſtroque intacta, nec ullis
Saucia vomeribus, per ſe dabat omnia tellus:
Contentique cibis nullo cogente creatis,
Arbuteos fœtus, montanaque fragra legebant,
Cornaque & in duris hærentia mora rubetis,

[k] Lib. viii.

Et quæ deciderant patula Jovis arbore glandes.
Ver erat æternum——
Poſtquam SATURNO tenebroſa in Tartara miſſo—
Tum primum ſubiere domos——
Semina tum primum longis Cerealia ſulcis
Obruta ſunt, preſſique jugo gemuere juvenci[1].

For it ſerved the grave purpoſe of the philoſophic Poet to decry the ſtate of nature; and it ſuited the fanciful paintings of the mythologic Poet to recommend it.

But every thing in this poem points to great and public ends. The turning *the ſhips into ſea-deities*, in the ninth book, has the appearance of ſomething infinitely more extravagant, than the *myrtle dropping blood*, and has been more generally and ſeverely cenſured; and indeed, if defended, it muſt be on other principles. The philoſophic commentators of Homer's poems, had brought the fantaſtic refinement of Allegory into great vogue. We may eſtimate the capacity of Virgil's judgment in not catching at ſo alluring a bait, by obſerving that ſome of the greateſt of the modern epic poets, who approached neareſt to Virgil in genius, have been betrayed by it. Yet here and there, our poet, to convey a political precept, has employed an ingenious allegory in paſſing. And the adventure in queſtion is, I think, of this number. By the tranſformation of the ſhips into ſea-deities, he would inſinuate, I ſuppoſe, the great advantages of cultivating a naval power; ſuch as extended commerce, and the dominion of the Ocean; which, in poetical language, is becoming *deities of the ſea*.

Mortalem eripiam formam, magnique jubebo
Æquoris eſſe Deas——

He explains the allegory more clearly in the following book, where he makes theſe tranſformed ſea-nymphs accompany Æneas, and his fleet of auxiliaries, through the Tyrrhene ſea.

[1] Metam. lib. i.

Atque

Atque illi medio in ſpatio chorus, ecce, ſuarum
Occurrit comitum: nymphæ, quas alma Cybele
Numen habere maris, nymphaſque e navibus eſſe
Juſſerat——
Agnoſcunt longe regem luſtrantque choreïs.

This Miniſterial hint was the more important and ſeaſonable, as all Octavius's traverſes, in his way to Empire, were from his want of a ſufficient naval Power; firſt in his War with Brutus and Caſſius, and afterwards with Sextus, the ſon of Pompey the Great. Nor was it, at this time, leſs flattering to Auguſtus; to whom the Alexandrians erected a magnificent Temple, Porticoes, and ſacred Groves, where he was worſhiped under the title of CÆSAR THE PROTECTOR AND PATRON OF SAILORS. So he became a *Sea-God* and at the head of theſe *Goddeſſes.* For as one of his Flatterers ſaid,

" Præſenti tibi MATUROS largimur honores:
" Jurandaſque TUUM PER NOMEN ponimus aras."

As the not taking the true ſcope of the *Æneis*, hath occaſioned miſtakes, to Virgil's diſadvantage, concerning the *plan and conduct* of the poem; ſo hath it likewiſe, concerning the *Characters.* The PIETY of Æneas, and his high veneration for the Gods, ſo much offends a celebrated French writer [m], that he ſays, *the hero was fitter to found a religion* [n] *than a monarchy.* He did not know, that the image of a perfect Lawgiver is held out to us in Æneas: and had he known that, he had perhaps been ignorant, that it was the office of ſuch a one to found *religions* and colleges of prieſts [o], as well as ſtates

[m] Monſieur de St. Evremont.
[n] i. e. a community of monks.
[o] Ἔνθα Προμηθεὺς,
Ἰαπετιονίδης ἀγαθὸν τέκε Δευκαλίωνα,
Ὃς πρῶτος ΠΟΙΗΣΕ ΠΟΛΕΙΣ καὶ ΕΔΕΙΜΑΤΟ ΝΗΟΥΣ
ΑΘΑΝΑΤΟΙΣ, πρῶτος δὲ καὶ ΑΝΘΡΩΠΩΝ ΒΑΣΙΛΕΥΣΕΝ.

and corporations. And Virgil tells us this was the office of his hero,

Dum conderet URBEM,
Inferretque DEOS Latio——

On the other hand Turnus, whoſe manners are contraſted with thoſe of our Hero, is, on his very firſt appearance, marked out by his irreverence to the Prieſteſs of Juno. But the humanity of Æneas offends this critic as well as his piety; he calls him a mere St. Swithin, always raining. The beauty of that circumſtance eſcaped him. It was proper to repreſent a perfect Lawgiver as quickly touched with all the affections of humanity: and the example was the rather to be inforced, becauſe vulgar Politicians are but too generally ſeen diveſted of theſe common notices; and the habit of vulgar heroiſm is apt to induce paſſions very oppoſite to them. Thus Virgil having painted Turnus in all the colours of Achilles, and Æneas in thoſe of Hector (for the ſubject of the *Iliad* being the deſtruction of a vicious and corrupt Community, the fitteſt inſtrument was a brutal warrior, *acer*, *iracundus*, ſuch as Achilles; and the ſubject of the *Æneid* being the erection of a great and virtuous Empire, the fitteſt inſtrument was a pious patriot, like Hector,) Turnus, I ſay, was to be characteriſed as one delighting in blood and ſlaughter.

Sævit amor ferri, & SCELERATA inſania belli,
Ira ſuper [p]——

And, to make this paſſion the more deteſtable, the Poet tells us it was inſpired into him by a Fury. But when he repreſents Æneas as accepting the favourable ſigns from Heaven, which puſhed him on to war, he draws him, agreeable to ſuch a character,

[p] Lib. vii. v. 461.

com-

compaſſionating the miſeries which his very enemies, by their breach of faith, were to ſuffer in it.

Heu, quantæ miſeris cædes Laurentibus inſtant!
Quas pœnas mihi, Turne, dabis! quam multa per undas
Scuta virûm, galeaſque, & fortia corpora volves,
Tibri pater! poſcant acies, & fœdera rumpant [q].

But the circumſtances of his Miſtreſs, as well as thoſe of his Rival, are artfully contrived to ſet off His PIETY. On excuſing his departure to the enraged Queen of Carthage, as forced by the command of the Gods, ſhe is made to anſwer him with this Epicurean ſcoff,

" Scilicet is ſuperis LABOR eſt, ea *cura* QUIETOS
" SOLLICITAT [r]———

very properly put into the mouth of a Woman immerſed in voluptuous pleaſures. Yet the Poet takes care to tell us, that her impiety, like Turnus's delight in blood and ſlaughter, was inſpired by the Furies.

" Heu! Furiis incenſa feror———

But there is a further beauty in this circumſtance of the Epiſode. Theſe two Lovers are made the Founders of the two Hoſtile States of Rome and Carthage. So, this was to inſinuate (in ſupport of the author's main purpoſe) That it was want of religion which occaſioned the *Punica Fides*; and the pious culture of it, which created the

Altæ Moenia Romæ.

Again, the Hero was to be drawn no leſs maſter of himſelf, under the charms of the ſofter paſſions, than under the violence of the rougher and more horrid. M. Voltaire ſays,

[q] Lib. viii. v. 537. [r] Lib. iv.

Virgile orne mieux la raiſon,
A plus d' art, autant d' harmonie;
Mais il s' epuiſe avec Didon,
Et rate à la fin Lavinie.

But this ingenious man did not conſider, that the Epiſode of Dido and Æneas, was not given to ornament his poem with an amuſing tale of a love adventure, but to expoſe the public miſchiefs which ariſe from Rulers' indulging themſelves in this voluptuous weakneſs, while they become

Regnorum immemores, turpique cupidine captæ.

The Poet therefore had defeated his own deſign, if when he had recovered his Hero from this weakneſs, and made him ſay of his deſtined Empire in Italy,

——hic Amor, hæc Patria eſt——

if when he had perfected his Character and brought him to the end of his labours, he had ſtill drawn him ſtruggling with this impotent and unruly paſſion.

Nor is the view, in which we place this poem, leſs ſerviceable to the vindication of the Poet's other characters. The learned author of the *Enquiry into the life and writings of Homer*, will allow me to differ from him, in thinking that thoſe *uniform manners* in the Æneis, which he ſpeaks of, was the effect of deſign, not, as he would have it, of cuſtom and habit: "Virgil, ſays he, had ſeen much of the "ſplendor of a court, the magnificence of a palace, "and the grandeur of a royal equipage: accordingly "his repreſentations of that part of life, are more "auguſt and ſtately than Homer's. He has a greater regard to decency, and thoſe poliſhed manners, "that render men ſo much of a piece, and make "them all reſemble one another in their conduct and "behaviour [a]." For the Æneis being a ſyſtem of

[a] Page 325.

Poli-

Politics, what this writer calls *the eternity of a government, the form of a magiſtrature, and plan of dominion*, muſt needs be *familiar with the Roman poet*; and nothing could be more to his purpoſe, than a repreſentation of *poliſhed manners*; it being the Legiſlator's office to tame and break men to humanity; and to make them diſguiſe, at leaſt, if they cannot be brought to lay aſide, their ſavage habits.

But this key to the Æneis not only clears up many paſſages obnoxious to the critics, but adds infinite beauty to a great number of incidents throughout the whole poem; of which take the following inſtances, the one, in *Religion*, and the other, in *civil Policy*.

1. Æneas, in the eighth book, goes to the Court of Evander, in order to engage him in a confederacy againſt the common enemy. He finds the king and his people buſied in the celebration of an annual ſacrifice. The purpoſe of the voyage is diſpatched in a few lines, and the whole epiſode is taken up in a matter altogether foreign to it, that is to ſay, the ſacrifice, the feaſt, and a long hiſtory of Hercules's adventure with Cacus. But it is done with great art and propriety; and in order to introduce, into this political poem, that famous inſtitute of Cicero, (in his book Of Laws) deſigned to moderate the exceſs of labouring ſuperſtition, the *ignotæ ceremoniæ*, as he calls them, which at that time ſo much abounded in Rome —"Divos & eos, qui "cœleſtes ſemper habiti, colunto, & ollos, QUOS "ENDO COELO MERITA VOCAVERINT, HERCU-"LEM, Liberum, Æſculapium, Caſtorem, Pollu-"cem, Quirinum"—Thus copied by Virgil, in the beginning of Evander's ſpeech to Æneas.

Rex Evandrus ait: Non hæc ſolemnia nobis,
Has ex more dapes, hanc tanti numinis aram
VANA SUPERSTITIO VETERUMQUE IGNARA DEORUM

Impo-

Impoſuit. *Sævis*, hoſpes Trojane, *periclis*
Servati facimus, MERITOSQUE novamus HONORES——

A leſſon of great importance to the pagan Lawgiver. This *Vana ſuperſtitio ignara veterum deorum* was, as we have ſhewn, a matter he took much care to rectify in the *Myſteries*; not by deſtroying that ſpecies of idolatry, the worſhip of dead men, which was indeed his own invention, but by ſhewing *why* they paid that worſhip; namely, for benefits done to the whole race of mankind, by thoſe deified Heroes.

Quare agite, o juvenes! *tantarum in munere laudum*, &c.

The concluſion of Evander's ſpeech,

COMMUNEMQUE VOCATE DEUM, & date vina volentes,

alludes to that other inſtitute of Cicero, in the ſame book Of Laws. "SEPARATIM nemo habeſſit Deos: "neve NOVOS, neve advenas, niſi publice adſcitos, "PRIVATIM colunto." Of which he gives the reaſon in his comment, "ſuoſque Deos, aut Novos "aut Alienigenas coli, confuſionem habet religio-"num, & ignotas ceremonias."

Nor ſhould we omit to obſerve a further beauty in this epiſode; and, in imitation, ſtill, of Cicero; who, in his book Of Laws, hath taken the beſt of the Roman Inſtitutes for the foundation of his ſyſtem: For the worſhip of HERCULES, as introduced by Evander, and adminiſtred by the POTITII on the altar called the ARA MAXIMA, was, as Dion. Hal. and Livy tell us, the oldeſt eſtabliſhment in Rome; and continued for many ages in high veneration. To this the following lines allude,

Hanc ARAM luco ſtatuit, quæ MAXIMA ſemper, &c.
—Jamque ſacerdotes, primuſque POTITIUS, ibant.

But

But Virgil was ſo learned in all that concerned the Roman ritual, that it was a common ſaying, (as we collect from Macrobius) *Virgilius noſter Pontifex maximus videtur:* And that writer not apprehending the reaſon of ſo exact an attention to ſacred things, being ignorant of the nature of the poem, ſays, MIRANDUM eſt hujus poetæ et circa noſtra et circa externa ſacra doctrinam [t].

2. In the *ninth* book we have the fine epiſode of Niſus and Euryalus; which preſents us with many new graces, when conſidered (which it ought to be) as a repreſentation of one of the moſt famous and ſingular of the grecian Inſtitutions. CRETE, that ancient and celebrated School of legiſlation, had a civil cuſtom, which the Spartans firſt, and afterwards all the principal cities of *Greece* [u] borrowed from

[t] Satur. l. iii. c 6.

[u] The Etruſci ſeem to have had the ſame cuſtom, in which the public repoſed its laſt confidence. Livy tells us, that in the 444th year of Rome, when the affairs of this people were grown deſperate by the repeated defeats of their armies, they had recourſe to the *lex ſacra*, as their laſt refuge. Of which the hiſtorian gives this ſuccinct and obſcure account,——"ad Vadimoniis "lacum Etruſci *lege ſacrata* coacto exercitu, quum *vir virum le-* "*giſſet*, quantis nunquam alias ante ſimul copiis, ſimul *animis* "dimicarunt," &c. lib. ix. The commentators are at a loſs for the meaning of this *ſacred law*, in raiſing an army where every ſoldier was to chuſe his fellow. I certainly think it to be the Inſtitution in queſtion: the Etruſci were deſcended from the Pelaſgi, and had afterwards civilized and poliſhed themſelves by Grecian cuſtoms, as one may well ſuppoſe from the character Livy gives of them in this book——"Cære educatus apud hoſpites, Etruſcis "inde literis eruditus erat:——habet autores, vulgo tum Roma- "nos pueros, ſicut nunc Græcis, ita *Etruſcis literis* erudiri ſoli- "tos." But, in general, the giving a traditive original even to the moſt characteriſtic cuſtoms, is very fallacious. MAHOMET, who certainly did not BORROW from the ancient Grecian practices, yet eſtabliſhed the ſame kind of Fraternity amongſt his followers, in the firſt year of the Hegira. See Abul feda *De vita Mahommedis*, cap. 26. init. *De Fraternitate inſtituta inter Moſlemos.* And, what is ſtill more extraordinary, the Miſſionaries aſſure us, that it is one of the moſt ſacred Inſtitutions amongſt the warrior-

from them, for every man of diſtinguiſhed valour or wiſdom to adopt a favourite youth, for whoſe education he was anſwerable, and whoſe manners he had the care of forming. Hence Niſus is ſaid to be

ACERRIMUS ARMIS,

Hyrtacides;

And Euryalus,

Comes Euryalus, quo PULCHRIOR alter
Non fuit Æneadum, Trojana neque induit arma;
Ora PUER prima ſignans INTONSA JUVENTA.

The Lovers (as they were called) and their youths always ſerved and fought together;——ſo Virgil of theſe:

His amor unus erat, pariterque in bella ruebant,
Tum quoque communi portam ſtatione tenebant.

The Lovers uſed to make preſents to their favourite youths.—So Niſus tells his friend:

Si, TIBI, quæ posco promittunt (nam *mihi* facti
Fama ſat eſt) &c.

warrior-nations of the free people in North America. Which, becauſe it ſo exactly reſembles the Grecian, in all its circumſtances, I ſhall give, as I find it deſcribed by one of their beſt writers. "Chacun parmi eux a un ami à peu pres de ſon age, "auquel il s'attache, et qui s'attache à lui par des liens in- "diſſolubles. Deux hommes ainſi unis pour leur intérêt com- "mun, doivent tout faire & tout riſquer pour s'entr'aider, & ſe "ſecourir mutuellement: *la mort même, à ce qu'ils croyent, ne les "ſepare que pour un tems: ils comptent bien de ſe rejoindre dans "l'autre monde pour ne ſi plus quitter*, perſuadés qu'ils y auront en- "core beſoin l'un de l'autre.—On ajoute, que ces amis, quand "ils ſe trouvent eloignés les uns des autres, s'invoquent recipro- "quement dans les périls, ou ils ſe recontrent; ce qu'il faut "ſans doute entendre de leurs genies tutélaires. *Les* PRESENS "*ſont les noeuds de ces aſſociations*, l'intérêt & le beſoin les fortifi- "ent; c'eſt un ſecours ſur lequel on peut preſque toujours comp- "ter. *Quelques uns pretendent qu'ils s'y gliſſe du deſordre*; mais "j'ai ſujet de croire qu'au moiens cela n'eſt pas general." *Journal d'un voyage dans l'Amerique Septentrionale par le P. de Charlevoix*, tome vi. p. 14.

The ſtates of Greece, where this Inſtitution prevailed, reaped ſo many advantages from it, that they gave it the greateſt encouragement by their laws: ſo that Cicero, in his book *Of a republic*, obſerved, "opprobrio fuiſſe adoleſcentibus ſi amatores non haberent?" Virgil has been equally intent to recommend it by all the charms of poetry and eloquence. The amiable character, the affecting circumſtance, the tenderneſs of diſtreſs, are all inimitably painted.

The youth ſo educated, were found to be the beſt bulwark of their country, and moſt formidable to the enemies of civil liberty. On which account, the Tyrants, wherever they prevailed, uſed all their arts to ſuppreſs an Inſtitution ſo oppoſite to private intereſt and ambition. The annals of ancient Greece afford many examples of the bravery of theſe Bands, who chearfully attempted the moſt hazardous adventures [w]. So that Virgil did but follow the cuſtom of the beſt policied States (which it was much for his honour to do) when he put theſe two friends on one of the moſt daring actions of the whole war; as old Aletes underſtood it:

Dî patrii, quorum ſemper ſub numine Troja eſt,
Non tamen omnino Teucros delere paratis,
Cum tales animos juvenum, & tam certa tuliſtis,
Pectora.

[w] One can hardly account for that ſtrange miſtake of the Abbé Velly in his elegant Hiſtory of France, where ſpeaking of theſe *fraternities in arms* amongſt the *Northern* Nations, (for nature dictates the ſame practice to all, in the ſame circumſtances) he ſays—"On n'en trouve AUCUN VESTIGE chez ces fieres Republiques qui s'etoient attribué l'eſprit et la politeſſe à l'excluſion de tout autre Peuple: mais elles ſont de toute ancienneté chez les Nations Septentrionales, que la Grece & l'Italie plutôt civiliſees, ont juge àpropos de nommer Sauvages et Barbares." Tom. v. p. 58.

Plu-

Plutarch, ſpeaking of the Thebans, in the *Life of Pelopidas*, ſays, that "Gorgias firſt enrolled the "SACRED BAND, conſiſting of three hundred choſen "men; and that this corpſe was ſaid to be com-"poſed of LOVERS and their FRIENDS. It is re-"ported, ſays he, that it continued unconquered till "the battle of Chæronea; and when, after that ac-"tion, Philip was ſurveying the dead, and came to "the very ſpot where theſe three hundred fell, who "had charged in cloſe order ſo fatally on the Ma-"cedonian lances, and obſerved how they lay heap-"ed upon one another, he was amazed, and being "told, that this was the band of *Lovers* and their "*Friends*, he burſt into tears, and ſaid, *Accurſed be* "*they who can ſuſpect that theſe men either did or* "*ſuffered any thing diſhoneſt*. But certainly (conti-"nues my author) this inſtitution of Lovers did not "ariſe in Thebes, as the poets feigned, from the "PASSION of Laius, but from the WISDOM of Le-"giſlators [x]." Such was the Friendſhip our poet "would here repreſent, where he ſays,

Niſus AMORE PIO pueri—

and where he makes Aſcanius call Euryalus,

VENERANDE puer—

The one dies in defence of the other; revenges his death; and then falls with him, like the Lovers in the SACRED BAND:

[x] Τὸν δ' ἱερὸν λόχον, ὥς φασιν, συνετάξατο Γοργίδας πρῶτος, ἐξ ἀνδρῶν ἐπιλέκτων τριακοσίων,—ἔνιοι δέ φασιν ἐξ ἐραστῶν καὶ ἐρωμένων γενέσθαι τὸ σύστημα τοῦτο.——λέγεται δὲ διαμεῖναι μέχρι τῆς ἐν Χαιρωνείᾳ μάχης ἀήττητον· ὡς δὲ μετὰ τὴν μάχην ἐφορῶν τοὺς νεκροὺς ὁ Φίλιππος. ἔστη κατὰ τοῦτο τὸ χωρίον, ἐν ᾧ συνετύγχανε κεῖσθαι τοὺς τριακοσίους ἐναντίους ἀπηντηκότας ταῖς σαρίσσαις ἅπαντας ἐν τοῖς στενοῖς ὅπλοις, καὶ μετ' ἀλλήλων ἀναμιγνυμένους, θαυμάσαντα, καὶ πυθόμενον ὡς ὁ τῶν ἐραστῶν καὶ τῶν ἐρωμένων οὗτος εἴη λόχος δακρύσαι, καὶ εἰπεῖν, Ἀπόλοιντο κακῶς οἱ τούτους τι ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν αἰσχρὸν ὑπονοοῦντες. Ὅλως δὲ τῆς περὶ τοὺς ἐραστὰς συνηθείας, οὐχ ὥσπερ οἱ ποιηταὶ λέγουσι, Θηβαίοις τὸ Λαΐου πάθος ἀρχὴν παρέσχεν, ἀλλ' οἱ ΝΟΜΟΘΕΤΑΙ. Vol. ii. p. 218, 219. Brian. ed.

moriens

moriens animam abſtulit hoſti.
Tum ſuper exanimem ſeſe projecit AMICUM
Confoſſus, placidaque ibi demum morte quievit.

And here let it be obſerved, that, as this epiſode is given for a picture of this Inſtitution in it's purity; ſo, in the Enemies' quarter, he hath given another drawing of it, in it's degeneracy and corruption: for the SACRED BAND, like the MYSTERIES, underwent the common fate of time and malice.

—Tu quoque flaventem prima lanugine malas
Dum ſequeris Clytium infelix, nova gaudia Cydon
Dardania ſtratus dextra ſecurus amorum
Qui juvenum tibi ſemper erant, miſerande jaceres[y].

The poet hath obſerved the ſame conduct, as we ſhall ſee hereafter, with regard to the *pure* and the *corrupt* MYSTERIES.

Before I leave theſe previous circumſtances, permit me only to take notice, that this was the *ſecond ſpecies* of the EPIC POEM; our own country-man, Milton, having produced the *third:* for juſt as Virgil rivaled Homer, ſo Milton was the emulator of both. He found Homer poſſeſſed of the province of MORALITY; Virgil of POLITICS: and nothing left for him, but that of RELIGION. This he ſeized, as ambitious to ſhare with them in the Government of the poetic world: and by means of the ſuperior dignity of his ſubject, hath gotten to the head of that Triumvirate which took ſo many ages in forming. Theſe are the *three ſpecies* of the Epic poem; for its largeſt ſphere is HUMAN ACTION; which can be only conſidered in a *moral*, a *political*, or *religious* view: and theſe the three great MAKERS; for each of their Poems was ſtruck out at a heat, and came to perfection from its firſt eſſay. Here then the grand Scene

[y] L. x. ver. 324.

was closed: and all further improvements of the Epic at an end.

It being now understood, that the Æneis is in the style of ancient legislation, it would be hard to think that so great a master in his art, should overlook a DOCTRINE, which, we have shewn, was the foundation and support of ancient Politics; namely a *future state of rewards and punishments*. Accordingly he hath given us a complete system of it, in imitation of his models, which were Plato's *vision of Er*us, and Tully's *dream of Scipio*. Again, as the Lawgiver took care to support this *Doctrine* by a very extraordinary Institution, and to commemorate it by a RITE, which had all the allurement of spectacle; and afforded matter for the utmost embellishments of poetry, we cannot but confess a description of such a Scene would add largely to the grace and elegance of his work; and must conclude he would be invited to attempt it. Accordingly, we say, he hath done this likewise, in the allegorical descent of Æneas into Hell; which is no other than an enigmatical representation of his INITIATION INTO THE MYSTERIES.

Virgil was to represent an Heroic Lawgiver in the person of Æneas; now, INITIATION into the *Mysteries* was what sanctified his Character and enobled his Function. Hence we find all the ancient Heroes and Lawgivers were, in fact, initiated [z]. And it was no wonder the Legislator should endeavour by his example to give credit to an institution of his own creating.

Another reason for the Hero's initiation was the important instructions the founders of Empire re-

[z] Δείξεν Τριπτολέμῳ τε Διόκλεϊ τε Πληξίππῳ
Εὐμόλπῳ τε βίη, κελεὸν θ' ἡγήτορι λαῶν,
Δρησμοσύνην ἱερῶν, καὶ ἐπέφραδεν ὄργια πᾶσιν.
Homeri Fragm. *Hymn. in Cer.* apud Paus. *Corinth.*

ceived

ceived in matters that concerned their office [a], as we may see in the second section of the third book.

A third reason for his initiation, was their custom of seeking support and inspiration from the God who presided in the *Mysteries* [b].

A fourth reason for his initiation, was the circumstance in which the poet has placed him, unsettled in his affairs, and anxious about his future fortune. Now, amongst the uses of initiation, the advice and direction of the ORACLE was not the least: and an oracular bureau was so necessary an appendix to some of the *Mysteries*, as particularly the *Samothracian*, that Plutarch, speaking of Lysander's initiation there, expresses it by a word that signifies *consulting the oracle*, Ἐν δὲ Σαμοθρᾴκῃ χρηστηριαζόμενος, &c. on this account, Jason, Orpheus, Hercules, Castor, and (as Macrobius says [c]) Tarquinius Priscus, were every one of them initiated into the *Mysteries*.

All this the poet seems clearly to have intimated in the speech of Anchises to his son:

> Lectos juvenes fortissima corda,
> Defer in Italiam.—Gens dura atque aspera cultu
> *Debellanda tibi Latio est. Ditis tamen ante*
> INFERNAS *accede* DOMOS—
> Tum genus omne tuum, &, *quæ dentur mœnia,*
> DISCES [d].

[a] — γίνεσθαι δέ φασι καὶ εὐσεβεστέρους καὶ δικαιοτέρους καὶ κατὰ πάντα βελτίωνας ἑαυτῶν τοὺς τῶν μυστηρίων κοινωνήσαντας· διὸ καὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων ἡρώων τε καὶ ἡμιθέων τοὺς ἐπιφανεστάτους πεφιλοτιμῆσθαι μεταλαβεῖν τῆς τελετῆς· καὶ γὰρ Ἰασίωνα καὶ Διοσκούρους, ἔτι δ' Ἡρακλέα καὶ Ὀρφέα μυηθέντας ἐπιτυχεῖν ἐν πάσαις ταῖς στρατείαις, διὰ τὴν τῶν θεῶν τούτων ἐπιφάνειαν. *Diod.* p. 224.

[b] Lib. iii. cap. 4.

[c] The rhetor Sopater, in his Διαιρήσεις ζητημάτων, makes Pericles say, Πιστεύω ταῖς ἐν Ἐλευσῖνι θεαῖς, τοῦτόν μοι ἐκβεβηκέναι τὸν νοῦν, καὶ τὸ στρατήγημα τοῦτο ἐξ ἀνακτόρων δοῦναι τῶν μυστικῶν.

[d] *Æn.* v. ver. 729, & seq.

A fifth reaſon was the conforming to the old popular tradition, which ſaid, that ſeveral other Heroes of the Trojan times, ſuch as Agamemnon and Ulyſſes, had been initiated [e].

A ſixth and principal was, that AUGUSTUS, who was ſhadowed in the perſon of Æneas, had been initiated into the ELEUSINIAN *Myſteries* [f].

While the *Myſteries* were confined to Egypt, their native country, and while the Grecian Lawgivers went thither to be initiated, as a kind of deſignation to their office, the ceremony would be naturally deſcribed, in terms highly allegorical. This was, in

[e] Ἀγαμέμνονά φασι μεμυημένον, ἐν ταραχῇ ὄντα πολλῇ κατὰ Τροίαν, δι' ἀκαταστασίαν τῶν Ἑλλήνων, παῦσαι τὴν στάσιν, πορφυρίδα ἔχοντα— Ὀδυσσέα φασὶ μεμυημένον ἐν Σαμοθρᾳκῃ χρησασθαι τῷ κρηδέμνῳ ἀντὶ ταινίας. Scholia Apollon. Rhod. *Arg.* lib. i. ver. 916.

Ὄφρα δαέντες
Ἀῤῥήκτους ἀγανῇσι τελεσφορίῃσι θεμίστας ——

[f] Suet. Oct. c. xciii.—Hence the reader will be able to judge of the delicacy of taſte, and accuracy of diſcernment, in a late Writer; who, in a book called *Elements of Criticiſm*, corrects Virgil's want of judgment in this part of the *Æneis*, after having given inſtances of defects full as notorious, in the *Georgics*. "An "epiſode in a narrative Poem (ſays this Man of Taſte) being, in "effect, an Acceſſory, demands not that ſtrict union with the prin- "cipal ſubject, which is requiſite betwixt a whole and its conſti- "tuent parts. The relation however, of *Principal* and *Acceſſory* "being pretty intimate, an Epiſode LOOSELY connected with "the principal ſubject will never be graceful. I GIVE FOR "AN EXAMPLE *the deſcent of Æneas into Hell*, which em- "ploys the 6th Book of the Æneid. The Reader IS NOT PRE- "PARED for this important event. NO CAUSE IS ASSIGNED "that can make it appear NECESSARY, or even natural, to ſuſ- "ſpend, for ſo long a time, the principal action," &c. &c. V. i. p. 38.—The Critic having told us that *a ſtrict union is not required between the Principal and Acceſſory*, finds fault with the *Acceſſory*, that no cauſe is given to make it appear, that it is NECESSARY to the *principal*. However I ought not to be too ſevere on this great Critic, ſince the Obſervation was certainly made on purpoſe to recommend my interpretation of this *deſcent into Hell*; which ſhews, if not the *neceſſity*, yet the infinite grace and beauty of this noble *Acceſſory*, and the cloſe and *natural* connexion it has with its *Principal*.

part,

part, owing to the genius of the Egyptian manners; in part, to the humour of Travellers; but most of all, to the policy of Lawgivers; who, returning home, to civilize a barbarous people, by Laws and Arts, found it useful and necessary (in order to support their own characters, and to establish the fundamental principle of a FUTURE STATE) to represent *that* initiation, in which, was seen the condition of departed mortals in machinery, as AN ACTUAL DESCENT INTO HELL. This way of speaking was used by Orpheus, Bacchus, and others; and continued even after the *Mysteries* were introduced into Greece, as appears by the fables of Hercules, Castor, Pollux, and Theseus's *descent into hell.* But the allegory was generally so circumstanced, as to discover the truth concealed under it. So Orpheus is said to get to hell by the power of his harp:

Threïcia fretus cithara, fidibusque canoris:

that is, in quality of Lawgiver; the harp being the known symbol of his laws, by which he humanized a rude and barbarous people. So again, in the lives of Hercules and Bacchus, we have the true history, and the fable founded on it, blended and recorded together. For we are told, that they were in fact initiated into the *Eleusinian Mysteries*; and that it was just before their descent into Hell, as an aid and security in that desperate undertaking[g]. Which, in plain speech, was no more, than that they were initiated into the *lesser Mysteries* before they were admitted into the *greater*. The same may be said of what is told us of Theseus's adventure. Near Eleusis there was a Well, called Callichorus; and, adjoining to that, a *stone*, on which, as the tradition went, Ceres sat down, sad and weary, on her coming to Eleusis.

g —Καὶ τοὺς περὶ Ἡρακλέα τε καὶ Διόνυσον, κατιόντας εἰς ᾅδου, πρότερον λόγον ἐνθάδε μυηθῆναι, καὶ τὸ θάρσος τῆς ἐκεῖσε πορείας παρὰ τῆς Ἐλευσινίας ἐναύσασθαι. Auctor *Axiochi.*

Hence the ſtone was named Agelaſtus, the *melancholy ſtone*[h]. On which account it was deemed unlawful for the Initiated to ſit thereon. "For Ceres (ſays "Clemens) wandering about in ſearch of her daugh-"ter Proſerpine, when ſhe came to Eleuſis, grew "weary, and ſat down melancholy on the ſide of a "well. So that, to this very day, it is unlawful "for the Initiated to ſit down there, leſt they, who "are now become perfect, ſhould ſeem to imitate "her in her deſolate condition[i]." Now let us ſee what they tell us concerning Theſeus's deſcent into hell. "There is alſo a ſtone (ſays the ſcholiaſt on "Ariſtophanes) called by the Athenians, Agelaſtus; "on which, they ſay, Theſeus ſat when he was me-"ditating his deſcent into hell. Hence the ſtone had "its name. Or, perhaps, becauſe Ceres ſat there, "weeping, when ſhe ſought Proſerpine[k]." All this ſeems plainly to intimate, that the *deſcent* of Theſeus was his *entrance* into the *Eleuſinian Myſteries*. Which entrance (as we ſhall ſee hereafter) was a fraudulent intruſion.

Both Euripides and Ariſtophanes ſeem to confirm our interpretation of *theſe deſcents into hell*. Euripides, in his Hercules furens, brings the hero, juſt come from hell, to ſuccour his family, and deſtroy the tyrant Lycus. Juno, in revenge, perſecutes him with the Furies; and he, in his tranſport, kills his wife and children, whom he miſtakes for his enemies.

[h] Ἀγέλαστον πέτρα. So Ovid:

Hic primum ſedit gelido mœſtiſſima ſaxo;
Illud Cecropidæ nunc quoque *triſte* vocant.

[i] Ἁλωμένη γὰρ ἡ Δηὼ καὶ ζήτησιν τῆς θυγατρὸς τῆς κόρης, ὡς ἦλθεν ἐπὶ τὴν Ἐλευσῖνα, αὐτοκάμωτι, καὶ φρέατι ἐπικαθίζει λυπουμένη. Τοῦτο τοῖς μεμυημένοις ἀταλαιπωρίας εἵνεκεν νῦν, ἵνα μὴ δοκοῖεν αἱ τελεσμένοι μιμεῖσθαι τὴν ὀδυρομένην. Clemens *Protrept.*

[k] Ἔστι δὲ καὶ Ἀγέλαστον πέτρα καλουμένη παρὰ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, ἐφ' ἧς καθίσαι φασὶ Θησέα μέλλοντα καταβαίνειν εἰς ᾅδου· ὅθεν καὶ τὴν πέτραν ἢ ὅτι ἐκεῖ ἐκάθισεν ἡ Δημήτηρ κλαίουσα, ὅταν ἐζήτει τὴν κόρην. Schol. Equit. *Ariſtoph.* l. 782.

When

When he comes to himſelf, he is comforted by his friend Theſeus; who would excuſe his exceſſes by the criminal examples of the Gods: a conſideration, which, as I have obſerved above, greatly encouraged the people in their irregularities; and was therefore obviated in the Myſteries, by the detection of the vulgar errors of polytheiſm. Now Euripides ſeems plainly enough to have told us what he thought of the fabulous deſcents into hell, by making Hercules reply, like one juſt come from the celebration of of the Myſteries, and entruſted with the ἀπόῤῥητα. "The examples (ſays he) which you bring of the "Gods, are nothing to the purpoſe. I cannot think "them guilty of the crimes imputed to them. I "cannot apprehend, how one God can be the ſo-"vereign of another God.—A God, who is truly ſo, "ſtands in need of no one. Reject we then theſe "idle fables, which the poets teach concerning "them." A *ſecret*, which we muſt ſuppoſe, Theſeus (whoſe entrance into the *Myſteries* was only a fraudulent intruſion) had not yet learnt.

The comic poet, in his *Frogs*, tells us as plainly what he too underſtood to be the ancient heroes' deſcent into hell, by the equipage, which he gives to Bacchus, when he brings him in, enquiring the way of Hercules. It was the cuſtom at the celebration of the *Eleuſinian* myſteries, as we are told by the ſcholiaſt on the place, to have what was wanted in thoſe rites, carried upon aſſes. Hence the proverb, *Aſinus portat myſteria*: accordingly the poet introduces Bacchus, followed by his buffoon ſervant Xanthius bearing a bundle in like manner, and riding on an aſs. And, leſt the meaning of this ſhould be miſtaken, Xanthius, on Hercules's telling Bacchus, that the inhabitants of Elyſium were the Initiated, puts in, and ſays, "And I am *the aſs carrying Myſteries.*" This was ſo broad a hint, that it ſeems to have awakened the old dreaming ſcholiaſt; who, when he comes to

that place, where the Chorus of the Initiated appear, tells us, we are not to underſtand this ſcene as really lying in the ELYSIAN FIELDS, but in the ELEUSINIAN MYSTERIES[l].

Here then, as was the caſe in many other of the ancient fables, the pomp of expreſſion betrayed willing poſterity into the *marvellous*. But why need we wonder at this in the genius of more ancient times, which delighted to tell the commoneſt things in a highly figurative manner, when a writer of ſo late an age as Apuleius, either in imitation of Antiquity, or perhaps in compliance to the received phraſeology of the *Myſteries*, deſcribes his *initiation* in the ſame manner. "Acceſſi confinium mortis; & calcato "Proſerpinæ limine, per omnia vectus elementa re- "meavi: nocte media vidi ſolem candido coruſcan- "tem lumine, Deos inferos & deos ſuperos. Acceſſi "coram, & adoravi de proximo[m]." Æneas could not have deſcribed his night's journey to his companions, after he had been let out of the ivory gate, in properer terms, had it been indeed to be underſtood of a journey into Hell.

Thus, we ſee, Virgil was obliged to have his Hero initiated; and he actually had the authority of Antiquity to call this initiation *A Deſcent into Hell*, Ἡ ΕΙΣ ΑΔΟΥ ΚΑΤΑΒΑΣΙΣ. Hence ſome of the pretended Orphic odes, ſung at the celebration of the *Myſteries*, bore this title, a name equivalent to ΤΕΛΕΤΑΙ, or ΙΕΡΟΣ ΛΟΓΟΣ. And ſurely he made uſe of his advantages with great judgment; for ſuch a fiction animates the relation, which, delivered out of allegory, had been too cold and inſipid for epic poetry.

[l] ἰστέον δὲ, ὅτι εἰ μὴ διὰ τὰς ἐν ἅδῃ μύστας φαίνεσθαι λέγειν ἀλλὰ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ διὰ τὰς ἐν Ἐλευσῖνι, ἐνταῦθα μὴ ὑφίστασθαι ἡ σκηνὴ τὸ δραματικόν. in ver. 357.

[m] Lib. xi. prope finem.

We

We ſee, from Æneas's urging the example of thoſe Heroes and Lawgivers, who had been initiated before him, that his requeſt was only for an *initiation:*

Si potuit manis arceſſere conjugis Orpheus,
Threïcia fretus cithara fidibuſque canoris:
Si fratrem Pollux alterna morte redemit,
Itque reditque viam toties: quid Theſea magnum,
Quid memorem Alciden? & mi genus ab Jove ſummo.

It is to be obſerved, that Theſeus is the only one of theſe ancient Heroes not recorded in hiſtory to have been initiated, though we have ſhewn that *his deſcent into hell* was, like that of the reſt, only a view of the *Myſteries.* The reaſon is, his entrance was a violent intruſion.

Had an old poem, under the name of Orpheus, intituled, A DESCENT INTO HELL, been now extant, it would, probably, have ſhewn us, that no more was meant than Orpheus's *initiation*; and that the idea of this ſixth book was taken from thence.

But further, it was cuſtomary for the poets of the Auguſtan age to exerciſe themſelves on the ſubject of the *Myſteries*, as appears from Cicero, who deſires Atticus, then at Athens, and *initiated*, to ſend to Chilius, a poet of eminence [n], an account of the *Eleuſinian* myſteries; in order, as it would ſeem, to inſert into ſome poem he was then writing [o]. Thus it appears, that both the ancient and contemporary poets afforded Virgil a pattern for this famous epiſode.

[n] See lib. i. ep. 16. *ad Atticum.*

[o] Chilius te rogat & ego ejus rogatu ΕΥΜΟΛΠΙΔΩΝ ΠΑΤΡΙΑ. lib. i. epiſt. 9. *ad Atticum.* On which Victorius obſerves, "πάτρια fere omnes excuſi, quemadmodum eſt in antiquis, habent: "ut intelligat ritus patrios & inſtitutiones illius ſacræ familiæ, & "auguſta myſteria, ut inquit Cicero, ii. *De legg.*"

Even Servius ſaw thus far into Virgil's deſign, as to ſay, that *many* things were here delivered *according to the profound learning of the Egyptian theology*[p]. And we have ſhewn, that the doctrines taught in the *Myſteries*, were invented by that people. But though I ſay this was our poet's general deſign, in this famous epiſode, I would not be ſuppoſed to mean, that he followed no other guides in the particular circumſtances of it. Several of them are borrowed from Homer; and ſeveral from the philoſophic notions of Plato: ſome of theſe will be taken notice of, in their place.

The great Agent in this affair is the SIBYL: and, as a Virgin, ſhe ſuſtains two principal and diſtinct parts: that of the inſpired *Prieſteſs*, to pronounce the ORACLE (whoſe connexion with the *Myſteries* is ſpoken of above); and that of *Hierophant*, to conduct the Initiated through the whole CELEBRATION.

Her firſt part begins,

Ventum erat ad limen, cum Virgo, *Poſcere fata.*
Tempus, ait. Deus, ecce, Deus—
O tandem magnis pelagi defuncte periclis, *&c.*

and ends,

Ut primum ceſſit furor, & rabida ora quierunt.

Her ſecond part begins at,

Sate ſanguine divûm,
Tros Anchiſiade, *&c.*

and continues through the whole book. For as we have obſerved, the Initiated had a guide or conductor, called Ἱεροφάντης, Μυσαγωγὸς, Ἱερευς, indifferently of either ſex[q], who was to inſtruct him in the preparatory ceremonies, and lead him through, and explain

[p] Multa per altam ſcientiam theologicorum Ægyptiorum.

[q] Τὰς ἱερείας [Δήμητρος] Μελίσσας ἐκάλουν οἱ ποιηταί. Schol. Eurip. *Hippol.* Μέλίσσας κυρίως τὰς τῆς Δήμητρος ἱερείας φησί. Schol. Pind. *Pythion.*

to

to him, all the ſhews and repreſentations of the *Myſteries.* Hence Virgil calls the Sibyl MAGNA SACERDOS, and DOCTA COMES, words of equivalent ſignification: and this, becauſe the *Myſteries* of Ceres were always celebrated in Rome by female prieſts [r]. And as the female *Myſtagogue*, as well as the male [s], was devoted to a ſingle life, ſo was the Cumæan Sibyl, whom he calls *Caſta Sibylla.* Another reaſon why a Prieſteſs is given to conduct him, is, becauſe Proſerpine preſides in this whole affair. And the name of the Prieſteſs in the *Eleuſinian Myſteries* ſhews that ſhe properly belonged to Proſerpine, though ſhe was alſo called the Prieſteſs of Ceres. "The Ancients (ſays Porphyrius) called the Prieſteſſes of Ceres Μέλισσαι, as being the miniſters or Hierophants of the ſubterraneous goddeſs; and Proſerpine herſelf, Μελιτώδης [t]." And Æneas addreſſes her in the language of the Aſpirant, to the Hierophant:

Potes namque omnia: nec te
Nequidquam lucis Hecate præfecit Averniis.

and ſhe anſwers much in the ſtyle of thoſe ſacred Miniſters,

[r] So the ſatyriſt,

Paucæ adeo Cereris vittas contingere dignæ.
Juv. *Sat.* vi.

[s] Hierophanta apud Athenas eviratur virum, & æterna debilitate fit caſtus. Hieron. ad Geron. *De Monogamia.* Cereris ſacerdotes, viventibus etiam viris, & conſentientibus, amica ſeparatione viduantur. Tertul. *De Monogamia*, ſub finem. Καὶ τὸν ΙΕΡΟΦΑΝΤΗΝ ἢ τὰς ΙΕΡΟΦΑΝΤΙΔΑΣ, ἢ τὸν δᾳδοῦχον, ἢ τὰς ἄλλας ἱερείας μυρίνης ἔχειν στέφανον· δι' ἃ ἢ τῇ Δήμητρι προσθέσθαι ταύτην φησί. Schol. Sophocl. *Oedip.* col. v. 674.——It was for this reaſon that theſe female *hierophants* were called Μέλισσαι, as is well obſerved by the Schol. on Pind. *in Pyth.* the *bee* being, among the ancients, the ſymbol of chaſtity:

Quod nec concubitu indulgent, nec corpora ſegnes
In Venerem ſolvunt.

[t] Τὰς Δήμητρος ἱερείας, ὡς χθονίας θεᾶς μύστιδας, Μέλισσας οἱ παλαιοὶ ἐκάλουν, αὐτήν τε τὴν Κόρην Μελίτωδη. *De Antro nymph.*

Quod

Quod ſi tantus amor, &c.
& INSANO juvat indulgere labori;
Accipe quæ peragenda prius.

For *inſanus* is the ſame as ὀργιαστικὸς, and this, as we are told by Strabo, was an inſeparable circumſtance in the celebration of the *Myſteries* [u].

The firſt inſtruction the Prieſteſs gives Æneas, is to ſearch for the GOLDEN BOUGH, ſacred to Proſerpine;

Aureus & foliis & lento vimine ramus,
Junoni infernæ ſacer.

Servius can make nothing of this circumſtance. He ſuppoſes it might poſſibly allude to a tree in the middle of the ſacred grove of Diana's temple in Greece; where, if a fugitive came for ſanctuary, and could get off a branch from the tree, which was carefully guarded by the prieſts, he was to contend in ſingle combat with one of them, and, if he overcame, was to take his place [w]. Though nothing can be more foreign to the matter in queſtion than this rambling account, yet the Abbe Banier is content to follow it [x], for want of a better [y]. But the truth is, under

[u] Τῇ Δήμητρι τὴ Δία τὸ ΟΡΓΙΑΣΤΙΚΟΝ πᾶν, καὶ τὸ Βακχικὸν, καὶ τὸ χορικὸν, καὶ τὸ περὶ τὰς τελέτας μυστικόν. lib. x.

[w] But Servius, in his explanation of the *branch*, went upon the abſurd ſuppoſition that Æneas's deſcent into hell was the ſame with that of Ulyſſes, in Homer, *a necromantic incantation* by ſacrifice, to call up the ſhadows of the dead. "Ramus enim neceſſe erat, "ut & unius cauſa eſſet interitus, unde & ſtatim mortem ſubjungit Miſeni: & ad ſacra Proſerpinæ accedere, niſi ſublato ramo "non poterat. Inferos autem ſubire, hoc dicit ſacra celebrare "Proſerpinæ." And again, ad ver. 149. "*Præterea jacet exanimum tibi corpus amici.* Ac ſi diceret; Eſt & alia opportunitas deſcendendi ad inferos, id eſt, Proſerpinæ ſacra peragendi. "Duo enim horum ſacrorum genera fuiſſe dicuntur; unum NEKYOMANTIÆ, quod Lucanus exſequitur; & aliud SCIOMANTIÆ, id eſt, divinationis per umbras; σκία enim umbra eſt, & μαντεία, vaticinium, quod in *Homero, quem Virgilius ſequitur*, lectum eſt."

[x] *Explicat. hiſtor. des fables*, vol. ii. p. 133. Ed. 1715.

[y] The learned Selden in his comment on the ninth book of *Poly-olbion*, ſeems to approve the abſurd conjecture of P. Crinitus, that

under this *branch*, is figured the *wreath of myrtle*, with which the Initiated were crowned, at the celebration of the *Myſteries*[z]. 1. The *golden bough* is ſaid to be ſacred to Proſerpine, and ſo, we are told, was the *myrtle:* Proſerpine only is mentioned all the way; partly, becauſe the *Initiation* is deſcribed as an actual deſcent into hell; but principally, becauſe, when the RITES of the *Myſteries* were performed, Ceres and Proſerpine were equally invoked; but when the SHEWS were repreſented, as in the firſt part of this Epiſode, then Proſerpine alone preſided. 2. The quality of this *golden bough*, with its *lento vimine*, admirably deſcribes the *tender branches of myrtle*. 3. The doves of Venus are made to direct Æneas to the tree:

Tum maximus heros
Maternas agnoſcit *aves*.

They fly to it, and delight to reſt upon it, as their miſtreſs's favourite tree.

Sedibus optatis gemina ſuper arbore ſidunt.

For the *myrtle*, as is known to every one, was conſecrated to Venus. And there is a greater propriety and beauty in this diſpoſition, than appears at firſt ſight. For not only the *myrtle* was dedicated to Proſerpine as well as Venus, but the *doves* likewiſe, as Porphyry informs us[a].

that the *gold n-bough* ſignifies *miſletoe:* and would confirm it by that very reaſon, which abſolutely overthrows it; viz. that Virgil COMPARES it to the *miſletoe:* for it is contrary to all the rules of good writing, whether ſimply figurative, or allegoric, to make the *compariſon to the cover*, the *contents of the cover:* a COMPARISON neceſſarily implying, that the thing, to which another is compared, ſhould be different from that other.

[z] Μυρσίνης στεφάνῳ ἐστεφανῶντο οἱ μεμυημένοι. Schol. Ariſtoph. *Ranis.*

[a] Τῆς δὲ Φερεφάττης, παρὰ τὸ φέρεσθαι τὴν φάτταν, φασὶν οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν νομικῶν τῶν Θεολόγων. ἱερὸν γὰρ αὐτῆς ἡ φάττα. Porph. *De Abſt.* lib. iv. § 16.

But the reader may aſk, why is this myrtle-branch repreſented to be of *gold?* not merely for the ſake of the *marvellous*, he may be aſſured. A *golden bough* was literally part of the ſacred equipage in the *ſhews*, a burthen which the *Aſs*, *who carried the Myſteries*, we may be ſure, was chiefly proud of. This branch was ſometimes wreathed into a crown, and worn on the head; at other times, it was carried in the hand. Clemens Alexandrinus tells us [b], from Dionyſius Thrax the grammarian, that it was an Egyptian cuſtom to hold a branch in the act of adoration. And of what kind *theſe branches* were, Apuleius tells us, in his deſcription of a proceſſion of the Initiated in the *Myſteries* of Iſis. "Ibat tertius, attollens PALMAM AURO SUBTILITER FOLIATAM, nec non "mercurialem etiam CADUCEUM [c]." The *Golden branch*, then, and the *Caduceus* were related. And accordingly Virgil makes the former do the uſual office of the latter, in affording a free paſſage into the regions of the dead. Again, Apuleius, deſcribing the fifth perſon in the proceſſion, ſays, "Quintus "auream vannum AUREIS congeſtam RAMULIS [d]." So that a *golden bough*, we ſee, was an important implement, and of very complicated intention in the SHEWS of the *Myſteries*.

Æneas having now poſſeſſed himſelf of the GOLDEN BOUGH, a paſſport as neceſſary to his *deſcent* as a *myrtle crown* to *initiation*,

(Sed non ante datur telluris operta ſubire,
Auricomos quam quis decerpſerit arbore fœtus,)

carries it into the Sibyl's grot:

Et vatis portat ſub tecta ſibyllæ.

And this was to deſign initiation into the *leſſer Myſteries:* for Dion Chryſoſtom [e] tells us, it was per-

[b] —παρὰ Αἰγυπτίων καὶ τὸ τῶν θαλλῶν τῶν διδομένων τοῖς προσκυνοῦσι. *Strom.* lib. v. p. 568.

[c] *Metam.* lib. xi. p. 383. [d] Ibid. [e] *Orat.* 12.

formed

formed ἐν οἰκήματί μικρῷ, in a little narrow chapel, ſuch a one as we muſt ſuppoſe the Sibyl's grot to be. The *Initiated* into theſe rites were called ΜΥΣΤΑΙ.

He is then led to the opening of the deſcent:

Speluncæ *alta* fuit, *vaſtoque immanis hiatu*
Scrupea, tuta lacu nigro nemorumque tenebris.

And his reception is thus deſcribed:

Sub pedibus mugire ſolum & juga cœpta moveri
Sylvarum; viſæque canes ululare per umbram,
Adventante dea.

All this is exactly ſimilar to the fine deſcription of the poet Claudian, where, he profeſſedly and without diſguiſe, ſpeaks of the tremendous entry into theſe myſtic Rites,

Jam mihi cernuntur trepidis delubra moveri
Sedibus, & claram diſpergere fulmina lucem,
Adventum teſtata Dei. Jam magnus ab imis
Auditur fremitus terris, *templumque remugit*
Cecropium; *ſanctasque faces attollit* ELEUSIN;
Angues Triptolemi ſtridunt, & ſquamea curvis
Colla levant attrita jugis—
Ecce procul ternas Hecate variata figuras
Exoritur [f].

Both theſe deſcriptions agree exactly with the relations of the ancient Greek writers on this ſubject. Dion Chryſoſtom, ſpeaking of *initiation* into the *Myſteries*, gives us this general idea of it: "Juſt ſo it is, as "when one leads a Greek or Barbarian to be initiated "in a certain myſtic dome, excelling in beauty and "magnificence; where he ſees many myſtic ſights, "and hears in the ſame manner a multitude of voices; "where darkneſs and light alternately affect his

[f] *De raptu Proſrp.* ſub initio.

"ſenſes;

"ſenſes; and a thouſand other uncommon things "preſent themſelves before him [g]."

Our poet next relates the fanatic agitation of the *Myſtagogue*, on this occaſion,

Procul, o procul eſte, profani,
Conclamat Vates, totoque abſiſtite luco.
Tantum effata furens antro ſe immiſit aperto.

So again, Claudian, where he counterfeits the raptures and aſtoniſhment of the *Initiated*, and throws himſelf, as it were, like the Sibyl, into the middle of the ſcene,

Greſſus removete, profani,
Jam furor humanos noſtro de pectore ſenſus
Expulit.

The PROCUL, O PROCUL ESTE, PROFANI of the Sibyl, is a literal tranſlation of the formula uſed by the Myſtagogue, at the opening of the *Myſteries*:

ΕΚΑΣ, ΕΚΑΣ ΕΣΤΕ, ΒΕΒΗΛΟΙ.

But now the poet having determined to accompany his Hero through all the myſterious rites of his *initiation*, and conſcious of the imputed impiety, in bringing them out to open day, ſtops ſhort in his narration, and breaks out into this ſolemn apology,

Dii, quibus imperium eſt animarum, umbræque ſilentes;
Et Chaos & Phlegethon loca nocte ſilentia late,
Sit mihi fas audita loqui: ſit numine veſtro
Pandere res alta terra & caligine merſas—

And here let me obſerve, that this pretended apprehenſion of the Ancients, that they were doing an

[g] Σχεδὸν ἓν ὅμοιον, ὥσπερ εἴτις ἄνδρα Ἕλληνα, ἢ Βάρβαρον μυεῖσθαι παραδιδοὺς εἰς μυστικόν τινα οἶκον, ὑπερφυῆ κάλλει καὶ μεγέθει, πολλὰ μὲν ὀρώνια μυστικὰ διαπαλία, πολλῶν δὲ ἀκούοντα τοιούτων φωνῶν, σκότος τε καὶ φῶς ἐναλλάξ αὐτῷ φαινομένων, ἄλλων τε μυρίων γιγνομένων. *Orat.* 12.

unlawful

unlawful thing when they revealed the ſecrets of the *Realm of Dis*, aroſe from the cuſtom of the Myſteries, where theſe ſights were repreſented. For they had none of theſe ſcruples where they ſpeak of the Habitations of the Celeſtial Gods. Claudian, who (as we have obſerved) profeſſes openly to treat of the *Eleuſinian* Myſteries, at a time when they were in little veneration, yet, in compliance to old cuſtom, excuſes his undertaking in the ſame manner:

Dii, quibus in numerum, *&c.*
Vos mihi ſacrarum penetralia pandite rerum,
Et veſtri ſecreta poli, qua lampade Ditem
Flexit Amor, quo ducta ferox Proſerpina raptu
Poſſedit dotale Chaos; quantasque per oras
Sollicito genetrix erraverit anxia curſu;
Unde datæ populis leges, &, glande relicta,
Ceſſerit inventis Dodonia quercus ariſtis [h].

Had the revealing the *Myſteries* been as penal at Rome, as it was in Greece, Virgil had never ventured on this part of his poem. But yet it was eſteemed impious [i]; and what is more, it was infamous.

——vetabo qui Cereris ſacrum
Vulgarit arcanæ, ſub iisdem
Sit trabibus fragilemque mecum
Solvat phaſelum— Hor.

He therefore does it covertly; and makes this apology to ſuch as ſaw into his meaning.

The Hero and his Guide now enter on their journey:

Ibant obſcuri ſola ſub nocte per umbras:
Perque domos Ditis vacuas, & inania regna.

[h] *De raptu Proſerpinæ*, lib. i. ſub init.

[i] Athenis initiatus [Auguſtus] cum poſtea Romæ pro tribunali de privilegio ſacerdotum Atticæ Cereris cognoſceret, & quædam ſecretoria proponerentur, dimiſſo concilio & corona circumſtantium, ſolus audiit diſceptantes. Sueton. lib. ii. *Octav. Aug.* cap. 93.

Quale

Quale per incertam lunam sub luce maligna
Est iter in sylvis: ubi cœlum condidit umbra
Jupiter, & rebus nox abstulit atra colorem.

This description will receive much light from a passage in Lucian's dialogue of *the Tyrant*. As a company made up of every condition of life, are voyaging together to the other world, Mycillus breaks out, and says; "Bless us! how dark it is? What is "become of the fair Megillus? In this situation, "who can tell, whether Simmiche or Phryne be "the handsomer? every thing is alike, and of one "colour; there is no room for comparing Beauties. "My old cloak, which but now presented to your "eyes so irregular a figure, is become as honourable "a wear as his Majesty's purple. They are, indeed, "both vanished [k], and retired together under the "same cover. But my friend, the Cynic, where are "You! give me your hand: *you are initiated in the* "ELEUSINIAN MYSTERIES. *Tell me now, do you not* "*think this very like the blind march the good company* "*make there?* CY. *Oh extremely: and see, here comes* "*one of the Furies, as I guess by her equipage; her* "*torch, and her terrible looks* [l]."

[k] The original has a peculiar elegance. ἈΦΑΝΗ γὰρ ἄμφω, &c. alludes to the ancient Greek notions concerning the *first Matter*, which they called ἀφανὴς, *invisible*, as being without the qualities of *form* and *colour*. The investing Matter with these qualities, was the production of bodies, the τὰ φαινόμενα: and their dissolution, a return to a state of *invisibility*.—εἰς ἈΦΑΝΕΣ χωρεῖ τὰ διαλυόμενα, as the pretended Merc. Trismag. has it, cap. xi. *Matter*, in this state of invisibility, was, by the earlier Greeks, called ἈΔΗΣ. Afterwards, the state itself was so called; and at length it came to signify the abode of departed spirits.

[l] ΜΙ. Ἡράκλεις τοῦ ζόφου· πῶ νῦν ὁ καλὸς Μέγιλλος, ἢ τῷ διαγνῶ τις ἐνταῦθα εἰ καλλίων Φρύνης Σιμμίχη, πάντα γὰρ ἴσα, καὶ ὁμόχροα, καὶ οὐδὲν οὔτε καλὸν, οὔτε καλλίον· ἀλλ' ἤδη καὶ τὸ τριβώνιον, πρότερον τέως ἄμορφον εἶναι δοκοῦν, ἰσότιμον γίγνεται τῇ πορφυρίδι τοῦ βασιλέως· ἀφανῆ γὰρ ἄμφω, καὶ ὑπὸ τῷ αὐτῷ σκότῳ καταδεδυκότα. Κυνίσκε, σὺ δὲ πῶ πότε ἄρα ὢν τυγχάνεις;—ἔμβαλέ μοι τὴν δεξιάν· εἰπέ μοι, ἐτελέσθης γάρ, ὦ Κυνίσκε, τὰ ΕΛΕΥΣΙΝΙΑ, οὐχ ΟΜΟΙΑ τοῖς ἐκεῖ ἐνθαδέ σοι δοκεῖ; ΚΥΝ. εὖ λέγεις· ἰδοὺ ὧν προσέρχεται δαδουχοῦσά τις, φοβερόν τι, καὶ ἀπειληθικὸν προσβλέπουσα· ἢ ἄρα πῶ Ἐρινὺς ἐστιν; Luciani *Cataplu*.

The Sibyl, [illegible] cave, had [illegible] rage, [illegible]

Toque [illegible]

Nunc [illegible]

These [illegible] labours [illegible] imaginary [illegible] to all [illegible] ed for [illegible] Virgil [illegible] were both [illegible] labours are [illegible]

Vestibulum ante ipsum [illegible] Orci,
Luctus & ultrices [illegible]
Pallentesque [illegible]
Et metus, & [illegible]
Terribiles [illegible]
Tum consanguineus [illegible]
Gaudia, [illegible]
Ferreique Eumenidum [illegible] mens——

To understand the force of [illegible] be necessary to [illegible] have left us of the [illegible] ries of MITHRAS, [illegible] ticularly aspired to, by [illegible] mies; whence these Initiates were [illegible] the SOLDIERS OF MITHRAS [illegible] "Nonnus, could be initiated [illegible]

[m] Quint. is mistaken in supposing [illegible] Had this been the description of an [illegible] For then, indeed, in these words, [illegible] for the *effect*.

[n] Erubescite, Romani commilitones [illegible] candi, sed ab aliquo MITHRÆ [illegible] læo, &c. Tertull. *De corona* [illegible]

"Mithras] till he had passed gradually through the "probationary labours [by which he was to acquire "a certain *apathe* and sanctity.] There were eighty "degrees of these labours, from less to greater: and "when the aspirant has gone through them all, he "is initiated. These labours are,—to pass through "fire, to endure cold, hunger, and thirst, to under-"go much journeyings; and, in a word, every toil "of this nature °."

The second sort of trial were the *panic terrors*, of the *Mysteries*; and these, Virgil represents next. And to distinguish them from the figurative description of the *real labours* preceding, he separates the two accounts by that fine circumstance of the *tree of dreams*, which introduces the second sort.

In medio ramos annosaque brachia pandit
Ulmus opaca, ingens: quam sedem somnia vulgo
Vana tenere ferunt, foliisque sub omnibus hærent.
Multaque præterea variarum monstra ferarum,
Centauri in foribus stabulant, Scyllæque biformes,
Et centum geminus Briareus & bellua Lernæ;
Horrendum stridens, flammisque, armata Chimæra:
Gorgones, Harpyæque, & forma tricorporis umbræ.

These *terribiles visu formæ* are the same which *Pletho*, in the place quoted above, calls ἀλλόκοτα τὰς μορφᾶς φάσματα, as they were seen in the entrance of the *Mysteries*; and which Celsus tells us, were like-

° οὐ δύναται οὖν τις εἰς αὐτὸν τελεσθῆναι, εἰ μὴ πρότερον διὰ τῶν βαθμῶν τῶν κολάσεων παρέλθοι. βαθμοὶ δέ εἰσι κολάσεων τὸν μὲν ἀριθμὸν ὀγδοήκοντα, ἔχοντες δὲ ὑπόβασιν καὶ ἀνάβασιν. κολάζονται γὰρ πρῶτον τὰς ἐλαφροτέρας, εἶτα τὰς δραστικωτέρας. καὶ εἶθ' οὕτω μετὰ τὸ παρελθεῖν διὰ πασῶν τῶν κολάσεων, τότε τελεῖται ὁ τελούμενος· αἱ δὲ κολάσεις εἰσὶ τὸ διὰ πυρὸς παρελθεῖν, τὸ διὰ κρύους, διὰ πείνης καὶ διψης, διὰ ὁδοιπορίας πολλῆς, καὶ ἁπλῶς διὰ πασῶν τῶν τοιούτων. Nonnus, in *Secundam Nazianz. Steleteuticam*. And again he says, οὐδεὶς δὲ δύναται τελεῖσθαι τὰς τοῦ Μίθρου τελετὰς, εἰ μὴ διὰ πασῶν τῶν κολάσεων παρέλθοι, καὶ δείξοι ἑαυτὸν ἀπαθῆ τίνα καὶ ὅσιον, &c.

wise

wise presented in the Bacchic rites; τοῖς ἐν ταῖς Βακχικαῖς Τελεταῖς τὰ φάσματα καὶ δείματα προεισάγουσι [p].

But it is reasonable to suppose, that though these things had the use here assigned to them, it was some circumstance in the recondite physiology of the East, which preferred them to this station. We are to consider then this dark entrance into the *Mysteries*, as a representation of the CHAOS, thus described.

Ibant obscuri sola sub nocte per umbram,
Perque domos Ditis *vacuas* & *inania* regna.

And amongst the several Powers invoked by the Poet, at his entrance on this scene, CHAOS is one.

Di, quibus imperium est animorum umbræque silentes:
Et CHAOS & Phlegethon, *loca nocte tacentia late.*

Now a fragment of Berosus, preserved by George Syncellus, describes the ancient CHAOS, according to the physiology of the Chaldeans, in this manner,—"There was a time, they say, when all was water "and darkness. And these gave birth and habita-"tion to MONSTROUS ANIMALS OF MIXED FORMS "AND SPECIES. For there were men with two "wings, others with four, and some again with "double faces.—Some had the horns of goats, some "their legs, and some the legs of horses; others had "the hind-parts of horses, and the fore-parts of men, "like the hippocentaurs. There were bulls with hu-"man heads, dogs with four bodies ending in fishes, "horses with dogs heads; *and men, and other crea-"tures with the heads and bodies of horses, and with "the tails of fishes.* And a number of animals, "whose bodies were a MONSTROUS COMPOUND of "the dissimilar parts of beasts of various kinds. "Together with these, were fishes, reptiles, serpents, "and other creatures, which, by a reciprocal trans-

[p] Origen. *Contra Cels.* lib. iv. p. 167.

" lation of the parts to one another, became all por-
" tentouſly deformed: the pictures and repreſenta-
" tions of which were hung up in the temple of Be-
" lus. A woman ruled over the whole, whoſe name
" was Omoroca, in the Chaldee tongue Thalath,
" which, in greek, ſignifies the Sea; and, (on ac-
" count of their powerful connexion) the Moon[q]."
This account ſeems to have been exactly copied in the *Myſteries*, as appears from the deſcription of the poet,

Multaque præterea variarum monſtra ferarum
Centauri in foribus ſtabulant, Scyllæque biformes,
Et centum geminus Briareus, & belluæ Lernæ
Horrendum ſtridens, flammiſque armata Chimæra:
Gorgones, Harpyiæque, & forma TRICORPORIS umbræ;

The CANINE figures have a conſiderable ſtation in this region of monſters: And he tells us,

viſæque CANES ululare per umbram:

which Pletho explains in his ſcholia on the magic oracles of Zoroaſter. " It is the cuſtom, in the
" celebration of the *Myſteries*, to preſent before ma-
" ny of the Initiated, phantaſms of a CANINE fi-

[q] Γενέσθαι φησὶ χρόνον, ἐν ᾧ τὸ πᾶν, σκότος καὶ ὕδωρ εἶναι, καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ζῶα τεραλωδη, καὶ εἰδῴλεῖς τὰς ἰδίας ἔχοντα ζωογονεῖσθαι. Ἀνθρώπους γὰρ διπλέρους γενηθῆναι, ἄνους δὲ καὶ τετραπλέρους, καὶ διπροσώπους.—τοὺς μὲν αἰγὸν σκέλη καὶ κέρατα ἔχοντας, τοὺς δὲ ἱππόποδας, τοὺς δὲ τὰ ὀπίσω μὲν μέρη ἱππων, τὰ δὲ ἔμπροσθεν ἀνθρώπων, ὡς ἱπποκενταύρους τὴν ἰδέαν εἶναι. Ζωογονηθῆναι δὲ καὶ ταύρους, ἀνθρώπων κεφαλὰς ἔχοντας. καὶ κύνας τετρασωμάτους ὑρὰς ἰχθύων· ἐκ τῶν ὄπισθιν μερῶν ἔχοντας, καὶ ἵππους κυνοκεφάλους, καὶ ἀνθρώπους, καὶ ἕτερα ζῶα, κεφαλὰς μὲν καὶ σώματα ἵππων ἔχοντα, ὑρὰς δὲ ἰχθύων καὶ ἄλλα δὲ ζῶα παντοδαπῶν θηρίων μορφὰς ἔχοντα. Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, ἰχθύας, καὶ ἐρπετὰ, καὶ ὄφεις, καὶ ἄλλα ζῶα πλείονα θαυμαστὰ καὶ παρηλλαγμένα τὰς ὄψεις ἀλλήλων ἔχοντα. ὧν καὶ τὰς εἰκόνας, ἐν τῷ τοῦ Βήλου ναῷ ἀνάκειται. Ἄρχειν δὲ τούτων παίδων γυναῖκα, ἣ ὄνομα Ὁμορωκά. Εἶναι δὲ τοῦτο Χαλδαϊστὶ μὲν Θαλάθ, ἑλληνιστὶ δὲ μεθερμηνεύεται θάλασσα, καλεῖται δὲ ἰσόψηφον Σελήνῃ. Georg. Syncel. *Chronogr.*

" gure,

"gure, and other monstrous shapes and appear-"ances [r]."

The woman, whose name *Thalath* coincides with that of the *Moon*, was the *Hecate* of the Greeks, who is invoked by Æneas on this occasion.

Voce vocans HECATEN *cælo Erebo*que potentem.

Hence terrifying visions were called *Hecatea* [s]. The reason why Hecate, or the Moon, came to be one of the Governesses in these rites, was, because some had placed Elysium in the Moon; the Elysian fields being from thence called the *fields of Hecate*. The ancients called Hecate, *Diva* TRIFORMIS. And Scaliger observes that this word *Thalath*, which Syncellus, or Berosus, says, was equivalent to the Moon, signifies TRIA.

And now we soon find the Hero in a fright,

Corripit hic subita trepidus formidine ferrum
Æneas, strictamque aciem venientibus offert.

With these affections the Ancients represent the *Initiated* as possessed on his first entrance into these holy Rites, "Entering now into the mystic dome (says "Themistius) he is filled with horror and amaze-"ment. He is seized with solicitude, and a total "perplexity: he is unable to move a step forward, "and at a loss to find the entrance to that road "which is to lead him to the place he aspires to. "Till the Prophet [the vates] or Conductor, laying "open the vestibule of the temple [t]"——To the same purpose Proclus: "——As in the most holy "*Mysteries*, before the scene of the mystic visions,

[r] Εἴωθε τοῖς πολλοῖς τῶν τελουμένων φαίνεσθαι κατὰ τὰς τελετὰς κυνώδη τινὰ, καὶ ἄλλως ἀλλόκοτα τὰς μορφὰς φάσματα.

[s] *Schol. Apollon. Argon.* l. iii. v. 859.

[t] Ὁ μὲν ἄρτι προσιὼν τοῖς ἀδύτοις, φρίκης τε ἀνεπίμπλατο καὶ ἰλίγγου· ἀδημονίᾳ τε εἴχετο καὶ ἀπορίᾳ συμπάσῃ, οὐδὲ ἴχνους λαβέσθαι οἷός τε ὤν, οὔτε ἀρχῆς ἠστινοσοῦν ἐπιδράξασθαι εἴσω φερούσης· ὁπότε δὲ ὁ προφήτης ἐκεῖνος ἀναπετάσας τὰ προπύλαια τοῦ νεώ. *Orat. in Patrem.*

"there is a terror infuſed over the minds of the In-"itiated, ſo," &c.[u]

The adventurers come now to the banks of Cocytus. Æneas is ſurprized at the crowd of ghoſts which hover round it, and appear impatient for a paſſage. His Guide tells him they are thoſe who have not had the rites of ſepulture performed to their manes, and ſo are doomed to wander up and down for a hundred years, before they be permitted to croſs the river.

Nec ripas datur horrendas, nec rauca fluenta
Tranſportare prius, quam ſedibus oſſa quierunt.
Centum errant annos, volitantq; hæc litora circum.
Tum demum admiſſi ſtagna exoptata reviſunt.

We are not to think this old notion took its riſe from the vulgar ſuperſtition. It was one of the wiſeſt contrivances of ancient politics; and came originally from Egypt, the fountain-head of legiſlation. Thoſe profound maſters of wiſdom, in projecting for the common good, found nothing would more contribute to the ſafety of their fellow citizens than the public and ſolemn interment of the dead: as without this proviſion, private murders might be eaſily and ſecurely committed. They therefore introduced the cuſtom of pompous funeral rites: and, as Herodotus and Diodorus tell us, were of all people the moſt circumſtantially ceremonious in the obſervance of them. To ſecure theſe by the force of Religion, as well as civil cuſtom, they taught, that the deceaſed could not retire to a place of reſt, till theſe rites were performed. The notion ſpread ſo wide, and fixed its roots ſo deep, that the ſubſtance of the ſuperſtition remains, even to this day, in moſt civilized countries. By ſo effectual a method did

[u] "Ωσπερ ἐν ταῖς ἀγιωλάταις τελεταῖς πρὸ τῶν μυστικῶν θεαμάτων ἐκπλήξις τῶν μυουμένων, ἔστω.—In Plat. *Theol.* lib. iii. cap. 18.

the

the Legiſlature gain its end, the ſecurity of the citizen. There is a circumſtance in claſſical antiquity, which will ſufficiently inform us of how great moment theſe rites were eſteemed. HOMER, SOPHOCLES, and EURIPIDES, are confeſſed to be the greateſt maſters of their art, and to have given us the beſt models of it. Yet, in the judgment of modern critics, the funeral rites for Patroclus, in the Iliad, and for Ajax and Polynices, in the Ajax and the Phœnicians, are a vicious continuation of the ſtory, which violates the *unity of the action.* But they did not conſider, that funeral rites were anciently deemed an inſeparable part of the Hero's ſtory: And therefore thoſe great maſters of deſign, could not underſtand the action to be complete, till that important office to the dead was diſpatched [w]. Nay ſo dreadful was the apprehenſion of the want of *funeral Rites*, that the Hiſtorians tell us, it was one of the principal cauſes of the Spartan baſhfulneſs, in that War in which *Tyrtæus* was employed to reſtore them to their ancient Spirit. Who when he had diſſipated this ſuperſtitious terror by the magic of his martial numbers, they ruſhed on to the charge with a reſolution to conquer or to die.

But the Egyptian Sage found, afterwards, another uſe in this opinion; and by artfully turning it to a puniſhment on inſolvent debtors, ſtrengthened public credit, to the great advantage of commerce, and conſequently of civil community. For, inſtead of that general cuſtom of modern barbarians to bury inſolvents alive, this polite and humane people had a law of greater efficacy, which denied burial to

[w] Προσιέναι δὲ ἔτι τούτῳ τῷ νόμῳ τόνδε, τὸν διδόντα τὸ χρέων, ἢ ἀπάσης κρατέειν τῆς τοῦ λαμβάνοντος θήκης· τῷ δὲ ὑπολιθέντι τοῦτο τὸ ἐνεχυρον τοῦδε ἐπεῖναι ζημίην, μὴ βουλομένῳ ἀποδοῦναι τὸ χρέων, μηδὲ αὐτῷ ἐκείνῳ, τελευτήσαντι εἶναι ταφῆς κυρῆσαι μήτ' ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ πατρώῳ τάφῳ, μήτ' ἐν ἄλλῳ μηδενὶ, μήτ' ἄλλον μηδένα τὸν ἐωυτοῦ ἀπογενόμενον θάψαι. Herod. lib. ii. cap. 136.

them when dead. And here the learned Marſham ſeems to be miſtaken, when he ſuppoſes, that the Grecian opinion of the wandering of unburied ghoſts aroſe from this interdiction of ſepulchral rites [x]. On the contrary it appears, that the law was founded on the opinion, originally Egyptian, and not the opinion on the law; for the law had no other ſanction than the opinion.

In a word, had not our poet conceived it a matter of much importance, he had hardly dwelt ſo long upon it, or returned again to it [y], or laid ſo much ſtreſs on it, or made his hero ſo attentively conſider it:

Conſtitit Anchiſa ſatus, & veſtigia preſſit,
MULTA PUTANS.

But having added

—Sortemque animo miſeratus *iniquam*;

and Servius commented, "Iniqua enim ſors eſt puniri propter alterius negligentiam: nec enim quis "culpa ſua caret ſepulchro;" Mr. Bayle cries out [z], "What injuſtice is this! was it the fault of theſe "ſouls, that their bodies were not interred?" But neither of them knowing the origin of this opinion, nor ſeeing its uſe, the latter aſcribes *that* to the blindneſs of Religion, which was the iſſue of wiſe Policy. Virgil, by his *ſors iniqua*, means no more than that in this, as well as in ſeveral other civil inſtitutions, *a public benefit was often a private injury.*

The next thing obſervable is the ferry-man, Charon; and he, the learned well know, was a man of this world, an Egyptian of a well-known Character. This People, like the reſt of mankind, in their de-

[x] Ab interdictæ apud Ægyptios ſepulturæ pœnâ, inolevit apud Græcos opinio inſepultorum corporum animas à Charonte non eſſe admiſſas. *Canon Chronicus, Seculum* xi. ſec. 3.

[y] V. 373. & ſeq.

[z] *Reſponſ. aux Queſt. d'un Provincial*, p. iii. cap. 22.

ſcrip-

ſcriptions of the other world, uſed to copy from ſomething they were well acquainted with in this. In their funeral rites, which, as we obſerved, was a matter of greater moment with them than with any other people, they uſed to carry their dead over the Nile, and through the marſh of Acheruſia, and there put them into ſubterraneous caverns; the ferry-man employed in this buſineſs being, in their language, called Charon. Now in their *Myſteries*, the deſcription of the paſſage into the other world was borrowed, as was natural, from the circumſtances of their funeral rites. So that the Charon *below* might very well refuſe to charge his Boat with thoſe whom his nameſake *above* had not admitted. And it might be eaſily proved, if there was occaſion, that the Egyptians themſelves transferred theſe realities into the ΜΥΘΟΣ, and not the Greeks, as later writers generally imagine.

Charon is appeaſed at the ſight of the *golden bough:*

Ille admirans venerabile donum
Fatalis virgæ, LONGO POST TEMPORE viſum.

But it is repreſented as the paſſport of all the ancient Heroes who had deſcended into hell; how then could it be ſaid to be *longo poſt tempore viſum*, Æneas being ſo near the times of thoſe Heroes? To explain this, we muſt have in mind what hath been ſaid above of a perfect Lawgiver's being held out in Æneas, and of Auguſtus's being delineated in the Trojan chief. So that here Virgil is pointing to his Maſter; and what he would inſinuate, is, that the Roman emperor, initiated in the Eleuſinian rites, ſhould, in a later age, rival the fame of the firſt Grecian Lawgivers.

But Æneas hath now croſſed the river, and is come into the proper regions of the Dead. The firſt Apparition that occurs is the dog Cerberus:

Hæc

Hæc ingens latratu regna trifauci
Perſonat, adverſo recubans immanis in antro.

This is plainly one of the phantoms of the *Myſteries*, which Pletho tells us above, was in the ſhape of a dog, κυνώδη τινά. And in the fable of Hercules's deſcent into hell, which, we have ſhewn, ſignified no more than his Initiation into the *Myſteries*, it is ſaid to have been, amongſt other things, for fetching up the dog Cerberus.

The Propheteſs, to appeaſe his rage, gives him a medicated cake, which caſts him into a ſlumber:

Cui vates, horrere videns jam colla colubris,
Melle ſoporatam et medicatis frugibus offam
Objicit.

In the *Myſteries* of Trophonius (who was ſaid to be nurſed by Ceres [a], that is, as I underſtand it, to derive his rites from the Eleuſinian) the Initiated carried the ſame ſort of medicated Cakes to appeaſe the ſerpents he met with in his paſſage [b]. Tertullian, who gives all *Myſteries* to the devil; and very equitably, as the good man makes *him* the author of all that is done there, mentions the offering up of theſe cakes, *celebrat et panis oblationem* [c]. This in queſtion was of *poppy-ſeed*, made up with honey; and ſo I underſtand *medicatis frugibus*, here, on the authority of the poet himſelf, who, in the fourth book, makes the prieſteſs of Venus prepare the ſame treat for the *dragon* who guarded the Heſperian fruit:

Spargens humida mella ſoporiferumque papaver.

Honey, as we have ſhewn above, was ſacred to Proſerpine, who on that account was called Μελιτώδης;

[a] Δήμητρι—τῷ Τροφωνίῳ εἶναι τροφόν. *Pauſan. Bœot.* c. 39.
[b] Μελιτοῦντας ἐπάγοντες ἐν ταῖν χεροῖν, μειλίγματα ἑρπετῶν.——*Philoſ. Vit. Apoll.* l. viii. c. 15.
[c] *De præſcr. adver. hæret.*

and

and the *poppy* was conſecrated to Ceres: Cereale Papaver, ſays Virgil; on which words Servius thus comments: "Vel quod eſt uſui, ſicut frumentum, "vel quo Ceres uſa eſt ad oblivionem doloris; nam "ob raptum Proſerpinæ vigiliis defatigata, guſtato "eo acta eſt in ſoporem [d]."

But, without doubt, the images, which the ſpiſcated juice of poppy preſents to the fancy, was one reaſon why this drug had a place in the ceremonial of the SHEWS: not improbably, it might be given to ſome at leaſt of the *Initiated*, to aid the impreſſion of thoſe myſtic viſions which paſſed before them. For that ſomething like this was done, that is, giving medicated drugs to the Aſpirants, we are informed by Plutarch; who ſpeaks of a ſhrub called Leucophyllus uſed in the celebration of the *Myſteries* of *Hecate*, which drives men into a kind of frenzy, and makes them confeſs all the wickedneſs they had done or intended. And *confeſſion* was one neceſſary preparative for initiation.

The regions, according to Virgil's topography, are divided into three parts: 1. PURGATORY. 2. TARTARUS. 3. ELYSIUM. For Deiphobus (in the firſt) ſays,

Diſcedam, EXPLEBO numerum, reddarque tenebris [e].

And, in the ſecond, it is ſaid of Theſeus,

Sedet, ÆTERNUMque ſedebit
Infelix Theſeus.——

The *Myſteries* divided them in the ſame manner. So Plato, in the paſſage [f] quoted above (where he ſpeaks of what was taught in the *Myſteries*) talks of ſouls ſticking faſt in mire and filth, and remaining

[d] Ad lib. i. *Georg.* v. 212.

[e] But the nature and end of this purgatory the poet deſcribes at large, from v. 736, to v. 745.

[f] See note (a) p. 243.

in

in darkneſs, till a long ſeries of years had purged and purified them; and Celſus, in *Origen*[g], ſays, that the *Myſteries* taught the doctrine of eternal puniſhments.

Of all the three States this of Tartarus only was *eternal*. There was, indeed, another, in the ancient pagan theology, which had the ſame relation to Elyſium, that Tartarus had to Purgatory, the extreme of reward, as Tartarus of puniſhment. But then this ſtate was not in the infernal regions, but in Heaven. Neither was it the lot of common Men, but reſerved for *heroes* and *dæmons*; Beings of a ſuperior order, ſuch as Hercules, Bacchus, &c. who became Gods on their admiſſion into Heaven, where *eternity* was the conſequence of their deification.

Cicero diſtinguiſhes the two orders of ſouls, according to the vulgar Theology, in this manner. "Quid autem ex hominum genere conſecratos, ſicut "Herculem & cæteros coli lex jubet, indicat *omni*-"*um* quidem *animos immortales* eſſe; FORTIUM BO-"NORUMQUE DIVINOS[h]."

And here it is to our purpoſe to obſerve, that the Virtues and Vices, which ſtock theſe three Diviſions with inhabitants, are ſuch as more immediately affect Society. A plain proof that the poet followed the views of the Legiſlator, the inſtitutor of the *Myſteries*.

PURGATORY, the firſt diviſion, is inhabited by ſuicides, extravagant lovers, and ambitious warriors: And, in a word, by all thoſe who had indulged the violence of their paſſions; which made them rather wretched than wicked. It is remarkable that amongſt theſe we find one of the *Initiated*:

Cererique ſacrum Polybœten.

This was agreeable to the public doctrine of the *Myſteries*, which taught, that initiation with virtue

[g] See note (I) p. 257. [h] *De Legg.* lib. ii. cap. 12.

pro-

procured men great advantages over others, in a future ſtate; but that without virtue, it was of no avail.

Of all theſe diſorders, the poet hath more diſtinctly marked out the miſery of SUICIDE.

Proxima deinde tenent mœſti loca, qui ſibi lethum
Inſontes peperere manu, lucemque peroſi
Projecere animas. Quam vellent æthere in alto
Nunc & pauperiem & duros perferre labores!

Here he keeps cloſe to the myſteries; which not only forbad *ſuicide*, but taught on what account it was criminal. "That which is ſaid in the MYSTERIES (ſays Plato) concerning theſe matters of "man's being placed in a certain watch or ſtation, "which it is unlawful to fly from, or forſake, is a "profound doctrine, and not eaſily fathomed [i]."

Inſontes,

[i] Ὁ μὲν δὴ ἐν ΑΠΟΡΡΗΤΟΙΣ λεγόμενος περὶ αὐτῶν λόγος, ὡς ἔν τινι φρουρᾷ ἐσμὲν οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ οὐ δεῖ δὴ ἑαυτὸν ἐκ ταύτης λύειν, οὐδ' ἀποδιδράσκειν, μεγάς τε τις μοι φαίνεται καὶ οὐ ῥᾴδιος διϊδεῖν· *Phæd.* p. 62. Ser. ed. tom. i. The very learned Mr. Dacier tranſlates ἐν ἀποῤῥήτοις, *dans les Myſteres*; and this agreeably to his knowledge of antiquity. For ἀπόῤῥητα was uſed by the ancients, to ſignify not only the grand ſecret taught in the *Myſteries*, bnt the *Myſteries* themſelves; as appears from innumerable places in their writings. Yet the celebrated French tranſlator of Puffendorf's *Law of nature and nations*, lib. ii. cap. 4. § 19. note (1), accuſes him of not underſtanding his author: "Mr. Dacier ſait dire à Platon que *l'on* "*tenoit tous les jours ces diſcours au peuple dans les ceremonies &* "*dans les Myſteres*. Il ſeroit à ſouhaiter qu'il eût allégué quel-"que autorité pour etablir un fait ſi remarquable. Mais il s'agit "ici manifeſtement des inſtructions ſecrétes que les Pythagori-"ciens donnoient à leurs initiez, & leſquelles ils decouvroient "les raiſons les plus abſtruſes, & les plus particuliers des dogmes "de leur philoſophie. Ces inſtructions cachées s'appelloient "ἀπόῤῥητα——Ce que Platon dit un peu auparavant de Philoläus, "philoſophe Pythagoricien, ne permit pas de douter que la rai-"ſon, qu'il rapporte ici comme trop abſtruſe & difficile à com-"prendre, ne ſoit celle que donnoient les Pythagoriciens." He ſays, *it were to be wiſhed Dacier had ſome authority for ſo remarkable a fact.* He hath this very paſſage, which is ſufficient; for the word ἀπόῤῥητα can mean no other than the *Myſteries*. But thoſe

Infontes, ſays the Poet, to diſtinguiſh Suicides (properly ſo called) from thoſe whom the Laws condemned to be their own Executioners: for this inhuman treatment was amongſt the capital inflictions, in the Criminal Code of the Ancients.

Hitherto all goes well. But what muſt we ſay to the poet's putting *new-born infants*, and *men falſely condemned*, into his purgatory? For though the *faith and inquiſition* of modern Rome ſend many of both ſorts into a place of puniſhment, yet the genius of ancient paganiſm had a gentler aſpect. It is, indeed,

thoſe who want further authority, may have enough of it, in the nature and end of the *Myſteries*, as explained above.—He ſay, "It is evident, Plato is here talking of the ſecret inſtructions "which the Pythagoreans gave to their Initiated, in which they "diſcovered their moſt abſtruſe and particular doctrines." This cannot be ſo, for a very plain reaſon. The philoſophy of the Pythagoreans, like that of the other ſects, was divided into the *exoteric* and *eſoteric*; the *open*, taught to all; and the *ſecret*, taught to a ſelect number. But the *impiety of ſuicide* was in the firſt claſs, as a doctrine ſerviceable to ſociety: "Vetatque Pytha-"goras injuſſu imperatoris, id eſt, Dei, de præſidio & ſtatione "vitæ decedere," ſays Tully, in his book *Of old age*; who, in his *Dream of Scipio*, written in the *exoteric* way, condemns *ſuicide* for the very ſame reaſon: but in an epiſtle to a particular friend, which certainly was of the *eſoteric* kind, he approves of it; "Ceteri quidem, Pompeius, Lentulus tuus, Scipio, Afranius, "fœde perierunt. At Cato PRÆCLARE. Jam iſtuc quidem, "cum volemus, licebit." lib. ix. ep. 18. It could not be, therefore, that the impiety of *ſuicide* ſhould be reckoned amongſt the ἀπόῤῥητα of philoſophy, ſince it was one of their *popular* doctrines. But this will be fuller ſeen, when we come to ſpeak of the philoſophers, in the next book. Mr. Barbeyrac concludes, that "as Plato had ſpoken of Philolaus a little before, it cannot be "doubted but that he ſpeaks of the reaſon againſt *ſuicide*, as a "doctrine of the Pythagorean philoſophy." What has been ſaid above, utterly excludes this interpretation. But though it did not, there is nothing in the context which ſhews, Plato thought of Philolaus in this place. It is allowed, this was a doctrine of the Pythagoric ſchool, though not of the *eſoteric* kind. The *Myſteries*, and that School, held a number of things in common; this has been ſhewn, in part, already: and when we come to ſpeak of Pythagoras, it will be ſeen how it happened.

difficult

difficult to tell what theſe inmates have to do here. Let us conſider the caſe of the *infants*; and if we find it can only be cleared up by the general view of things here given, this will be conſidered as another argument for the truth of our interpretation of the DESCENT.

Continuo *auditæ voces*, *vagitus et ingens*,
Infantumque animæ flentes in limine primo:
Quos dulcis vitæ exortes, & ab ubere raptos
Abſtulit atra dies, & *funere* merſit *acerbo*.

Theſe appear to have been the *cries and lamentings* that, Proclus tells us, were heard in the Myſteries [k]. So that we only want to know the original of ſo extraordinary a circumſtance. Which, I take, to have been juſt ſuch another proviſion of the Lawgiver for the ſecurity of INFANCY, as that about *funeral rites* was for the ADULT. For nothing could more engage Parents in the care and preſervation of their young, than ſo terrible a doctrine. Nor are we to imagine, that their natural fondneſs needed no inforcement, or ſupport: for that moſt degenerate and horrid practice among the ancients, of EXPOSING INFANTS, was univerſal [l]; and had almoſt eraſed *mor-*

[k] Καὶ τοῖς μυσηρίοις τὰς μυσικὰς ΘΡΗΝΟΥΣ μυσικῶς παρειλήφαμεν. In *Comment. in Platonis Remp.* lib. x.

[l] We may well judge it to be ſo, when we find it amongſt the CHINESE (ſee *M. Polo.* lib. ii. cap. 26.) and the ARABIANS, the two people leaſt corrupted by foreign manners, and the vicious cuſtoms of more civilized nations. The Arabians, particularly, living much in a ſtate of nature, where mens wants are few, and conſequently where there is ſmall temptation to this unnatural crime, yet were become ſo prone to it, that their lawgiver Mahomet found it neceſſary to exact an oath of the Arabian women, not to deſtroy their children. The form of this oath is given us by Gagnier, in his notes on Abel-feda's *Life of Mahomet*, and it is in theſe words; "—Ne deo rem ullam aſſocient; ne furentur; "ne fornicentur; NE LIBEROS SUOS OCCIDANT [metu pauper-"tatis uti habetur, *Sur* vi. v. 151.] neque inobedientes ſint Apo-"ſtolo Dei, in eo quod juſtum eſt." p. 41. n. (a)

tality

tality from the minds of the beſt inſtructed, and *inſtinct* from the breaſts of the moſt tenderly affected [m]. St. Paul ſeems to have had this in his eye, when he accuſed the pagan world of being WITHOUT NATURAL AFFECTION [n]. It needed therefore the ſtrongeſt and ſevereſt check: and I am well perſuaded it occaſioned this counterplot of the Magiſtrate, in order to give inſtinct fair play, and call back baniſhed nature. Nothing, indeed, could be more worthy of his care: for the deſtruction of children, as Pericles finely obſerved of youth, is *like cutting off the ſpring from the year.* Accordingly we are told by Diodorus, that the Egyptians had a law [o] againſt this un-

[m] See what has been further ſaid on this ſubject B. I. Sect. 4.

[n] 1 Cor. i. 31.

[o] The Egyptian laws were ſaid to have been of Iſis's own appointment. This will ſhew us with what judgment and addreſs Ovid has told the tale of Lidgus the Cretan, in his *Metamorphoſis*; (of the nature and art of which Work more will be obſerved hereafter.) Lidgus (in the ix^th^ book, fab. 12.) is repreſented as commanding his pregnant wife, Telethuſa, to deſtroy the expected infant, if it proved a female. Yet is this Cretan thus characterized,

vita fideſque
Inculpata fuit——

in a word, juſt ſuch another as Terence's man of univerſal benevolence, (mentioned above) the Author of the famous maxim, *homo ſum, humani nihil a me alienum puto*, and of the very ſame command of infanticide to his Wife; who for not obeying it is reckoned by him, amongſt thoſe, *qui neque jus neque bonum atque æquum ſciunt*. Telethuſa, however, as common as ſuch a command was, and as indifferent as it was eſteemed, is much alarmed with the apprehenſion of falling into the cruel ſituation of being obliged to execute it. In this diſtreſs Iſis appears to her in a dream, promiſes her aſſiſtance, and orders her to deceive her huſband, and bring up whatever the Gods ſhould ſend.

Pone graves curas, mandataque falle mariti;
Nec dubita, cum te partu Lucina levarit,
Tollere quicquid erit——

Ovid's moral of his tale is this, "That Egypt had oppoſed very "wiſe and humane laws to the horrid practice of INFANTICIDE, "now become general, and continuing unchecked by all other "civil inſtitutions."

natural

atural practice, which law he numbers amongſt the ngularities of that highly policied nation. "They are obliged (ſays he) to bring up all their children, in order to render the country populous; this being eſteemed the beſt means of making ſtates flouriſhing and happy [p]." And Tacitus ſpeaks of he prohibition as no leſs ſingular amongſt the Jews: Augendæ multitudini conſulitur. Nam & NECARE QUENQUAM EX GNATIS, NEFAS [q]."

Here again Mr. Bayle is much ſcandalized: "The firſt thing which we meet on the entrance into the other world, is the ſtation aſſigned to INFANTS, who cried and lamented without ceaſing; and next to that, the ſtation of men unjuſtly condemned to death. Now what could be more ſhocking or ſcandalous than the puniſhment of thoſe little creatures, who had yet committed no ſin, or of thoſe perſons whoſe innocence had been oppreſſed by calumny [r]?" The firſt difficulty is already cleared up: the ſecond ſhall be conſidered by and by. But it is no wonder Mr. Bayle could not digeſt this doctrine of the *infants*; for I am much miſtaken, if it did not ſtick with Plato himſelf; who, relating the *Viſion of Erus, the Pamphylian*, concerning the diſtribution of rewards and puniſhments in another life, when he comes to the condition of infants, paſſes it over in theſe words: ——"But of children who died in their infancy, he reported

[p] Καὶ τὰ γινόμενα παῖδα τρέφουσιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἕνεκα τῆς πολυανθρωπίας ὡς ταύτης μέγιστα συμβαλλομένης πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν χώρας τε καὶ πόλεων. Lib. i. *Hiſtor.*

[q] Tacit. *Hiſt.* lib. v.

[r] La premiere choſe que l'on rencontroit à l'entrée des Enfers, étoit la ſtation des petits enfans, qui ne ceſſoient de pleurer, & puis celle des perſonnes injuſtement condamnées à la mort. Quoi de plus choquant, de plus ſcandaleux, que la peine de ces petites creatures, qui n'avoient encore commis nul péche; ou que la peine de ceux, dont l'innocence avoit été opprimée par la calomnie. *Reſponſ. aux Quæſt. d'un Prov.* p. 3. cap. xxii.

"certain other things NOT WORTHY TO BE RE-"MEMBRED[s]." Erus's account of what he saw in another world, was a summary of what the Egyptians taught in their *Mysteries* concerning that matter. And I make no doubt but the thing *not worthy to be remembered*, was the doctrine of *infants in purgatory*: which appears to have given Plato much scandal, who did not, at that time at least, reflect upon its original and use. But here let us take notice, for the honour of HUMANITY, that while Pagans both old and new could be shocked at this punishment, modern papists, to the eternal disgrace of SUPERSTITION, can condemn unbaptised Infants, without remorse, to infinitely greater.

But now, as to the FALSELY CONDEMNED, we must seek another solution:

Hos juxta, falso damnati crimine mortis;
Nec vero hæ sine sorte datæ, sine judice sedes.
Quæsitor Minos urnam movet: ille silentum
Consiliumque vocat, vitasque & crimina discit.

This designment appears both iniquitous and absurd. The *falsely accused*[t] are not only in a place of punishment, but, being first delivered under this single predicament, they are afterwards distinguished into two sorts; some as blameable, others as innocent. To clear up this confusion, it will be necessary to transcribe an old story, told by Plato, in his *Gorgias*:——"This law, concerning mortals, was en-"acted in the time of Saturn, and is yet, and ever "will be, in force amongst the Gods; that he who "had lived a just and pious life, shall, at his death, "be carried into the islands of the blessed, and "there possess all kinds of happiness, untainted "with the evils of mortality: but that he who had

[s] Τῶν δὲ εὐθὺς γενομένων, καὶ ὀλίγον χρόνον βιούντων περὶ ἄλλα ἔλεγεν ΟΥΚ ΑΞΙΑ ΜΝΗΜΗΣ. *De rep.* lib. x. p. 615. Serr. edit.

[t] Servius, on the place, characterizes them in this manner—"qui sibi per simplicitatem adesse nequiverunt."

"lived

" lived unjuſtly and impiouſly, ſhall be thruſt into " a place of puniſhment, the priſon of divine juſ- " tice, called Tartarus. Now the judges, with " whom the execution of this law was intruſted, " were, in the time of Saturn, and under the in- " fancy of Jove's government, *living men, ſitting in* " *judgment on the living*; and paſſing ſentence on " them, upon the day of their deceaſe. This gave " occaſion to unjuſt judgments: on which account, " Pluto, and thoſe to whom the care of the happy " iſlands was committed, went to Jupiter, and told " him, that men came to them *wrongfully judged,* " *both when acquitted, and when condemned.* To " which the Father of the Gods thus replied: I will " put a ſtop to this evil. Theſe wrong judgments " are partly occaſioned by the corporeal covering of " the perſons judged; for they are tried while liv- " ing: now many have their corrupt minds hid un- " der a fair outſide, adorned with birth and riches; " and, when they come to their trial, have witneſſes " at hand, to teſtify for their good life and conver- " ſation; this perverts the proceſs, and blinds the " eyes of juſtice. Beſides, the judges themſelves are " encumbered with the ſame corporeal covering: " and eyes and ears, and an impenetrable tegument " of fleſh, hinder the mind from a free exertion of " its faculties. All theſe (as well their own cover- " ing, as the covering of thoſe they judge) are bars " and obſtacles to right judgment. In the firſt place " then, ſays he, we are to provide that the fore- " knowledge which they now have of the day of " death, be taken away: and this ſhall be given in " charge to Prometheus; and then provide, that " they who come to judgment, be quite naked [u]:

[u] This evidently refers to the old Egyptian cuſtom, when the judges beheld and examined their kings naked; ἔτω καὶ ὁ Ἄρχων δικαστὴς ὢν ἐν τοῖς παλαιοῖς χρόνοις, γυμνὸν ἐθεώρει τὸν βασιλέα. Horapollinis *Hierogl.* lib. i. cap. 40.

"for from henceforth they shall not be tried, till "they come into the other world. And as they are "to be thus stripped, it is but fit their judges should "await them there in the same condition; that, at "the arrival of every new inhabitant, soul may look "on soul, and all family relation, and every worldly "ornament being dropt and left behind, RIGHTE-"OUS JUDGMENT may at length take place. I, "therefore, who foresaw all these things, before you "felt them, have taken care to constitute my own "sons to be the judges: two of them, Minos and "Rhadamanthus, are Asiatics; the third, Æacus, "an European. These, when they die, shall have "their tribunal erected in the shades, *just in that* "part of the highway, where the two roads divide, "the one leading to the happy islands, the other to "Tartarus. Rhadamanthus shall judge the Asiatics, "and Æacus the Europeans; but to Minos I give "the superior authority of hearing appeals, when "any thing obscure or difficult shall perplex the "others' judgments; that every one may have his "abode assigned him with the utmost equity [w]."

The

[w] Ἦν οὖν νόμος ὅδε περὶ ἀνθρώπων ἐπὶ Κρόνου, καὶ ἀεὶ καὶ νῦν ἔτι ἐστὶν ἐν θεοῖς· τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὸν μὲν δικαίως τὸν βίον διελθόντα καὶ ὁσίως, ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσῃ, εἰς μακάρων νήσους ἀπιόντα, οἰκεῖν ἐν πάσῃ εὐδαιμονίᾳ ἐκτὸς κακῶν· τὸν δὲ ἀδίκως καὶ ἀθέως, εἰς τὸ τῆς τίσεώς τε καὶ δίκης δεσμωτήριον, ὃ δὲ τάρταρον καλοῦσιν, ἰέναι. Τούτων δὲ δικασταὶ ἐπὶ Κρόνου, καὶ ἔτι νεωστὶ τοῦ Διὸς τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχοντος, ζῶντες ἦσαν ζώντων, ἐκείνῃ ἡμέρᾳ δικάζοντες ᾗ μέλλοιεν τελευτᾷν· κακῶς οὖν αἱ δίκαι ἐκρίνοντο. Ὅτε οὖν Πλούτων καὶ οἱ ἐπιμεληταὶ ἐκ μακάρων νήσων ἰόντες, ἔλεγον πρὸς τὸν Δία, ὅτι φοιτῶεν σφὶν ἄνθρωποι ἑκατέρωσε ἀνάξιοι, εἶπεν οὖν ὁ Ζεὺς, Ἀλλ' ἐγὼ (ἔφη) παύσω τοῦτο γιγνόμενον· νῦν μὲν γὰρ κακῶς αἱ δίκαι δικάζονται. ἀμπεχόμενοι γὰρ (ἔφη) οἱ κρινόμενοι κρίνονται· ζῶντες γὰρ κρίνονται, Πολλοὶ οὖν ψυχὰς πονηρὰς ἔχοντες, ἠμφιεσμένοι εἰσὶ σώματά τε καλὰ, καὶ γένη καὶ πλούτους· καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἡ κρίσις ἦ, ἔρχονται αὐτοῖς πολλοὶ μάρτυρες, μαρτυρήσαντες ὡς δικαίως βεβιώκασιν. Οἱ οὖν δικασταὶ ὑπό τε τούτων ἐκπλήττονται, καὶ ἅμα καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀμπεχόμενοι δικάζουσι, πρὸ τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς αὐτῶν ὀφθαλμοὺς καὶ ὦτα καὶ ὅλον τὸ σῶμα προκεκαλυμμένοι· ταῦτα δὲ αὐτοῖς πάντα ἐπίπροσθεν γίγνεται, καὶ τὰ αὐτῶν ἀμφιέσματα, καὶ τὰ τῶν κρινομένων. Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν (ἔφη) παυστέον ἐστὶ προειδότας αὐτοὺς τὸν θάνατον· νῦν γὰρ προΐσασι· τοῦτο

μὲν

The matter now begins to clear up; and we ſee plainly, that the circumſtance of the *falſely condemned* alludes to this old fable: ſo that by *falſo damnati crimini mortis* (if it be the true reading) VIRGIL did not mean, as one would ſuppoſe, *innocentes addicti morti ob injuſtam calumniam*, but *homines indigne et perperam adjudicati*; not *men falſely condemned*, but *wrongfully judged*, whether to acquittal or conviction; but condemnation being oftenеſt the ſentence of juſtice, the greater part is put figuratively for the whole.

He who thinks this too licentious a figure, will perhaps be inclined to believe, that the poet might write

Hos juxta, falſo damnati TEMPORE mortis:

which not only points up to the fable, but hints at the original of it; and beſides, agrees beſt with the context. But as the words *tempore mortis* are only to be explained by this paſſage of Plato, a tranſcriber might be eaſily tempted to change them to ſomething more intelligible.

One difficulty only remains; and that, to confeſs the truth, hath ariſen rather from a miſtake of Virgil, than of his reader. We find theſe people yet unjudged, already fixed, with other criminals, in the aſſigned diſtrict of purgatory. But they are

μὲν ὖν κ) δὴ εἴρηται τῷ Προμηθεῖ, ὅπως ἂν παύσῃ αὐτῶν· ἔπειλα γυμνὸς κριλέον ἀπάντων τύτων· τεθνεῶτας γὰρ δεῖ κρίνεσθαι· κ) τὸν κριλὴν δεῖ γυμνὸν εἶναι, τεθνεῶτα, αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ αὐτὴν τὴν ψυχὴν θεωρῦντα, ἐξαίφνης ἀποθανόντος ἑκάςυ, ἔρημον πάντων τῶν συγγενῶν· καὶ ἀπολιπόντα ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς πάντα ἐκεῖνον τὸν κόσμον, ἵνα δικαία ἡ κρίσις ᾖ. Ἐγὼ μὲν ὖν ταῦτα ἐγνωκὼς πρότερος ἢ ὑμεῖς, ἐποιησάμην δικας ὰς υἱεῖς ἐμαυτῦ· δύο μὲν ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας, Μίνω τε κ) Ῥαδαμάνθυν· ἕνα δὲ ἐκ τῆς Εὐρώπης, Αἰακόν. Οὗτοι ὖν ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσωσι, δικάσυσιν ἐν τῷ λειμῶνι, ἐν τῇ τριόδῳ, ἐξ ἧς φέρεον τὼ ὁδὼ, ἡ μὲν εἰς μακάρων νήσυς, ἡ δ' εἰς τάρταρον· κ) τὰς μὲν ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας Ῥαδαμάνθυς κρινεῖ, τὰς δὲ ἐκ τῆς Εὐρώπης Αἰακός. Μίνω δὲ πρωτοσία δώσω, ἐπιδιακρίνειν, ἐὰν ἦ ἀπόρρητόν τι τῷ ἑτέρῳ, ἵνα ὡς δικαιοτάτη ἡ κρίσις ᾖ περὶ τῆς πορείας τοῖς ἀνθρώποις. Tom. i. p. 523. Serr. Edit.

miſplaced, through an overſight of the poet; which had he lived to perfect the Æneis, he would probably have corrected: for the fable tells us they ſhould be ſtationed on the borders of the three diviſions, in that part of the high road, which dividing itſelf in two, leads, the one, to Tartarus, the other to Elyſium, thus deſcribed by the poet,

Hic locus eſt, partes ubi ſe via findit in ambas,
Dextera, quæ Ditis magni ſub mœnia tendit:
Hic iter Elyſium nobis; at læva malorum
Exercet pœnas, & ad impia Tartara mittit.

It only remains to conſider the origin or moral of the fable; which, I think, was this: it was an Egyptian cuſtom, as we are told by *Diodorus Siculus*, for judges to ſit on every man's life, at the time of his interment; to examine his paſt actions, and to condemn and acquit according to the evidence before them. Theſe judges were of the prieſthood; and ſo, it is probable, taught, like the prieſts of the church of Rome, that their decrees were ratified in the other world. Partiality and corruption would, in time, pervert their decrees; and ſpite and favour prevail over juſtice: As this might ſcandalize the people, it would be found neceſſary to teach, that the ſentence which was to influence every one's final doom, was reſerved for a future judicature. However, the Prieſt took care that all ſhould not go out of his hands; and when he could ſit no longer *Judge*, he contrived to find his account in turning *Evidence*; as may be ſeen by the ſingular caſt of this ancient inſcription: "Ego Sextus Anicius Pontifex TESTOR honeſte hunc "vixiſſe: manes ejus inveniant quietem [x]."

How much this whole matter needed explaining, we may ſee by what a fine writer makes of it, in a diſcourſe written to illuſtrate Æneas's deſcent into hell: "There are three kinds of perſons (ſays he)

[x] Fabius Celſus *Inſcript. Antiq.* lib. iii.

"deſcribed

"described as being situated on the BORDERS; and "I can give no reason for their being stationed there "in so particular a manner, but because none of "them seem to have had a proper right to a place "among the dead, as not having run out the thread "of their days, and finished the term of life that "had been allotted them upon earth. The first of "these are the souls of infants, who are snatched "away by untimely ends; the second are of those "who are put to death wrongfully and by an unjust "sentence; and the third, of those who grew weary "of their lives, and laid violent hands upon them-"selves [y]."

After this, follow the episodes of Dido and Deïphobus, in imitation of Homer; where we find nothing explanatory of the true nature of this episode, but the strange description of Deïphobus; whose mangled phantom is drawn according to the philosophy of Plato; which teaches that the dead not only retain all the passions of the mind, but all the marks, and blemishes of the body [z]. A wild doctrine which Lucian agreeably rallies in his *Menippus*; who is made to say, that he saw Socrates in the Shades, busied at his old trade of *Disputation:* but that his legs yet appeared swelled, from the effects of his last deadly potion [a].

Æneas, having passed this first division, comes now on the confines of TARTARUS; and is instructed in what relates to the crimes and punishments of the inhabitants.

[y] Mr. Addison's *Works*, vol. ii. p. 300, quarto edit. 1721.

[z] Μαστιγίας αὖ εἴτις ἦν, καὶ ἴχνη εἶχε των πληγῶν οὐλὰς ἐν τῷ σώματι, ἢ ὑπὸ μαστίγων ἢ ἄλλων τραυμάτων ζῶν, καὶ τεθνεῶτος τὸ σῶμά ἐστιν ἰδεῖν ταῦτα ἔχον· καλεαγότα εἴτου ἦν μέρη, ἢ διεστραμμένα ζῶντος, καὶ τεθνεῶτος ταῦτα ἔνδηλα· ἐνὶ δὲ λόγῳ οἷος εἶναι παρεσκεύαστο τὸ σῶμα ζῶν, ἔνδηλα ταῦτα καὶ τελευτήσαντος ἦν πάντα, ἢ τὰ πολλὰ ἐπί τινα χρόνον. *Georg.* p. 524.

[a] ἔτι μέντοι ἐπεφύσητο αὐτῷ, καὶ διῳδήκει ἐκ τῆς φαρμακοποσίας τὰ σκέλη.

His guide here more openly declares her office of HIEROPHANT, or interpreter of the *Myſteries*.

Dux inclyte Teucrûm,
Nulli fas caſto ſceleratum inſiſtere limen:
Sed ME *cum lucis* HECATE PRÆFECIT *avernis*,
Ipſa Deûm pœnas DOCUIT, *perque omnia* DUXIT.

It is remarkable, that Æneas is led through the regions of Purgatory and Elyſium; but he only ſees the ſights of Tartarus at a diſtance, and this could not well be otherwiſe in the ſhews of the *Myſteries*, for very obvious reaſons.

The criminals deſtined to eternal puniſhment, in this diviſion, are,

1. Thoſe who had *ſinned ſo ſecretly as to eſcape the animadverſion of the Magiſtrate:*

Gnoſſius hæc Rhadamanthus habet durriſſima regna:
Caſtigatque auditque dolos, SUBEGITQUE FATERI
Quæ quis apud ſuperos, FURTO lætatus inani,
Diſtulit in ſeram commiſſa piacula mortem.

And it was principally on account of ſuch crimes that the Lawgiver inforced the doctrine of a future ſtate of puniſhment. But it is worth while to obſerve, that, according to the teaching of the *Myſteries*, the RACK TO EXTORT CONFESSION, came originally from THE PLACE OF THE DAMNED, where only it could be equitably applied.

2. Thoſe whoſe principles diſſolve the firſt bonds of aſſociation, and ſociety, the ATHEISTS and *deſpiſers of God and religion:*

Hic genus antiquum terræ Titania pubes.

This was agreeable to the laws of Charondas, who ſays: "Be the contempt of the Gods put in the "number of the moſt flagitious crimes[b]." The poet dwells particularly on that ſpecies of impiety which affects divine honours:

[b] Ἔστω δὲ μέγιστα ἀδικήματα θεῶν καταφρόνησις, apud Stobæi *Serm.* xlii.

Vidi

Vidi & crudeles dantem Salmonea pœnas,
Dum flammas Jovis & ſonitus imitatur Olympi.

And this without doubt, was an oblique caſtigation of the APOTHEOSIS, then beginning to be paid and received at Rome.

3. The *infringers of the duties of* IMPERFECT *obligation, which civil laws cannot reach:* ſuch as thoſe without natural affection to brothers, duty to parents, protection to clients, or charity to the poor:

Hic quibus inviſi fratres, dum vita manebat;
Pulſatusve parens; & fraus innexa clienti[c];
Aut qui divitiis ſoli incubuere repertis,
Nec partem poſuere ſuis; quæ maxima turba eſt.

4. Thoſe peſts of public and private peace, the TRAYTOR and the ADULTERER; with all their various ſpawn, of *perjury* and *inceſt.*

Quique ob adulterium cæſi, quique arma ſecuti
Impia, nec veriti dominorum fallere dextras—
Vendidit hic auro patriam, dominumque potentem
Impoſuit; fixit leges pretio, atque refixit.
Hic thalamum invaſit natæ, vetitosque hymenæos.

It is obſervable, he does not ſay, ſimply, *adulteri,* but *ob adulterium cæſi*; as implying, that the greateſt civil puniſhment pleads for no mitigation of this crime at the bar of divine juſtice.

5. The INVADERS AND VIOLATORS OF THE HOLY MYSTERIES, held out in the perſon of Theſeus, make the fifth and laſt claſs of offenders.

Sedet, æternumque ſedebit
Infelix Theſeus; Phlegyasque[d] miſerrimus omnes

[c] So the law of the *Twelve Tables:* PATRONUS SI CLIENTI FRAUDEM FECERIT, SACER ESTO.

[d] The Phlegyæ here mentioned, I take to be thoſe people of Bœotia ſpoken of by Pauſanias, who attempting to plunder the temple of Apollo at Delphi, were deſtroyed by lightening, earthquakes, and peſtilence; hence Phlegyæ, I ſuppoſe, ſignified impious, ſacrilegious perſons in general; and is ſo to be underſtood in this place.

Admonet,

the other, for their clandeſtine intruſion int
ſteries. We have already offered ſeveral r
ſhew that the deſcent of Theſeus into hell,
lation of the Myſteries: to which we may
the ancients tell us of the duration of his
ment, which was four years; the interin
the celebrations of the greater *Myſteries.*
the tragedian makes him ſay:

Tandem profugi noctis æternæ plagam,
Vaſtoque manes carcere umbrantem polu
Ut vix cupitum ſufferunt oculi diem!
Jam QUARTA *Eleuſis* dona Triptolemi ſe
Paremque toties libra compoſuit diem;
Ambiguus ut me ſortis ignaræ labor
Detinuit inter mortis & vitæ mala [f].

This may reconcile the contradictory accoun
fable concerning Theſeus; ſome of whic
was delivered from heli; others, that he was
detained there. The *firſt* relates to the libe
him by the preſident of the *Myſteries* at the
celebration: the other, to what the *Myſteri*
he and all would ſuffer in the other world fo
ing them. This leads us to a circumſtance

mous Epiſode. In Æneas's ſpeech to the Sibyl, Theſeus is put amongſt thoſe heroes who went to, and returned from, hell:

Quid Theſea magnum,
Quid memorem Alciden?——

But in the place before us he is repreſented as confined there eternally. Julius Hyginus, in his *Commentaries on Virgil* [r], thinks this a groſs contradiction; which Virgil would have corrected, had he lived to finiſh the poem. But can it be ſuppoſed, the poet was not aware of this, in two paſſages ſo near one another, in the ſame book? In truth, his employing theſe differing circumſtances, confirms the general interpretation; and the general interpretation helps to reconcile the difference. Æneas wanted to be initiated; and when he ſpeaks to the Sibyl, or *Myſtagogue*, he enumerates thoſe heroes who had been initiated before him; that is, ſuch who had ſeen the *ſhews* of the *Myſteries*, of which number was Theſeus, though he had intruded violently. But when Virgil comes to deſcribe theſe *Shews*, which were ſuppoſed to be a true repreſentation of what was done and ſuffered in Tartarus, Theſeus is put among the *damned*, that being his ſtation in the other world.

This will remind the learned reader of a ſtory told by Livy. "The Athenians (ſays he) drew upon "themſelves a war with Philip, on a very ſlight oc- "caſion; and at a time when nothing remained of "their ancient fortune, but their high ſpirit. Two "young Acarnanians, during the days of INITIA- "TION, themſelves *uninitiated*, and ignorant of all "that related to that ſecret worſhip, entered the "temple of CERES along with the crowd. Their "diſcourſe ſoon betrayed them; by making ſome "abſurd enquiries into the meaning of what they

[r] A. Gellii *Noct. Att.* lib. x. cap. 16.

"ſaw

" ſaw: ſo being brought before the Preſident of the " *Myſteries*, although it was evident they had entered " ignorantly and without deſign, they were put to " death, as guilty of a moſt abominable crime[h]."

The office Theſeus is put upon, of admoniſhing his hearers againſt IMPIETY, could not, ſure, be diſcharged in theſe *ſhews* by any one ſo well, as by him who repreſented the Violator of them. But the critics, unconſcious of any ſuch deſign, conſidered the taſk the poet has impoſed on Theſeus, of perpetually ſounding in the ears of the damned, this admonition:

DISCITE JUSTITIAM MONITI, ET NON TEMNERE DIVOS,

as a very impertinent employment. For though it was a ſentence of great truth and dignity, it was preached to very little purpoſe amongſt thoſe who were never to hope for pardon or remiſſion.

Even the ridiculous Scarron hath not neglected to put it in this abſurd light[i]: and it muſt be owned, that, according to the common ideas of Æneas's deſcent into hell, it can hardly be ſeen in any other.

But, ſuppoſe Virgil to be here relating the admonitory maxims delivered during the celebration of theſe MYSTIC SHEWS, and nothing could be more juſt or uſeful: for then the diſcourſe was addreſſed to the *vaſt multitude of living ſpectators*. Nor is it a mere ſuppoſition that ſuch diſcourſes made part of theſe

[h] Contraxerant autem cum Philippo bellum Athenienſes haudquaquam digna cauſa, dum ex vetere fortuna nihil præter animos ſervant. Acarnanes duo juvenes per initiorum dies, non initiati, templum Cereris, imprudentes religionis, cum cetera turba ingreſſi ſunt. Facile eos ſermo prodidit, abſurde quædam percunctantes; deductique ad antiſtites templi cum palam eſſet per errorem ingreſſos, tanquam ob infandum ſcelus, interfecti ſunt. *Hiſt.* lib. xxxi.

[i] Cette ſentence eſt bonne & belle,
Mais en Enfer de quoi ſert-elle?

repre-

repreſentations. Ariſtides expreſly ſays [k], that in no place were more aſtoniſhing words pronounced or ſung, than in theſe *Myſteries*. The reaſon, he tells us, was, that the *ſounds* and the *ſights* might mutually aſſiſt each other in making an impreſſion on the minds of the Initiated. But, from a paſſage in Pindar, I conclude, that in theſe ſhews (from whence men took their ideas of the infernal regions) it was cuſtomary for each offender, as he paſſed by, in machinery, to make an admonition againſt his own crime. "It is reported (ſays Pindar) that Ixion, by "the decrees of the Gods, while he is inceſſantly "turning round his rapid wheel, calls out upon "MORTALS to this effect, That they ſhould be al-"ways at hand to repay a benefactor for the ſervices "he had done them [l]." Where the word ΒΡΟΤΟΙ, *living men*, ſeems plainly to ſhew that the ſpeech was at firſt made before men in this world.

The poet cloſes his catalogue of the damned with theſe words:

Auſi omnes immane nefas, AUSOQUE POTITI.

For the antients thought that an action was ſanctified by the ſucceſs; which they eſteemed a mark of the favour and approbation of the Gods,

Victrix Cauſa Diis PLACUIT, ſed victa Catoni.

As this was a very pernicious doctrine, it was neceſſary to teach, that the imperial villain who trampled on his country, and the baffled plotter who expired on a gibbet, were equally the objects of divine vengeance.

[k] Τίνι δ' ἄλλῳ χωρίῳ, ἢ μύθων φήμαι θαυμαστότερα ἐφύμνησαν, ἢ τὰ δρώμενα μείζω ἔσχε τὴν ἔκπληξιν, ἢ μᾶλλον εἰς ἐφαμιλλον καθίστη ταῖς ἀκοαῖς τὰ ὁρώμενα; *Eleuſ.*

[l] Θεῶν δ' ἐφέλμασιν
Ἰξίονα φασὶ ταῦτα
Βρόδιοις λέγειν, ἐν πτερόεντι τροχῷ
Παλίσ κυλινδόμενον,
Τὸν εὐεργέταν ἀγαναῖς ἀμοιβαῖς
Ἐποιχόμενος τίνεσθαι. 2 *Pyth.*

Æneas

Æneas has now paſſed *Tartarus*; and here end the LESSER MYSTERIES. Their original explains why this ſort of *ſhews* was exhibited in them. We are told, they were inſtituted for the ſake of Hercules, when about to perform his eleventh labour, of fetching Cerberus from hell [m], and were under the preſidency of *Proſerpine* [n].

The Hero advances to the borders of ELYSIUM, and here he undergoes the *luſtration*:

Occupat Æneas aditum, *corpusque recenti*
Spargit aqua, ramumque adverſo in limine figit.

"Being now about to undergo the luſtrations (ſays "Sopater) which immediately precede initiation into "the *greater Myſteries*, they called me happy [o]."

Accordingly, Æneas now enters on the GREATER MYSTERIES, and comes to the abodes of the bleſſed:

Devenere locos lætos, & amœna vireta
Fortunatorum nemorum, ſedeſque beatas:
Largior hic campos æther, & lumine veſtit
Purpureo: ſolemque ſuum, ſua ſidera norunt.

Theſe two ſo different ſcenes of Tartarus and Elyſium explain what Ariſtides meant, when he called the ſhews of *Eleuſinian Myſteries*, *that moſt ſhocking, and, at the ſame time, moſt raviſhing repreſentation* [p].

The Initiated, who till now only bore the name of Μύσαι, are called ΕΠΟΠΤΑΙ, and this new viſion, ΑΥΤΟΨΙΑ. "The Αὐτοψία, or the ſeeing with their

[m] εἰ Ἐλευσίνισι ἐπ' αὐτῷ τὰ μικρὰ ἐποιήσαντο μυστήρια——Ἐμυήθη ἐν Ἐλευσῖνι τὰ δ' αὐτὸν [Ἡρακλέα] λεγόμενα ΜΙΚΡΑ μυστήρια. Tzetz. in *Lycoph.*

[n] τὰ δὲ μικρὰ Περσεφόνης——*Schol. Ariſtoph. ad Plut. ſecund.*

[o] Μέλλων δὲ τοῖς καθαρσίοις, τοῖς πρὸ τῆς τελετῆς, ἐπεύχεσθαι, εὐδαίμονα ἐμαυτὸν. In *Diviſ. Quæſt.*

[p] τοῦτον φρικαδέστατόν τε καὶ φαιδρότατον. *Eleuſ.*

"own

"own eyes (ſays Pſellus) is when he who is initiated "beholds the divine lights [q]."

In theſe very circumſtances Themiſtius deſcribes the Initiated, when juſt entered upon this ſcene. "It "being thoroughly purified, he now diſcloſes to the "Initiated, a region [r] all over illuminated, and ſhin- "ing with a divine ſplendor. The cloud and thick "darkneſs are diſperſed [s]; and the mind emerges, as

[q] Αὐτοψία ἐστὶν, ὅταν αὐτὸς ὁ τελεσθεὶς τὰ θεῖα φῶτα ὁρᾷ. In *Schol.* in *Orac.* Zoroaſt.

[r] This which was *all over illuminated*, and which the prieſt had *thoroughly purified*, was ἄγαλμα, an image. The reaſon of transferring what is ſaid of the illumination of the region, is, becauſe this image repreſented the appearances of the divine Being, in one large, uniform, extenſive light. Thus Jamblichus *De myſteriis:* Μεῖζα δὲ ταῦτα τῶν αὐτοφανῶν ΑΓΑΛΜΑΤΩΝ λόγους ἀφορισόμεθα· ἐκεῖν ἐν μὲν ταῖς τῶν θεῶν ΑΥΤΟΨΙΑΙΣ, ἐνεργέστερα καὶ αὐτῆς τῆς ἀληθείας ὁρᾶται τὰ θεάματα, ἀκριβῶς τε διαλάμπει, καὶ διηρθρωμένα λαμπρῶς ἐκφαίνεται.—And again, Ὡσαύτως τοίνυν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶ ΦΩΤΟΣ· τὰ μὲν τῶν θεῶν ΑΓΑΛΜΑΤΑ φωλὸς πλέον ἀγράπτει—τὸ μὲν τῶν θεῶν πῦρ, ἀτομον, ἀφθεγκτὸν ἐκλάμπει, καὶ πληροῖ τὰ ὅλα βάθη τῦ κόσμω πυρίως, ἀλλ' ὑ περικοσμίως. § ii. cap. 4. He ſays, too, that it was *without figure*, ψυχῆς δὲ τῆς μὲν ὅλης, καὶ ἐν ὑδενὶ τῶν κατὰ μέρος εἴδει καλεχομένης πῦρ ὁρᾶται ἀνείδεον—cap. 7. To this image, the following lines in the *Oracles* of Zoroaſter allude:

Μὴ φύσεως καλέσῃς ΑΥΤΟΠΤΟΝ ΑΓΑΛΜΑ,
Οὐ γὰρ χρὴ κείνης σε βλέπειν πρὶν σῶμα ΤΕΛΕΣΘΗ.

"Invoke not the ſelf conſpicuous image of nature, for thou muſt "not behold theſe things before thy body be purified by initia- "tion." This αὐτόπτον ἄγαλμα was only a diffuſive ſhining light, as the name partly declares, thus deſcribed preſently after, in the ſame *Oracles:*

Ἡνίκα βλέψῃς μορφῆς ἄτερ εὐῖδρον πῦρ,
Λαμπόμενον σκιρτῆδὸν ὅλε κατὰ βένθεα κόσμε,
Κλῦθι πυρὸς φωνήν.

And the *ſight* of this divine ſplendor was what the *Myſteries* called, ΑΥΤΟΨΙΑ.

[s] Pletho tells us with what theſe clouds were accompanied, viz. thunder and lightning, and other meteoric appearances. Τὰ δὲ τελεμένοις φαινόμενα, κεραυνοὶ, καὶ πῦρ, καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο, σύμβολα ἄλλως ἐστὶν, ὑ θεῦ τίς φυσις. In *Schol. ad Orac. Mag. Zor.* He ſays they were ſymbols, but not of the nature of the deity: and this was true; for the ſymbol of this Nature was the αὐτόπτον ἄγαλμα which followed: Hence, as we ſee above, it was *without figure.*

"it were, into day, full of light and chearfulneſs, as "before, of diſconſolate obſcurity [t]."

Let me obſerve, that the lines,

Largior hic campos æther, & lumine veſtit
Purpureo: SOLEMque ſuum, ſua ſidera norunt,

are in the very language of thoſe, who profeſs to tell us what they ſaw at their *initiation into the greater Myſteries.* "Nocte media vidi SOLEM *candido* co-"ruſcantem lumine [u]," ſays Apuleius on that occaſion: for *candido* and *purpureo lumine* ſignify the very ſame thing.

Here Virgil, by leaving his Maſter, and copying the amiable paintings of Elyſium as they were repreſented in the *Myſteries*, hath artfully avoided a fault, too juſtly objected to Homer, of giving ſo dark and joyleſs a landſcape of the *fortunata nemora*, as could raiſe no deſire or appetite for them: his favourite Hero himſelf, who inhabited them, telling Ulyſſes, that he had rather be a day-labourer above, than command in the regions of the dead. Such a repreſentation defeats the very intent of the Lawgiver, in propagating the doctrine of a future ſtate. Nay, to mortify every excitement to noble actions, the Greek poet makes reputation, fame, and glory, the great ſpur to virtue in the pagan ſyſtem, to be viſionary and impertinent. On the contrary, Virgil, whoſe aim, in this poem, was the ſervice of Society, makes the love of glory ſo ſtrong a paſſion in the other world, that the Sibyl's promiſe to Palinurus, that his NAME ſhould be affixed to a promontory, rejoices his ſhade even in the regions of the unhappy:

[t] —ἀποσμήξας πανταχόθεν, ἐπεδείκνυ τῷ μυουμένῳ μαρμαρύσσον τε ἤδη, καὶ αὐγῇ καταλαμπόμενον θεσπεσίᾳ, ἥτε ὁμίχλη ἐκείνη, καὶ τὸ νέφος ἀθρόον ὑπερρήγνυτο· καὶ ἐξεφαίνετο ὁ νοῦς ἐκ τοῦ βάθους, φέγγους ἀνάπλεως καὶ ἀγλαΐας ἀντὶ τοῦ πρότερον σκότου. *Orat. in Patrem.*

[u] *Met.* l. xi.

Æternumque

Æternumque locus Palinuri *nomen* habebit:
His dictis curæ emotæ, pulsusque parumper
Corde dolor tristi; GAUDET COGNOMINE TERRA.

They were the licentious stories of the Gods, and this ungracious description of Elysium (both so pernicious to society) which made Plato drive Homer out of his Republic.

But to return. The poet having described the climate of the happy regions, speaks next of the amusements of its inhabitants.

Pars in gramineis exercent membra palæstris;
Contendunt ludo, & fulva luctantur arena.

Besides the obvious allusion, in these lines, to the philosophy of Plato, concerning the duration of the passions, it seems to have a more secret one to what he had all the way in his eye, the *Eleusinian Mysteries*; whose celebration was accompanied with the GRECIAN GAMES[w]. On which account too, perhaps, it was that, in the disposition of his work, his fifth book is employed in the *Games*, as a prelude to the *Descent* in the sixth.

1. The first place, in these happy regions, is assigned to LEGISLATORS, *and the founders of Society, who brought men from a savage to a civil life.*

Magnanimi Heroës, nati melioribus annis.

At the head of these is Orpheus, the most renowned of the European Lawgivers; but better known under the character of Poet: for the first laws being written in measure, to allure men to learn them, and, when learnt, to retain them, the fable would have it, that by the force of harmony, he softened the savage inhabitants of Thrace:

[w] Ἐνδοξότατοι πάντων οἱ κατὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἀγῶνες. καὶ μὴν τούτων πρεσβύτατος ὁ τῶν Παναθηναίων· εἰ δὲ βούλει, ὁ τῶν Ἐλευσινίων. *Aristides Panath.*—Μυηθῆναι δὲ ξένων πρώτους Ἡρακλέα, καὶ Διοσκούρους· ἀγῶνά τε γυμνικὸν γενέσθαι πρῶτον Ἐλευσῖνι τῆς Ἀττικῆς. *Idem Eleusin.*

Threicius longa cum veſte ſacerdos
Obloquitur numeris ſeptem diſcrimina vocum.

But he has the firſt place; becauſe he was not only Legiſlator, but the Introducer of the *Myſteries* into that part of Europe.

2. The next is allotted to PATRIOTS, *and thoſe who died for the ſervice of their country:*

Hic manus, ob patriam pugnando vulnera paſſi.

3. The third to *virtuous and pious* PRIESTS:

Quique ſacerdotes caſti, dum vita manebat;
Quique pii vates & Phœbo digna locuti.

For it was of principal uſe to Society, that religious men ſhould lead holy lives; and that they ſhould teach nothing of the Gods but what was agreeable to the divine nature.

4. The laſt place is given to the INVENTORS OF ARTS *mechanical and liberal:*

Inventas aut qui vitam excoluere per artes:
Quique ſui memores alios fecere merendo.

The order is exact and beautiful. The firſt claſs is of thoſe who FOUNDED Society, heroes and lawgivers: the ſecond, of thoſe who SUPPORTED it, patriots and holy prieſts: and the third, of thoſe who ADORNED it, the inventors of the arts of life, and the recorders of worthy actions.

Virgil has all along cloſely followed the doctrine of the *Myſteries*, which carefully taught that virtue only could entitle men to happineſs; and that rites, ceremonies, luſtrations and ſacrifices would not ſupply the want of it.

Nor has he been leſs ſtudious in copying their *ſhews* and *repreſentations*; in which the figures of thoſe heroes and heroines, who were moſt celebrated in the writings of the ancient Greeks, paſſed in proceſſion [x].

[x] —ὅσα μὲν δὴ θέας ἐχόμενα εἶδον γυναῖ παμπληθεῖς εὐδαιμόνων ἀνδρῶν ἢ γυναικῶν ἐν τοῖς ἀῤῥήτοις φάσμασιν· ἃ δ' εἰς τὸ μέσον ποιῆσαι, ἢ λογοποιοὶ ἢ συγγραφεῖς παύλης ὑμνῆσι—*Ariſtid.*

But,

But, notwithſtanding this entire conformity between the poet's ſcenes and thoſe repreſented in the *Myſteries*, ſomething is ſtill wanting to complete the proofs: and that is, the famous SECRET of the *Myſteries*, THE UNITY OF THE GODHEAD, of which ſo much hath been ſaid above. Had Virgil neglected to give us this characteriſtic mark, though, even then, we could not but ſay, his intention was *to repreſent an Initiation*; yet we muſt have been forced to own he had done it but imperfectly. But he was too good a painter, to leave any thing ambiguous; and hath therefore concluded his hero's *Initiation*, as was the cuſtom, with inſtructing him in the ΑΠΟΡΡΗΤΑ, or the doctrine of the UNITY. Till this was done, the *Initiated* was not arrived to the higheſt ſtage of perfection; nor, in the fulleſt ſenſe, intitled to the appellation of ΕΠΟΠΤΗΣ.

Muſæus, therefore, who had been *Hierophant* at Athens, takes the place of the Sibyl (as it was the cuſtom to have different Guides in different parts of the celebration) and is made to conduct him to the receſs, where his Father's ſhade opens to him *the doctrine of Truth*, in theſe ſublime words;

Principio cœlum, ac terras, camposque liquentes,
Lucentemque globum Lunæ, Titaniaque aſtra
SPIRITUS INTUS ALIT, totamque infuſa per artus
MENS agitat molem, & magno ſe corpore miſcet.
Inde hominum pecudumque genus, vitæque volantum,
Et quæ marmoreo fert monſtra ſub æquore pontus.

This was no other than the doctrine of the old Egyptians, as we are aſſured by Plato; who ſays they taught that Jupiter was the SPIRIT WHICH PERVADETH ALL THINGS [y].

[y] Ἰδωμεν δὲ καὶ τὰ τούτων παλαίτατα· ἃ δὲ τὰ Αἰγύπτια· τὴν Ἶσιν φασὶ, &c.— καὶ Δία μὲν, τὸ ΔΙΑ ΠΑΝΤΩΝ ΧΩΡΟΥΝ ΠΝΕΥΜΑ. *In Cratylo.*

We ſhall ſhew how eaſily the Greek Philoſophy corrupted this *principle* into (what is now called) SPINOZISM [z]. Here Virgil has approved his judgment to great advantage. Nothing was more abhorrent from the *Myſteries*, than Spinoziſm, as it overturned [a] the doctrine of a future ſtate of rewards and puniſhments, which the *Myſteries* ſo carefully inculcated; and yet the principle itſelf, of which Spinoziſm was the abuſe, was cheriſhed there, as it was the conſequence of the doctrine of the Unity, the grand ſecret of the *Myſteries*. Virgil, therefore, delivers the principle, with great caution, and pure and free of the abuſe; though he underſtood the nature of Spinoziſm, and (by the following lines in his fourth *Georgic*, where he delivers it) appears to have been infected with it.

——Deum namque ire per omnes
Terrasque tractusque maris, cœlumque profundum.
Hinc pecudes, armenta, viros, genus omne ferarum
Quemque ſibi tenues naſcentem arceſſere vitas.
Scilicet HUC REDDI DENIQUE AC RESOLUTA REFERRI
OMNIA——

But the *Myſteries* did not teach the doctrine of the Unity for mere ſpeculation; but, as we ſaid before, to obviate certain miſchiefs of polytheiſm, and to ſupport the belief of a Providence. Now, as a *future* ſtate of rewards and puniſhments did not quite remove the objections to it's inequalities here, the *Myſteries* added to it the doctrine of the METEMPSYCHOSIS, or the belief of a prior ſtate [b]. And this, likewiſe, our poet has been careful to record. For

[z] Book iii. Sect. 4. [a] See Book iii. Sect. 3 & 4.
[b] Vid. Porph. *de Abſt.* l. iv. ſect. 16. et Cic. Fragm. ex lib. *de Philoſophia.*

after

after having revealed the great ſecret of the Unity, he goes on to ſpeak of the *Metempſychoſis*, or tranſmigration, in this manner;

Has omnes, ubi mille rotam volvere per annos,
Lethæum ad fluvium Deus evocat agmine magno
Scilicet immemores ſupera ut convexa reviſant,
Rurſus & incipiant in corpora velle reverti.

And thence takes occaſion to explain the nature and uſe of a Popiſh PURGATORY, which, in his hero's paſſage through that region, had not been done: this affords him too an opportunity for that noble epiſode, the proceſſion of the hero's poſterity, which paſſes in review before him: And with this the ſcene cloſes. One might well allow Virgil the uſe of ſo important a digreſſion, (conſidering whom it was he celebrated under the character of Æneas) though it had been foreign to the nature of the *Myſteries* he is deſcribing. But indeed he was even here following their cuſtoms very cloſely. It was then, and had been for ſome time, the practice of the *Myſteries*, when communicated to any aſpirant of diſtinguiſhed quality, to exhibit to him, in their *ſhews* and *repreſentations*, ſomething ORACULAR, relating to his own fortune and affairs. Thus Himerius tells us, that Olympia, on her upriſing, after the birth of Alexander, was initiated into the Samothracian *Myſteries*; Where, in the *ſhews*, ſhe ſaw her huſband Philip, at that time in Potidæa [c].

In attending the hero's progreſs through the three eſtates of the dead, I have ſhewn, at almoſt every ſtep, from ſome ancient writer or other, the exact conformity of his adventures to thoſe of the Initiated in the *Myſteries*. We ſhall now collect theſe ſcattered lights to a point; which will, I am perſuaded, throw

[c] Λέγεται ποτὲ ἡ Ὀλυμπιάδα, τὴν ἐπὶ τοῖς Ἀλεξάνδρου τόκοις εὐδαίμονα ὑγιάζουσαν τὰ Καβείρων ἐν Σαμοθρᾴκῃ μυστήρια, ἰδεῖν καλὰ τὴν τελετὴν τὸν Φίλιππον. *In Eclog. Declam. apud Photium*, Cod. 165, 243.

such a lustre on this interpretation, as to make the truth of it irresistible. To this purpose, I shall have nothing to do, but to transcribe a passage from an ancient writer, preserved by Stobaeus; which professes to explain the exact conformity between [illegible], or a real descent to the infernal regions, and [illegible]ATION, where the representation of those regions was exhibited. His words are these: THE MIND IS AFFECTED AND AGITATED IN DEATH, JUST AS IT IS IN INITIATION INTO THE GRAND MYSTERIES. AND WORD ANSWERS TO WORD AS WELL AS THING TO THING: FOR ΤΕΛΕΥΤΑΝ IS TO DIE; AND ΤΕΛΕΙΣΘΑΙ, TO BE INITIATED. THE FIRST STAGE IS NOTHING BUT ERRORS AND UNCERTAINTIES; LABORIOUS WANDERINGS; A RUDE AND FEARFUL MARCH THROUGH NIGHT AND DARKNESS. AND NOW ARRIVED ON THE VERGE OF DEATH AND INITIATION, EVERY THING WEARS A DREADFUL ASPECT: IT IS ALL HORROR, TREMBLING, SWEATING, AND AFFRIGHTMENT. BUT THIS SCENE ONCE OVER, A MIRACULOUS AND DIVINE LIGHT DISPLAYS ITSELF; AND SHINING PLAINS AND FLOWERY MEADOWS OPEN ON ALL HANDS BEFORE THEM. HERE THEY ARE ENTERTAINED WITH HYMNS, AND DANCES, WITH THE SUBLIME DOCTRINES OF SACRED KNOWLEDGE, AND WITH REVEREND AND HOLY VISIONS. AND NOW BECOME PERFECT AND INITIATED, THEY ARE FREE, AND NO LONGER UNDER RESTRAINTS; BUT CROWNED AND TRIUMPHANT, THEY WALK UP AND DOWN THE REGIONS OF THE BLESSED; CONVERSE WITH PURE AND HOLY MEN; AND CELEBRATE THE SACRED MYSTERIES AT PLEASURE [d].

The

[d] Τὸ δὲ πάσχειν πάθος, οἷον οἱ τελεταῖς μεγάλαις καθοργιαζόμενοι· διὰ καὶ τὸ ῥῆμα τῷ ῥήματι, καὶ τὸ ἔργον τῷ ἔργῳ τοῦ τελεύταν καὶ τελεῖσθαι προσέοικε, πλάναι τὰ πρῶτα καὶ περιδρομαὶ κοπώδεις, καὶ διὰ σκότους τινὸς ὑποπτα-

The progress finished, and every thing over, Æneas and his Guide are let out again to the upper regions, through the *ivory gate* of DREAMS. A circumstance borrowed from Homer, and very happily applied to this subject; for, as Euripides elegantly expresses it,

"ΥΠΝΟΣ τὰ ΜΙΚΡΑ τοῦ θανάτου ΜΥΣΤΗΡΙΑ.

A DREAM is the LESSER MYSTERIES of *death.*

But, besides this of *ivory*, there was another of *horn.* Through the first issued *false* visions; and through the latter, *true.*

Sunt geminæ Somni portæ: quarum altera fertur
Cornea, qua *veris* facilis datur exitus umbris:
Altera candenti perfecta nitens elephanto;
Sed *falsa* ad cœlum mittunt insomnia manes.
His ubi tum natum *Anchises*, unaque Sibyllam
Prosequitur dictis, *portaque emittit eburna.*

Servius, with the rank spirit of a grammarian, who seldom finds any thing to stop at but a solecism in expression, says very readily, "Vult autem intelligi,

τοι πορεῖαι καὶ ατέλεστοι· εἶτα πρὸ τοῦ τέλους αὐτοῦ τὰ δεινὰ πάντα, φρίκη, καὶ τρόμος, καὶ ἱδρὼς, καὶ θάμβος· ἐκ δὲ τούτου, φῶς τι θαυμάσιον ἀπηνήσεν, ἢ τόποι καθαροὶ, καὶ λειμῶνες ἐδέξαντο, φωνὰς καὶ χορείας καὶ σεμνότητας ἀκουσμάτων ἱερῶν, καὶ φαντασμάτων ἁγίων ἔχοντες· ἐν αἷς ὁ παντελὴς ἤδη καὶ μεμυημένος ἐλεύθερος γεγονὼς, καὶ ἄφετος περιϊὼν ἐστεφανωμένος ὀργιάζει· καὶ σύνεστιν ὁσίοις καὶ καθαροῖς ἀνδράσι. *Sermo* cxix. The Son of Sirach, who was full of Grecian ideas, and hath embellished his admirable work of ECCLESIASTICUS with a great deal of Gentile learning, hath plainly alluded, tho' in few words, to these circumstances of INITIATION, where encouraging men to seek after *wisdom*, he says:—"At first she will walk with him by "CROOKED ways, and bring FEAR and DREAD upon him, and "TORMENT HIM WITH HER DISCIPLINE, until she may TRUST "his soul, and TRY him by her laws. Then will she return the "STRAIGHT way unto him, and COMFORT him, and shew him "her SECRETS."—διεστραμμένως πορεύεται μετ' αὐτοῦ ἐν πρώτοις· ΦΟΒΟΝ δὲ καὶ ΔΕΙΛΙΑΝ ἐπάξει ἐπ' αὐτὸν, καὶ ΒΑΣΑΝΙΣΕΙ ΑΥΤΟΝ ἘΝ ΠΑΙΔΙΑ ΑΥΤΗΣ, ἕως οὗ ΕΜΠΙΣΤΕΥΣΗι τῇ ψυχῇ αὐτοῦ· καὶ ΠΕΙΡΑΣΗ αὐτὸν ἐν τοῖς δικαιώμασιν αὐτῆς. Καὶ πάλιν ἐπανήξει κατ' εὐθεῖαν πρὸς αὐτὸν, καὶ ΕΥΦΡΑΝΕΙ αὐτὸν, καὶ ΑΠΟΚΑΛΥΨΕΙ αὐτῷ τὰ ΚΡΥΠΤΑ αὐτῆς. Chap. iv. ver. 17. 18.

"falſa eſſe omnia quæ dixit. He would have you "underſtand by this, that all he has been ſaying is "falſe and groundleſs." The following critics give the ſame ſolution. Ruæus, one of the beſt, may ſpeak for them all: "Cum igitur Virgilius Æneam "eburnea porta emittit, indicat profecto, quidquid a "ſe de illo inferorum aditu dictum eſt, in fabulis eſſe "numerandum." This interpretation is ſtrengthened by Virgil's being an Epicurean; and making the ſame concluſion in his ſecond *Georgic*:

Felix, qui potuit rerum cognoſcere cauſas,
Atque metus omnes & inexorabile fatum
Subjecit pedibus, *ſtrepitumque Acherontis avari!*

But Virgil wrote, not for the amuſement of women and children over a winter's fire, in the taſte of the *Mileſian fables*; but for the uſe of men and citizens; to inſtruct them in the duties of humanity and ſociety. The purpoſe, therefore, of ſuch a writer, when he treats of a FUTURE STATE, muſt be to make the doctrine intereſting to his reader, and uſeful in civil life: Virgil hath done the firſt, by bringing his Hero to it through the moſt perilous atchievement; and the ſecond, by appropriating the rewards and puniſhments of that ſtate to *virtue* and to *vice* only. Now if we will believe theſe critics, when the poet had laboured through a whole book, and employed all his art and genius to compaſs this important end, he fooliſhly defeats his whole deſign with one wanton daſh of his pen, which ſpeaks to this effect: "I "have laboured, countrymen, to draw you to vir"tue, and to deter you from vice, in order to make "particulars and ſocieties flouriſhing and happy. "The truths inforced to this purpoſe, I have endea"voured to recommend by the example of your an"ceſtor and founder, Æneas; of whom (to do you "the more credit) I have made an accompliſhed he"ro; and have ſet him on the moſt arduous and il-

"luſtrious

"luſtrious undertaking, the eſtabliſhment of a civil "community: and to ſanctify his character, and add "reverence to his laws, I have ſent him upon the "errand you ſee here related. But, leſt the buſineſs "ſhould do you any ſervice, or my hero any honour, "I muſt inform you, that all this talk of a *future ſtate* "is a childiſh tale, and Æneas's part in it, only a "fairy adventure. In a word, all that you have "heard, muſt paſs for a lenten dream, from which "you are to draw no conſequences, but that the poet "was in a capricious humour, and diſpoſed to "laugh at your ſuperſtitions." Thus is Virgil made to ſpeak in the interpretation of ancient and modern critics[c]. And this the concluſion he was pleaſed to give to the maſter-piece of all his writings.

The truth is, the difficulty can never be gotten over, but by ſuppoſing THE DESCENT TO SIGNIFY AN INITIATION INTO THE MYSTERIES. This will unriddle the enigma, and reſtore the poet to himſelf. And if this was Virgil's purpoſe; it is to be preſumed, he would give ſome private mark to aſcertain his meaning: for which no place was ſo proper as the concluſion. He has, therefore, with a beauty of invention worthy of himſelf, made this fine improvement on Homer's ſtory of the *two gates*; and by imagining that of horn for true viſions, and that of ivory for falſe, inſinuates, by the firſt, the *reality* of another ſtate; and by the ſecond, the *ſhadowy* repreſentations of it in the ſhews of the *Myſteries:* ſo that, not the things themſelves, but only the pictures of them, objected to Æneas, were falſe; as the Scene did not lye in HELL, but in the TEMPLE OF CERES.

[c] This abſurdity did not eſcape the learned Dacier, who, in his note on *porta fugiens eburna*, l. iii. Od. xxvii. of Horace, ſays,—Mais ce qu'il y a d'etonnant, c'eſt que Virgile fait ſortir Anchiſe par la port d'yvoire, qui eſt celle des faux ſonges; par la il detruit toutes les grandes choſes qu'il a dites de Rome & d'Auguſte.

This

This repreſentation being called ΜΥΘΟΣ, κατ' ἐξοχήν. And this we propoſe as the true meaning of

Altera candenti perfecta nitens elephanto:
Sed FALSA ad cœlum mittunt inſomnia manes.

For, *falſa inſomnia* do not ſignify *lying*, but, *ſhadowy dreams*. Thus the Roman widow, in the famous ſepulchral inſcription [f], begs the Dii manes to be ſo indulgent to her huſband's ſhade, that ſhe may ſee him in her dreams; that is, ſeem to ſee him, as the ſhade of Hector was ſeen by Æneas,

In ſomnis ecce ante oculos mœſtiſſimus Hector
Viſus adeſſe mihi———

and this, in diſtinction to what that Roman Widow makes the other part of her prayer, to be *really* joined to him in the other world.

But though the viſions which iſſued from the ivory gate were *unſubſtantial*, as being only repreſentative; yet I make no queſtion, but the ivory gate itſelf was *real*. It appears, indeed, to be no other than that ſumptuous door of the temple, through which the *Initiated* came out, when the *celebration* was over. This temple was of an immenſe bigneſs, as appears from the words of Apuleius: "Senex "comiſſimus ducit me protinus ad ipſas fores ÆDIS

[f] ITA PETO VOS MANES
SANCTISSIMI
COMMENDATVM HABEATIS
MEVM CONIVGEM ET VEL-
LITIS
HVIC INDVLGENTISSIMI ESSE
HORIS NOCTVRNIS
VT EVM VIDEAM
ET ETIAM ME FATO SVADERE
VELLIT VT ET EGO POSSIM
DVLCIVS ET CELERIVS
APVD EVM PERVENIRE.
Apud *Grut.* p. 786.

"AMPLIS-

" AMPLISSIMÆ [g]." Strabo is more particular: " Next (ſays he) is Eleuſis, in which is the temple " of the Eleuſinian Ceres, and the myſtic cell built " by Ictinus, CAPABLE OF HOLDING AS LARGE A " NUMBER AS A THEATRE [h]." But Vitruvius's de- " ſcription of it is ſtill more curious: " ELEUSINÆ " Cereris & Proſerpinæ cellam IMMANI MAGNITU- " DINE Ictinus Dorico more, ſine exterioribus colum- " nis *ad laxamentum uſus ſacrificiorum*, pertexit. " Eam autem poſtea, cum Demetrius Phalereus " Athenis rerum potiretur, Philon ante templum in " fronte columnis conſtitutis Proſtylon fecit. *Ita* " *aucto veſtibulo laxamentum initiantibus operisque* " *ſummam adjecit autoritatem* [i]." And Ariſtides thought this the moſt extraordinary circumſtance in the whole affair: " But the thing moſt wonderful " and divine was, that of all the public aſſemblies of " Greece, this was the only one which was contained " within the walls of one edifice [k]." Here was room, we ſee, and ſo purpoſely contrived, for all their SHEWS and REPRESENTATIONS.

And now, having occaſionally, and by parts only, ſaid ſo much of theſe things, it will not be amiſs, in concluſion to give one general and conciſe idea of the whole. I ſuppoſe the ſubſtance of the celebration to be a kind of drama of the hiſtory of Ceres; as thoſe under the patronage of the other Gods repreſented their Hiſtory; ſo HERCULES and MYTHRAS, who protected the oppreſſed from the ravages of wild Beaſts or more cruel Men, had their labours in *war* and *hunting* dramatically held out. The Story of

[g] *Metam.* l. xi.

[h] Εἶτ' Ἐλευσὶν πόλις, ἐν ᾗ τὸ τῆς Δήμητρος ἱερὸν τῆς Ἐλευσινίας· καὶ ὁ μυστικὸς σηκὸς, ὃν κατεσκεύασεν Ἰκτῖνος, ὄχλον θιάτρου δέξασθαι δυνάμενον. —lib. ix. *Geog.*

[i] *De Architect.* Præf. ad l. vii.

[k] Τὸ δὲ δὴ μέγιστον καὶ θειότατον, μόνη γὰρ ταύτην πανηγύρεων εἰς οἶκος συλλαβὼν εἶχε. *Eleuſin. Orat.*

Ceres

Ceres afforded opportunity to repreſent the three particulars, about which the myſteries were principally concerned. 1. *The riſe and eſtabliſhment of civil ſociety.* 2. *The doctrine of a future ſtate of rewards and puniſhments.* 3. *The error of polytheiſm, and the principle of the unity.* The Goddeſs's legiſlation in Sicily and Attica (at both which places ſhe was ſaid to civilize the ſavage manners of the inhabitants) gave birth to the *firſt*[l]. Her ſearch for her daughter Proſerpine in hell, to the *ſecond*; and her reſentments againſt the Gods for their permiſſion of, or connivance at, the rape, to the *third*[m]. My ſuppoſition, of the dramatic nature of the ſhews, is not made without good authority. Lucian, in his *Alexander*, where he gives a large account of the impoſtures of that falſe prophet, ſpeaking of the *Myſteries* which he inſtituted, in honour of his new-found God, Glyco; ſays, they were celebrated (after the uſual preparatory rites of torch bearing, initiation, and public notice to the prophane to keep at diſtance,) by a three Days feſtival: "On the firſt day was repre-"ſented the labour of Latona and the Nativity of "Apollo; the nuptials of Ceronis; and the birth of "Æſculapius. On the ſecond, the appearance of "Glyco, and the generation of the god: and on the "third, the marriage of Podalirius with the mother "of Alexander." [n]Every thing in theſe rites being performed, as the turn of the learned author's rela-

[l] Teque, Ceres & Libera, quarum SACRA—a quibus initia vitæ, atque victus, legum, morum, manſuetudinis humanitatis exempla hominibus et civitatibus data, ac diſpertita eſſe dicuntur. *Cic. in Verr.* v. c. 72.

[m] This circumſtance Apollodorus informs us of; his Words are theſe:—Μαθοῦσα δὲ παρ' ἑρμοῦ, ὅτι Πλούτων αὐτὴν ἥρπασεν, ΟΡΓΙΖΟΜΕΝΗ ΘΕΟΙΣ ΑΠΕΛΙΠΕΝ ΟΥΡΑΝΟΝ· εἰκασθεῖσα δὲ γυναικὶ, ἦκεν εἰς Ἐλευσῖνα.

[n] Λῆξις ἐγίνετο λοχεία, καὶ Ἀπόλλωνος γοναὶ, καὶ Κορωνίδος γάμος, καὶ Ἀσκληπιὸς, ἐτέκετο· ἐν δὲ τῇ δευτέρᾳ Γλυκῶνος ἐπιφάνεια καὶ γένεσις τοῦ θεοῦ. Τρίτῃ δὲ ἡμέρᾳ, Ποδαλειρίου τε καὶ τῆς μητρὸς Ἀλεξάνδρου γάμος, &c.

tion neceſſarily implies, in imitation of ancient uſage. But here let it be obſerved, that the ſecrets of the *Myſteries* were unfolded both by *words* and *actions:* of which Ariſtides, quoted above, gives the reaſon; "That ſo the *ſounds* and *ſights* might mutually aſſiſt "each other in making an impreſſion on the minds "of the *Initiated.*" The *error of polytheiſm* therefore was as well expoſed by the *dark wanderings* in the ſubterraneous paſſages thro' which the Initiated began his courſe, as by the information received from the Hierophant: and the *unity* as ſtrongly illuſtrated by the αὐτοπτον ἄγαλμα, the *ſelf-ſeen image*[o], the diffuſive *ſhining light*, as by the *hymn of Orpheus*[p], or this *ſpeech of Anchiſes.*

On the whole, if I be not much deceived, the view in which I place this famous epiſode, not only clears up a number of difficulties, inexplicable on any other ſcheme; but likewiſe heightens and ennobles the whole poem; for now the epiſode is ſeen to be an eſſential part of the main ſubject, which is THE ERECTION OF A CIVIL POLICY and A RELIGION; cuſtom having made *initiation into the Myſteries* a neceſſary preparative for that arduous undertaking.

But there is no place in this admirable Poem, even to the SHIELD OF ÆNEAS, which will not inſtruct us how conſiderable a ſtation the MYSTERIES held in public life; and how neceſſary they were ſuppoſed to be, to compleat the equipage of a Hero.

The ornaments on this ſhield repreſent two famous Hiſtories of different periods, and very differently executed. The firſt, a looſe ſketch of the foundation and early fortunes of Rome; the ſecond, a highly finiſhed picture of the victory of Actium. Theſe ſo diſſimilar pieces ſeem to be as oddly connected; by a ſudden jump unto the other world.

[o] See note (r) p. 335. [p] See p. 235.

Hinc

Hinc procul addit
Tartareas etiam ſedes, alta oſtia Ditis;
Et ſcelerum pœnas, & te, Catilina, minaci
Pendentem ſcopulo, Furiarumque ora trementem;
Secretoſque pios; his dantem jura Catonem [s].

But there is more in this diſpoſition than appears at firſt ſight. The ſeveral parts make an uniform and connected Syſtem. The firſt of the two principal parts, we have obſerved, is a view of the foundation and firſt eſtabliſhment of ancient Rome. Now Dionyſius of Halicarnaſſus tells us, that this city, was in nothing more excellent, or worthy of imitation, than in the genius of its national Religion; which was ſo conſtructed, as to be always ready to render ſervice to the State. Hence, Virgil, when he has brought us to the time in which their CIVIL eſtabliſhment was perfectly ſecured by the ſlaughter and diſperſion of the Gauls,

(Scutis protecti corpora longis,)

goes on to the RELIGIOUS conſtitution:

Hic exultantes Salios, nudoſque Lupercos,
Lanigeroſque apices, & lapſa ancilia cœlo
Exciderat: caſtæ ducebant ſacra per urbem
Pilentis matres in mollibus——

Now Strabo obſerves, that the ancient pagan religion conſiſted of two parts, the OPEN and the SECRET [t]. The *open*, Virgil hath given us in the Salian and Lupercal rites. What remained was the *ſecret*; and this he preſents to us in an oblique deſcription of the *Myſteries*; where (as we have ſhewn) the ſcenes of a future ſtate were exhibited to the Initiated.

Hinc procul addit
TARTAREAS etiam SEDES, alta oſtia Ditis;

[s] Lib. viii. [t] Lib. x.

Et

Et ſcelerum pœnas, & te, Catilina, minaci
Pendentem ſcopulo, Furiarumque ora trementem;
SECRETOSQUE PIOS; his dantem jura Catonem.

So that, as before, a particular INITIATION into the *Myſteries* was meant by Æneas's deſcent to the infernal regions; here, the general CELEBRATION of them is to be underſtood by this contracted view of Tartarus and Elyſium.

As this meaning ſeems neceſſary to give common propriety to the deſcription of the ſhield, there is reaſon, I think, for receiving it. And if we allow, that the MYSTERIES are here repreſented under the idea of the *infernal regions*, we gain a new argument in favour of the interpretation of the ſixth book.

If it be aſked why Cato is put, as it were, in the place of Minos; and Catiline, of Tityus; the anſwer will let us into another beauty. It is a fine inſinuation, that theſe foreign rites of Eleuſis deſerved to be naturalized at Rome. In which he only followed the opinion of Cicero[*].

Here it may not be improper to take notice of a vulgar miſtake, as old at leaſt as Servius, that Cato the cenſor, and not Cato of Utica, is meant in this place; as if the Court-poet would not dare to celebrate the profeſſed enemy of the Julian houſe. This made the critics ſeek out for a Cato of a diſtant age, to brave Catiline in Hell; when they might have ſeen it could be no other than his great contemporary, who had before withſtood him in Rome. The laſt line,

SECRETOSQUE pios; his dantem jura Catonem,

was probably a compliment to Cato in his little ſenate at Utica.

[*] See p. 245.

All

All this conſidered, we ſee the reaſon, the great artiſt had to call his picture, his portraiture on the ſhield,

—— Clypei NON ENARRABILE textum;

an ÆNIGMATICAL Picture.

And now the nature and purpoſe of the *ſixth* book being further ſupported by this collateral circumſtance, it will enable us to diſcover and explain another beauty in the *ſeventh*; which depending on this principle, could not be ſeen till it was eſtabliſhed.

If the recommendation of the *Myſteries* was of ſuch importance in an epic poem of this *ſpecies*; and if, at the time of writing, many of the *Myſteries* were become abominably corrupt, we can hardly believe but that the poet, after he had ſo largely expatiated in praiſe of thoſe that were holy and uſeful, would take care to ſtigmatize ſuch as were become notoriouſly profligate: becauſe this tended equally with the other, to vindicate, what he had in view, the honour of the inſtitution. And what ſtrengthens this conjecture, is the ſimilar conduct of another great writer of antiquity upon the ſame ſubject, whom we are now coming to, APULEIUS of Madaura, whoſe *Metamorphoſis* is written altogether in this view of *recommending the pagan Myſteries*; in which, as we ſhall find, he hath been no leſs circumſtantial in reprobating the corrupt *Myſteries* of the SYRIAN GODDESS than in extolling the pure rites of the EGYPTIAN ISIS. A conduct ſo much alike, that the two caſes will ſerve mutually to ſupport what is here ſaid of either.

This then ſeemed a neceſſary part in the plan of Virgil's Poem. But it was no eaſy matter to execute it. Another allegory would have been without grace; nor was there any repoſe in the latter part of the action of the poem, as in the former, to admit a digreſſion of ſuch a length. On the other hand,

to

to condemn all *corrupt Myſteries*, in the plain way of a judiciary ſentence, did not ſuit the nature of his poem: or if it had ſuited, could it have been uſed; without hurting the uniform texture of the work; after the *pure rites* had been ſo covertly recommended under figures and fictions.

The poet, therefore, with admirable invention, hath contrived, in the next book, to render the moſt corrupt of the *Myſteries*, the ſecret rites of BACCHUS, very odious, by making them the inſtrument to traverſe the deſigns of Providence, in the eſtabliſhment of his Hero; and by putting a FURY on the office of exciting the *aſpirants*, to the *celebration* of them. Amata, the mother of Lavinia, in order to violate the league and alliance between Æneas and Latinus, contrives, at the inſtigation of Alecto, to ſecrete her daughter; and to devote and conſecrate her to Bacchus, in an *initiation* into one of his abominable rites.

SIMULATO numine BACCHI
Majus adorta NEFAS, majoremque orſa furorem,
Evolat, & *natam* frondoſis montibus ABDIT[t];
Quo thalamum eripiat Teucris, tedaſque moretur:
Evoë, Bacche! fremens SOLUM TE VIRGINE DIGNUM
Vociferans——
Fama volat: Furiisque accenſas pectore *matres*,
Idem omnis ſimul ardor agit, nova quærere tecta
Deſeruere domos——
Clamat: Io, matres——
Solvite crinales vittas, capite orgia mecum.
Talem inter ſylvas, inter deſerta ferarum

[t] Livy, we have ſeen, in his account of theſe rites of *Bacchus*, ſays, "Raptos a Diis homines dici, quos machinæ illigatos ex conſpectu in abditos ſpecus abripiant."

Reginam Alecto stimulis agit undique Bacchi[u].

The Myſteries of Bacchus were well choſen for an example of corrupted Rites, and of the miſchiefs they produced; for they were early, and flagrantly corrupted. But his principal reaſon for this choice, I ſuppoſe, was a very extraordinary ſtory he found in the Roman annals, of the horrors committed in that city, during the clandeſtine celebration of the *Bacchic rites*; which Livy has tranſcribed very circumſtantially into the thirty-ninth book of his *Hiſtory*.

Nor did the poet think he had done enough, in repreſenting the *corrupt Myſteries* under theſe circumſtances of diſcredit, without ſpecifying the miſchiefs they produced; nor that he had ſufficiently diſtinguiſhed them from the *pure*, without ſhewing those miſchiefs to be ſuch as the *pure* had taken care to obviate.

The next news, therefore, we hear of Amata, after her celebration of the rites of Bacchus, is her suicide, and a ſuicide of the moſt ignominious kind.

Purpureos moritura manu diſcindit amictus,
Et nodum *informis leti* trabe nectit ab alta.

This diſaſter, the poet makes Jupiter charge upon

[u] Lib. vii.——Plutarch deſcribes theſe *corrupt Myſteries*, in the ſame manner; but adds, that they were not celebrated in honour of any of the Gods, but to prevent miſchief from evil Demons, whom, by ſuch ſort of Rites, they would appeaſe and render innocuous.——ἑορτὰς δὲ καὶ θυσιάς ὥσπερ ἡμέρας ἀποφράδας καὶ σκυθρωπὰς ἐν αἷς ὠμοφαγίαι καὶ διασπασμοὶ, νηστειάι τε καὶ κοπετοὶ, πολλαχοῦ δὲ πάλιν αἰσχρολογίαι πρὸς ἱεροῖς, μανίαι τε ἄλλαι ὀρινόμεναι ῥιψαυχίαι σὺν κλόνῳ, θεῶν μὲν οὐδενὶ, ΔΑΙΜΟΝΩΝ δὲ ΦΑΥΛΩΝ, αποτροπῆς ἕνεκα φήσαιμ' ἂν τελεῖν μειλίχια καὶ παραμυθια.——περὶ τῶν ἐκλελοιπότων χρηστηρίων.

Juno;

Juno; who, by the miniſtry of Alecto, excited Amata to an *initiation*,

Terris agitare vel undis
Trojanos potuiſti: infandum accendere bellum,
DEFORMARE DOMUM, & luctu miſcere hymenæos.

Suicide, as we learn by Plato [w], the *holy myſteries* expreſly forbad and condemned. On which account our poet, in his allegorical deſcription of what was repreſented in the *Eleuſinian*, has placed theſe criminals in a ſtate of miſery.

Proxima deinde tenent mœſti loca, qui ſibi lethum——

Thus nobly hath Virgil completed his deſign on the ſubject of the MYSTERIES. The hero of the poem is initiated into the moſt pure and holy of them; his capital Enemy, into the moſt impure and corrupt; and the ſchemes and intrigues of each party have a correſpondent iſſue.

To conclude, the Principles here aſſumed, in explaining this famous poetical fiction, are, I preſume, ſuch as give ſolidity, as well as light, to what is deduced from them; and are, perhaps, the only Principles from which any thing reaſonable can be deduced in a piece of criticiſm of this nature. For, from what I had ſhewn was taught, and repreſented in the *Myſteries*, I infer that Æneas's DESCENT INTO HELL ſignifies an INITIATION; becauſe of the exact conformity, in all circumſtances, between what Virgil relates of his Hero's adventure, and what antiquity delivers concerning the SHEWS and DOCTRINES of thoſe MYSTERIES, into which Heroes were wont to be initiated. On the contrary, had I gratuitouſly ſuppoſed, without any previous knowledge of what was practiſed in the *Myſteries*, that the *deſcent* was

[w] See above, p. 318.

an *initiation*, merely becauſe Auguſtus (who was ſhadowed under the perſon of Æneas) was initiated; and thence inferred, that the *Myſteries* did exhibit the ſame ſcenes which the Poet hath made *Hell* to exhibit to his Hero, my explanation had been as devoid of any ſolid inference, as of any rational principle. And yet if authority could ſupport ſo impertinent a conduct, one might have ventured on it. A celebrated writer[z], in a tract intitled *Reflections on the character of Iapis in Virgil*, goes altogether on this gratuitous kind of criticiſm. Without any previous knowledge of the life and fortunes of ANTONIUS MUSA, the phyſician of Auguſtus, he ſuppoſes that Virgil meant this perſon by IAPIS, merely becauſe Auguſtus was meant by Æneas. And then, from what the poet tells us of Iapis's hiſtory, the critic concludes it muſt have made part of the hiſtory of Muſa; and ſo, inſtead of explaining a fable by hiſtory, he would regulate hiſtory on a fable. Whereas the principles of true criticiſm ſhould have directed him to inquire previouſly what Antiquity had left us, concerning the perſon of Antonius Muſa: and if, on comparing what he found there, with what Virgil has delivered concerning Iapis, any ſtrong reſemblance was to be found; then, and not till then, his ingenious conjecture, that *Iapis* was *Muſa*, would ſtand upon a reaſonable bottom. It was not thus that an able critic [y] lately explained Virgil's noble allegory, in the beginning of the *third* GEORGIC; where, under the idea of a magnificent Temple, to be raiſed to the Divinity of Auguſtus; the poet promiſes the famous epic poem which he afterwards erected in his honour; or, as our Milton ſays,

——"built the lofty rhime."

[z] * Dr. Atterbury Biſhop of Rocheſter.

[y] See Hor. *Ep. ad Auguſt. with an Engl. Comm. and Notes*, p. 36.

But

But had the exiſtence of ſuch a poem never come to our knowledge, I am perſuaded, this excellent writer had never troubled the world with ſo ſlender a conjecture that a Temple ſignified an epic poem; and therefore that Virgil executed, or at leaſt intended, ſuch a work. In truth, Critics ſhould proceed in theſe enquiries about their author's ſecret meaning, with the ſame caution and ſobriety which Courts of Juſtice employ in the detection of concealed criminals; who take care, in the firſt place to be well aſſured of the *corpus delicti*, before they venture to charge the fact upon any one.

Thus far concerning the *uſe* of the MYSTERIES to SOCIETY. How *eſſential* they were eſteemed to RELIGION, we may underſtand by the METAMORPHOSIS OF APULEIUS; a book, indeed, which from its very firſt appearance hath paſſed for a trivial fable. Capitolinus, in the life of Clodius Albinus, where he ſpeaks of that kind of tales which diſconcert the gravity of philoſophers, tells us that Severus could not bear with patience the honours the Senate had conferred on Albinus; eſpecially their diſtinguiſhing him with the title of *learned*, who was grown old in the ſtudy of old-wives-fables, ſuch as the Mileſian-Punic tales of his countryman and favourite, Apuleius: "Major fuit (ſays Severus, in his letter to the ſenate on this occaſion) "dolor quod illum pro "*literato* laudandum plerique duxiſtis, quum ille "næniis quibuſdam anilibus occupatus *inter Mileſias* "*Punicas Apuleii ſui* et ludicra literaria conſeneſce-"ret." That poor, modern-ſpirited critic Macrobius, talks too of Apuleius in the ſame ſtrain.—— "Nec omnibus fabulis Philoſophia repugnat, nec "omnibus acquieſcit——Fabulæ, aut tantum conci-"liandæ auribus voluptatis aut adhortationis quoque "in bonam frugem gratia repertæ ſunt, auditum "mulcent; velut comœdiæ; quales Menander ejuſ-"ve imitatores agendas dederunt: vel argumenta

" fictis caſibus amatorum referta; quibus vel mul-
" tum ſe *Arbiter* exercuit, vel APULEIUM nonnun-
" quam *luſiſſe* MIRAMUR. Hoc totum fabularum
" genus, *quod ſolas aurium delicias profitetur, e ſacra-*
" *rio ſuo in nutricum cunas ſapientiæ tractatus elimi-*
" *nat* [a]."—However he ſeems to wonder that Apuleius ſhould trifle ſo egregiouſly: and well he might. For the writer of the *Metamorphoſis* was one of the graveſt and moſt virtuous, as well as moſt learned, philoſophers of his age. But Albinus appears to have gone further into the true character of this work, than his rival Severus. And if we may believe Marcus Aurelius, who calls Albinus, " homo
" exercitatus, vita triſtis, gravis moribus [b]," he was not a man to be taken with ſuch trifling amuſements as Mileſian fables. His fondneſs therefore for the *Metamorphoſis* of Apuleius ſhews, that he conſidered it in another light. And who ſo likely to be let into the author's true deſign, as Albinus, who lived very near his time, and was of Adrumetum in the neighbourhood of Carthage, where Apuleius ſojourned and ſtudied, and was honoured with public marks of diſtinction! The work is indeed of a different character from what ſome Ancients have repreſented it; and even from what modern Critics have pretended to diſcover of it. Thoſe Ancients, who ſtuck in the outſide, conſidered it, without refinement, as an idle fable: the Moderns, who could not reconcile a work of that nature to the gravity of the author's character, have ſuppoſed it a thing of more importance, and no leſs than a general ſatire on the vices of thoſe times: " Tota porro hæc metamorphoſis
" Apuleiana (ſays Mr. Fleuri [b]) & ſtylo & ſenten-
" tia, ſatyricon eſt perpetuum, ut recte obſervavit
" Barthius, *Adverſ.* lib. li. cap. 11. in quo magica

[a] Lib. i. c. 2.
[b] Capitolinus, in *Claud. Alb.*
[b] Ed. Ap. in uſ. Delph.

" deli-

" deliria, ſacrificulorum ſcelera, adulterorum crimi-
" na, furum & latronum impunitæ factiones palam
" differuntur." But this is far ſhort of the matter. The author's main purpoſe was not to ſatyrize the ſpecific *vices of his age* (tho' to enliven his fable, and for the better carrying on his ſtory, he hath employed many circumſtances of this kind) but to recommend PAGAN RELIGION as the only cure for *all vice whatſoever.*

To give what we have to ſay its proper force, we muſt conſider the real character of the writer. Apuleius, of Madaura in Afric, was a devoted Platoniſt; and, like the Platoniſts of that age, an inveterate enemy to Chriſtianity. His zeal for the *honour of philoſophy* is ſeen in that ſolemn affirmation, when convened before a court of juſtice, " Philoſo-
" phiæ honorem qui mihi ſalute mea antiquior eſt,
" nuſquam minui[c]." His ſuperſtitious attachment to the *Religion of his country* is ſeen in his immoderate fondneſs for the MYSTERIES. He was initiated, as himſelf tells us, into almoſt all of them: and, in ſome, bore the moſt diſtinguiſhed offices. In his Apology before the proconſul of Africa, he ſays, " Vin' dicam, cujuſmodi illas res in ſudario obvo-
" lutas, laribus Pontiani commendarim? Mos tibi
" geretur. *Sacrorum pleraque Initia in Græcia parti-*
" *cipavi.* Eorum quædam ſigna & monumenta tra-
" dita mihi a ſacerdotibus ſedulo conſervo. Nihil
" inſolitum, nihil incognitum dico: vel unius Li-
" beri Patris Symmiſtæ, qui adeſtis, ſcitis, quid do-
" mi conditum celetis, & abſque omnibus profanis
" tacite veneremini. *At ego, ut dixi, multijuga ſa-*
" *cra et plurimos ritus, varias ceremonias,* STUDIO
" VERI *et officio erga Deos, didici.* Nec hæc ad tem-
" pus compono: ſed abhinc ferme triennium eſt,
" cum primis diebus quibus Œam veneram, publice

[c] *Apol.* p. 114. Ed. Pric.

"*disserens de* ÆSCULAPII MAJESTATE eadem sta
"præ me tuli, & quot sacra nossem percensui. Ea
"disputatio celebratissima est; vulgo legitur; in om-
"nium manibus versatur; non tam facundia mea,
"quam mentione Æsculapii religiosis Œensibus
"commendata.——Etiamne cuiquam mirum videri
"potest, cui sit ulla memoria religionis, *hominem tot*
"*Mysteriis Deûm conscium* quædam sacrorum cre-
"pundia domi adservare [d]?" His attachment to the *open* worship of Paganism was not inferior to that of the *secret*, as appears by what follows from the same Apology:——"Morem mihi habeo, quo-
"quò eam, simulacrum alicujus Dei inter libellos
"conditum gestare; eique diebus festis thure &
"mero & aliquando victimis supplicare [e]." His great devotion to Paganism, therefore, must needs have been attended with an equal aversion to Christianity; and it is more than probable, that the oration he speaks of as made in honour of Æsculapius, was in the number of those INVECTIVES, at that time so well received by the enemies of our holy faith. For, not to insist on the success of his oration, which, he tells us, was in every body's hands, a thing common to discourses on subjects that engage the public attention, but rarely the fortune of such stale ware as panegyrics on a God long worn into an establishment; not, I say, to insist upon this, we may observe that Æsculapius was one of those ancient heroes [f], who were employed, by the defenders of Paganism, to oppose to JESUS; and the circumstances of Æsculapius's story made him the fittest of any in fabulous antiquity, for that purpose. Ovid, who lived before these times of danger

[d] *Apologia*. p. 63—4. Ed. a Pricæo, Par. 1635. 4to.
[e] *Apologia*. p. 72.
[f] Justin Martyr. Apol. 2.——ὅτι δὲ πάλιν ἔμαθον προφητεύοντα [illegible] καὶ νεκρὰς ἀνεγέρειν, τὸν Ἀσκληπιὸν παρηνεγκαν, ——See Cyrill. *cont. Julian.* l. vi.

to

to the pagan Gods, and indeed, before the coming of that Deliverer who gave occaſion to ſo many impious compariſons, hath yet made Ochirröe, in contemplation of his future actions, propheſy of him in ſuch ſtrains as preſented to his excellent Tranſlator the image of the *true phyſician of mankind*; and thereby enabled him to give a ſublime to his verſion, which is not borrowed from his original.

Ergo ubi vaticinos concepit mente furores,
Incaluitque Deo, quem clauſam pectore habebat;
Aſpicit infantem, totique ſalutifer orbi
Creſce puer, dixit: tibi ſe mortalia ſæpe
Corpora debebunt: animas tibi reddere ademptas
Fas erit. Idque ſemel, dîs indignantibus, auſus,
Poſſe dare hoc iterum flamma prohibebere avitâ;
Eque deo corpus fies exſangue; deuſque,
Qui modò corpus eras, & bis tua fata novabis.

OVID.

Once as the ſacred infant ſhe ſurvey'd,
The God was kindled in the raving maid,
And thus ſhe utter'd her prophetic tale:
" Hail, great phyſician of the world, all hail;
" Hail, mighty Infant, who in years to come,
" Shalt heal the nations and defraud the tomb;
" Swift be thy growth, thy triumphs unconfin'd
" Make kingdoms thicker, and increaſe man-
" kind.
" Thy daring art ſhall animate the dead,
" And draw the thunder on thy guilty head:
" Then ſhalt thou die.——But from the dark
" abode
" Riſe up victorious, and be twice a God."

ADDISON.

But the Reformers of Paganiſm having lately reſolved all the Popular Gods into the Attributes and Manifeſtations of the FIRST CAUSE, Æſculapius bore a

very diſtinguiſhed rank in this new Model. Pauſanias tells us, that in Phocis there was a celebrated Temple dedicated to him, where he was worſhiped, as *the Author and original of all things*[z].

Having ſeen what there was in the common paſſion of his Sect, and in his own fond mode of ſuperſtition, to indiſpoſe Apuleius to *Chriſtianity*; let us inquire what private provocation he might have to prejudice him againſt it: for, a private provocation, I am perſuaded, he had; occaſioned by a perſonal injury done him by one of THIS PROFESSION; which, I ſuppoſe, did not a little contribute to exaſperate his bigottry. He had married a rich widow, againſt the good liking of her firſt huſband's Relations; who endeavoured to ſet aſide the marriage on pretence of his employing ſorcery and enchantments to engage her affections. Of this, he was judicially accuſed by his wife's brother-in-law, Licinius Æmilianus, before the Proconſul of Africa. Now his Accuſer, if I am not much miſtaken, was a CHRISTIAN, tho' this intereſting circumſtance hath eſcaped the notice of his commentators. However let us hear the character Apuleius himſelf gives of his Party.—"Atqui ego ſcio nonnullos, et cum primis *Æmilianum* iſtum, *facetiæ* ſibi habere *res divinas deridere*. Nam, ut audio, perceuſentibus iis qui iſtum novere, NULLI DEO *ad hoc ævi ſupplicavit*; *nullum templum frequentavit*. Si fanum aliquod prætereat, NEFAS HABET ADORANDI GRATIA MANUM LABRIS ADMOVERE. Iſte vero nec diis rurationis, qui eum paſcunt ac veſtiunt, ſegetis ullas aut vitis aut gregis primitias impartit; nullum in villa ejus delubrum ſitum, nec locus aut lucus conſecratus. At quid ego de luco aut delubro loquor? *Negant vidiſſe ſe, qui fuere, unum ſaltem*

[z] Σταδίοις δὲ ἀπωτέρω Τιθορέας ἱδρυμένοις ναός ἐστιν Ἀσκληπιοῦ, καλεῖται δὲ Ἀρχαγέτας. Τιμὰς δὲ παρὰ αὐτῶν ἔχει Τιθορέων, καὶ ἐπὶ πᾶσι παρὰ Φωκέων τῶν ἄλλων. Lib. X.

in

in finibus ejus aut lapidem unctum, aut ramum coronatum. Igitur agnomenta ei duo indita: *Charon*, ob oris et animi *diritatem*: ſed alterum, quod LIBENTIUS AUDIT, ob deorum contemptum, *Mezentius*[h]." And now let us ſee how this agrees with what Arnobius tells us, the Pagans objected to his Sect—" In hac enim conſueſtis parte crimen nobis maximum *impietatis* affigere, quod neque *ædes ſacras venerationis* ad Officia conſtruamus, *nec Deorum alicujus ſimulacrum* conſtituamus, aut formam: non *altaria fabricemus*, non aras, non cæſorum ſanguinem animantium demus, *non tura*, *non frugas ſalſas*, non denique vinum liquens paterarum effuſionibus inferamus. Quæ quidem nos ceſſamus non ideo vel exædificare, vel facere *tanquam impias geramus & ſceleroſas mentes*, *aut aliquem ſumpſerimus temeraria in Deos deſperatione* CONTEMPTUM: ſed quod, &c.[i]" Again, where Apuleius apoſtrophiſes his Adverſary in another place, he ſays, agreeably to the Character before given of him——SI QUID CREDIS, Æmiliane[k]! and again, after explaining a ſpiritual doctrine of Plato, he adds with a ſneer——attamen ſi audire VERUM velis, Æmiliane[l]! But the repetition of this characteriſtic word with an ironical emphaſis is his conſtant formula when he addreſſes Æmilianus, longe a VERO aberraſſe neceſſe habeat confiteri[m]——Immo ſi VERUM velis[n]——plane quidem ſi VERUM velis[o]. 1. Now, irreligion and atheiſm, we know, were the names Chriſtianity at that time went by, for having dared to renounce the whole family of the gentile Gods together. To this opprobrium, Origin alludes, when he retorts it on Polytheiſm, in this elegant manner——ὁι περὶ ἀγαλμάτων καὶ τῆς ΑΘΕΟΤ πολυθεότητος. Æmilianus we ſee had made ſuch clear work, that there was not ſo much

[h] *Apol.* p. 64, 5. [i] Arnob. adver. Gentes. L. vii. ſub init.
[k] P. 26. [l] P. 14. [m] P. 77.
[n] P. 98. [o] 108.

much as an *anointed ſtone*, or a *tree adorned with ſeparated garlands*, to be found throughout his whole Farce. That the Atheiſm of Æmilianus was of this ſort, and no *courtly* or *philoſophic* impiety, appears from his Character and Station. He was neither a fine Gentleman, nor a profound Inquirer into nature; characters indeed which are ſometimes found to be above Religion; but a mere Ruſtic, in his life and manners. Now plain, unpoliſhed men, in ſuch a condition of life, are never without ſome Religion or other: When therefore, we find Æmilianus out of the *eſtabliſhed*, we muſt needs conclude him to be a *Sectary* and a CHRISTIAN. 2. His neglect of his country Gods was not a mere negative affront of forgetfulneſs. He gloried in being their deſpiſer, and took kindly to the name of MEZENTIUS, as a title of honour——*aliorum, quod libentius audis, deorum contemptum, Mezentius*, which I would conſider as a further mark of a *Chriſtian*, *convict*. 3. He even held it an *abomination* ſo much as to put his hand to his lips, (according to the mode of adoration in thoſe times) when he paſſed by an Heathen Temple; nefas habet, adorandi gratia, manum labris admovere, the moſt characteriſtic mark of a *primitive Confeſſor*, by which he could never be miſtaken; nor, one would think, ſo long overlooked [P]. 4. By the frequent and ſarcaſtical repetition of the word *verum*, Apuleius ſeems to ſneer at that general title which the Faithful gave their *Religion*, of THE TRUTH. Æmilia

[P] On what is here ſaid concerning the Character of Æmilianus the moſt learned Chancellor, Moſheim, obſerves as follows, "Platonicis Chriſtianam Religionem aſtu ſubvertere ſtudentibus, APULEIUM non ita pridem addidit vir ingenio æque magnus atque doctrina, *Guil. Warburtonus* in *Demonſtratione divinæ Legationis Moſis*. Hunc enim in notiſſima illa de aureo Aſino fabula ſed *Metamorphoſi* id egiſſe putat, ut *Myſteria* Deorum ſumma virtute ad ſanandas & purgandas hominum mentes eſſe prædita, ſacriſque Chriſtianis idcirco longe anteferenda, demonſtraret, hominem nempe imprimis ſuperſtitioſum, Chriſtianiſque et publico Sectæ, quam probabat, & privato nomine inimicum. Obſervavit Vir egre-

Æmilianus it ſeems had miſ-repreſented a little image of *Mercury*, which Apuleius uſed to carry about with him, as a *ſqualid magical* figure. On which occaſion the Accuſed, in great rage, deprecates his Accuſer——"At tibi Æmiliane pro iſto mendacio, duat Deus iſte, Superum & Inferum commeator utrorumque Deorum malam gratiam, ſemperque obvias ſpecies mortuorum, quidquid Umbrarum eſt uſquam, quidquid Lemurum, quidquid Manium, quidquid Larvarum, oculis tuis oggerat! *Omnia nitium occurſacula, omnia Buſtorum formidamina, omnia ſepulcrorum terriculamenta.*"—This was the common curſe and ſuppoſed to be the common puniſhment of impiety and *Atheiſm*. But it has here a peculiar elegance as denounced againſt Æmilianus. The Buſta, or Repoſitory of dead bodies, ſo abhorred by the Pagans, were the very places in which the Chriſtians aſſembled for nocturnal Worſhip.

The averſion, therefore, which Apuleius had contracted to his Chriſtian accuſer, (and we ſee, by what is here ſaid, it was in no ordinary degree) would without doubt increaſe his prejudice to that Religion. I am perſuaded he gave the Character of the Baker's

egregius, qua eſt ſagacitate, rerumque veterum peritia, in Apuleio nonnulla nemini ante ipſum obſervata: in quibus id placet maxime, quod LICINIUM ÆMILIANUM, qui APULEIUM apud Africæ Proconſulem *Magiæ* accuſaverat CHRISTIANUM fuiſſe ex *Apologia*, quæ extat, accuſati, non ſine magna veri ſpecie ſuſpicatur. De conſilio vero *Fabulæ de Aſino*, quod commentationem *Myſteriorum* et Chriſtianæ Religionis contemtionem vir doctiſſimus eſſe conjicit, dubitare mihi liceat. quum nihil afferri videam ex ea, quod difficulter in aliam partem accipi poſſit." *De rebus Chriſt. ante Conſtant. M. Commentarii* Seculum tert. Sect. 21. not. (***) The Engliſh of which concluſion amounts to this, "That another interpretation might be given of the *Golden Aſs*." I believe ſo. It might be ſhewn to contain a proceſs for the diſcovery of the *Philoſopher's Stone*. And a certain German Chymiſt, if I be not miſtaken, has extracted this ſecret out of the *Fable*.

wife

wife, in his *golden Aſs*, for no other reaſon than to outrage our holy faith. Having drawn her ſtained with all the vices that could deform a Woman; to finiſh all, he makes her a Chriſtian. ——"Nec enim vel unum vitium nequiſſimæ "ille feminæ deerat: ſed omnia prorſus, ut in quam "dam cœnoſam latrinam, in ejus animam flagitia "confluxerant, ſæva, virioſa, ebrioſa, pervicax, in "rapinis turpibus avara, in ſumptibus fœdis profuſa: inimica fidei, hoſtis pudicitiæ. *Tunc ſpretis* "*atque calcatis divinis numinibus*, IN VICEM CERTÆ "RELIGIONIS MENTITA SACRILEGA PRÆSUMPTIONE DEI, QUEM PRÆDICARET UNICUM, CONFICTIS OBSERVATIONIBUS VACUIS, fallens omnes "homines, *&c.*[9]" So again in the fourth book, deſcribing certain magnific Shews exhibited to the people by one Democharès; when he comes to ſpeak of the criminals thrown to wild-beaſts, he expreſſes himſelf in this manner:——Alibi noxii, PERDITA SECURITATE, ſuis epulis beſtiarum ſaginas inſtruentes [p. 72.] The Oxf. MS. for *ſecuritate* reads *ſecuritate:* on which *Price* obſerves, *ego nec hoc nec illud intellectum habeo.* Apuleius by *noxii* apparently meant the *condemned Chriſtians*; and *perdita ſecuritate*, which is the true reading, cenſures either their reaſonable hope of a happy immortality, or their falſe confidence that the beaſts would not hurt them.

Let us ſee now how this would influence his writings. There was nothing the PHILOSOPHERS of that time had more at heart, eſpecially the *Platoniſts* and *Pythagoreans*, than the ſupport of ſinking Paganiſm. This ſervice, as hath been occaſionally remarked, they performed in various ways and manners: ſome by *allegorizing their Theology*; ſome by *ſpiritualizing their Philoſophy*; and ſome, as Jamblicus and Philoſtratus, by writing the *lives of their Heroes*, to op-

[9] Met. l. ix. p. 186. Pric. Ed.

poſe

poſe to that of Christ; others again, as Porphyry, with this view *collected their oracles*; or as Melanthius, Menander, Hiceſius, and Sotades *wrote deſcriptive encomiums on their* Mysteries. Which laſt, as we ſhall now ſhew, was the province undertaken by Apuleius; his *Metamorphoſis* being nothing elſe but one continued recommendation of them.

But to give what we have to ſay it's proper force; let us 1. enquire into the motives our Author might have for entering at all into the defence of Paganiſm: 2. His reaſons for chuſing this topic of defence, *the recommendation of the Myſteries.*

1. As to his defence of paganiſm in general, we may obſerve, 1. That works of this kind were very much in faſhion, eſpecially amongſt the Philoſophers of our author's Sect. 2. He was, as we have ſeen, moſt ſuperſtitiouſly devoted to pagan worſhip: and, 3. He bore a perſonal ſpite and prejudice to the Chriſtian profeſſion.

2. As to his making the defence of the *Myſteries* his choice, ſtill ſtronger reaſons may be aſſigned. 1. Theſe were the Rites to which he was ſo peculiarly devoted, that he had contrived to be *initiated* into all the *Myſteries* of note, in the Roman world; and in ſeveral of them had born the moſt diſtinguiſhed offices. 2. The *Myſteries* being at this time become extremely corrupt, and conſequently, in diſcredit, needed an able and zealous Apologiſt: both of which qualities met eminently in Apuleius. The corruptions were of two kinds, Debaucheries and Magic. The *Debaucheries* we have taken notice of, above: their *Magic* will be conſidered hereafter. But, 3. Our author's cloſe attachment to *Myſterious rites* was, without queſtion, the very thing that occaſioned all thoſe ſuſpicions and reports, which ended in an accuſation of *Magic:* And, conſidering what hath been ſaid of the corrupt ſtate of the *Myſteries*, the reader will not wonder that it ſhould.

Such then being the general character of the *Myſteries*, and of this their great Devotee, nothing was more natural than his projecting their defence; which at the ſame time, that it concurred to the ſupport of Paganiſm in general, would vindicate his own credit, together with an Inſtitution of which he was ſo immoderately fond. And the following conſiderations are ſufficient to ſhew, that the *Metamorphoſis* was written after his *Apology:* for, 1. His accuſers never once mention the fable of the *golden Aſs* to ſupport their charge of Magic, though they were in great want of proofs, and this lay ſo ready for their purpoſe. For, we are not to ſuppoſe that he alludes to the *Metamorphoſis* in the following words of the Apology,——Aggredior enim jam ad ipſum crimen *Magiæ*, quod ingenti tumultu, ad invidiam mei, accenſum, fruſtrata expectatione omnium, per *naſum quas anileis fabulas* deflagravit. p. 29—30. The *fabulæ tales* here hinted at, are the goſſiping ſtories which went about of him, and which he afterwards expoſes in the courſe of this defence. 2. He poſitively aſſerts before the tribunal of Maximus Claudius that he had never given the leaſt occaſion to ſuſpect him of *Magic:* "*Nuſquam* paſſus ſum *vel exiguam* ſuſpicionem *magiæ* conſiſtere[1]."

Now Antiquity conſidered INITIATION INTO THE MYSTERIES as *a delivery from a living death of vice, brutality, and miſery; and the beginning of a new life of virtue, reaſon, and happineſs*[2]. This therefore, was the very circumſtance which our Author choſe for the ſubject of his recommendation.

And as in the *Myſteries*, their moral and divine truths were repreſented in *ſhews* and *allegories*, ſo, in in order to comply with this method of inſtruction,

[1] P. 100.

[2] See what hath been ſaid above, in the diſcourſe of the *Myſteries*.

and

and in imitation of the ancient Maſters of wiſdom [t], who borrowed their manner of teaching from thence, he hath artfully inſinuated his doctrine in an agreeable Fable; and the fitteſt, one could conceive for his purpoſe, as will be ſeen when we come to examine it.

The foundation of this Allegory was a *Mileſian fable*, a ſpecies of polite trifling then much in vogue, and not unlike the modern *Arabian tales*. To allure his readers, therefore, with the promiſe of a *faſhionable* work, he introduces his Metamorphoſis in this manner: *At ego tibi ſermone iſto Mileſio varias fabulas conſeram*, AURESQUE TUAS *benevolas lepido ſuſurro* PERMULCEAM; plainly intimating that there was ſomething of more conſequence at bottom. But the *faſhionable* people took him at his word; and, from that day to this, never troubled their heads about a further meaning. The OUTSIDE engaged all their attention, and ſufficiently delighted them; as we may gather from the early title it bore of ASINUS AUREUS. And, from the beginning of one of Pliny's epiſtles, I ſuſpect that AUREÆ was the common title given to the *Mileſian*, and ſuch like tales as Strolers uſed to tell for a piece of money to the rabble in a circle. Pliny's words are theſe—aſſem para, et accipe AUREAM fabulam [u]. Unleſs we will rather ſuppoſe it to have been beſtowed by the few intelligent readers in the ſecret; for, in ſpite of the Author's repeated preparation, a ſecret it was, and ſo, all along continued.

Upon one of theſe popular Fables, he choſe to ingraft his inſtruction; taking a celebrated Tale from the *collections* of one Lucius of Patræ; who relates

[t] Strabo acquaints us with the inducements which the ancients had to practice this method of Inſtruction.——Ὅταν δὲ προσῇ καὶ τὸ θαυμαστὸν καὶ τὸ τερατῶδες, ἐπιτείνει τὴν ἡδονήν, ἥπερ ἐστὶ τῷ μανθάνειν φίλτρον. Καταεχὰς μὲν οὖν ἀνάγκη τοιούτοις διέλκουσι χρῆσθαι. περιούσης δὲ τῆς ἡλικίας ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν ὄντων μάθησιν ἄγειν, ἤδη τῆς διανοίας ἐξῳκισμένης, καὶ μηκέτι θεομένης κολάκων. Καὶ ἰδιωτης δὲ πᾶς καὶ ἀπαίδευτος τρόπον τινὰ παῖς ἐστι, φιλομυθεῖ τε ὡσαύτως. Geog. l. i.

[u] L. ii. Fp. 20.

[illegible] into an Ass, and his adventures [illegible] Lucian has epitomized this story, [illegible] seem to have paraphrased it: and the [illegible] being a METAMORPHOSIS, it admirably suited [illegible] the METEMPSYCHOSIS, to which [illegible] doctrine belongs, was one of the fundamental [illegible] of the Egyptians. But from Photius's account [illegible] I should incline to think that amongst those who composed books of Metamorphoses [illegible] according to the popular theology, rather than a writer of Milesian [illegible] the former Lucian's work paraphrased: and after having laid that Lucian borrowed [illegible] from thence to ridicule pagan religion [illegible] our Lucius giving a most [illegible] the transmutations, and treating as [illegible] changes of men into one another, of Metamorphoses and of the contrary, hath warranted [illegible] the most [illegible] of the fables and absurdities of the ancient Mythology, and consistent [illegible] writing for the amusement of the Pa[illegible] account for the boldness of [illegible] with which he introduces [illegible] ——— [illegible] impious [illegible] human [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

fond of PLEASURE, and as curious of MAGIC. Apuleius takes care to keep up the firſt part of this character as he goes along, *familiaris* CURIOSITATIS *admonitus*, l. iii. *familiari* CURIOSITATE *attonitus*, l. ix. And *Curioſus* and *Magus* were uſed by the Ancients as Synonymous. So Apuleius himſelf.——*At ego* CURIOSUS *alioquin, ut primum* ARTIS MAGICÆ *ſemper optatum nomen audivi*, p. 24. Hence it is that he is repreſented as having been initiated in all the *corrupt Myſteries*, where Magic was profeſſedly practiſed. *Fotis*, the inferior Prieſteſs in the magic rites of the Inchantreſs, *Pamphile*, enjoining him ſilence, ſays, *ſacris pluribus initiatus*, profecto nôſti ſanctam ſilentii fidem [w]. As to the ſecond, we have his adventure with *Byrrhena* and *Pamphile*, which ſeems to be borrowed from Prodicus's fable of the conteſt between *Virtue* and *Pleaſure* for the young *Hercules*. Byrrhena meets our adventurer, pretends to be his relation [x], and tells him that ſhe brought him up from his infancy: by which is intimated that virtue was moſt natural to him. She leads him home to her houſe, which is deſcribed as a magnificent palace: one of its principal ornaments is the hiſtory of Diana [y]; where the puniſhment of Actæon is not forgotten [z], as a ſeaſonable leſſon againſt *vicious curioſity*. And to keep him to herſelf, ſhe promiſes to make him heir of all her fortunes. Then taking him apart, ſhe warns him to beware of the miſchievous practices of his hoſteſs Pamphile. "Per hanc, inquit, "Deam (Dianam) ô Luci cariſſime, ut anxie tibi "metuo, et, utpote pignori meo, longe proviſum

[w] P. 53.

[x] Ego te, o Luci, meis iſtis manibus educavi: quidni? parentis tuæ non modo ſanguinis, verum alimoniarum etiam ſocia ſui. p. 23.

[y] Ecce lapis Parius in Dianam factus tenet libratam totius loci medietatem, ſignum perfecte luculentum,——introeuntibus obvium, et majeſtate numinis venerabile, *etc.* p. 22.

[z] Inter medias frondes lapidis Actæonis ſimulacrum, *curioſo obtutu in dorſum projectus*, etc. p. 23.

" cupio, cave tibi, ſed *cave fortiter*, a malis artibus,
" et facinoroſis illecebris Pamphiles illius,—Maga
" primi nominis, et omnis carminis ſepulcralis ma-
" giſtra creditur: quæ ſurculis et lapillis, et id ge-
" nus frivolis inhalatis, omnem iſtam lucem mundi
" ſideralis imis Tartari, et in vetuſtum chaos ſub-
" mergere novit. Nam cum quemquam conſpexe-
" rit ſpecioſæ formæ juvenem, venuſtate ejus ſumi-
" tur: et illico *etc.*

But Lucius makes a choice very different from that of Hercules. He had promiſed to obſerve *Byrrhena*'s admonitions, and to return to her again: but a circumſtance of immoderate mirth intervening, he found in himſelf a more than ordinary averſion to keep his word. Ad hæc ego formidans et procul perhorreſcens etiam ipſam domum ejus, *etc.*[a] This is a fine circumſtance, nothing being ſo great an enemy to modeſty and chaſtity (figured in the perſon of Byrrhena) as immoderate mirth. He gives a looſe to his vicious appetite for *Pleaſure* and *Magic*: and the crimes and follies into which they lead him ſoon ends in his transformation to a Brute.

This contrivance of the introductory part is artful; and finely inſinuates the great moral of the piece, that brutality attends vice as it's punishment: and puniſhment by actual transformation was keeping up to the popular opinion[b]. His making a paſſion for *Magic* contribute to this dreadful change is no leſs ingenious, as it cleared both *himſelf* and the *Myſteries* from that imputation; for it appeared that *Magic* was ſo far from being innocent, that in his opinion, it was attended with the ſevereſt puniſhment; ſo far from being encouraged by the *Myſteries*, that they only could relieve men from the diſtreſſes which this vicious curioſity brought upon it's votaries; as is ſhewn by the cataſtrophe of the Piece.

[a] P. 51. [b] See B. iii. Sect. 3.

St.

St. Auſtin permitted himſelf to doubt whether Apuleius's account of his change into an ASS was not a true relation.——*Sicut Apuleius, in libris quos Aſini aurei titulo inſcripſit, ſibi ipſi accidiſſe, ut accepto veneno, humano animo permanente, aſinus fieret,* AUT INDICAVIT *aut finxit*[c]. I ſhall ſay nothing to ſo extravagant a doubt, but only obſerve, that it appears from hence, that St. Auſtin eſteemed Apuleius a profligate in his manners, and addicted to the ſuperſtitions of *Magic*. And yet it is by no means credible, that he who took ſo much pains, in a very ſerious and public way[d], to free himſelf from theſe imputations, ſhould afterwards wantonly undo all he had ſo ſucceſsfully performed in ſupport of a doubtful reputation, by an unneceſſary narrative of his own early debaucheries. But it may be ſaid, that all this happened in his youth; and that his ſubſequent *Initiations* had purified his manners: But neither will his APOLOGY admit of this ſuppoſition; for there he expreſly inſiſts on the virtue of his youth. "De "eloquentia vero, ſi qua mihi fuiſſet, neque mirum, "neque invidioſum deberet videri, ſi *ab incunte ævo* "unis ſtudiis litterarum ex ſummis viribus deditus, "omnibus aliis ſpretis voluptatibus *ad hoc ævi*, "haud ſciam anne ſuper omneis homines impenſo "labore, diuque noctuque, cum deſpectu et diſpen-"dio bonæ valetudinis, eam quæſiſſem——Quis "enim me hoc quidem pacto eloquentior vivat? "quippe qui nihil *unquam* cogitavi quod eloqui non "auderem. Eundem me aio facundiſſimum; nam "*omne peccatum* ſemper nefas habui. Eundem diſ-"ertiſſimum; quod nullum meum factum vel dictum "extet, de quo differere publice non poſſim[e]." What have we then to conclude but that the repreſentation of himſelf in this *Fable*, under a debauched character, is entirely feigned? Yet ſtill it would be

[c] *Civ. Dei*, l. xviii. c. 18. [d] His Apology. [e] P. 6.

as abſurd to imagine that a grave and moral Philoſopher ſhould chuſe to exhibit himſelf to the public in the odious, and falſe light of a *Magician* and *Debauchee*; and take a pleaſure in dwelling upon the horrors of ſo deteſtable a Character, for no other purpoſe than to amuſe and entertain a ſet of diſſolute readers. We muſt needs therefore go a ſtep further, and conclude that he aſſumed it only for the ſake of the GENERAL MORAL, and the better to carry on his Allegory; which was, to recommend the MYSTERIES as the certain cure for all the DISORDERS OF THE WILL.

This being his end, he was but too much encouraged by the example of the moſt moral of the ancient Satiriſts, to particularize the various maladies to which he was applying a remedy. Let this, and his copying only what he found in his original Author, ſtand for ſome kind of excuſe in a wretched Pagan; and it is the beſt we have, for all the obſcenities with which his Fable abounds.

But to proceed with his plan. Having now ſhewn himſelf thoroughly brutalized by his crimes; he goes on to repreſent at large the miſeries of that condition, in a long detail of his miſadventures; in the courſe of which he fell, by turns, under the dominion of every vicious paſſion; though the incidents are chiefly confined to the miſchiefs of unlawful love: And this, with much judgment, as one of the principal ends of the *Myſteries* was to curb and ſubdue this inordinance, which brings more general and laſting miſery upon Mankind than all the other. And as it was the great moral of his piece to ſhew *that pure religion* (ſuch as a platonic Philoſopher eſteemed pure) *was the only remedy for human corruption*; ſo, to prevent the abuſe or miſtake of this capital Principle, he takes care to inform us, *that an attachment to ſuperſtitious and corrupt Religion does but plunge the wretched victim into ſtill greater miſeries.* This he finely

finely illuſtrates, in the hiſtory of his adventures with the BEGGING PRIESTS OF CYBELE; whoſe enormities are related in the eighth and ninth books; and whoſe CORRUPT MYSTERIES are intended as a contraſt to the PURE RITES OF ISIS: With which, in a very ſtudied deſcription and encomium, he concludes the *Fable*.

In the mean time, matters growing from bad to worſe, and Lucius plunged deeper and deeper in the ſink of vice, his affairs come to a criſis. For this is one great beauty in the conduct of the Fable, that every change of ſtation, while he remains a brute, makes his condition ſtill more wretched and deplorable. And being now (in the *ninth* book) about to perpetrate one of the moſt ſhocking enormities; NATURE, though ſo deeply brutalized, REVOLTS; he abhors the idea of his projected crime; he evades his keepers; he flies to the ſea-ſhore; and, in this ſolitude, begins to reflect more ſeriouſly on his loſt condition. This is finely imagined; for we often ſee men, even after a whole life of horrors, come ſuddenly to themſelves on the hideous aſpect of ſome Monſter-vice too frightful even for an hardened Reprobate to bear. Nor is it with leſs judgment that the Author makes theſe beginnings of reformation confirmed by ſolitude; when the unhappy victim of PLEASURE hath broken looſe from the companions and partakers of his follies.

And now, a more intimate acquaintance with his hopeleſs condition obliges him to fly to Heaven for relief. The MOON is in full ſplendour; and the awful ſilence of the night inſpires him with ſentiments of Religion.—"Video præmicantis Lunæ candore "nimio completum orbem,—nactusque opacæ noctis "ſilentioſa ſecreta, certus etiam SUMMATEM DEAM "præcipua majeſtate pollere, resque prorſus humanas ipſius regi *providentia*, etc[1]." He then puri-

[1] P. 238.

fies himself in the manner prescribed by PYTHAGORAS[g], the Philosopher most addicted to Initiations of all the early Sages; as Apuleius, of all the later; and so makes his prayer to the *Moon* or Isis; invoking her by her several names of the *Eleusinian Ceres*, the *celestial Venus*, *Diana* and *Proserpine*: when betaking himself to repose, she appears to him in a dream[h]. This was not a circumstance of the Fabulist's own invention. Pausanias tells us "that in Phocis there "was a Chapel consecrated to Isis, of all the places "of worship, which the Greeks erected to this "Egyptian Goddess, by far the most holy: that in "this sacred place it was not lawful for any to ap"proach, but such whom the Goddess had invited, "and appeared to, in a *Dream*, for that purpose[i]." Here she appears under that SHINING IMAGE so much spoken of by the *Mystics*, as representing the divine nature in general[k]. "Necdum satis consi"veram: et ecce pelago medio, venerandos Dei "etiam vultus attollens, emergit *divina facies*, ac "dehinc paulatim toto corpore PER LUCIDUM SI"MULACRUM, excusso pelago, ante me constitit "visum est. Ejus mirandam speciem ad vos etiam

[g] —meque protinus, purificandi studio, marino lavacro trado: septiesque submerso fluctibus capite, quod eum numerum præcipue religioni aptissimum divinus ille *Pythagoras* prodidit—p. 238.

[h] Artemidorus says, that for a man to dream that *Ceres*, *Proserpine*, or *Bacchus* appears to him, betokens some extraordinary good fortune to happen to him. Δημήτηρ ἢ Κόρη ἢ ὁ λεγόμενος Ἴακχος τοῖς μεμυημένοις ταῖς θεαῖς ἀγαθόν τι ἢ ἐ τὸ τύχον ἐσόμενον σημαίνουσι. l. iv. c. 44. The ancient ONEIROCRITICS, as we have observed, B iv. Sect. 4. were not founded on the arbitrary fancies of the impostors who professed that art, but on the customs and superstitions of the times, and with a principal reference to the Egyptian HIEROGLYPHICS and MYSTERIES.

[i] Τοῦ δὲ Ἀσκληπιοῦ περὶ τεσσαρά κοῖλα ἀπέχει ναΐδιον περίβολος, ἢ ἄδυτόν ἱερόν Ἰσιδος ἀγιώτατον ἐπώνυμα Ἕλλησι θεῶν τὴν Ἀιγυπτίαν. πεπρῆσθαι. Οὔτε γὰρ πρόσοδον ἐξεῖναι ὁτῳοῦν ἐπαύριον δὲ Τιθορασίοις νομίζουσιν, ὕστερ ἔσοδος ἐς τὸ ἄδυτον ἄλλοις γε ἢ ἐκείνοις ἐστίν, οὓς ἂν αὐτὴ προτιμήσασα ἡ Ἰσις καθ' ὑπνους ἢ δι' ὀνείρων. Lib. x. c. 32.

[k] See above, p. 335, note (r.)

" referre connitar—Corona multiformis, variis flo-
" ribus ſublimem diſtinxerat verticem: cujus media
" quidem ſuper fronte *plana rotunditas*, candidum
" lumen emicabat. Dextra lævaque ſulcis *inſurgen-*
" *tium viperarum* cohibita, *ſpicis* etiam *Cerealibus*
" deſuper porrectis.—Et quæ longe longeque etiam
" meum confutabat obtutum, *palla* nigerrima, ſplen-
" deſcens atro nitore; quæ circum circa remeans,—
" per intextam extremitatem, et in ipſa oræ planitie,
" *ſtellæ* diſperſæ coruſcabant: earumque media ſe-
" meſtris Luna flammeos ſpirabat ignes.—Dextera
" quidem ferebat *æreum crepitaculum:* cujus per an-
" guſtam laminam in modum balthei recurvatam,
" trajectæ mediæ paucæ virgulæ, criſpante brachio
" tergeminos jactus, reddebant, argutum ſonitum[1]."
Theſe ſeveral ſymbolic Attributes, the *lucid Round*, the *ſnakes*, the *ears of corn*, and the *ſiſtrum*, repreſent the tutelar Deities of the *Hecataean*, *Bacchic*, *Eleuſinian* and *Iſiac* MYSTERIES. That is, MYSTIC RITES IN GENERAL; for whoſe ſake the allegory was invented. As the black Palla in which ſhe is wrapped, embroidered with a ſilver-moon, and ſtars, denotes the TIME, in which the Myſteries were celebrated, namely the dead of NIGHT; which was ſo conſtant and inſeparable a circumſtance, that the author calls *initiation*, NOCTIS SOCIETAS.

In her ſpeech to Lucius ſhe gives this extraordinary account of herſelf, " En aſſum, tuis commota
" Lucî precibus, RERUM NATURA PARENS, ele-
" mentorum omnium Domina, ſæculorum proge-
" nies initialis, Summa numinum, Regina manium,
" Prima cœlitum, Deorum Dearumque facies uni-
" formis: quæ cœli luminoſa culmina, maris ſalu-
" bria flamina, inferorum deplorata ſilentia nutibus
" meis diſpenſo. Cujus numen unicum, multiformi
" ſpecie, ritu vario, nomine multijugo totus venera-

[1] P. 239—40.

" tur

" tur orbis—priſcaque doctrina pollentes Ægyptii, " cerimoniis me prorſus propriis percolentes, ap- " pellant vero nomine reginam Isidem [m]." This was exactly adapted to the deſign of the *Myſteries*; and preparatory to the communication of the ΑΠΟΡΡΗΤΑ. It had likewiſe this further uſe, to patch up and recommend the pagan Religions; by ſhewing that their *Polytheiſm* conſiſted in nothing elſe than in giving the supreme God various names, merely expreſſive of his various attributes. This was the faſhionable colouring, which, after the appearance of Chriſtianity, the advocates of paganiſm employed to blanch their Idolatry. I will only obſerve further, that the words, *Ægyptii ceremoniis me prorſus propriis percolentes*, inſinuate, what was true, that all Mysterious worship came firſt from Ægypt; this people having penetrated furtheſt into the nature of the Gods: As the calling her, who repreſents the *Myſteries in general*, rerum Natura parens, ſhews plainly what were the ΑΠΟΡΡΗΤΑ of them all.

Parent nature then reveals to Lucius the means of his recovery. Her feſtival was on the following day; when there was to be a Proceſſion of her Votaries. The Prieſt who led it up (ſhe told him) would have a chaplet of Roses in his hand, which had the virtue to reſtore him to his former ſhape. But as breaking through a habit of vice is, of all things, the moſt difficult; ſhe adds encouragements to her promiſes, " nec quidquam rerum mearum reformides, ut ar- " duum. Nam hoc eodem momento, quo tibi " venio, ſimul et ibi præsens, quæ ſunt conſequen- " tia ſacerdoti meo per quietem facienda præcipio [n]." Alluding to what was taught in the *Myſteries*, that the *aſſiſtance of Heaven* was always *preſent* to ſecond the efforts of virtue. But in return for the favour of releaſing

[m] P. 241. [n] P. 242.

releaſing him from his brutal ſhape, i. e. of reforming his manners by *Initiation*, ſhe tells him ſhe expected the ſervice of his whole life; And this, the *Myſteries* required: Nor ſhould her ſervice (ſhe ſaid) go unrewarded, for he ſhould have a place in ELYSIUM hereafter; And this, too, the *Myſteries* promiſed. "Plane memineris, et penita mente conditum ſem-"per tenebis, *mihi reliqua vitæ tuæ curricula*, ad "uſque terminos ultimi ſpiritus *vadata*. Nec injuri-"um, cujus beneficio redieris ad homines ei totum "debere quod vives. Vives autem *beatus*, vives, in "mea tutela, *glorioſus*: et cum ſpatium ſeculi tui "permenſus ad inferos demearis; ibi quoque in ipſo "ſubterraneo ſemirotundo, me, quam vides Ache-"rontis tenebris interlucentem, ſtygiiſque penetra-"libus regnantem, CAMPOS ELYSIOS *incolens ipſe*, "tibi propitiam frequens adorabis [q]."

Lucius is at length confirmed in his reſolution of *aſpiring* to a life of virtue. And on this change of his diſpoſitions, and intire conqueſt of his paſſions, the Author finely repreſents all Nature as putting on a new face of chearfulneſs and gaiety. "Tanta hi-"laritudine præter peculiarem meam geſtire mihi "cuncta videbantur; ut pecua etiam cujuſcemodi, "et totas domos, et ipſum diem ſerena facie gaudere "ſentirem [p]." And to enjoy Nature, in theſe her beſt conditions, was the boaſted privilege of the *Initiated*, as we may ſee from a Chorus in the *Frogs* of Ariſtophanes [q].

And now the Proceſſion, in honour of ISIS, begins. Where by the way, we muſt obſerve, that the *two firſt days* of the celebration of the *Eleuſinian Myſteries* are plainly deſcribed: the one called ΑΓΥΡΜΟΣ, from the multitude aſſembled; the other

[q] P. 242. [p] P. 243.

[q] Μόνοις γὰρ ἡμῖν ἥλιος
Καὶ φέγγος ἱλαρόν ἐστιν
Ὅσοι μεμυήμεθ'—Act. i.

ΑΛΑΣΕ

ΑΛΑΣΕ ΜΥΣΤΑΙ, from the Proceſſion made to the ſea-ſhore. "Tunc influunt *Turbæ* ſacris divinis ini-"ti tæ[r]—jam *ritam maris* proximamus[s]." The Prieſt or Hierophant of the Rites leads up the train of the initiated with a garland of Roſes in his hand. Lucius approaches, devours the Roſes, and, according to the promiſe of the Goddeſs, is reſtored to his native Form: by which, as we have ſaid, no more was meant than a change of Manners, from vice to virtue. And this the author plainly intimates by making the Goddeſs thus addreſs him under his brutal Figure, "peſſimæ mihique deteſtabilis jamdu-"dum beluæ iſtius corio te protinus exue[t]." For an Aſs was ſo far from being *deteſtable*, that it was employed in the celebration of her rites; and was ever found in the retinue of Oſiris or Bacchus. The *garland* plainly repreſents that which the aſpirants were crowned with at their *initiation*; juſt as the *virtue* of the Roſes deſigns the *Myſteries*. At his transformation he had been told, that ROSES were to reſtore him to Humanity: ſo that, amid' all his adventures, he had ſtill this remedy in view. Particularly in a circumſtance of great diſtreſs, he met with a ſpecies of them called *roſa laurea*; but on examining its properties, he found that, inſtead of a reſtorative, it was a deadly poiſon to all kind of cattle—"quarum cuncto pecori cibus lethalis eſt." Who can doubt then, but by this *roſe-laurel* was meant all *debauched, magical, and corrupt Myſteries*, ſuch as thoſe of the SYRIAN GODDESS, whoſe Miniſters he repreſents in ſo abominable a light[u]; in oppoſition to what he calls "ſobriæ religionis obſervatio:" and in thoſe Rites. *initiation* was ſo far from promoting a life of virtue, that it plunged the deluded Votary into ſtill greater miſeries. Theſe *emblematic Roſes* were not of our author's invention. For

[r] P. 245. [s] P. 249. [t] P. 242. [u] L. viii. p. 174.

the

the ROSE, amongſt the Ancients, was a ſymbol of SILENCE, the requiſite quality of the *Initiated.* And therefore the ſtatues of Iſis or Diana Multimammea, (images conſecrated to the uſe of the *Myſteries*) are crowned with chaplets of Roſes; deſigning what we now mean, when we ſay, in proverbial ſpeech, UNDER THE ROSE.

Our Author proceeds to tell us, that the people wondered at this inſtantaneous Metamorphoſis. Populi mirantur, *religioſi veneranʼur* tam evidentem maximi numinis potentiam—et *facilitatem reformationis*[w]. For the *Myſteries* boaſted the power of giving a ſudden and entire change to the mind and affections: And the advocates of Paganiſm againſt Chriſtianity uſed to oppoſe this boaſt to the real and miraculous efficacy of GRACE.

As ſoon as Lucius had recovered the integrity of his nature, by *initiation*, the Prieſt covers him, naked as he was, with a LINEN garment[x]. A habit always beſtowed upon the Aſpirant, on his admiſſion to the *Myſteries*; the *rationale* of which, Apuleius himſelf gives us in his Apology[y].

When all was over, the Prieſt accoſts his Penitent in the following manner. "Multis et variis exant-"latis laboribus, magniſque Fortunæ tempeſtatibus, "et maximis actus procellis, ad portum quietis et "*aram Miſericordiæ* tandem, Luci veniſti: nec tibi "natales, ac ne dignitas quidem vel ipſa, qua flores, "uſquam doctrina profuit: ſed lubrico virentis æta-"tulæ, *ad ſerviles delapſus voluptates*, CURIOSITATIS

[w] P. 247,—8.

[x] Sed ſacerdos, utcunque *divino monitu cognitis ab origine cunctis cladibus meis*, quamquam et ipſe inſigni permotus miraculo, nutu ſignificato prius præcipit, tegendo mihi LINTEAM dari LACINIAM, p. 248.

[y] *Lana* ſegniſſimi corporis excrementum, pecori detracta, jam inde Orphei et Pythagoræ ſcitis, profanus veſtitus eſt. Sed enim mundiſſima LINI ſeges, inter optimas fruges terræ exorta non modo *indutui et amictui ſanctiſſimis Ægyptiorum ſacerdotibus*, ſed opertui quoque in *rebus ſacris* uſurpatur. *Apol.* p. 64.

"IMPROS-

" quid metus mortis quotidianæ nefari
" profuit? in tutelam jam receptus es
" *ſed* VIDENTIS; *quæ* SUÆ LUCIS SPLENI
" *etiam deos illuminat.* Sume jam vultu
" *candido iſto habitu tuo* congruentem
" pompam Deæ SOSPITATRICIS innova
" VIDEANT IRRELIGIOSI: VIDEANT, ET
" SUUM RECOGNOSCANT. En ecce priſt
" nis abſolutus, ISIDIS *magnæ* PROVIDE
" *dens Lucius de ſua fortuna triumphat* [z]."

Here the MORAL OF THE FABLE is c
plain terms; and, in this *moral*, all w
vanced, concerning the purpoſe of the v
confirmed. It is expreſly declared, that
inordinate CURIOSITY were the cauſes c
diſaſters; from which the only relief w
TION into the MYSTERIES. Whereby t
would inſinuate, that nothing was more
from thoſe holy rites than DEBAUCHERY a
the two enormities they were then com
pected to encourage.

It hath been obſerved above, that, b
return to his proper Form, was meant his

it was called by the Ancients, Κακίας ἀφαίρεσιν, a *ſeparation from evil:* the *ſecond* was to *enlighten* it, when purified, and to bring it to the knowledge of divine ſecrets, as Hierocles ſpeaks, ἔπειτα ἔτω ἐπιβάλλει τῇ τῶν θειοτέρων γνώσει. Hence they named the one ΚΑΘΑΡΣΙΝ, and the other ΤΕΛΕΙΟΤΗΤΑ, PURIFICATION and PERFECTION. The *firſt* is here repreſented in the incident of Lucius's being reſtored to humanity by the uſe of *roſes:* The *ſecond*, as the matter of chief importance, the Author treats more circumſtantially.

He begins with making the Prieſt take occaſion, from the benefit already received, to preſs Lucius to enter into the GREATER MYSTERIES of Iſis. "Quo "tibi tamen tutior ſis, atque munitior; da nomen "huic *ſanctæ militiæ*, cujus olim ſacramento etiam "lætaberis; teque jam nunc obſequio religionis "noſtræ dedica, et miniſterii jugum ſubi voluntari-"um. *Nam, cum cœperis Deæ ſervire, tunc magis "ſenties fructum tuæ libertatis*[a]:" But at the ſame time makes him inform the Candidate, that nothing was to be precipitated: for that not only many previous Rites and Ceremonies, concerning religious diet, and abſtinence from prophane food, were to be obſerved; but that the Aſpirants to theſe *higher Myſteries* were to wait for A CALL. "Quippe cum avi-"ditati contumaciæque ſummè cavere, et utramque "culpam vitare, ac neque vocatus morari, nec non "juſſus feſtinare deberem. Nec tamen eſſe quem-"quam de ſuo numero tam perditæ mentis, vel "immo deſtinatæ mortis, qui non ſibi quoque ſe-"orſum, jubente Domina, temerarium atque ſacrile-"gum audeat miniſterium ſubire, noxamque letalem "contrahere. Nam et inferûm clauſtra, et ſalutis "tutelam in Deæ manu poſita ipſamque traditionem "ad inſtar voluntariæ mortis et præcariæ ſalutis cele-

[a] P. 249.

"brari,

"brari [b]." Accordingly, he is initiated into the GREATER MYSTERIES. The ceremony is described at large [c]; and we find it to agree exactly with what, we have shewn, other ancient writers more professedly deliver concerning it.

The Author, by the doubts and apprehensions which retarded his *initiation*, first gives us to understand, that the highest degree of sanctity was required of those who entered into the *Mysteries*.—"At ego, "quamquam cupienti voluntate præditus, tamen re- "ligiosa formidine retinebar. Quod enim sedulo "percontaveram, *difficile religionis obsequium, et cas- "timoniorum abstinentiam satis arduam, cauteque cir- "cumspectu vitam, quæ multis casibus subjacet, esse mu- "niendam* [d]." These difficulties now surmounted, he is *initiated* with the accustomed Ceremonies. He then makes his Prayer, in which the grand ΑΠΟΡΡΗΤΑ of the *Mysteries* is still [e] more plainly referred to. "Tu quidem sancta et humani generis SOSPITA- "TRIX perpetua, semper fovendis mortalibus muni- "fica, dulcem matris affectionem miserorum casibus "tribuis.—TE SUPERI COLUNT; OBSERVANT IN- "FERI; TU ROTAS ORBEM; LUMINAS SOLEM; "REGIS MUNDUM; CALCAS TARTARUM; TIBI "RESPONDENT SIDERA [f]; GAUDENT LUMINA; "REDEUNT TEMPORA; SERVIUNT ELEMENTA: "TUO NUTU SPIRANT FLAMINA; NUTRIUNTUR "NUBILA; GERMINANT SEMINA; CRESCUNT GER- "MINA; TUAM MAJESTATEM PERHORRESCUNT "AVES COELO MEANTES; FERÆ MONTIBUS ER-

[b] P. 253—4. [c] P. 255—6—7. [d] P. 252.

[e] See the quotation above.—*Fortunæ Videntis, quæ suæ luci splendore terros etiam Deos illuminat.*

[f] *Respondent sidera.* This, I suppose, relates to the *music of the spheres.* The image is noble and sublime. It is taken from the *consent* in the lyre, to answer to, and obey the hand of the Master who had put them into tune.

"RANTES;

"RANTES; SERPENTES SOLO LATENTES; BELUÆ "PONTO NATANTES[g]."

The affair thus over, and the honour attendant on *initiation* into the *greater Myſteries* being marked out in the words—*cominabar ſacrarium; totæ civitati notus ac conſpicuus, digitis hominum nutibuſque notabilis*[h]; the Author, in the next place, takes occaſion, agreeably to his real practice and opinions, to recommend a MULTIPLICITY OF INITIATIONS. He tells us how *Iſis* counſelled him to enter into the *Myſteries* of *Oſiris:* how, after that, ſhe invited him to a third *initiation:* and then rewarded him for his accumulated Piety with an abundance of temporal Bleſſings.

All this conſidered, we can no longer doubt but that the true deſign of his work was to recommend INITIATION INTO THE MYSTERIES, IN OPPOSITION TO THE NEW RELIGION. We ſee the Cataſtrophe of the piece, the whole Eleventh Book, entirely taken up with it; and compoſed with the greateſt ſerioufneſs and ſuperſtition.

And, ſurely, nothing could be better conceived, to recommend the *Myſteries*, than the idea of ſuch a plan; or better contrived than his execution of it. In which, he omits no circumſtance that might be plauſibly oppoſed to CHRISTIANITY; or that might recommend the MYSTERIES with advantage to the Magiſtrate's protection: as where he tells us, that in theſe Rites, *they prayed for the proſperity of all Orders in* "*the* STATE—fauſta vota præfatus principi magno, "ſenatuique et equiti, totique populo romano."

This interpretation will throw new light on *every part* of the GOLDEN ASS. But I have been ſo long upon the ſubject, that I have only time to give one inſtance; and this, chiefly becauſe it reflects light back again on my general interpretation of the Fable.

[g] P. 257—8. [h] P. 249.

In the fifth and ſixth books is the long epiſode of Cupid and Psyche; viſibly allegorical throughout; and entirely foreign to all the reſt of the work, conſidered as a mere Mileſian fable; but very applicable to the Writer's purpoſe, if he had that moral to inculcate which we have here aſſigned unto him.

There was no man, though he regarded the *golden Aſs* as a thing of mere amuſement, but ſaw that the ſtory of Cupid and Psyche was a *philoſophic allegory of the progreſs of the ſoul to perfection, in the poſſeſſion of divine love and the reward of immortality.* The Amour of Cupid and Pſyche was a ſubject which lay in common amongſt the Platonic writers. And every one faſhioned this agreeable fiction (as our Author has done here) according to the doctrines he had to convey under it. By this means it could not but become famous. The remaining monuments of ancient ſculpture convince us that it was very famous; in which, nothing is ſo common as the figures of Cupid and Psyche in the various circumſtances of their adventures. Now we have ſhewn at large, that the profeſſed end of the *Myſteries*, in the later ages of their celebrity, was to reſtore the ſoul to it's original rectitude, and, in every age, to encourage good men with the promiſes of *happineſs in another life.* The fable, therefore, of *Cupid and Pſyche*, in the fifth and ſixth books, was the fineſt and moſt artful preparative for the ſubject of the eleventh, which treats profeſſedly of the *Myſteries.*

But if we look more nearly into this beautiful Fable, we ſhall find that, beſides it's general purpoſe, it has one more particular. We have obſerved that the *corrupt ſtate* of the *Myſteries*, in the time of Apuleius, was one principal reaſon of his undertaking their apology. Theſe corruptions were of two kinds, debaucheries and magic. Their *debaucheries* have been taken notice of above. Their magic was of three ſorts: 1. The Magic of invocation or

Necro-

NECROMANCY. 2. The Magic of transformation or METAMORPHOSIS. 3. And the Magic of divine communication under a viſible appearance or THEÜRGY. The ORACULAR RESPONSES, introduced late into the *Myſteries*, ſeem to have given birth to the firſt: The Doctrine of the METEMPSYCHOSIS taught therein, to the ſecond: and the ΑΠΟΡΡΗΤΑ concerning the DIVINE NATURE, to the third. The abomination of the two firſt ſorts was ſeen by all, and frankly given up as criminal: but the fanatic Platoniſts and Pythagoreans of the latter ages, eſpouſing the third, occaſioned it to be held in credit and reverence. So that, as Heliodorus tells us, the Egyptian prieſts (between whoſe fanaticiſm and that of the Platoniſts there was, at this time, a kind of coalition [1]) affected to diſtinguiſh between the MAGIC of *Necromancy* and the magic of *Theürgy*; accounting the firſt infamous and wicked; but the laſt very fair, and even commendable. For now both thoſe philoſophic Enthuſiaſts had their *myſterious Rites*, which conſiſted in the practice of this THEÜRGIC MAGIC. Theſe were the *Myſteries*, to obſerve it by the way, of which the Emperor Julian was ſo fond, that he placed his principal felicity (as the Chriſtians placed his principal crime) in their celebration. But our Author, who had imbibed his Platoniſm, not at the muddy ſtreams of thoſe late Fanatics, but at the pure fountain-head of the Academy itſelf, well underſtood how much this ſuperſtition, with all it's plauſible pretences, had polluted the *Myſteries*; and, therefore, as in the courſe of the adventures of his *golden Aſs*, he had ſtigmatized the two other kinds of *Magic*, he compoſed this celebrated tale (hitherto ſo little underſtood) to expoſe the Magic of THEÜRGY. It is, as we ſaid, *a philoſophic Allegory of the progreſs of the Soul to perfection, in the poſſeſſion of Divine Love and the reward of immortality*, delivered in the adventures of

[1] See Book iii. Sect. iv. towards the end.

IMAGE, i. e. ſeen by the ſplendour of it
Now the ſtory tells us, there were three
youngeſt of whom was called PSYCHE; b
are to underſtand, the *three peripatetic ſo*
ſitive, the *animal*, and the *rational*; or in c
ſenſe, *appetite*, and *reaſon*; that the beauty c
the *rational Soul*, was ſo divine, that men
altars of the Gods to follow and worſhip h
ing to the ancient aphoriſm,

Nullum Numen abeſt, ſi ſit PRUDENT

She is contracted to, and poſſeſſes the *c*
or DIVINE LOVE; who cohabits with h
BLY, amidſt all kinds of pleaſure and delig
mean time her Siſters, envious of her ſu
a ion, take advantage of the God's *i*
perplex her with a thouſand doubts an
which end in exciting her *curioſity* to get
her lover. By which the Author ſeems t
that they are the irregular paſſions an
which ſtir up men's curioſity to this ſpeci
the THEURGIC VISION. *Pſyche* is delud
and, againſt the expreſs injunction of the

of CERES and JUNO, and ſeeks protection of thoſe Deities; by which is meant, men's having recourſe to their *Myſteries*, againſt the evils and diſaſters of life; as is plainly marked in the reaſon given for her application—"nec ullam vel dubiam SPEI MELIORIS "viam volens omittere[m]."—They both deny her admittance, which intimates that the *purer Myſteries* diſcouraged all kind of *Magic*, even the moſt ſpecious. In a word, after a long and ſevere repentance and penance, in which the Author ſeems to have ſhadowed out the trials and labours undergone by the Aſpirants to the *Myſteries*, ſhe is pardoned and reſtored to the favour of Heaven. She is put again into poſſeſſion of DIVINE LOVE, and rewarded with the prerogative of IMMORTALITY.

There are many other circumſtances in this fine Allegory equally ſerving to the end here explained: as there are others which allude to divers beautiful platonic notions, foreign to the preſent diſcourſe. It is enough that we have pointed to its chief, and peculiar purpoſe; which it was impoſſible to ſee while the nature and deſign of the whole Fable lay undiſcovered.

But now perhaps it may be ſaid, "That all this is very well. An Allegory is here found for the GOLDEN ASS, which, it muſt be owned, fits the Fable. But ſtill it may be aſked, Was it indeed made for it? Did the Author write the tale for the moral; or did the Critic find the moral for the tale? For an Allegory may be drawn from almoſt any ſtory: and they have been often made for Authors who never thought of them. Nay, when a rage of allegorizing happens to prevail, as it did a century or two ago, the Author himſelf will be tempted or obliged, as well as the Commentator, to encourage this deluſion. *Arioſto* and *Taſſo*, writers of the higheſt

[m] P. 112.

reputation, one of whom compoſed after the *Gothic* Romances, as the other did from the *Claſſic*, without ever concerning themſelves with any other moral than what the natural circumſtances of the Fable conveyed; yet, to ſecure the ſucceſs of their works, they ſubmitted, in compliance to faſhion and falſe taſte, to the ridiculous drudgery of inventing a kind of poſthumous Allegory, and ſometimes more than one; that the reader himſelf might ſeaſon their Fables to his own taſte. As this has been the caſe, To ſhew that I neither impoſe upon myſelf nor others, I have reſerved the Author's own declaration of his having an *Allegoric meaning*, for the laſt confirmation of my ſyſtem. It is in theſe words,

At ego tibi ſermone iſto Mileſio
Varias Fabulas conſeram, aureſque tuas
Benevolas lepido ſuſurro permulceam;
Modo ſi PAPYRUM ÆGYPTIAM ARGUTIA
NILOTICI CALAMI INSCRIPTAM, non ſpreveris
Inſpicere [a]——

A direct inſinuation of it's being replete with the profound *Ægyptian wiſdom*; of which, that Nation, by the invention of the MYSTERIES, had conveyed ſo conſiderable a part to the *Greeks*.

Before I totally diſmiſs this matter it may not be improper to obſerve, that both VIRGIL, and APULEIUS have repreſented the genuine MYSTERIES, as Rites of perfect ſanctity and purity; and recommended only ſuch to their Countrymen; while they expoſe impure and impious Rites to the public execration; for it was their purpoſe to ſtigmatize the reigning corruptions, and to recommend the ancient ſanctity. On the other hand, a man attached by his office to the recommendation of the *Myſteries*, as then practiſed, was to do the beſt he could, when

[a] In init. Fab.

deprived

deprived of the benefit of this diſtinction; and was to endeavour to give fair colours to the foulest things. This was the caſe of JAMBLICHUS. His friend *Porphyry* had ſome ſcruples on this head. He doubts whether thoſe Rites could come from the Gods, which admitted ſuch a mixture of lewdneſs and impurity. Such a mixture *Jamblichus* confeſſes; but, at the ſame time, endeavours to account for their divine original, by ſhewing, that they are only the emblems of natural Truths; or a kind of moral purgation of the inordinate paſſions [o]. You will ſay, he might have given a better anſwer; That they were *modern* abuſes and corruptions. He aſks your pardon for that. Such a confeſſion would have been condemning his own Platonic fanaticiſm; that very fanaticiſm which had brought in theſe abominations. He was reduced therefore to the neceſſity of admitting that they were no after-corruptions, but coeval with the Rites themſelves. And this admiſſion of ſo learned a Hierophant, is, as far as I am able to collect, the only ſupport which any one can now have for ſaying, that *the Myſteries were impure and abominable even from their firſt Inſtitution.*

Hitherto we have conſidered the Legiſlator's care in perpetuating the doctrine of a FUTURE STATE. And if I have been longer than ordinary on this head, my excuſe is, that the topic was new [p], and the doctrine itſelf,

[o] De myſteriis, Sect. i. cap. xi.

[p] A well-known writer, Mr. Jackſon, (not to ſpeak at preſent of Others of a later date) who had long and ſcurrilouſly railed at the author of the D. L. in a number of miſerable pamphlets, hath at length thought fit in a Thing, called *Chronological antiquities*, to borrow from this book, without any acknowledgment, all he had to give the public concerning the pagan MYSTERIES; and much concerning the HIEROGLYPHICS and *origin of idolatry*. But this is the common practice of ſuch ſort of writers: and is only mentioned here to ſhew the reader to what claſs they belong. The treatment theſe volumes have met with from ſome

itſelf, which is the main ſubject of the preſent inquiry, much intereſted in it.

A very remarkable circumſtance (for which we are indebted to the obſervation of modern travellers) may convince us, that Rulers and Governors cultivated the belief of this doctrine with a more than common aſſiduity. Many barbarous nations have been diſcovered in theſe later times, on the coaſts of Africa, which, in the diſtractions of Government, and tranſmigrations of People, have, it is probable, fallen from a *civilized* to a *ſavage* ſtate of life. Theſe are found to have little or no knowledge of a God, or obſervance of Religion. And yet, which is a ſurpriſing paradox, they ſtill retain the ſettled belief and expectation of a FUTURE STATE. A wonder to be accounted for no other way than by what hath been ſaid above of the Legiſlator's principal concern for the ſupport of this Doctrine; and of the deep root, which by it's agreeable nature, it takes in the Mind, wherever it has been once received. So that though, as it hath been obſerved, *no Religion ever exiſted without the doctrine of a Future State*, yet the doctrine of a Future tate hath, it ſeems, ſometimes exiſted without a Religion.

of the moſt worthleſs of my Countrymen, made me think it expedient to contraſt their behaviour with that of the moſt learned and reſpectable foreign Divines and Critics of France, Germany, and Holland, in their animadverſions on this work, occaſionally inſerted in the notes.

APPEN-

APPENDIX.

WE have ſeen with what art, and care in contrivance, the Sages of the GENTILE World endeavoured, by the intervention of the MYSTERIES, to prevent the memory of THE FIRST CAUSE of all things from being totally obliterated from the minds of men; while the perverſe conſtitution of the National Idolatries prevented the true God's being received into any PUBLIC Worſhip. To the SECRET of the *Myſteries* it was, that theſe Pſeudo-Evangeliſts invited their more capable Diſciples, awfully admoniſhing them *to give heed unto it, as unto a light ſhining in a dark place.* For it was no more than ſuch a glimmering, till the *riſing of the day-ſtar* of the Goſpel, in the *hearts* of the Faithful.

But if the late noble Author of THE FIRST PHILOSOPHY deſerves credit; all this care was as abſurd as it was fruitleſs.

The Inſtitutors of the *Myſteries* imparted this SECRET, as the true and only ſolid foundation of RELIGION: for the FIRST CAUSE was, in their ideas, a God whoſe ESSENCE indeed was incomprehenſible, but his ATTRIBUTES, as well moral as natural, diſcoverable by human reaſon. Such a God was wanted for that foundation: for *unaſſiſted* reaſon taught *them*, as, in its moſt *aſſiſted* ſtate, it had taught St. PAUL, *That he who cometh to God, muſt believe that he is; and that he is a* REWARDER *of them who diligently ſeek him.* Thus Plato, in his *Book of Laws* ſpeak-

ſpeaking of Religion, and it's uſe to civil Society, ſays, "It is not of ſmall conſequence, that what we "here reaſon about the GODS, ſhould, by all means "and methods, be made probable; as that they ARE, "and that they are GOOD[a]." Hence, tho' their miſtaken *mode* of teaching deprived the pagan world of the *fruit* of the Doctrine, the purpoſe however was laudable and rational.

But now comes a modern Sage[b],——PHILOSOPHER and STATESMAN like the Ancient, (in all things elſe how unlike!) who tells us "that they made the Baſis of Religion far too wide: that men have no further concern with God than TO BELIEVE THAT HE IS, which his *phyſical Attributes* make fully manifeſt: but, That he is *a rewarder of them who diligently ſeek him*, Religion doth not require us to believe, ſince this depends on God's MORAL ATTRIBUTES, of which we have no conception." In this manner, by the turn of a hand, hath our Noble Philoſopher changed *Natural Religion* into NATURALISM; and made this care of the ancient Sages as ridiculouſly conceived as it was ineffectually proſecuted.

But to do juſtice to the weak endeavours of thoſe Friends and Servants of Mankind, who ſurely deſerve a grateful memory with Poſterity, I ſhall take the liberty to examine his Lordſhip's reaſoning on this branch of his FIRST PHILOSOPHY; which caſts ſo malignant a ſhade over the whole religious World.

He pretends to prove *That we have* NO ADEQUATE *ideas of God's moral attributes, his* GOODNESS *and* JUSTICE, *as we have of his natural, his Wiſdom and Power.* Here let me obſerve, that his Lordſhip uſes the words, *inadequate ideas*, and, *no ideas*, as terms of the ſame import. And I think, not improperly.

[a] ὡς θεόι τ' ἐισι, καὶ ἀγαθοὶ. [b] Lord Bolinbroke.

I have

I have therefore followed him in the indifferent uſe of either expreſſion. For the reaſon of his calling our ideas of God's *moral attributes* INADEQUATE, is, becauſe he denies that goodneſs and juſtice in God, and goodneſs and juſtice amongſt Men, are the ſame IN KIND. But if not the *ſame in kind*, we can have NO IDEA of them; becauſe we have no idea of any *other kind* of goodneſs and juſtice.

He lays down theſe three Propoſitions.

1. That, by METAPHYSICS, or by reaſoning *a priori*, we can gain no knowledge of God at all.

2. That our knowledge of his *Attributes* are to be acquired only by a contemplation on his WORKS, or by the reaſoning *a poſteriori*.

3. That in *this* way, we can only arrive at the knowledge of his NATURAL Attributes, not of his MORAL.

"It is from the CONSTITUTION OF THE WORLD "ALONE (ſays his Lordſhip) and from the ſtate of "mankind in it, that we can *acquire any ideas* of the "divine attributes, or a *right to affirm any thing* "*about them* [c]."

"The knowledge of the Creator is, on many ac-"counts, neceſſary to ſuch a creature as man: and "therefore we are made able to arrive by a proper "exerciſe of our mental faculties, *from a knowledge* "*of God's works to a knowledge of his exiſtence*, and "of that infinite POWER and WISDOM which are de-"monſtrated to us in them. OUR KNOWLEDGE "CONCERNING GOD GOES NO FURTHER [d]."

"Artificial Theology connects by very problema-"tical reaſoning *a priori*, MORAL ATTRIBUTES, ſuch "as we conceive them, and ſuch as they are rela-"tively to us, with the *phyſical attributes* of God; "tho' there be no ſufficient foundation for this pro-

[c] Vol. v. p. 331. [d] Vol. iv. p. 86.

"ceeding;

" ceeding, nay, tho' *the phænomena are in ſeveral* " *caſes repugnant* [e]."

Having thus aſſured us that the ideas of God's *moral attributes* are to be got by no conſequential reaſoning at all, either *a priori* or *a poſteriori*, the two only ways we have to knowledge; He rightly concludes, that if Man hath ſuch ideas, they were not FOUND but INVENTED by him. And therefore, that nothing might be wanting to the full dilucidation of this curious point, he acquaints us who were the Authors of the FICTION, and how ſtrangely the thing came about.

" Some of the Philoſophers (ſays his Lordſhip) " having been led by a more full and accurate con- " templation of Nature to the knowledge of a ſu- " preme ſelf-exiſtent Being of infinite *power and wiſ-* " *dom*, and the firſt Cauſe of all things, were not " contented with this degree of knowledge. They " MADE A SYSTEM of God's MORAL as well as *phy-* " *ſical* ATTRIBUTES, BY WHICH TO ACCOUNT FOR " THE PROCEEDINGS OF HIS PROVIDENCE [f]."

Theſe Philoſophers then, it ſeems, invented the ſyſtem of God's *moral attributes*, in order to account for the difficulties ariſing from the view of God's *moral government*. If the World till now had been ſo dull as to have no conception of theſe Attributes; his Lordſhip's Philoſophers, we ſee, made amends; who were ſo quick witted to conceive, and ſo ſharp ſighted to find out, the obliquities of a *crooked* line before they had got any idea of a *ſtraight* one. For juſt to this, neither more nor leſs, does his Lordſhip's obſervation amount, that——*they made a Syſtem of God's moral attributes, by which to account for the proceedings of his Providence.* 'Till now, none of us could conceive how any doubts concerning *moral Government* could ariſe but on the previous ideas of

[e] Vol. v. p. 316. [f] Vol. iv. p. 48.

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the *moral attributes* of the *Governor*. This invention of his Lordſhip's old Philoſophers puts me in mind of an ingenious Modern, the curious SANCHO PANCHA; who, as his hiſtorian tells us, was very inquiſitive to diſcover the author of that very uſeful invention we call SLEEP: for, with this worthy Magiſtrate, Sleep and good Cheer were the FIRST PHILOSOPHY. Now the things ſought after by Sancho and his Lordſhip, were at no great diſtance; for if *Sleeping* began when men firſt ſhut their eyes, it is certain the *idea of God's Goodneſs* appeared as ſoon as ever they opened them.

Dr. Clarke's Demonſtration of the *moral attributes a priori*, I ſhall leave, as his Lordſhip is pleaſed to do, in all it's force. If the Doctor's followers think their Maſter's honour concerned, where his arguments are not, they have a large field and a ſafe to ſhew their proweſs. I rather chuſe to undertake the NOBLE PHILOSOPHER on his own terms, without any other arms than the arguments *a poſteriori*. For he is ſuch a Champion for the good Cauſe, that he not only appoints his Adverſaries the Field, but preſcribes to them the uſe of their weapons.

But his Lordſhip, like other great men, is not eaſily approached; and when he is, not always fit to be ſeen. You catch his FIRST PHILOSOPHY, as Butler's Hero did Ariſtotle's FIRST MATTER, *undreſſed, and without a rag of form*; however flaunting and fluttering in FRAGMENTS. To ſpeak plainly, his Lordſhip's entire neglect or ignorance of Method betrays him into endleſs *repetitions:* and, in theſe, whether for want of preciſion in his ideas, propriety in his terms, or art in his compoſition, the queſtion is perpetually changing; and rarely without being newcovered by an equivocal expreſſion. If you add to this, the perpetual *contradictions* into which he falls, either by defect of memory, exceſs of paſſion, or diſtreſs of argument, you will allow it to be no eaſy matter

matter to take him fairly, to know him fully, and to repreſent him to the beſt advantage: in none of which offices would I be willingly defective. Indeed, when you have done this, the buſineſs is over; and his Lordſhip's reaſoning generally confutes itſelf.

When I reflect upon what this hath coſt me, the reading over two or three bulky volumes to get poſſeſſion of a ſingle argument; which now you think you hold, and then again you loſe; which meets you full when you leaſt expect it; and ſlips away from you the very moment it promiſes to do moſt: when, I ſay, I reflect upon all this, I cannot but lament the hard luck of the *Engliſh* CLERGY, who, tho' apparently leaſt fit, as being made Parties; certainly the leaſt concerned as there is nothing that can impoſe on a Scholar, tho' a great deal that may miſlead the People, are likely to be the men moſt engaged with his Lordſhip in this controverſy. Time was, when if a Writer had a diſpoſition to ſeek objections againſt Religion, tho' he found them hardly, and urged them heavily, yet he would digeſt his thoughts, and methodize his reaſoning. The Clergy had then nothing to do but to anſwer him, if they found themſelves able. But ſince this ſlovenly cuſtom (as Lord SHAFTSBURY calls it) has got amongſt our Free-thinkers, of *taking their phyſic in public*, of throwing about their looſe and crude indigeſtions under the name of FRAGMENTS, things which in their very name imply not ſo much the *want*, as the *excluſion* of all *form*, the Advocate of Religion has had a fine time of it: he muſt work them into conſiſtence, he muſt mould them into ſhape, before he can ſafely lay hold of them himſelf, or preſent them handſomely to the Public. But theſe Gentlemen have provided that a Clergyman ſhould never be idle. All, he had of old to attend, was the ſaving the ſouls of thoſe committed to his care. He muſt now begin his work a great deal higher; he muſt firſt convince his flock

that

that they have ſouls to be ſaved. And the ſpite of all is, that at the ſame time his kind maſters have doubled his taſk, they appear very well diſpoſed to leſſen his wages.

We have obſerved, that the DENIAL of God's *moral attributes* is the great barrier againſt Religion in general: but it is more eſpecially ſerviceable in his Lordſhip's idioſyncratic terrors; the terrors of a *future State*. To theſe we owe his famous book of FRAGMENTS, compoſed occaſionally, and taken as an extemporaneous cordial, each ſtronger than the other, to ſupport himſelf under his frequent paroxyſms. For, ſet the *moral attributes* aſide, and we can neither form any judgment of the *end* of man, nor of the *nature* of God's government. All our knowledge will be confined to our *preſent* ſtate and condition[g]. It is by the *moral attributes*, we learn, that man was made for *happineſs*; and that God's diſpenſation to us *here* is but *part* of a general ſyſtem: This naturally extends our views to, and terminates our knowledge in, *Futurity*.

The fate of all Religion therefore being included in the queſtion of God's *moral attributes*, I hold it of much importance to prove againſt his Lordſhip, that MEN MAY ACQUIRE ADEQUATE IDEAS OF THEM in the ſame way, and with equal certainty, in which they acquire the knowledge of God's *natural attributes*: And the knowledge of theſe latter his Lordſhip deduces from its original in the following words.

"All our knowledge of God (ſays he) is derived "from his works. Every part of the immenſe Uni- "verſe, and the order and harmony of the Whole, "are not only conformable to our ideas or notions "of WISDOM and POWER, but theſe ideas and no-

[g] One of his Lordſhip's Corollaries therefore from the Propoſition of *no moral attributes*, is this, "Our Knowledge concerning "God goes no further than for the neceſſary uſe of human life." Vol. iv. p. 486.

"tions

" tions were impreſſed originally and principally by " them, on every attentive mind; and men were led " to conclude, with the utmoſt certainty, that a " Being of infinite *wiſdom* and *power* made, preſerv- " ed, and governed the ſyſtem. As far as we can " diſcover, we diſcern theſe in all his works; and " where we cannot diſcern them, it is manifeſtly due " to our imperfection, not to his. This now is real " knowledge, or there is no ſuch thing as know- " ledge. We acquire it immediately in the objects " themſelves, in God, and in Nature, the work of " God. We know what *wiſdom* and *power* are: we " know both intuitively, and by the help of our ſen- " ſes, that ſuch as we conceive them to be, ſuch " they appear in the Work: and therefore we " know demonſtratively that ſuch they are in the " Worker[h]."

All this is mighty well: and on theſe very grounds I undertake to prove that men may get as clear and preciſe ideas of God's GOODNESS and JUSTICE.

But, to prevent, or, indeed, now things are gone thus far, rather to *redreſs* all ambiguity in the terms, and equivocation in the uſe of them; it will be proper to explain what TRUE PHILOSOPHY means by God's works, whether *phyſical* or *moral*.

Now, it means, if I am not much miſtaken, that CONSTITUTION OF THINGS which God hath eſtabliſhed, and directed to a plain and obvious end: no regard being had to thoſe impediments or obſtructions in it's courſe, which the Author of nature hath permitted to ariſe from any part of the *material*, or *intellectual* Creation.

Thus, when we conſider his *phyſical* works, in order to make our eſtimate of his *wiſdom* and *power*, we conceive them as they are in themſelves; and in the perfection of their firſt conſtitution; tho' the

[h] Vol. v. p. 524.

greater

greater portions of the *phyſical* ſyſtem may, from the intractability of Matter, be ſubject to ſome *inconſiderable irregularities*; which, as the TRUE PHILOSOPHER [1] obſerves, *will be apt to increaſe till this Syſtem wants a reformation:* and tho' the ſmaller Portions of it, ſuch as the bodies of animals, may, from various accidents in their conception and birth, often want that convenient form in the adaption of their parts, from the wonderful contrivance of which, in the various bodies of animals in general, ariſes ſo illuſtrious an evidence of the *wiſdom* and *power* of the Creator.

Surely, then, common ſenſe guided by equitable meaſure requires us to eſtimate God's *moral Works* on the ſame ſtandard: to conſider what the *moral conſtitution is in itſelf:* and (when the queſtion is of God's *goodneſs* and *juſtice*) to keep that conſideration diſtinct. And not ſuffer it to be diſturbed by the view of any interruptions occaſioned by the perverſe influence of the paſſion or action of material or immaterial Beings. For, here, Both concur to violate the Conſtitution: In the *natural* ſyſtem, man's *Free will* hath no place: in the *moral*, the abuſe of *Free-will* occaſions the greateſt of it's diſorders.

In proſecuting this queſtion, therefore, As, in order to acquire and confirm our ideas of God's *wiſdom* and *power*, we conſider the *natural ſyſtem* ſo far forth only as it's order and harmony is ſupported by the *general Laws* of matter and motion: ſo, in order to acquire and confirm our ideas of his *goodneſs* and *juſtice*, we ſhould regard the *moral ſyſtem* ſo far forth only as it's order and harmony is ſupported by that GENERAL LAW, which annexes *happineſs to virtue, and to vice, miſery, and ruin.*

[1] Newton.

Thus much, and only thus much, is *God's Word* in either ſyſtem: and it is from *God's Work*, he tells us, we are to demonſtrate his *Attributes*. The reſt, (where diſorders real or apparent obtrude themſelves to obſtruct our views in theſe diſcoveries) proceed from *Matter* and *Mind*.

And it is not to be forgotten, that the concluſion, Religioniſts draw from hence, in ſupport of their *adequate* ideas of God's *moral* attributes, hath the greater ſtrength upon his Lordſhip's own principles; who holds, that this Conſtitution ariſes *ſolely from the* WILL of God: For then we are ſure that the WILL, which annexes happineſs to virtue, and miſery to vice, muſt ariſe from God's *moral* rather than from his *phyſical* nature.

Having premiſed thus much; no more, indeed, than neceſſary to obviate one continued SOPHISM, which runs thro' all his Lordſhip's reaſonings, againſt the *moral attributes* (where, the *courſe and operation of that moral Conſtitution*, as it appears under the diſturbances occaſioned by man's free-will, is perpetually put for the *Conſtitution itſelf*) I now proceed to ſhew, that, from GOD'S WORKS, we have as preciſe ideas of his GOODNESS and JUSTICE as of his *power* and *wiſdom*.

His Lordſhip obſerves, that *from every part of the immenſe Univerſe, and from the harmony of the Whole, men are led to conclude, with the utmoſt certainty, that a Being of infinite* WISDOM *and* POWER *made, preſerved, and governed the Syſtem.* This, he obſerves in favour of the *natural* attributes. And what ſhould hinder men from making the ſame obſervation in favour of the *moral*, viz. That the happineſs and miſery by the very conſtitution of nature, attendant on Virtue and on Vice, lead men to conclude, with equal certainty, that a Being of infinite GOODNESS and JUSTICE made, preſerves, and governs the ſyſtem?

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The exiſtence of this *moral Conſtitution* in the natural connexion between vice and miſery, virtue and happineſs, his Lordſhip amply acknowledges. Let us conſider it, therefore, both as it reſpects BODIES of men, and INDIVIDUALS.

That *Communities* are always happy or miſerable in proportion as their Manners are virtuous or vicious, his Lordſhip himſelf is, on all occaſions, ready to demonſtrate. If ſuch a Conſtitution of things do not beſpeak the Author of it, *good* and *juſt*, how is it poſſible to conclude any thing of the character of the Creator, from his WORKS? His Lordſhip thinks, "that from the marks of wiſdom and power in the *phyſical ſyſtem* we learn with the utmoſt certainty that God is *wiſe* and *powerful*; and he ſays, that we acquire this knowledge immediately, as it were, by our ſenſes." Are there not the ſelf ſame marks of goodneſs and juſtice in this part at leaſt of the *moral ſyſtem* which reſpects Communities? And do not we come to know as immediately by our ſenſes, and as certainly by our reaſon, that God is *good* and *juſt*?

If we conſider the *moral Conſtitution*, as it reſpects *Particulars*, we ſee virtue and vice have the ſame influence on our happineſs and miſery. Here, indeed, we find more interruptions, in the *means* to the *end*, than in the other part. Our material and our intellectual Natures are here of more force, to diſorder the harmony of the Syſtem. In *Communities*, it can rarely be diſturbed, but by a Peſtilence, or that other, moral, Plague, a Hero or a Conqueror. Amongſt *Particulars*, indeed, phyſical evil and the abuſe of free-will operate more ſtrongly: But when once the demonſtration of the *moral attributes* is clearly made from that part of the Conſtitution which regard *Communities*, it can never afterwards be ſhaken by the diſorders in that other part which regards *Particulars*. The eſtabliſhed truth is now a Principle

for further diſcoveries; and all we can fairly deduce from theſe diſorders is the CERTAINTY of a *future State*. But this by the way.

What I inſiſt upon at preſent is, that, to decide the queſtion concerning God's *Attributes*, we are to conſider the Conſtitution of things, as it is in itſelf. This is, properly, *God's work*. The diſorders in it, occaſioned by the abuſe of man's *free-will*, is not his work, but man's. This, his Lordſhip too, upon another occaſion, namely, when he combats the argument of a *future ſtate*, from an unequal Providence, is perpetually repeating. So that theſe diſorders muſt, even on his Lordſhip's own principles, be excluded from the account, when we eſtimate God's Nature and *Attributes*, from his *Works*.

"But we ſee not thoſe diſorders in the *natural* world, which we both ſee and feel in the *moral*." This would be ſome objection did God in the *moral*, as in the *natural* ſyſtem, direct immediately, or conſtitute things mechanically; or had Free-will the ſame influence on the *natural* as on the *moral* ſyſtem.—Did God direct, immediately or mechanically in both Conſtitutions, or did he direct immediately and mechanically in neither, and that yet the *moral* remained more ſubject to diſorder than the *natural*, it might indeed follow that we had not ſo clear ideas of God's *goodneſs* and *juſtice* as of his *wiſdom* and *power*: But ſince He has thought fit to leave man, FREE; and hath been pleaſed to ſuffer the abuſe of free-will to affect the *moral* ſyſtem, and not the *natural*; as this, I ſay, is the caſe, the greater irregularities in the *one* do not take off from the equal clearneſs of the demonſtration, which reſults from the nature of *both one and the other* Conſtitution. This difference is not to be aſcribed to a contrary conduct in the Governor of the two Syſtems, but to the contrary natures of the Subjects. Paſſive matter being totally inert, it's reſiſtance to the

the Laws impreſſed upon it, muſt be extremely weak: and conſequently the diſorders ariſing from that reſiſtance, proportionably ſlow and unheeded: while that active ſelf-moving principle, the Mind, flies out at once from the centre of its direction, and can every moment deflect from the line of truth and equity. Hence moral diſorders began early, became exceſſive, and have continued, through all ages, to diſturb the harmony of the Syſtem.

What is here ſaid will, I ſuppoſe, be ſufficient to confute the following aſſertions; and to detect the miſtake on which they ariſe.

"Every thing (ſays his Lordſhip) ſhews the *wiſ-*
"*dom* and *power* of God conformably to our ideas
"of wiſdom and power in the *phyſical* world and in
"the *moral*. *But every thing does not ſhew in like*
"*manner the* juſtice *and* goodneſs *conformably to our*
"*ideas of theſe attributes in either. The phyſical attri-*
"*butes are in their nature more glaring and leſs equi-*
"*vocal*[k]."

And again, "There is *no ſufficient foundation* in
"the phænomena of Nature to connect the moral at-
"tributes with the phyſical attributes of God. *Nay,*
"*the phænomena are in ſeveral caſes repugnant*[l]."

But ſince he goes ſo far as to talk of the *want of a foundation*, and even a *repugnancy*; Before I proceed with the main branch of my reaſoning, I will juſt urge one ſingle argument for the reality and full evidence of the *moral attributes:* and it ſhall be taken from his own conceſſions, and ſhall conclude on his own principles.

He tells us, that ſuch as he, "who apply them-
"ſelves to the *firſt Philoſophy*, apply themſelves to
"the nobleſt objects that can demand the attention
"of the mind—To the ſignification of GOD'S WILL,

[k] Vol. v. p. 524. [l] Vol. v. p. 316.

"concerning the duties we owe to him, and to one "another[m]."

And again, "It is ſufficient to eſtabliſh our *moral* "obligations that we conſider them relatively to our "own ſyſtem. From thence they ariſe: and ſince "they ariſe from thence, it muſt be the WILL of that "Being who made the ſyſtem, that we ſhould ob-"ſerve and practiſe them[n]."

Let me aſk then, Whence it is that we collect this WILL from the objects which his Lordſhip allows us to contemplate, namely, his WORKS *in this ſyſtem?* He will ſay from certain *qualities* in thoſe objects.—What are thoſe qualities? He will reply, the *fitneſſes* of means to ends.——Who was the Author of theſe fitneſſes? He hath told us, the *God of nature.*——It was God's *will* then, that we ſhould uſe the *means*, in order to obtain the *ends.* Now, in the moral Syſtem, the means are virtuous practice; the end, happineſs. Virtue therefore muſt needs be pleaſing to him; and Vice, as it's contrary, diſpleaſing. Well, but then, as to this approbation and diſlike; it muſt be either capricious, or it muſt be regulated on the nature of things. *Wiſdom*, which his Lordſhip condeſcends to give his Maker, will not allow us to ſuppoſe it capricious. It is regulated therefore on the nature of things. But if the *nature of things* be, as his Lordſhip holds it is, the *conſtitution of God*, and dependent on his *will*, then he who is pleaſed with virtue, and diſpleaſed with vice, muſt needs be himſelf *good* and *juſt*.

To proceed now with the principal branch of our reaſoning. His Lordſhip goes on thus. *But men not only might collect God's natural attributes from the phyſical ſyſtem, but in effect they did: and all men, at all times, had theſe notions ſo ſtrongly impreſſed on them,*

[m] Vol. v. p. 447. [n] Vol. v. p. 452.

the

that they were led to conclude with the utmoſt certainty for a Being of infinite power and wiſdom.

I deſire to know in what time or place it ever happened, before his Lordſhip philoſophiſed at Batterſea, *and could find no foundation, in the phænomena of nature, to connect the moral with the phyſical attributes of God*, that a Man, who believed God's infinite wiſdom and power, did not with equal confidence believe his infinite goodneſs and juſtice? In truth, theſe two ſets of ideas, the *phyſical* and *moral* attributes of the Deity, were equally extenſive, they were equally ſteddy, and, till now, they were always inſeparable.

He ſays, that *as far as we can diſcover, we diſcern infinite wiſdom and power in all God's works: and where we cannot diſcern them, it is manifeſtly due to our imperfection, not to his.*

What his Lordſhip here ſays will deſerve to be conſidered. A compariſon is inſinuated between our diſcovery of infinite power and wiſdom from the *phyſical* works of God; and our diſcovery of infinite goodneſs and juſtice from his *moral* works; in which, the advantage is given to the former. Now, in order to come to a juſt deciſion in this point (omitting at preſent the notice of his general Sophiſm which operates in this obſervation, as in the reſt) we muſt diſtinguiſh between the *means of acquiring* the knowledge of God's Attributes, and that *knowledge when acquired.*

As to the firſt, (the *means of acquiring*,) there ſeems to be ſome advantage on the ſide of God's PHYSICAL works. For, as his Lordſhip rightly obſerves, *where we cannot diſcern wiſdom and power in the phyſical works it is due to our imperfection, not to his: for as men advance in the knowledge of nature we ſee more and more of wiſdom and power.* And he inſinuates, we cannot ſay the ſame concerning the difficulties in the *moral* ſyſtem. It is true, we cannot. But then

let me tell him, neither can we ſay the contrary. The reaſon is, The phyſical ſyſtem lies open to our enquiries; and by the right application of our ſenſes to well tried experiments, we are able to make conſiderable advances in the knowledge of Nature. It is not ſo in the *moral* ſyſtem; all we know here are a few general principles concerning its Conſtitution; and further than this, human wit or induſtry is unable to penetrate. Theſe general principles are, indeed, amply ſufficient to deduce and eſtabliſh the *moral attributes* from the *moral ſyſtem*; but not ſufficient to remove all difficulties that ariſe from what we ſee of the actual adminiſtration of that Syſtem. So that, tho' *we* cannot ſay, that *as we advance in the knowledge* of the moral ſyſtem *we ſee more and more of goodneſs and juſtneſs*; So neither can *his Lordſhip* ſay (tho' his words ſeem to inſinuate he could) that as we advance, we ſee *leſs and leſs*. Whereas the truth is, beyond thoſe general principles, we cannot advance at all.

But then, as to the ſecond part in the diſtinction, (the *knowledge of the attributes, when acquired.*) I hold the advantage, and a great one it is, lies altogether on the ſide of the MORAL. And thus I argue: Tho' the idea of God's *natural* attributes be as clear in the abſtract, as that of his *moral*, yet the idea of his moral attributes is, in the concrete, more adequate than that of his natural. The reaſon ſeems convincing. The moral relation in which we ſtand to God, as free agents, is juſt the ſame whether man exiſts alone, or whether he be but a link in the chain of innumerable orders of intelligences ſurrounding the whole Creation. Hence we muſt needs have a full knowledge of our duty to him, and of his diſpoſition towards us: on which knowledge is founded the exactneſs of our conceptions of his moral attributes, his *juſtice* and *goodneſs*. But the natural relation in which we, or any of God's creatures,

tures, ſtand towards him, as material Beings, is not the ſame when conſidered ſimply, as when conſidered to be a portion of a dependent and connected Whole. Becauſe whenever ſuch a Whole exiſts, the harmony and perfection of it muſt firſt of all be conſulted. This harmony ariſeth from the mutual ſubſerviency and union of its parts. But this ſubſerviency may require a miniſtration of government, with regard to certain portions of Matter thus allied, different from what might have followed had thoſe portions ſtood alone, becauſe that preciſe diſpoſition, which might be fit in one caſe might be unfit in the other. Hence we, who know there is a Whole, of which our material ſyſtem is a Part; and yet are totally ignorant both of it's nature and extent, can have but a very confuſed idea of that phyſical relation in which we ſtand towards God: ſo that our conceptions of his *natural* attributes, his *power* and *wiſdom*, which are founded on that idea, muſt in the concrete be proportionably vague and inadequate.

But it may be aſked, perhaps, Whence ariſes this reciprocal advantage which the *moral* and the *natural* attributes have over one another, in the *means of acquiring* the knowledge of the *Attributes*, and the preciſion of *that knowledge when acquired?* I will tell the Reader in two words. Of *our own phyſical* ſyſtem, we know many particulars, (that is, we diſcover much of the *means*, but nothing of the *end*) and of the *univerſal* phyſical ſyſtem we are entirely ignorant. On the other hand, we know but few particulars of *our own moral* ſyſtem, (that is, we diſcover only the *end*, and not the *means*) and of the *univerſal* moral ſyſtem we underſtand the general principles.

His Lordſhip proceeds. *This now* [the knowledge of God's *natural* attributes] *is real knowledge; or there is no ſuch thing as knowledge. We acquire it immediately in the objects themſelves,* IN GOD, *and in nature the work of God.*

What

What his Lordſhip means by, *in God*, in diſtinction from the *work of God*, I confeſs I do not underſtand: Perhaps it may be intended to inſinuate, in honour of the *natural attributes*, that they may be even proved *a priori*; for this is not the firſt time by many, when, after having heartily abuſed a thing or perſon, he has been reduced to ſupport himſelf on the authority, or the reaſoning they afford him. Or perhaps, it was only uſed to round the period, and ſet off his eloquence. However, I agree with him, that this is *real knowledge*. And ſo too, I think, is the knowledge of the *moral* attributes, ſo gained. Why truly, ſays his Lordſhip, *I do allow juſt ſo much goodneſs and juſtice in God as we ſee in that* CONSTITUTION, *which annexes happineſs to virtue and miſery to vice. But this*, ſays he, *I think, had better be called* WISDOM. I think ſo too; if by *ſo much*, he means no more than what concerns God's *natural government*: and that he means no more is plain from his making the *natural* conſequence of vice and virtue the only ſanction of the moral Law. But I will venture to go further, and ſay, that, from what we ſee in this *Conſtitution*, we may collect PERFECT GOODNESS AND JUSTICE. *Matter* and man's *Free-will* diſturb the Syſtem: But if the *Conſtitution* be the effect of God's *Will*, as his Lordſhip holds it is; and the mark of his *Wiſdom*, as all mankind hold with him; Does not that *Wiſdom* require that his *Will* ſhould not be defeated? Would it not be defeated, if the diſorders occaſioned by the perverſity of his Creatures were not remedied and ſet right? And is not A REMEDY the cleareſt mark of *perfect goodneſs* and *juſtice?*

Take it in another light. Free-will croſſes that *Conſtitution*, which God, by eſtabliſhing, ſhews he intended ſhould take place. This *preſent* diſturbance could not have been prevented, becauſe, according to my Lord and his ill uſed Poet, it was neceſſary

to

to the ſchemes of divine wiſdom, that there ſhould be ſuch a creature as MAN:

"For in the ſcale of reaſoning life, 'tis plain
"There muſt be, ſomewhere, ſuch a rank as
"man."

The conſequence is, that the diſorder will be *hereafter* rectified.

Had Man indeed been made *unneceſſarily*; and had this Man broke in upon God's general Syſtem, his Lordſhip might have had ſome pretence to ſay, as he does, that GOD MEANT THE SYSTEM SHOULD NOT BE FURTHER PURSUED; that is, that the ſcheme which annexes happineſs to virtue, and miſery to vice, ſhould remain in it's preſent condition of an incomplete Diſpenſation, to all eternity. But ſince Man is acknowledged to be a *neceſſary* part of a general Syſtem, complete in all it's members, it is nonſenſe to talk of *God's not meaning the particular Syſtem ſhould be further purſued*, when that *further purſuit* is only to bring it to it's natural period; ſhort of which, it would remain unfiniſhed, nay, unformed.

He goes on. *We know what* WISDOM *and* POWER *are. We know both intuitively, and by the help of our ſenſes, that ſuch as we conceive them to be, ſuch they appear in the* WORK; *and therefore we know demonſtratively that ſuch they are in the* WORKER.

And do we not know what GOODNESS and JUSTICE are? And by the very ſame means? Do we not *intuitively*, and by the *help of our ſenſes know*, that ſuch as we conceive them to be, ſuch they appear in the WORK, namely, in that *conſtitution of things*, which, his Lordſhip tells us, annexes happineſs to virtue, and miſery to vice? And may we not *demonſtratively* collect from thence that ſuch they are in the WORKER? ſince this *Conſtitution*, his Lordſhip tells us again, is the effect of God's WILL. On his own principles, therefore, applied to his own ſtate of the reaſoning a poſteriori, it appears, that God

" the benefits of ſociety, and, from th
" lars, frame the general notions of
" *juſtice.* He might go a ſtep further
" this is *human* goodneſs and *human* juſ
" we can comprehend, ſuch as we can e
" ſuch as the ſupreme mind has made
" duty and intereſt to exerciſe, by the co
" the human ſyſtem, and by the rela
" ariſe in it: from all which our notic
" *neſs* and *juſtice* reſult, and are compou

We know then, according to our mocl
ras, what *goodneſs* and *juſtice* are, as certai
Wiſdom and *Power* are: Since this qu
Attributes are all known by the ſame me
no other: *we know both intuitively and b*
our ſenſes, that ſuch as we conceive them
they appear in the work. For he bids
eyes inward; then *ſurvey mankind*; and
ſerve how *reaſon*, from the *conſtitution of*
ture, confirms our *intuitive* knowledge
which we gain by the *help of our ſenſes.*—
does all this ſignify, if *Anaxagoras* or hi
be in an humour of concluding againſt

thoſe notions which God, by his *moral Conſtitution*, has put into our hands; and by the declaration of his WILL has taught us to *apply?* Yes, he bids us conclude, that we are *unable to frame any adequate notion of divine* GOODNESS *and* JUSTICE, and yet, on the force of the very ſame reaſoning, to conclude as ſteadily, that we are *able to frame an adequate notion of divine* WISDOM *and* POWER.——This old *Philoſopher*, I ſuppoſe, was not brought in to be laughed at, like his drunken Church-HELOTES [P]; yet, he plays the fool to admiration.—*We* DO KNOW, ſays Anaxagoras, *what* Goodneſs *and* Juſtice *are: we know both intuitively, and by the help of our ſenſes, that ſuch as we conceive them to be, ſuch they appear in the* WORK; *and* THEREFORE *we* DO NOT KNOW *that ſuch they are in the* WORKER.

Might I be permitted to addreſs myſelf to this Renegado Sophiſt, I would ſay,—Your brethren, the antient Philoſophers, reaſoned *a poſteriori* in this manner, "Can you think there is *wiſdom* and *power* in you, and none in your Maker?"—By no means. They reaſoned well.—Let me aſk you then, is there *goodneſs* and *juſtice* in you, and none in your Maker?" His anſwer, I ſuppoſe, would be the ſame. But, prompted by his Lordſhip, into whoſe ſervice he is now entered, he adds, That, from *human goodneſs* and *juſtice* we cannot come to the NATURE of the *divine*. What ſhould hinder us, I pray you? Is it not from our *intuitive conception* of our own *wiſdom* and *power* that we gain an adequate idea of God's? Are *wiſdom* and *power* MORE PERFECT, as they are found in man, than *goodneſs* and *juſtice?* If therefore the IMPERFECTION of theſe attributes in Man hinder

[P] —"far be it from me to wiſh (ſays his Lordſhip) that the "race of Metaphyſicians and Caſuiſts ſhould increaſe.—But ſince "there will be ſuch men, it is very reaſonable to wiſh that they "may ſerve to the ſame good purpoſe that the Helotes, the drunken "ſlaves, did at Sparta, &c. *V.* 5. *p.* 446.

our acquiring an adequate idea of thoſe in God, we can have no adequate idea of his *wiſdom* and *power*: if the IMPERFECTION does not hinder, then we may have an adequate idea of his *goodneſs* and *juſtice*.

But, the inference to God's *power* and *wiſdom*, his Lordſhip ſays, is ſupported by what men ſee of the effects of them, in his Works; the order and harmony of the *phyſical* Syſtem. Do we not ſee likewiſe the effects of God's *goodneſs* and *juſtice*, in the order and harmony of the *moral*, in the happineſs that naturally attends virtue and the miſery conſequent on vice? And is not the *moral* Syſtem as much *God's Work*, as the *phyſical*?

Thus, we ſee, that by the very reaſoning, his Lordſhip EMPLOYS to prove the *natural* attributes, and by the very method he PRESCRIBES to us for proving the *moral* attributes, we have demonſtrated the *moral* with a preciſion and a certainty, at leaſt equal to the *natural*. His Lordſhip ſeems to have been aware of the event; and therefore when he had ſet us at defiance, he tried to put the change upon us, under pretence of reminding us, that the *moral attributes* ſhould be examined by, or *applied to*, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE WORLD AND THE STATE OF MANKIND IN IT [9]. I had full as much reaſon to be aware of his Lordſhip. And therefore, in ſtating the queſtion, at my entrance on the ſubject, I obviated this miſerable Sophiſm. I call it by no better name, becauſe it is not *the conſtitution of the world or the ſtate of mankind in it*, but the CONSTITUTION OF THE MORAL SYSTEM, or the nature of Virtue and Vice as they naturally operate to produce happineſs and miſery, by which God's *moral attributes* are to be tried and aſcertained. But this, which, by a ſteady light, gives us an uniform view, he would have us turn from; to contemplate that obſcure, diſturbed, and ſhifting Scene, the actual

[9] Vol. v. p. 331.

ſtate

ſtate of vice and virtue, of miſery and happineſs, amongſt men. That is, he would have us conclude concerning God's nature, not from his VOLUNTARY CONSTITUTION of things, but from the BREACHES in that Conſtitution made by the abuſe of man's free-will: which yet, (when he is arguing *for an equal providence*) he again and again confeſſes ought not to be charged upon God; and declaims violently againſt the folly of thoſe who impute the effects of that abuſe to him. Tho' here, (in his various attempts to blot out *the idea of God's moral attributes*) he be full of the diſorders of the moral Syſtem, conſidered as part of God's deſign.

But ſince I have mentioned his arguments for an *equal providence*, I ſhould be unjuſt to my argument, if I concealed from the Reader, another of his contradictions.—He had Man's *future State* as well as *God's moral attributes* to throw out of the religious World; or, to ſpeak more properly, he had RELIGION to overturn, by taking away its very ESSENCE: and as the *irregularities* in the preſent adminiſtration of God's moral Providence ſtood in the way of his firſt attempt; and the *conſiſtency* of the *moral Syſtem itſelf* in the way of the other; when he argues againſt a FUTURE STATE, You would think there were no *irregularities*; and when he argues againſt the MORAL ATTRIBUTES, You would think there was no *conſiſtency*.

We now come to his Lordſhip's particular objections againſt the *moral attributes*. One of them is that they are BOUNDED.

"They [the Divines] go further. As God is "perfect, and man very imperfect, they talk of his "*infinite goodneſs* and *juſtice*, as of his infinite wiſ-"dom and power; tho' the latter may preſerve their "nature without any conceivable bounds, and the "former muſt ceaſe to be what they are, unleſs we "conceive them BOUNDED. Their nature implies "neceſ-

" neceſſarily a limitation in the exerciſe of them. " Thus then the *moral attributes*, according to this " Theology, requires infinitely more of God to " man than men are able, or would be obliged if " they were able, to exerciſe to one another: greater " profuſion in beſtowing benefits and rewards, greater " rigour in puniſhing offences [1]."

You have here his Lordſhip's own words; and nothing leſs could induce any one to think ſo diſadvantageouſly of this Philoſopher of the firſt head, as they neceſſarily imply. Let us conſider the *premiſſa* and examine the *inferences* both *implied* and *expreſſed*.

He ſays, 1. That the *moral attributes are bounded*; 2. That the *natural are not bounded*. Let us ſee to what the firſt propoſition amounts; and how much truth there is in the ſecond.

1. The *moral attributes* are conſidered by us as relative to *intelligent* creatures: The *natural* are not ſo conſidered. Thus, the goodneſs and juſtice when relative to man, are greatly *bounded*; a certain low degree of reward ſuffices for his *good*; a certain low degree of puniſhment for his *evil* actions. Let God's goodneſs and juſtice reſpect a higher rank of intelligent Beings, and they will be then *leſs bounded*; for greater rewards and puniſhments will be required: and ſo on, to the higheſt rank of intelligent creatures. Yet as the higheſt is at infinite diſtance from the Creator, the exerciſe of the moral attributes, as they bear relation to his intelligent creatures, muſt be ſtill *bounded*.

2. His ſecond propoſition is, that *the natural attributes are not bounded*. It is true, theſe cannot be conſidered as relative to God's *intelligent* creatures; yet ſince, in their exerciſe, they muſt be conſidered as relative to his Creation at large; and ſince Cre-

[1] Vol. v. p. 528.

ation,

ation, however immenſe, is not infinite, the natural attributes ſo conſidered are not infinite: but if not infinite, they are *bounded*. There is no difference therefore, in *the exerciſe* of God's attributes, between the *moral* and the *natural*, ſave only in the degree.

But if we conſider God's *moral* and *natural* attributes more abſtractedly, not as they are *in the exerciſe*, and relative to intelligent Beings, and to actual Creation, but as they are in his nature, then they are both *unbounded*. Thus we ſee his Lordſhip's notable diſtinction is both imaginary and uſeleſs.

However, let us give him all he aſks; and then ſee what he will be able to *infer* from it.

1. His firſt *inference* ſeems to be this: "As the moral attributes are bounded, and not infinite like the natural, our idea of them muſt be *obſcure* and *inadequate*." What! becauſe they are better adapted to human contemplation? as things *bounded* certainly are better adapted than things *infinite*. Our idea of ſuch of God's attributes as bear relation to a Being, whoſe nature and properties we know, namely MAN, muſt needs be more adequate and better defined than the idea of ſuch attributes as bear relation to Beings, whoſe nature and properties we know not, namely the groſs of thoſe which make up the UNIVERSE.

2. His other *inference*, is expreſſed in theſe words: *Thus then the moral attributes, according to this Theology, requires infinitely more of God to man than men are able, or would be obliged if they were able, to exerciſe to one another.* To ſay, the moral attributes, according to Chriſtian Theology, or, as he is pleaſed to call it, *artificial Theology*, requires INFINITELY *more*, is an extravagant hyperbole. To ſay, it *requires more*, is true. And for this plain reaſon: the relation between Creator and Creature is much more intimate than that, between Fellow-creatures; therefore the divine *goodneſs* is more abundant: The relation between Lord and Servant is more appropriate than

that between Fellow ſervants; therefore the divine *juſtice* is more ſevere. And had it not been deemed too preſuming to refer his Lordſhip to Scripture for inſtruction (eſpecially in a matter where the abuſe of Scripture was chiefly intended) I might there have pointed to a *Parable* which would have ſet him right: and has always kept *artificial Theology*, whatever he might think, from going wrong. But *infinite*, when applied to the *exerciſe* of a moral attribute in reference to Man, is his Lordſhip's nonſenſe, with due reverence be it ſpoken, not the *nonſenſe of artificial Divines*. They were not ignorant, that the rule, *infirmiorem vel deteriorem partem ſequitur conſequentia*, held as well in *Morals* as in *Logic*. Tho' God be infinite, man is finite; and therefore, with reſpect to man, the exertion of a *moral* attribute is finite, not infinite. His Lordſhip himſelf ſaw ſomething of this, as appears by his own words. *The nature of the moral attributes implies neceſſarily a limitation in the uſe of them.* And why would he ſuppoſe, Divines could not ſee as far into this matter as himſelf?

But if there be an error in *artificial Theology* he is as ſure, at one time or other, to eſpouſe it; as he is ready at all times to calumniate the Divine who holds it. Men, in their ill adviſed zeal to defend the Scripture doctrine of the Son's Divinity, were not always ſufficiently careful in ſelecting their arguments. Amongſt ſuch as had perhaps been better let alone, they employed this; That as man's offence was againſt an infinite Being, it required an infinite ſatisfaction; which none but ſuch a Being could give. Now his Lordſhip, we ſee, eſpouſes this very principle to diſcredit God's moral attributes, and the *artificial Theology* of Jeſus Chriſt; which ſpeaks, indeed, of *infinite* rewards; but not as matter of *due*, but of *grace*.

As the being *bound* is one of his Lordſhip's objections againſt the moral attributes, ſo the being merely HUMAN, is another.

"After

"After Dr. CLARKE (ſays he) has repeated over "and over, that all the *moral attributes* are the ſame "in God as in our ideas; and that he, who denies "them to be ſo, may as well deny the divine *phyſical* "*attributes*, the Doctor inſiſts only on two of the "former, on thoſe of *juſtice* and *goodneſs*. He was "much in the right to contract the generality of his "aſſertion. The abſurdity of aſcribing TEMPE-"RANCE, for inſtance, or FORTITUDE, to God, "would have been too groſs, and too viſible even to "eyes that prejudice had blinded the moſt. But "that, of aſcribing *juſtice* and *goodneſs* to him, ac-"cording to our notions of them, might be better "covered, and was enough for his purpoſe, tho' "NOT LESS REALLY ABSURD[s]."

Which ſhall we moſt admire: His *Knowledge* or his *Ingenuity?* Or ſhall we follow the advice of his own Motto[t], and *Wonder at nothing?*

When men contemplate what they call, moral virtue, or the attributes of Humanity, they divide them into two claſſes, perfectly diſtinct from one another. In the firſt are comprized thoſe which belong to man under the idea of a free intelligent Being, ſuch as *goodneſs* and *juſtice:* in the ſecond, thoſe which belong to him under the idea of a creature of his own frail ſpecies, ſuch as *temperance* and *fortitude*. The firſt belong to all free intelligent Beings; the latter, only to ſuch a Being as man: *Thoſe* ariſe out of the nature of free intelligence, and ſo are common to all: *Theſe*, from the imperfections of a very inferior creature, and ſo are peculiar to Humanity; for we eaſily conceive a higher Order of free created Intelligencies, in which the moral virtues of the ſecond claſs have no place. They are ſuperior to the impreſſions of fear, and ſo have no room to exert *fortitude:* They are removed from the temptation of exceſs, and ſo have no need to exerciſe *temperance*.

[s] Vol. v. p. 311. [t] *Nil admirari.*

Now when CLARKE, after other Divines, had ſaid that *the moral attributes are the ſame in God as in our ideas*, What Attributes could they poſſibly mean but thoſe of the *firſt claſs*; thoſe which belong to Beings under the idea of free Intelligences? STUPID as his Lordſhip is pleaſed to make Divines, they could never *blunder* at ſuch a rate as to conceive, that thoſe virtues or *moral attributes*, which proceed from the *imperfection* of the Creature, might belong in any manner to the Creator, whom they ſuppoſed to be *all perfect*. They held, with his Lordſhip, and they will hold without him, that the great God is *infinitely* wiſe and powerful. Were they then in any danger to give him *temperance*, which implied his being obnoxious to *folly*; or *fortitude*, which argued *impuiſance?* Infinite wiſdom, therefore, and infinite power, exclude from God the very ideas of *temperance* and *fortitude*. But do infinite wiſdom and infinite power exclude from God the ideas of *goodneſs* and *juſtice?* On the contrary, his Lordſhip, as we ſhall ſee preſently, is reduced to the poor ſhift of owning *goodneſs* and *juſtice* to be contained in infinite *wiſdom* and *power*; after he had ſaid, as here he does, *That the aſcribing goodneſs and juſtice to God is* NO LESS REALLY ABSURD *than the aſcribing temperance and fortitude to him.*

—But CLARKE *contracted the generality of the aſſertion to ſerve a purpoſe.* I think he did: and for one of the beſt *purpoſes* in the world, that of COMMON SENSE. Had his Lordſhip been pleaſed to *contract* himſelf on the ſame principle, he might have paſſed, perhaps, for a greater Philoſopher; tho' he had certainly been a leſs Writer.

But then, if you aſk, *What purpoſe* his Lordſhip had *to ſerve*, when he uſed the equivocal word ALL, (which may ſignify either *all* of one kind, or *all* of every kind) where he obſerves, Clarke holds, *that* ALL *the moral attributes are the ſame in God*, &c? I anſwer, it was to give himſelf the poor pretence to

ſay,

ſay, that Clarke afterwards *contracted his generality*, or, in other words, that he contradicted himſelf.

A third objection againſt the *moral attributes* is, "That PASSIONS and AFFECTIONS mix with our goodneſs and juſtice; which therefore cannot be ſuppoſed to be *the ſame in kind* with God's; tho' our wiſdom and power, with which no paſſions or affections mix, muſt be the *ſame in kind* with his."

Were paſſion and affection *inſeparable* from human goodneſs and juſtice, the objection might ſeem to have ſome force; indeed, not much even then. But how miſerable muſt the objection appear to thoſe who ſee, as all men may, that they are *ſeparable?* Separable, I mean, in practice as well as ſpeculation: (Of which we have at preſent * one great Example at leaſt, in a high Tribunal where they ſhine the moſt.) So that the true idea even of human goodneſs and juſtice excludes all paſſion and affection. What hinders then our riſing, from that idea, to Divine goodneſs and juſtice, any more than our riſing, from the idea of human wiſdom and power, to the Divine wiſdom and power; and from perceiving, that as well the *moral*, as the *natural* attributes, are the ſame in kind, both in God and man?

But, this is not all that may be fairly ſaid in favour of our adequate idea of God's *moral attributes*, when compared with the *natural*. For tho' PASSION mixes not with the human attributes of wiſdom and power, yet ſomething elſe does, much more difficult to be ſeparated than *paſſion*, from the human attributes of goodneſs and juſtice, I mean the INSTRUMENTALITY OF MATTER. We can conceive nothing of *human power* without the uſe of ſuch an inſtrument: yet this, by his Lordſhip's own confeſſion, does not hinder us from riſing from the idea of our own wiſdom and power, to the wiſdom and power of God; nor from ſeeing that they are the ſame *in kind*.

* 1765.

Why then ſhould the other foreign combination hinder us from ſeeing that goodneſs and juſtice are the ſame *in kind?*

Still, further. The MANNER *of knowing* in God, on which depends his natural attribute of WISDOM, is confeſſedly different from what it is in man; and, at the ſame time, is a thing of which we have no conception: yet this, according to his Lordſhip's account, does not hinder our attaining to an adequate idea of *divine wiſdom*, tho' it riſes only from what we ſee of the *human*.

How happens it then, that, in both theſe caſes, notwithſtanding the foreign mixture of the *inſtrumentality of matter*, and the *manner of knowing*, we attain an adequate idea of God's wiſdom and power? His Lordſhip will tell you, it is by ſeparating what is foreign, from what is native to the ideas of wiſdom and power. And ſhall not I have as much credit with my Reader, when I tell him, we acquire an adequate idea of God's goodneſs and juſtice, by ſeparating from the idea of human goodneſs and juſtice the foreign mixture of *paſſion* and *affection?*

But his Lordſhip has a greater quarrel than all this, with the MORAL ATTRIBUTES. They give riſe to embarraſſed queſtions, diſhonourable to God, and miſchievous to Religion.

" As they [the Divines] modeled God's govern-
" ment on a human plan, ſo they conceived his per-
" fections, *moral* as well as phyſical, by human ideas.
" —Thus God was ſaid to be the FIRST GOOD: but
" then the general notion or abſtract idea of this
" *good* was not only taken from human goodneſs,
" but was conſidered too with little or no other rela-
" tion than to man—A queſtion aroſe therefore
" on theſe hypotheſes, *How could evil come into a ſyſ-*
" *tem of which God was the author?*—this queſtion
" made a further hypotheſis neceſſary; another firſt
" God, another coeternal and coequal principle was
intro-

"introduced to ſolve it; *a firſt cauſe of all evil*, as "the other was *of all good*[u]."

The falſe repreſentation of this fact I reſerve for another occaſion: the falſe inference from it is what I now propoſe to conſider.

His Lordſhip ſuppoſes, that the notion of God's *moral attributes* gave birth to an inſoluble queſtion concerning *the origin of evil*; and that this occaſioned the invention of the miſchievous hypotheſis of the *two Principles*. Who would have ſuſpected all this evil to ariſe from the FIRST GOOD! Yet ſo it was: And therefore the notion of ſuch a GOOD muſt be *falſe*; or at leaſt, very *hurtful*.

I. As to the firſt, if his Lordſhip's inference be right, it will unſettle all uſeful knowledge; becauſe there is no great principle, either in *phyſics*, or in *natural Theology*, but which, if we be not on our guard, and wiſe enough to ſtop at the extent of our ideas, will lead us into inextricable difficulties: As one might inſtance in a point that ariſes out of both the ſciences, phyſics and morals together—*The agreement between free-will and preſcience*. This is a well-known caſe: And as his Lordſhip pretends to untie this knot, which hath ſo long kept the learned world intangled, let us examine his great talents on what is worthy of them. "Our ideas (ſays he) of divine "intelligence and wiſdom may be neither *fantaſtical* "nor *falſe*, and yet God's MANNER of knowing "may be ſo different from ours, that fore-knowledge, "as we call it *improperly in him*, may be conſiſtent "with the contingency of events; altho' that which "we call *properly* fore-knowledge *in ourſelves*, be not "ſo[w]."

I have two or three remarks to make on theſe words.

1. Our ideas of God's moral attributes, his *goodneſs* and *juſtice*, he makes *fantaſtical* and *falſe*, on account of difficulties ariſing from them: yet God's

[u] Vol. iv. p. 88. [w] Vol. v. p. 525.

natural attributes, his *intelligence* and *wiſdom*, *may*, he ſays, *be neither fantaſtical nor falſe*, tho' a difficulty as great ariſes from them; namely, the apparent diſcordancy between free-will and preſcience.

2. My ſecond remark is, that his ſolution is more *fantaſtic* and *falſe* than the wildeſt chimera of School-metaphyſics. The difficulty in reconciling God's preſcience to man's free-will does not ariſe from our ignorance in God's MANNER OF KNOWING, but from God's ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE.

3. My third remark is, that his Lordſhip, who is here ſo penetrating, that he can eaſily reconcile *preſcience* and *free-will*, is yet, in another place, ſo cloudy, that he cannot ſee how an "*equal providence* and *free agency* may ſtand together [x]."

4. My laſt remark is (and it riſes out of the foregoing) that where Religion is not concerned, his Lordſhip ſees no difficulty in any part of the ſyſtem of Creation: But as ſoon as ever Religion appears, then difficulties ſtart up by dozens. Of this, take an inſtance from, as it will lead us back to, the caſe in hand. Our ideas of God's *moral attributes*, he ſays, muſt needs be falſe, becauſe the conceiving of them by human goodneſs and juſtice raiſes up the queſtion of the *origin of evil*, conſidered *morally*. Well. And does not the conceiving of God's *phyſical attributes*, by human wiſdom and power, lead to the queſtion of the *origin of evil*, conſidered *naturally?* Yet our ideas of the phyſical attributes are neither *falſe nor fantaſtical*. But to this, his Lordſhip replies, Evil, conſidered *naturally*, is not real, but apparent only. Why ſo? Becauſe it contributes to the greater good of the whole. May not the ſame thing be ſaid of Evil, conſidered *morally?* Nay, hath it not been actually ſaid, and proved too, on the ſame prin-

[x] See my obſervations on this propoſed difficulty at the end of the 4th vol. of the *Divine Legation*.

ciples?

ciples? It follows then, that they are either both *real*, or both *fantaſtic*.

In a word, the truth is no more than this, Preſumptuous man knows not where to ſtop: he would penetrate even to the Arcana of the Godhead;

"For Fools ruſh in, where Angels fear to tread."

And this impious humour it was which gave birth to the abſurd hypotheſis of TWO PRINCIPLES. But is the folly to be charged upon our idea of the *moral attributes?* Ridiculous! We ſee it's *cauſe* is in vanity and ſelf-conceit: paſſions that operate alike on all Syſtems; and find materials to gratify their extravagance, equally in the *phyſical* as in the *moral* attributes of the Deity.

II. As to his Lordſhip's ſecond inference, that *this* idea is at leaſt productive of much *miſchief*, and therefore it would be better to have none at all; Let me obſerve, that the idea of God's very exiſtence is productive of much miſchief, even all the miſchiefs of Superſtition. Is it therefore better to be without a God? Who beſides his Lordſhip would ſay ſo[y]? Why then ſhould we think it better to be without the idea of the *moral attributes*, even tho' the evils it produced were *neceſſary?* But that is not the caſe. They are *caſual* only: the iſſue of pride and preſumption; which the idea of the *moral attributes* does not at all influence.

III. HOWEVER, theſe, if not hurtful, are USELESS; and this is his next cavil. "Infinite *wiſ-*"*dom* and *power* (ſays his Lordſhip) have made "things as they are: how *goodneſs* and *juſtice* re-"quired they ſhould be made is neither *coram ju-*"*dice*, nor to any rational purpoſe to enquire[z]." To inquire how the *univerſe of things ſhould be made*,

[y] He indeed ſays, *he had rather be an Atheiſt than acknowledge the Chriſtian Theology*, and we may believe him. See vol. iv. p. 34.

[z] Vol. v. p. 363.

which

which refers to God's *power* and *wiſdom*, ſerves indeed to *no reaſonable purpoſe*. But to inquire concerning our own ſtate and condition in this Univerſe, which refers to God's *goodneſs* and *juſtice*, is either, *coram judice*, or we were ſent into the world to no purpoſe. His Lordſhip's ſophiſtry ſeems to confound two things that plain ſenſe hath always diſtinguiſhed; viz. *our own buſineſs from other men's*. When the King holds a Seſſion of juſtice, 'tis not for every Particular to inquire into all his meaſures: But every Particular who is ſummoned to attend the Court, is much concerned to know how he himſelf ſhall be dealt with. His Lordſhip, indeed, is ready to ſay, We are not *ſummoned*; that is, we are not *accountable creatures*. But this is begging the queſtion.

Again, to *inquire*, much more to preſcribe, *how things ſhould be made*, in any particular Syſtem, has all the folly, preſumption, and impiety, which his Lordſhip charges upon it: Becauſe the Parts having a relation to the Whole, an all-wiſe Architect makes them in conformity to that Whole, of which, we know nothing; and therefore our only concluſion ſhould be, that the Part we do know, is conſtituted for the beſt. But it is another thing to ſay (which is all that Divines have ſaid, how differently ſoever his Lordſhip is pleaſed to repreſent the matter) that God will act equitably with his rational Creation, by diſtributing good and evil to them according to their deſerts; becauſe this does not depend upon any Whole, of which we know nothing, but on his attributes of goodneſs and juſtice, of which, we know enough to determine with certainty concerning his final dealing with every rank of free and reaſonable Beings. In this caſe to paſs our judgment is ſo far from folly or impiety, that not to do it would be ſtupidity or hypocriſy. To call this proceeding, as his Lordſhip does, the patching or botching up one Syſtem with another, is a groſs miſrepreſentation.

At

AT LENGTH, he ends juſt where he ſet out, That we have NO IDEAS of the moral attributes at all. "Upon the whole matter (ſays he) we may conclude "ſafely from error, and in direct oppoſition to "CLARKE, that *goodneſs and juſtice in God cannot be* "*conceived, without manifeſt preſumption and impiety,* "*to be the ſame as in the ideas we frame of theſe per-* "*fections when we conſider them in men, or when we* "*reaſon about them abſtractedly in themſelves*; but "that in the ſupreme Governor of the World they "are ſomething TRANSCENDENT, and of which we "cannot make any true judgment, nor argue with "any certainty about them [a]." It was for jargon like this that a famous Schoolman got the name of the TRANSCENDENT DOCTOR. Yet he aſſures us that he is juſtified by the authority of St. PAUL and Dr. BARROW. *Theſe two great Divines* (ſays he) *are on my ſide* [b]. Two noble Supporters, (it muſt be confeſſed) to his Lordſhip's Atchievement! One thing I have obſerved, which may be worth reflecting on—A ſtrange propenſity in FREE-THINKERS to miſtake their enemies for their friends; and as ſtrange a propenſity in the CLERGY to miſtake their friends for their enemies. This different turn is odd enough; and, at firſt view, ſeems a little myſterious; when, perhaps, there may be no more in it than this,—Free-thinkers have invented the trick, to amuſe the Clergy, in order to raiſe their ſuſpicions, and excite their jealouſy againſt their beſt Friends: And, unhappily, the Clergy have, now and then, fallen into the ſnare.

But, after all, who would expect that *the leather-dreſſing Pontiff* [c] of all men ſhould have been thought worthy to ſupport the *firſt Philoſophy!* What has St.

[a] Vol. v. p. 359. [b] Vol. v. p. 362.

[c] This is the title with which he dignifies SAINT PAUL, in his iv. vol. p. 423. What Pity was it, his Lordſhip did not know that *Theodoret* had called him a downright COBLER.

PAUL

PAUL done at laſt to deſerve this honour? Why, in anſwer to the objections againſt God's diſpenſations in the religious World, the Apoſtle refers us, "for "intire ſatisfaction, to the incomprehenſible wiſdom "of God, who frequently in the courſe of his pro- "vidence ordereth things in methods tranſcending "our abilities to diſcover or to trace[d]." This ſolution, which is here extolled for its great *modeſty*, is referred to, in another place, for it's greater IMPUDENCE[e].

But St. PAUL ſays, *we muſt have recourſe to the incomprehenſible wiſdom of God.* In good time. But how does this prove that, in Paul's opinion, we have no adequate idea of the *moral attributes?* Unleſs the *quality* of an Agent, and his *action*, be one and the ſame thing.

Dr. BARROW, I preſume, will ſtand his Lordſhip in no better ſtead than St. Paul. "As the dealings "of every wiſe man (ſays the Doctor) are ſometimes "founded upon maxims, and admit juſtifications "not obvious or penetrable by vulgar conceit, ſo "may God act according to rules of wiſdom and "juſtice, which it may be quite impoſſible by our "faculties to apprehend, or with our means to de- "ſcry. As there are natural modes of Being and "operation, ſo there may be prudential and moral "modes of proceeding, far above our reach, pecu- "liar objects of divine wiſdom not to be underſtood "by any creature, eſpecially by creatures who ſtand "in the loweſt form of intelligence; one remove "from beaſts. In fine, thoſe rules of equity and "experience which we in our tranſactions with one "another do uſe, if they be applied to the dealings "of God will be found very incongruous or defici- "ent, the caſe being vaſtly altered from that infinite "diſtance in nature and ſtate between God and us, "and from the immenſe difference which his rela- "tions towards us have from our relations to one

[d] Vol. v. p. 360. [e] Vol. iii. p. 307.

"another."

"another[f]." What now has all this (which relates only to the *incomprehenſible nature of God's providence)* to do with our *inadequate ideas of his moral attributes?* At leaſt, if his Lordſhip will contend, that the man who thinks God's providence *incomprehenſible*, muſt needs think our ideas of his moral attributes *inadequate*, he muſt go a ſtep further; and confeſs, that Barrow ſuppoſed our ideas of the *natural* attributes to be *inadequate* likewiſe; for he puts both on the ſame footing. *As there are* NATURAL *modes of Being and operation*, (ſays the Doctor) *ſo there may be prudential and* MORAL *modes proceeding far above our reach.* But as this would be going too far; farther than the FIRST PHILOSOPHY will allow of, I ſuppoſe his Lordſhip would be content to give up this quotation from Barrow, as nothing to the purpoſe.

AT LAST, and when you would leaſt expect it, Common-ſenſe and Common-ſentiments return. And God's moral attributes, after much ado, are allowed to be in Nature. "Where Religions (ſays "his Lordſhip) which pretend to be revealed, pre-"vail, a new character of God's *goodneſs* ariſes—an "*artificial goodneſs* which ſtands often in the place of "the NATURAL[g]." And this, after he had ſo often told us, that we have no adequate idea of any goodneſs at all. Well, but as awkwardly as God's *natural goodneſs* comes (and, in every ſenſe) *a poſteriori*, yet it comes, and deſerves to be made welcome. "All the knowledge (ſays he) that God has given "us the means to acquire, and therefore all he de-"ſigned we ſhould have of his phyſical and MORAL "nature and attributes, is derived from *his works*, "and from the TENOUR OF THAT PROVIDENCE by "which he governs them[h]." You will obſerve the words—*the tenour of that Providence*——I have de-

[f] Vol. v. p. 361, 2. [g] Vol. v. p. 431.
[h] Vol. v. p. 523, 4.

tected

tected the ſophiſtry of them before, where I have ſtated the meaning of the terms, *God's works*. I bid you obſerve them now, to judge of the following climax, (if I may ſo call it) of his walk down ſtairs. "The *wiſdom* is not ſo often diſcernible by us [in "God's works] as the power of God, nor the *good-* "*neſs* as the wiſdom[i]." As ſcanty and ſlender as the knowledge is of God's moral attributes, which his Lordſhip here allows us to collect from his works, yet it flatly contradicts what his Syſtem had obliged him over and over to maintain; particularly in the following words——*Of divine goodneſs and divine juſtice* (ſays his Lordſhip in the perſon of Anaxagoras) *I am unable to frame any adequate notions*[k], *from God's works.*

This Mock-conceſſion is again repeated, and as carefully guarded. "By natural Theology (ſays his "Lordſhip) we are taught to acknowledge and adore "the infinite *wiſdom* and *power* of God, which he "has manifeſted to us in ſome degree or other in "every part, even the moſt minute, of his Creation. "*By that too, we are taught to aſcribe* GOODNESS *and* "JUSTICE *to him, wherever he intended we ſhould ſo* "*aſcribe them*, that is, wherever either his works, or "the diſpenſations of his providence do as NECESSA-"RILY communicate theſe notions to our minds, as "thoſe of wiſdom and power are communicated to "us, in the whole extent of both[l]."

What his Lordſhip would have you infer from this is, that we are NO WHERE taught to aſcribe *goodneſs* and *juſtice* to God; ſince the *diſpenſations of his providence* do NO WHERE, in his Lordſhip's opinion, NECESSARILY *communicate theſe notions*. But allow him his premiſes, that neither God's Works nor Diſpenſations do NECESSARILY communicate to us the

[i] Vol. v. p. 335.
[l] Vol. v. p. 527.
[k] Vol. iv. p. 116, 17.

notions of God's goodneſs and juſtice; Would his concluſion follow, that therefore we are no where taught in theſe works and diſpenſations to aſcribe thoſe attributes unto him? Suppoſe theſe works and diſpenſations did only PROBABLY communicate theſe notions to our minds; will not this probability teach us to aſcribe goodneſs and juſtice to him? God hath ſo framed the conſtitution of things, that man, throughout his whole conduct in life, ſhould be neceſſarily induced to form his judgment on appearances and probable arguments. Why then not in this, as well as the reſt? or rather, why not in this, above the reſt? if ſo be God indeed had not (as I have ſhewn he hath) neceſſarily communicated theſe notions.——But ſtill, what is this to our *adequate* idea of the moral attributes, the point in queſtion? God's not *neceſſarily communicating*, affects only the *reality*, not the *preciſion* of the idea. All therefore we learn by the obſervation, which would thus put the change upon us, is, that his Lordſhip has a very ſtrong inclination, that God ſhould have neither *goodneſs* nor *juſtice*; ſo far as they carry with them any DISPOSITION to *reward* or *puniſh*. For as to the Attributes *themſelves*, diveſted of their conſequences; and undiſturbed by our IMPIOUS IMITATION[m], he has little or no quarrel with them. His Lordſhip certainly never intended to *teach* the common Reader more of the ſecrets of his Philoſophy than what NECESSARILY ariſes from his *profeſſions*. But to make God treat Mankind in this manner, to communicate to their minds the appearance of Attributes which he has not, is drawing an image of the Deity from his Lordſhip's own likeneſs; the very fault he ſo much cenſures in Divines. But if it muſt needs be, that God is to be repreſented either after Them,

[m] OUR OBLIGATION TO IMITATE GOD IS A FALSE AND PROFANE DOCTRINE. Vol. v. p. 65.

or

or after his Lordſhip, I ſhould chuſe to have the Clergy's God, tho' made out of no better ſtuff than ARTIFICIAL THEOLOGY, (becauſe this gives him both *goodneſs* and *juſtice)* rather than his Lordſhip's God, which has neither; altho' compoſed of the more refined materials of the FIRST PHILOSOPHY. In the mean time, I will not deny but He may be right in what he ſays, That men conceive of the Deity, *more humano*; and that his Lordſhip's God and the Clergy's God, are equally faithful copies of themſelves.

In a word, if God *teaches*, whether clearly or obſcurely, he certainly intended, we ſhould *learn*. And what we get even by appearances, is real knowledge, upon his Lordſhip's own principles. For if TRUTH be, as he aſſures us it is, of ſo precarious a nature as to take it's Being from our own Syſtem, it muſt be *real* as far as it *appears*. "Our knowledge "(ſays this great Philoſopher) is ſo dependent on "our own ſyſtem, that a great part of it would not "be *knowledge* perhaps, but *error* in any other[n]."

It is thus he involves himſelf in perpetual contradictions: And it will be always thus, when men diſpute (for believe they cannot[o]) againſt common notices, and the moſt obvious truths; ſuch as *liberty of will*; the *certainty of knowledge*; and this, which (I reckon) obtrudes itſelf upon us as forcibly as either, the MORAL ATTRIBUTES OF THE DEITY.

But the game is now on foot, let us follow it cloſe. We have unravelled him through all his windings; and we may ſoon expect to ſee him take ſhelter in the thick cover of God's incomprehenſible Nature; and rather than allow (more than in jeſt)

[n] Vol. iii. p. 356.

[o] Hear what he himſelf ſays of FREE WILL. *The free-will of man no one can deny he has, without* LYING, *or renouncing his intuitive knowledge.* Vol. v. p. 406.

the

the *moral attributes* of the Deity, ready to reſolve all his Attributes, both *natural* and *moral*, into one INDEFINITE PERFECTION.

But ſoft. Not yet. We muſt come to it by degrees and regular advances. Firſt, the *moral attributes* are to be *reſolved* into the *natural*.

——"If they [the *natural* and *moral* attributes] "may be conſidered ſeparately, as we are apt to "conſider them; and if the LATTER and every "thing we aſcribe to theſe, are not to be RESOLVED "*rather into the former*; into his infinite intelligence, "wiſdom, and power [p]."——It is yet, we ſee, but a queſtion; and that only, whether the *moral* attributes are not to be reſolved into the *natural*. In the next paſſage the matter is determined. "I "think (and what he thinks, he holds it but rea-"ſonable we ſhould all think) that the *moral* attri-"butes of the ſupreme Being are *abſorbed in his* "*wiſdom*; that we ſhould conſider them only as dif-"ferent modifications of this *phyſical* attribute [q]."

We are not yet near the top. However, before we go any higher, let us ſet together his INCONSISTENCIES, as they appear in this ſituation. Sometimes *the ideas of divine wiſdom are better determined than thoſe of divine goodneſs* [r]: Sometimes *we have no ideas at all of divine goodneſs* [s]: And ſometimes again, (as in the place before us,) the *divine goodneſs is the ſame as wiſdom*, and therefore, doubtleſs, (notwithſtanding his Lordſhip) the idea of it as well defined. Now, of all theſe aſſertions, to which will he ſtick? To which, do you aſk? To none of them, longer than they will ſtick to him: And ſtraggling, undiſciplined Principles, picked up at adventures, are not apt to ſtick long to any ſide: As ſoon as they begin to incline towards the enemy,

[p] Vol. v. p. 523, 4.
[q] Vol. v. p. 335.
[r] Vol. v. p. 341, 526.
[s] Vol. iv. p. 116, 17.

he has done with them.——Come, if you will needs have it, you ſhall. The ſecret is this. The attributes are mere NAMES; and there is an end of them. All that remains, worth ſpeaking of, is one undefined ETERNAL REASON: and ſo the Farce concludes.

"The moral ATTRIBUTES (ſays he) are *barely* "NAMES that we give to various manifeſtations of "the infinite wiſdom of one *ſimple uncompounded* "*being*[t]."

"Of divine goodneſs and divine juſtice I am un-"able to frame any adequate notions; and inſtead "of conceiving ſuch diſtinct moral attributes in the "ſupreme Being, *we ought, perhaps, to conceive no-*"*thing more than this*, that THERE ARE VARIOUS "APPLICATIONS OF ONE ETERNAL REASON, WHICH "IT BECOMES US LITTLE TO ANALYZE INTO AT-"TRIBUTES[u]."

To this miſerable refuge is his Lordſhip reduced to avoid DIVINE JUSTICE. But why, the Reader will ſay, did he not ſpeak out at firſt, and end his quarrel with the *moral attributes* at once? Your humble ſervant for that. Barefaced NATURALISM has no ſuch charms as may make her received when and wherever ſhe appears. There is need of much preparation, and not a little diſguiſe, before you can get her admitted even to what is called *good company*.——But then, you will ſay, after he had reſolved to ſpeak out, Why did he ſtop again in his career; and, when his premiſſes are general againſt *all* attributes, his concluſion became particular, againſt the *moral* only? Not without reaſon, I aſſure you. He had need of the *natural* attributes, to ſet up againſt the *moral:* and therefore had himſelf *analyzed* this *eternal reaſon* into the ſpecific attributes of *wiſdom* and *power*. But when he ſaw his Adverſaries might, by the ſame way, *analyze* it into *good-*

[t] Vol. v. p. 453.

[u] Vol. iv. p. 117.

neſs and juſtice, he then thought fit to pick a quarrel with his own method: But it was to be done obliquely. And hence ariſes all this embarraſs and tergiverſation. He would willingly, if his Readers would be ſo ſatisfied, analyze the *eternal reaſon* into *wiſdom* and *power:* but there he would ſtop: and leave the other ſide of the *eternal reaſon*, unanalyzed: and if *goodneſs* and *juſtice* ſhould chance to ſtart out, he has a trick to *reſolve* and *abſorb* them into wiſdom and power, as only *different modifications of the phyſical attributes*. But if this ſhould revolt his Readers, and they expect equal meaſure; then, rather than give them back the *goodneſs* and *juſtice* which he has been at all this pains to proſcribe, he will throw *wiſdom* and *power* after them, and *reſolve* all into the ONE ETERNAL REASON.

Baſhful NATURALISM has now thrown aſide her Veil; and is, we ſee, ready to face down and defy her Rival; whom till now ſhe was content to counterfeit. Give me leave, therefore, to repreſs this laſt effort of her inſolence and of his Lordſhip's ſuperior Wiſdom. He now tells us, "that theſe pretended attributes, as they are commonly ſpecified, and diſtinguiſhed into *natural* and *moral*, are a mere human fiction; invented, by aid of analogy from the actions, paſſions, and qualities obſervable in man: and that the ſimple nature of Deity is one uniform perfection; of which, Infinity being the baſe, we can have no diſtinct idea or conception."

To this I reply, that it is indeed true, that theſe ſpecific attributes, from which we deduce all our knowledge of the nature and will of God, are formed on analogy, and bear relation to ourſelves. But then we ſay ſuch attributes are not, on that account, the leſs real or eſſential. The light of the SUN is not in the orb itſelf, what we ſee it in the RAINBOW. There it is one candid, uniform, perfect blaze of glory: here we ſeparate it's Perfection into

the various attributes of red, yellow, blue, purple and what elſe the ſubtle optician ſo nicely diſtinguiſhes. But ſtill the *ſolar* light is not leſs real in the Rainbow, where it's rays become thus untwiſted, and each differing thread diſtinctly ſeen in its effect, than while they remained united and incorporated with one another in the Sun. Juſt ſo it is with the divine Nature: it is one ſimple individual Perfection in the Godhead himſelf: but when refracted and divaricated, in paſſing through the medium of the human mind, it becomes power, juſtice, mercy; which are all ſeparately and ADEQUATELY repreſented to the underſtanding. But that his Lordſhip ſo frequently diſcards his own principles, I ſhould hope he would ſubmit to this illuſtration, ſince he owns *that we ſee the Deity in a reflected, not in a direct light*[w].

It is a true light then and not a falſe: and the knowledge which it conveys is real, not fantaſtic: For mirrors are not wont to reflect the ſpecies of the mind's viſions, but things exterior and ſubſtantial. To turn us, therefore, from God's *attributes*, (tho' the indirect, yet the well-defined, Image of him) becauſe they diſcover ſomething to us we may not like, a HELL and a FUTURE JUDGMENT, to turn us, I ſay, from theſe, to the *undefined eternal reaſon*, is doing like certain French Philoſophers, who, when they quarrelled with Newton's Theory of light and colours, contrived to break the Priſm by which it was demonſtrated.

And now, Reader, let me aſk, Who is there that deſerves the name of MAN, and will not own, that they are the MORAL ATTRIBUTES of the Deity which make him AMIABLE; juſt as the *natural attributes* make him *revered?*—What is his Lordſhip's quarrel with the God of MOSES and PAUL, but that he is made *unamiable*, and repreſented without *goodneſs*

[w] Vol. v. p. 524.

or *juſtice? Their God*, therefore, he expreſly tells us, *ſhall not be his God*[x]. Well then: He has his God to make. And who would not expect to find him, when made by ſuch a Workman, a God of infinite goodneſs and juſtice. No ſuch matter: Theſe qualities come not out of his Lordſhip's hands; ſo, cannot enter into the compoſition of his God: They are *barely* NAMES *that men give to various manifeſtations of the infinite wiſdom of one ſimple uncompounded Being*. The pretended want of them in the God of the Jews afforded his Lordſhip a commodious cavil; for he had RELIGION to remove out of his way: But when he came to erect NATURALISM in it's ſtead, it had been very inconvenient to give them to his own Idol.

Honeſt Plutarch, tho' a Prieſt, was as warm an enemy to PRIEST-CRAFT as his Lordſhip. He derives all the evils of Superſtition from men's not acquiring the idea of a God *infinitely good and juſt*. And propoſes this knowledge as the only cure for Superſtition. This is conſiſtent. But what would the ancient World have thought of their Philoſopher, had his remedy, after hunting for it through a hundred volumes, been a God without any goodneſs and juſtice at all.

NATURE tells us, that the thing moſt deſirable is the knowledge of a God whoſe goodneſs and juſtice gives to every man according to his works. His LORDSHIP tells us, that REASON or NATURAL RELIGION diſcovers to us no ſuch God. Now, if both ſpeak truth, How much are we indebted to REVELATION! Which, when *natural Religion* failed us, brings us to the knowledge of a God infinitely good and juſt; and gives us an adequate idea of thoſe attributes! I ſay no more than his Lordſhip has con-

[x] "Can any man preſume to ſay, that the God of Moſes or the God of Paul is the true God? &c." Vol. v. p. 567.

 feſſed.

feſſed.——*Chriſtianity*, ſays he, DISCOVERS *the love of God to man; his infinite* JUSTICE *and* GOODNESS[y].

Is this a bleſſing to be rejected? His Lordſhip has no room to ſay ſo, ſince the diſcovery is made in that very way, in which, upon his own Principles, it only could be made. He pretends, "We have no other natural way of coming to the knowledge of God but from his *works*. By theſe, *he ſays*, we gain the idea of his *phyſical attributes*; and if there be any thing in his *works* which ſeems to contradict thoſe attributes, 'tis only ſeeming: For as men advance in the knowledge of nature, the difficulties vaniſh. It is not ſo, he ſays, with regard to the *moral attributes*. There are ſo many *phænomena* which contradict theſe, and occaſion difficulties never to be cleared up, that they hinder us from acquiring an *adequate* idea of the *moral attributes*." Now admitting all this to be true, (for generally, his Lordſhip's aſſertions are ſo extravagant, that they will not even admit a ſuppoſition of their truth, though it be only for argument's ſake,) What does it effect but this, the giving *additional credit to Revelation?* The *phyſical difficulties* clear up as we advance in our knowledge of *Nature*, and we advance in proportion to our diligence and application. But the *moral difficulties* never clear up, becauſe they riſe out of the *Whole Syſtem* of God's moral diſpenſation; which is involved in clouds and darkneſs, impenetrable to mortal ſight: and all the force of human wit alone will never be able to draw the veil. The aſſiſtance muſt come from another quarter. It muſt come, if it comes at all, from the Author of the Diſpenſation. Well; *Revelation* hath drawn this veil, and ſo, removed the darkneſs which obſtructed our attaining an *adequate* idea of the *moral* attributes. Shall we yet ſtand out? And, when we are brought

[y] Vol. v. p. 532.

hither

hither upon his Lordſhip's own principles, ſtill withhold our aſſent? Undoubtedly you muſt. Beware, (ſays he) of a pretended Revelation. Why ſo? "Be-"cauſe the Religion of nature is perfect and abſo-"lute: and therefore Revelation can teach nothing "but what Religion hath already taught [z]." Strange; Why, *Revelation* teaches thoſe *moral* attributes! which you, my Lord, own, *natural Religion* does not teach——Here we ſtick.

"Dic aliquem ſodes, dic, Quintiliane, colorem:
"Hæremus——

And here, we are like to ſtick. His Lordſhip leaves us in a Riddle. Will you have the ſolution? It is fooliſh enough; as the ſolution of ſuch kind of things generally are. But if the Reader hath kept his good humour, which, I confeſs is difficult amidſt all theſe provocations of impiety, it is enough to make him laugh. I ſaid before, that his Lordſhip borrowed all his reaſoning againſt Revelation, from ſuch as Tindal, Toland, Collins, Chubb, and Morgan. This ſolemn argument particularly, of the PERFECTION OF NATURAL RELIGION, and the ſuperſeded uſe of Revelation, he delivers to us juſt as he found it in Tindal. Now Tindal, who pretended to hold that natural Religion taught both the *moral attributes* and a *future ſtate*, had ſome pretence for ſaying that *it was perfect and abſolute*. But what pretence has his Lordſhip to ſay it after him, who holds that natural Religion taught neither one nor the other? The truth is, he refuſed no arms againſt REVELATION; and the too eager purſuit of this his old enemy thro' thick and thin has led him into many of theſe ſcrapes.

To ſee his Lordſhip uſe TINDAL'S ARGUMENTS *againſt Revelation, and for the perfection of Natural*

[z] Vol. v. p. 544.

Reli-

Religion, along with his own PRINCIPLES of *no moral attributes* and *no future State*, muſt needs give the Reader a very uncommon idea of his abilities: for the firſt of theſe principles makes one entire abſurdity of all he borrows from Tindal againſt Revelation; and the ſecond takes away the very pretence for *perfection* in natural Religion.

His Lordſhip's friend, *Swift*, has ſomewhere or other obſerved, that no ſubject in all Literature but Religion could have advanced TOLAND and ASGILL into the claſs of reputable Authors. Another of his friends ſeems to think that no ſubject but Religion could have ſunk his Lordſhip ſo far below it: IF EVER LORD BOLINGBROKE TRIFLES, (ſays *Pope*) IT WILL BE WHEN HE WRITES ON DIVINITY[a]. But ſuch is the fate of Authors, when they chuſe to write upon ſubjects for which they were not qualified either by *nature* or *grace*. For it is with Authors as with Men: Who can gueſs *which Veſſel was made for honour, and which for diſhonour?* when ſometimes, one and the ſame is made for both. Even this choice Piece of the FIRST PHILOSOPHY, his Lordſhip's ſacred pages, is ready to be put to very different uſes, according to the different tempers in which they have found his few Admirers on the one ſide, and the Public on the other; like the china Utenſil in the DUNCIAD, which one Hero uſed for a p—pot, and another carried home for his Head-piece.

[a] *Pope's Works*, Vol. IX. Letter XIV.

The END of the FIRST VOLUME.



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